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UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS

**The Road to Cypriot Independence. A Study of the Factors which
brought about the Zurich-London Agreement.**

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
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Spyros Litsas

Durham, September 2000



19 SEP 2001



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Durham
September 2000

ABBREVIATIONS

- AKEL:** Reform Party of the Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού)
- BBC:** British Broadcasting Corporation.
- EDA:** Unified Democratic Left (Ενωμένη Δημοκρατική Αριστερά).
- EKK:** Labour Cypriot Party (Εργατικό Κυπριακό Κόμμα).
- ERE:** National Radical Union (Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση).
- EOKA:** National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών).
- KATAK:** Association of the Turkish Cypriot Minority (Kibris Adasi Turk Azinligi Kuruma).
- KEK:** Cypriot National Party (Κυπριακό Εθνικό Κόμμα).
- KF:** Liberal Party (Κόμμα Φιλελευθέρων).
- KKE:** Greek Communist Party (Ελληνικό Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα).
- KKK:** Cypriot Communist Party (Κυπριακό Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα).
- NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- OXEN:** Orthodox Christian Union of Youth (Ορθόδοξη Χριστιανική Ένωση Νέων)
- PADE:** Progressive Agricultural Democratic Union (Προοδευτική Αγροτική Δημοκρατική Ένωση).
- PEK:** Panagrarian Union of Cyprus (Παναγροτική Ένωση Κυπρίων).
- PEO:** Pancyprian Federation of Labour (Πανκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία).
- PEON:** Pancyprian National Youth Organization (Πανκυπριακή Εθνική Οργάνωση Νέων).
- PESP:** Pancyprian Greek Socialist Vanguard (Πανκυπριακό Ελληνικό Σοσιαλιστικό Μέτωπο).
- PTUC:** Pancyprian Trade Union Committee (Πανκυπριακή Συνδικαλιστική Επιτροπή).
- SEK:** Cypriot Worker Confederation (Κυπριακή Εργατική Συνομοσπονδία).
- UK:** United Kingdom.
- UN:** United Nations.
- USA:** United States of America (Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες Αμερικής).
- USSR:** Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.
- X-KEA:** X-Party of National Resistance (X-Κόμμα Εθνικής Αντίστασης).

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The Athenians to the Melians
416-5 BC:

"As for us, even assuming that our empire does come to an end, we are not despondent about what would happen next. One is not so much frightened of being conquered by a power which rules over others, as Sparta does (not that we are concerned with Sparta now), as of what would happen if a ruling power is attacked and defeated by its own subjects. So far as this point is concerned, you can leave it to us to face the risks involved. What we shall do now is to show you that it is for the good of our own empire that we are here and it is for the preservation of your city that we shall say what we are going to say. We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves.
Thucydides, V:9 .

Life is a combination of moments and details, different for every individual. My life, in a mysterious and appealing way, was always strongly linked with Cyprus, even if the roots of my family tree have never reached the fertile grounds of Aphrodite's island. Fate brought my parents together in a classical concert dedicated to the Enosis cause, therefore quite frequently my father used to say to me that I have Vivaldi's passion and the irrationality of the Nationalist slogans of that era to thank for my existence. When Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974, I was only 19 days old, and though still innocent of the political complexities of the Greco-Turkish relations, I played a decisive role in determining the fate of my family. A law of the ruling Greek military junta exempted every father with an infant less than 30 days old from military duties in case of war. Therefore, my father was not called to go to Cyprus, unlike his two brothers who were both killed serving their country. I was named after one of them, and I can



still recall that the only story able to put me in bed during my early childhood was about the day that my two uncles left for the Cypriot front. Nevertheless, that was long ago. Cyprus, for me, was just another topic for lively discussions with my friends during my undergraduate years, and empty philosophical debates concerning the nature of the Cypriot question and possible solutions, until I saw a live television coverage of a Greek Cypriot, of my age, climbing the flagstaff of a Turkish Cypriot check-point, aiming to lower the Turkish flag. This young man was killed instantly by Turkish Cypriot bullets. At that moment, four years ago, I realized that there are still people who are ready to sacrifice themselves for an island that has sought peace of mind since the dawn of history.

This is neither a study of British foreign policy in Cyprus nor of the Enosis¹ movement, but of a combination of the above factors, aiming to examine the reasons that led to the Zurich-London agreement and signalled the end of colonisation and the defeat of the Enosis movement in Cyprus. This task will be accomplished by examining the diplomatic history of that time, both in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, interviewing key actors, and researching diplomatic archives and relevant secondary sources. I will provide more specific details concerning the methodology of this thesis in due course.

The end of the Cold War caused considerable changes in the geostrategic equilibrium of the globe. History, religion, cultures, people; they are relevant again breaking free from the repetitious ideological and economic confrontation of the two superpowers that transformed the world into two opposed camps. Globalization is the new trend, and the Internet [sic] is the vehicle that eradicates national frontiers and cultural barriers.

According to the spirit of the time, all the burdens of the past must be left out from the new chapter of our race, including the political ones that caused such considerable pain and grief to millions of our co-travellers in the labyrinth of history. Politicians, old enemies in the game of dominance, share the same table, and the people, obedient pawns in the game of self-destruction, are shaking their hands and re-evaluating their mistakes. Cyprus, the cradle of the goddess of beauty Aphrodite, could not escape the order of the time. A new wind of hope is blowing above the island of the Eastern Mediterranean, a fresh breeze that takes away the echo from the voice of the ghosts of the past and creates new expectations for re-conciliation and peaceful co-existence.

¹ Enosis: Unification in Greek. The Enosis movement, as it will be presented in this thesis, was the Greek Cypriot policy since 1878 that demanded the unification of Cyprus with continental Greece. During this thesis I will make use of the Greek word, since it is widely used by Western academics in such a great extent that it seized a place in the Western political vocabulary.

The tourist who visits Cyprus will be amazed by the natural beauties of the island and by the kindness and hospitality of its people. However, if he searches a little bit deeper, he will soon realize that the island is sick and that all the “doctors” that tried to prevent the inevitable simply failed. The island has a malignant tumor in its lungs, a fatal disease that threatens the very existence of Cyprus. As the tourist enters the old section of Nicosia, he will be able to admire the neo-classic architecture of the houses with the big balconies, and the narrow streets that form a pleasant labyrinth in the heart of this aged city. Suddenly, though, the tourist will realize that Nicosia is not like any other city that he may have visited before, that the picturesque labyrinth of the old section of the city suddenly ends and that soldiers and blockades prevent the continuation of his relaxing walk among buildings and memories of another era. The reason for the unpleasant halt is because the tourist will have arrived at the end, not of the island, but of the Cypriot Republic. Naturally, curiosity will prevail over anger and disappointment, and he will come closer to the barricades. The soldiers will smile at him and they will ask if he wants to climb a ladder to the top level of the barricades, in order to see the rest of the city through the specially designed binoculars. If the tourist accepts that tempting offer, he will soon find himself looking to the other section of the city: he will notice that there are soldiers there as well, but with different helmets, and he will probably hear the voice of a young officer saying to him that this is the neighborhood in which his father was raised but he can not visit it because now the Turkish Cypriots are holding it. From the top level of the barricades the tourist would observe the capital of the so-called Turkish Cypriot Republic of Northern Cyprus, the other half of Nicosia, a no-go area for almost every visitor.²

It is a great mystery how such a small territory as Cyprus has given rise to such pain and blood through the centuries: how such a beautiful island can arouse the most destructive instincts of the human being. Nevertheless, on 20 July 1974, five days after the overthrow of Makarios by the Athenian junta and the establishment of a puppet-regime under the leadership of the Greek Cypriot Nikos Samson, Turkey invaded Cyprus, and by August had occupied 40% of the island and turned 200,000 Greek Cypriots into homeless refugees. This resulted in the partition of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot state in the South and a Turkish Cypriot regime in the North, not recognized by any state of the world except Turkey. Since then, hundreds of thousands of pages have been dedicated to Cyprus, putting the island of the Eastern Mediterranean in the central

² The Republic of Cyprus forbids entrance to everyone that has visited the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and whose passport has a stamp of the Turkish Cypriot regime.

focus of the academic world. Historians, International Relations theorists, economists and world-known reporters tried to analyse the past of the island, drew conclusions about the Turkish invasion in 1974, and attempted to predict, within the methodological framework of science, the future of the island. So what is the aim of this particular study, and is it possible to find a space for itself among the vast bibliography concerning Cyprus?

This thesis will cover the period from the end of the Second World War until the Zurich-London agreement. It does not aim to serve either the British historiography, or the Greek one. My final aim is to link the two above sections with this study, to draw common conclusions for both countries, and create a common and accessible base of knowledge concerning the Cypriot question for the future generations of Britain and Greece. In addition, this study is not aiming to efface all the previous written works concerning the Cypriot question and re-write history from the beginning. However, it will seek to keep a critical eye, attempting to clarify every dark corner of that period, and to introduce new facts and pieces of evidence that will complete the gigantic puzzle of the Cypriot question. The main question that I will seek to address and answer is: What were the factors that brought about the Zurich-London agreement and signalled the end of the Enosis movement in Cyprus? In other words, what was the contribution of the internal and external factors of the Cypriot question towards its final outcome? This question will apply to every chapter of this thesis and I will attempt to analyse with a great detail the positive or negative influence of the Enosis movement towards the Cypriot question.³ Nevertheless, this is not going to be the only question that this thesis will seek to answer. Every chapter will set a series of questions that will be linked with the aforementioned one, directly or indirectly.

In this paragraph I intend to give a short summary of every chapter of this thesis, as well as the questions that each chapter will seek to answer. Chapter II will introduce the reader to the historic past of the island, investigate the diplomatic background which led to the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878 over Cyprus' fate, and will also review the reactions of the Cypriot population towards the British establishment from 1878 until

³ It is important to note here the methodological mistake that Greek and Western Europeans commonly commit in discussing the Enosis movement. It is quite common to identify EOKA with the Enosis movement in Cyprus. However, this constitutes a methodological inaccuracy. The Enosis movement dates back to 1878, while EOKA appeared in the Cypriot political spectrum in 1955. EOKA was the military wing of the Enosis movement. To suggest that it exclusively represented the anti-colonial movement in Cyprus is like suggesting that ELAS (National People's Liberation Army) exclusively represented the Greek resistance movement during the Axis occupation in Greece - ELAS was the military wing of EAM (National Liberation Front), or that IRA (Irish Republican Army) exclusively represents the anti-British front in Northern Ireland (IRA is the military wing of Sinn Féin).

the end of the 1930s. However, the main task of this chapter will be to identify the birth of Nationalism in Cyprus, and analyse the main reasons for the occurrence of this development. The main question that this chapter will seek to answer is: To what extent has the British administration encouraged and legitimized the national division of the Greek and the Turkish communities inside the Cypriot framework, and for what purpose? Chapter III will cover the period from the early days of the Second World War until the Plebiscite of January 1950, and the first Greek Cypriot attempt to internationalize the Cypriot question. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: From which perspective did the British establishment embrace and encourage the formation of AKEL? What was the main result that derived from the formation of AKEL, for the Cypriot political framework? Why did the post-Second World War modus vivendi influence the modification of British colonial policy in Cyprus? To what extent has the Greek Civil War influenced the official line of Athens towards the Enosis demands of the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy? What were the main reasons for the collapse of the Consultative Assembly of 1948 and what was its impact on the political developments in Cyprus? Chapter IV will cover the period from the appearance of Makarios III as a decisive factor in Cypriot affairs to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept-Dec 1954). This chapter will be divided in two equal parts. The first part will examine Makarios' entry in the Cypriot political arena as the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of the island, his plans for the re-organization of the Greek Cypriot community according to the demands of the Enosis movement and his methods towards the internationalization of the Cypriot question. Additionally, the first part of this chapter will review the diplomatic situation between Greece and Britain over the Cypriot issue, as well as the geostrategic and political developments that occurred during that time for the aforementioned countries and influenced their approaches to the Cypriot question. The main question that the first part will answer is: Under which circumstances and under the influence of which factors did the Cypriot question become an international issue of the United Nations? Secondary questions that will be answered are: How can the initially negative attitude of the Greek government, towards Makarios' demands to take the Cypriot question to the United Nations, be justified in accordance with the diplomatic aims of Athens during that time? Why did Britain decide to turn down the Greek proposals for bipartite negotiations over Cyprus? To what extent did the Suez Treaty influence the British line towards the Cypriot question? The second part of this chapter will be a detailed analysis of the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United concerning the

Greek appeal for Cyprus. The legal and diplomatic arguments of Britain, Greece and Turkey will be presented and examined, while an overall evaluation of the Ninth Assembly will be presented for all three countries. The questions that the second part will answer are: What are the theoretical complications of the terms self-government and self-determination within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations? What were the legal obligations that derived from the Lausanne Treaty for Britain, Greece, and Turkey concerning Cyprus? How can the role of the United States concerning the final outcome of the Greek appeal in the United Nations be justified within the geostrategic framework of the Cold War? Which factors influenced Athens to apply to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and was that a positive or negative decision? Chapter V will review the appearance of the Greek Cypriot guerilla group, EOKA, in Cyprus. The aim of this chapter will be to contribute to the above analysis by adding new evidence for EOKA, that will shed light on the dark corners of that period. This chapter will approach the process of EOKA's formation, covering the period from EOKA's first action until the beginning of the Tripartite Conference in London, on July 1955. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Why was EOKA's formation a negative development for the Enosis movement and for the inter-communal unity of the island? Why did the British side not protect peace and order in Cyprus by arresting Grivas and preventing the formation of EOKA? What were the geostrategic gains for London in allowing Grivas and EOKA to establish themselves in the Cypriot political arena and, most importantly in the Greek Cypriot mentality? Chapter VI will examine the so-called Tripartite Conference in London, (29 August–7 September 1955), and its diplomatic results concerning the Cypriot question. Additionally, it will evaluate the influence of the Conference upon the diplomatic relations of Britain, Greece and Turkey. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: What was the extent of the American influence on the Tripartite Conference? How can the Greek acceptance of the British invitation in London be justified? To what extent has the evacuation of the British military base from Suez and the protection of the Middle East oil resources influenced British policy towards the Cypriot question? What were the main reasons for the failure of the Tripartite Conference? What were the main factors that influenced Turkish policy concerning Cyprus? Chapter VII will review the period from the direct diplomatic negotiations between the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios and the governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, until Makarios' arrest and exile in Seychelles, on 9 March 1956. Through the chapter a detailed analysis of the talks will be presented,

examining the diplomatic arguments of the two sides, as well as their intentions concerning the fate of the Cypriot question, and the internal and external political developments that resulted in Makarios' arrest and exile. The main task of this chapter is to evaluate Harding's constitutional proposals and assess the reasons for the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept them. Secondary questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: How was the decision of Athens to appeal again to the UN justified within the framework of Greece's internal situation during that time? Why did the American position towards Harding's proposals change? What were the main reasons that influenced London to order Makarios' arrest and exile? Chapter VIII will examine the constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe concerning the Cypriot question, and their final outcome. It will analyse the diplomatic background that led to Lord Radcliffe's dispatch to Cyprus and the constitutional proposals of the British side. It will also present the political and diplomatic situation in the Middle East during that time, and will attempt to link it with the internal developments in Cyprus. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the outcome of Lord Radcliffe's proposals for the course of the Cypriot question. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Was London truly motivated to resolve the Cypriot crisis by sending Lord Radcliffe to the island? Why did Athens decide to turn down Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals? Secondary questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Why did London turn down Averof's proposals concerning the Cypriot question? What was the Greek role during the Suez crisis and how did this influence the British attitude towards the Cypriot question? Why was the idea of partition negative for the peace and unity of Cyprus? Chapter IX will examine the period from Makarios' liberation from Seychelles to the introduction of Foot's and Macmillan's proposals, concerning the finding of a solution to the Cypriot question. It will present the diplomatic background of Makarios' liberation from the place of his exile, attempting to analyse the reasons that forced London to modify its policy towards Makarios' isolation from the Cypriot political arena. In addition, this chapter will consider Foot's and Macmillan's plans concerning the Cypriot question, by evaluating their context, as well as their final outcome and influence on the internal political scene of Cyprus. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: How can the researcher evaluate Foot's-Macmillan's plan concerning the Cypriot question? How can Athens' attitude towards Foot's proposals be justified? Under what circumstances did London decide to present Macmillan's proposals concerning the Cypriot question? Secondary questions that will be presented in this chapter are: Under what circumstances did London decide on Makarios' release

from Seychelles? Why did the US support the Greek initiative that resulted in Makarios' release? What was the political significance of Harding's replacement by Foot in Cyprus? Chapter X will examine the period from the announcement of Makarios' plan concerning the independence of Cyprus until the final agreement of all the involved sides, embodied in the Zurich-London agreement. This chapter will analyse the diplomatic background of the complicated negotiations concerning the future of Cyprus, and will examine the final outcome of the Zurich-London agreement by assessing its context. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: What was the diplomatic importance of Makarios' proposal concerning an independent Cyprus? What were the reasons that persuaded both Athens and Ankara to come to negotiations concerning the Cypriot question? What were the reasons that made Makarios reluctant to recognize the Zurich-London agreement and how were those hesitations bypassed? What was the Zurich-London agreement? Chapter XI will be the concluding chapter of this thesis. It will seek to assess the contribution of internal and external factors which influenced the Cypriot question, in order to answer the main question of this thesis: What were the factors that brought about the Zurich-London agreement and signalled the end of the Enosis movement in Cyprus? In addition, this chapter will assess the importance of the Zurich-London agreement and will answer the following questions: Which side benefited the most from the Zurich-London agreement? Did the Zurich-London agreement have the capacity to last permanently?

There are a number of possible methodological approaches towards an explanation of the Cyprus question and its solution. A theoretical approach, for example, could seek to place this question in a structural context and explain the course of diplomacy and negotiation within the framework of realism. Alternatively, a colligation would trace the long sequence of events leading to the de-colonisation process, which in turn explains the British willingness to relinquish control over the island.

However, neither of these approaches would be appropriate for this particular enquiry. It is concerned with a unique event, that is the achievement of a particular settlement the Zurich-London agreement through a process of negotiation and the conciliation (and manipulation) of the contending parties. It is true that that while unique it shares many of the characteristics of post-colonial conflict and ethnic divisions. An attempt has been made to place the Cyprus question within this context. It is not, however, a case study, nor is this question treated as explicable within a colligatory sequence of changes. It is contended that individuals are central to an explanation and that decision and action should be related to the reasoning of the main

actors. The methodology of this thesis is based on an analysis which is historical but in a particular sense. It seeks to establish the interplay of circumstances and reasons from the point of view of the actor. Evidence of this reasoning and the interpretation of primary sources together with interviews are central to the thesis.

This points to interpretation as the basic form of explanation and its truth conditions depend on the evidence. Clearly there may be a variety of interpretations based on the same evidence but the best interpretation is one which fits the evidence most closely and does not substitute opinion for it. The process by which the Zurich- London agreement was achieved is a contingent one and dependent on changing assessments as well as circumstances. This thesis seeks to explain why perceptions changed and the ultimate compromise was achieved.

Despite the vast bibliography that already exists concerning the Cypriot question, still, I faced notable difficulties in collecting all the necessary sources. One of the main problems was the fact that my knowledge concerning the Turkish language is limited. Therefore, it was impossible to search the Turkish archives or even to read a selected bibliography of secondary sources in Turkish. Nevertheless, my lack of knowledge concerning the Turkish language does not decrease the academic validity of this study. Whenever it was necessary to identify various elements of the Turkish foreign policy concerning Cyprus I made use of either British and American primary sources, or Turkish secondary sources translated to English. In addition, my poor knowledge of the Turkish language was balanced by my detailed understanding of Ottoman and Turkish history, and in particular the Greco-Turkish relations from 19th century until this day. Another great problem for the writing of this thesis was the considerable lack of Greek primary sources. According to a law issued immediately after the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974, all the significant documents of the state, especially those about the Greek Foreign relations and policies, are inaccessible to the public for 50 years. However, I overcame this obstacle by interviewing key figures of the Greek political world and by making an extending use of memoirs and diaries. Throughout this thesis, I made use of British and American primary sources such as the House of Commons Debates and the Foreign Relations of the United States, in an attempt not to introduce but to establish accessible British and American primary sources as a part of the Greek historiography as well. On the other hand, it was a great pleasure for me to introduce for the first time in the British historiography three memoirs of great

importance, K. Karamanlis' memoirs and E. Averof-Tositsas'⁴, the legacies of two of the most important politicians of Greece in the 20th century, and N Kranidiotis', Makarios' closest associate and one of the most important Greek Cypriots of his generation. In addition, a great number of secondary sources will be presented in this thesis, both British and Greek, linking this thesis with previous attempts to examine the Cypriot question of Enosis.

The structure of this study is a historic narration, with the eleven chapters arranged in a chronological order, the sections of each chapter represents thematic and analytical approaches of the facts and the incidents that led to the Zurich-London agreement. This was a conscious choice made for a number of reasons. Revisionist scholars accuse their traditionalist colleagues of inadequate theoretical basis, only to receive the counter-charge that revisionists lack academic solidity.⁵ This study attempts to cut across these mutual recriminations by way of employing what is good in both schools, whilst avoiding their more obvious failings. On the other hand, this study, in so far as it can lay any claim to a theoretical basis, has been supplemented by the consultation of virtually all sources pertinent to the subject. It is hoped that this will assist in eschewing deterministic interpretations and tackling the most unwelcome difficulty besetting the study of recent and controversial historical phenomena. However, most of all this study has the aim to separate, through the historical analysis, the analytical "*what happened and why*", from the emotive and judgmental "*who was right and who was wrong*". Machiavelli instructed Rafaello Girolami that:

*"...occasionally words must serve to veil the facts. But this must happen in such a way that no one becomes aware of it; or, if it should be noticed, excuses must be at hand, to be produced immediately."*⁶

Ultimately, everything depends on whether one can defy these instructions.

⁴ E. Averof-Tositsas' memoirs were published in the United States under the title Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question 1950-1963, (New York, 1986). The American edition, however, is more a selection than a full publication of Tositsas' memoirs, excluding large parts of the original document. The American edition is based mainly on what the author had to say about the American involvement in the Cypriot question, therefore during this thesis I made use of the original Greek text.

⁵ See: R.J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, (Princeton, 1973) and W.F. Kimball, The Cold War warmed over, (American Historical Review, 1974), vol. 79, p.p. 1119-36.

⁶ Quoted by A. Kosteler, Darkness at Noon, (London, 1987), p. 135.

CHAPTER II

CYPRUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES: FROM THE ACHEAN SETTLERS TO THE BRITISH LION.

The Athenians to the Melians

*"The standard of justice depends
on the equality of power to compel
and... the strong do what they have
the power to do and the weak
accept what they have to accept."
Thucydides, V:89.*

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the foundations for the rest of this thesis. It will attempt to introduce the reader to the historic perplexities of Cyprus by investigating the diplomatic background which led to the Anglo-Turkish agreement over the fate of the island, and the first period of British rule in the island. It will also review the reactions of the Cypriot population towards this. However, the main interests of this chapter are: to identify the birth of Nationalism in the Cypriot framework; to examine the main reasons for the occurrence of this development; and, in an attempt to separate history from national propaganda, to answer the question: To what extent has the British administration encouraged and legitimized the national division of the two communities inside the Cypriot framework and for what purpose?

Cyprus lies in the Northeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea with an area of 9,251 square kilometers. It played a vital role in the geo-strategic equilibrium of the region during the early days of the Cold War as a bulwark against Soviet penetration in the Middle East. Cyprus, after 1954, became the new home for MI6's regional base, controlling MI6 stations at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Amman, Jeddah, Baghdad, Tehran, Basra, Damascus, Cairo and Port Said, while the British air bases in the island could be used as

the nucleus of Western defence in case of a Soviet invasion in the Middle East.¹ Geographically, it belongs to the Asian continent. Its distance from the Minor Asia coast is 43 miles (Cape of Kormakiti-Amamur), and from the Syrian coast, 76 miles. It is 255 miles from Egypt (Larnaca's port- Port Said), and 200 miles from Crete.² Since the dawn of history the island's rich deposits of copper and timber attracted settlers and invaders from neighbouring areas. According to archaeological records the first settlers in Cyprus were the Achaeans, coming from Pelloponesos at the beginning of the 12th century BC after the fall of Troy. At the end of the 8th century the victorious campaigns of Saragon II, King of Assyria, brought Cyprus within his control. In 583 BC, the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus the Elder, established his rule in the island, while in 478 BC, the Greek allied fleet, under Pausanias' command, restored Cyprus to the free Greek world. During the reign of Alexander the Great Cyprus became an important naval base of the Macedonian Empire, and in 58 BC, the island had been incorporated in the Roman Empire as a part of the province of Cilicia under the proconsul Cornelius Lentulus Spinther. In 395 AD, Cyprus became part of the Byzantine Empire. In 1191, the English King, Richard Coeur-de-Lion, captured the island but in 1192 he sold it to the Latin dynasty of the House of Lusignan at the price of 100,000 gold Byzantine besants. In 1489, the Venetian Republic annexed the island and in 1571 the Ottoman Muzzafer Pasha captured Nicosia, bringing Cyprus under Ottoman control.³

The capture of Nicosia by Muzzafer Pasha signalled the end of a long period of Frank and Venetian presence in Cyprus. A detailed research of the new social and political facts that the new rulers of Cyprus introduced, in an attempt to remove the already established socio-economic feudal system from the Cypriot mentality, is of great importance in order to understand and analyse the appearance and development of Nationalism in Cyprus. The Ottoman Empire had been organized in self-governed religious communities (Milletts), under the leadership of the clerical hierarchy. This particular system offered Ottoman subjects a relatively high amount of religious and cultural freedom, while it accepted the presence, inside the Ottoman framework, of different nationalities. The principal element of unity inside the Milletts was religion.

¹ For more concerning MI6 presence in the island see: N. West, *The Friends*, (London, 1988), p. 70. For more concerning the role of the airfields of Cyprus in the case of a Soviet invasion in the Middle East see: B. O'Malley & I. Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, (London, 1999), p.p. 6-7.

² *Great Greek Encyclopaedia*, (Athens, 1961), vol. IV, p. 405.

National identity took a secondary role, with insignificant influence, and was mainly adopted by the Ottoman state for the accomplishment of communal unity and disciplined administrative function.⁴ The above model of governing was introduced in Cyprus, as well. The island that for so many centuries witnessed a great number of invasions and settlements, by various national, racial, and religious groups, was divided in two Millets: The Muslim and the Christian/Orthodox (Rum Millet).⁵ The Ottoman administrative system influenced the sociological orientation of the island. Under the Ottomans the Cypriot society had its bases in the terms "family" and "village". Outside the theoretical framework of those two terms, any other identification was valid according to religion. This can be easily identified by the official and unofficial censuses of that period, which classified the population according to religious beliefs, without even the vaguest reference to terms of national division.⁶ The two Millets, during the early period of the Ottoman era in Cyprus, passed through stages of peaceful co-existence and conflict, aiming not to question the Ottoman rule with the adoption of a national revolt, but to improve their socio-economic standards.⁷ In terms of social class, the two Millets were not internally homogeneous, which created explosive conditions and class animosity between members of the same religious group. The equal amount, in a proportional base, of Muslims and Christians in every class category, from the landless farmers to the Cypriot aristocracy, resulted in common class efforts to secure or to protect social rights. Class issues lay behind every revolt in Cyprus during that time⁸ and the notion of national identity was a vague terminology with no valid importance inside the Ottoman framework.

The Ottoman system of Millet functioned with no special problems till the end of the 18th century, when the religious differences of the Ottoman subjects began to adopt a nationalist character. The pioneers of this development were members of the elite Greek-speaking community of the Ottoman empire, who became the leading elements

³ For more concerning the early Cypriot history see: Sir G. Hill, A History of Cyprus, (Cambridge, 1940, 1948), vol. I-III, A. Agelides, Cyprus: A Chronograph of Pillage and Struggle from the Ancient Times until the Invasion, (Athens, 1996).

⁴ K. Karpas, Ethnicity and Community and the Rise of Modern Nations in the Ottoman State, in (Actes du II Congress International des Etudes du Sud-Est Europeen), (Athens, 1978), vol. II, p. 115.

⁵ D. Alastos, Cyprus in History. A Survey of 5,000 Years, (London, 1976), p. 262.

⁶ T. Papadopoulos, Social and Historical Data on Population, 1570-1881, (Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 1965), p. 6.

⁷ H. Luke, A Portrait of Appreciation, (London, 1965), p. 79.

⁸ For common revolts of Muslim and Christian villagers against their co-religious landowners and the clergy, and the continuous revolts of the Cypriot aristocracy against the Sultan in Constantinople see: H.D. Purcell, Cyprus, (New York, 1989), pp.189-192.

of the Ottoman merchant class by exploiting the religious, political, and economic tolerance of the Sublime Porte. The Greek-speaking population had managed to secure a greater deal of autonomous administration from the Sultan than other Balkan peoples, such as the Serbs or the Bulgarians. This gave them the opportunity to develop a strong common link and to ascend the Ottoman social scale, which led them to become the key figures of the naval trade and diplomacy inside the Ottoman framework. As A. Vakalopoulos, the notable Greek historian, once stated:

“The Greeks were the main reason for the establishment of capitalism as an economic model in the unenlightened Ottoman Empire”⁹

while the distinguished academic B. Lewis supports the view that in the late seventeenth century the Phanariot Greeks, thanks to their monopoly of the knowledge of Western languages, managed to be the only official interpreters of the Ottoman state in dealing with foreign embassies.¹⁰

The economic influence of those people was notable. However, their political influence was insignificant and limited, due to the administration system of Millet. Therefore, they tried to emphasize the religious, cultural and linguistic similarities that they had with other Ottoman citizens, in order to create and develop a national movement. The main explanation for the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman framework can be found in the revolutionary preaching of the French Revolution for the need of the adoption of a class, as well as a national identity; the American Revolution; and the failure of the Ottoman administrative system to deal successfully with corruption and social inequality in the vast setting of the Empire.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Greek War of Independence in 1821, the expression of the need for the adoption of a national identity by the Greek-speaking Ottoman community, managed to liberate only an insignificant part of the historic Greek area. The Greece that emerged from the revolt was a truncated state of some 800,000 inhabitants, while 2.4 million Greek-speaking people remained under Ottoman rule. This was a virtual guarantee that Greek foreign policy would be irredentist. The result of the “non-completed” revolution was the expression of national

⁹ Quoted by G. Castellan, *Historie des Balkans*, (Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1991), p. 360.

¹⁰ B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London, 1967), p. 62.

¹¹ For more concerning the origins of the Greek War of Independence see: N. Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*, (New York, 1972), pp. 214-48. See also M. Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, (London, 1999), pp. 22-39.

bitterness through the adoption of Nationalism and its spiritual product, the Great Idea. The main aim of the Great Idea was the restoration of the Byzantine (Greek Orthodox) Empire from Anatolia to Corfu, and from Cyprus to the northern frontiers of Macedonia. The Greek national idea appeared for the first time in Cyprus when the Christian population of the island tried to assist the revolutionary attempts of their co-religious brothers in continental Greece. The Ottomans tried with an immediate and violent response to discourage the Christian population from transferring the revolutionary climate of continental Greece into the Cypriot framework. Therefore, on 9/21 July 1821 the Christian population of Cyprus experienced the notorious Ottoman method of containment. An extended description of those days is given by the prominent French intellectual and painter, Lacroix.

"...Kuchuk Mehmed persists in inventing a plot, persuades the Grand Vezir of its reality: he, being perhaps a party to the stratagem, allows the Governor to make an example by the severe punishment of the leaders (prominent members of the Greek Cypriot society). Free to act, Kuchuk Mehmed on July 9, 1821, orders the arrest of the Archbishop (Kyprianos) and the other three bishops. They were taken to the Serai, and were scarcely inside before they were murdered by the janissaries... The gates of the palace were open, and the bleeding corpses thrown into the square. This was signal for a general massacre. The convent of Phaneromene was at once occupied, and the priest strangled. I was told... that before killing them the Turks, with a wild refinement of vengeance, saddled the priests, as they would their horses, breaking their teeth to force the bits into their mouth, and making them caper under their spurs. The Greek houses were giving over to pillage, massacres began again in all the districts of the island, and confiscation followed massacre."¹²

Nevertheless, despite the decisiveness that the Ottomans demonstrated and the era of terror that followed for the Christians of Cyprus, the first base for the flourishing of nationalism inside the Cypriot framework was an unalterable fact. The Christians began

¹² Sir H. Luke, Cyprus under the Turks: 1571-1878, (London, 1969), pp. 131-32.

to see the Ottomans as national tyrants and turned their faces to the newly founded Greek state seeking protection and a place of reference with which to identify themselves.

After March 1829, when the Great Powers recognized the independence of the Greek State, riots began to challenge Turkish authority in Cyprus. The Ottoman Empire, after three centuries of glory and triumphs, began to collapse and the Greek Cypriots found the opportunity to demand the unification of the island with the newly founded Greek State. Nationalism was well established in the Greek Cypriot mentality, however, the strategic position that the island held in the Eastern Mediterranean made that unification unattainable. Instead, the fading of the red crescent in Cyprus attracted the interest of the Great Powers of the time, who were ready to duel for the inclusion of Cyprus in their opulent collection of colonies. Characteristically, S. N. Phrankoudes, the French consul in Cyprus, in his letter of 15 March 1831 to the French Ministry of War and Foreign Affairs is clearly stating that the Cypriots were all longing for their island to be taken by France, and his successors, from time to time, suggested that annexation by France “*would be a sovereign cure for the island's troubles.*”¹³ In 1845, there were rumors that Cyprus was to be ceded to Great Britain as compensation for having expelled the Egyptians from Syria and re-united the province to the Ottoman Empire. The proposal for annexing Cyprus, extremely popular among diplomatic circles in England, came to nothing owing to strong reactions from the rest of the Great Powers, but led Disraeli to declare in 1847 that “*the English want Cyprus and they will take it as compensation*” and “*the English will not do the business of the Turks again for nothing.*”¹⁴ Disraeli's words, as we will see later on, fixed the boundaries of British foreign policy concerning the British role and attitude towards the Cypriot question. In 1849 came Germany's turn to express her interest in Cyprus. Prince Chlodwig Von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, a German diplomat and (later on) Imperial Chancellor, had on 1 November 1848 been appointed Imperial administrator at the courts of Rome, Florence and Athens. Arriving in Athens in December, he was sent on a voyage in the Archipelago and the Levant in a British gunboat. During the cruise he visited Rhodes, Crete and Cyprus and in 18 January, 1849, in his official report, he wrote:

¹³ *Cypriot Chronicles*, (Larnaca, 1930), vol. VIII, pp. 126-27.

¹⁴ J. Headlam, W. Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History*, (London, 1930), pp. 203-07, see also D.E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention policy of 1878*, (Cambridge, 1934), Harvard Historical Studies, no. 38.

*"Germany should take advantage of the weakness of the Ottoman power to acquire these islands by peaceful means... and of the three I consider Cyprus best adapted for German colonization. A secret agent should be sent out at once to make a report on the geology; it would show that the Cyprus market would justify Germany in taking the necessary steps in the Porte"*¹⁵

France could not exclude herself from the diplomatic game, concerning Cyprus' fate. R.H, Lang in his article "Cyprus" in Macmillan's Magazine (1878) wrote:

"There can be no doubt that Napoleon III seriously thought of Cyprus and recognized it as an important observatory over the provinces of Turkey in Asia and Africa. Hence, the valuable researches of M.A Gaudry, made and published in extend for the Emperor, and hence the hope prematurely expressed by that distinguished traveler in a communication to the "Revue des Deux Mondes", many years ago that Cyprus would soon come under the beneficent influence of the French civilization."

Despite the secret diplomacy concerning the fate of Cyprus by all the major European powers of the time, the decisive step for the island towards its place in history was a revolutionary incident in the north Balkans. In early May 1876 the rising of comitadjis (Bulgarian nationalist guerillas) occurred in Bulgaria. As an answer the panicked Ottoman Empire let loose against the Bulgarian population the armed irregulars, known as Bashi-Bazaks, well known for their savageness and barbarity. Through May and June, the Ottoman irregulars committed appalling massacres, in which both sexes and all ages suffered. The murder of over 12,000 Christians, and the fact that no Turk was punished, aroused a storm of protest in Britain and France and the immediate diplomatic reaction of Russia.¹⁶ The Crimean War was not a distant memory for Russia, and since the Tsar regarded himself as the champion of all the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, a new war between Turkey and Russia, a clear threat to the sensitive balance of power in

¹⁵ *Cypriot Chronicles*, (Larnaca, 1932), vol. X, pp. 241-45.

¹⁶ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe, 1789-1914 : A Survey of Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge, 1937), p. 519.

the Mediterranean, seemed inevitable. Nevertheless, Britain made a last attempt towards peace. Therefore, during November 1876 Lord Derby, a prominent member of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister in 1825, proposed a European conference at Constantinople to impose reforms on the Turks, due to their attitude towards the Bulgarian population. The Conference opened on the 23rd of December and from the first moment proved to be a diplomatic parody. The Sultan and his advisers, relying upon the European differences and conflicting military interests, were determined not to yield to their demands. The European powers proposed a system of local self-government for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, a scheme which aimed at pacification in the Balkans and the moral satisfaction of Russia, and on the other hand to maintain the Ottoman Turkey as a decisive factor of stability in the Balkans, able to resist Russian expansionism. However, the Ottoman side rejected that proposal and declared that it was a disgraceful plan aiming to destroy Turkey, and proposed an alternative scheme of domestic reforms.¹⁷ The Ottoman side was convinced that once more Britain, for the sake of the Straits, would not allow Russia to declare war against her. However, this time the Ottomans were isolated. Tsar Alexander II was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Crimean War and fight the Ottoman Empire with the rest of the European Powers against him. Therefore, due to secret diplomacy, he succeeded in securing the benevolent neutrality of Austria-Hungary in a possible Russo-Turkish war by promising to agree to a future annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina inside the Austro-Hungarian framework. Britain, on the other hand, mainly because of the widespread anti-Turkish feeling back home and not wishing to incapacitate the already disturbed Holy Alliance, decided not to stand by the Turkish side yet. However, as a condition for her neutrality she proposed to Russia two conditions. The first was that Russia had to recognize Britain's policy in Suez and Egypt, and the second was that Russia was not allowed to attack Constantinople. The Conference failed in its mission to maintain peace and order and on April 24 1877, Russian troops crossed the European and Asiatic frontiers of Turkey. The fourth and last Russo-Turkish war of the century had started. As was expected the Russian advancement against Turkey was rapid, but no diplomat expected the arrival of the Tsarist army, on January 20 1878, in Adrianople. The capture of Adrianople put under considerable threat the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the city of the cities, Constantinople. A possible advancement of the

¹⁷ For more about the Constantinople Conference see: E. Anastasiou, The last phase of the Ottoman Empire, (Athens, 1969), pp. 210-34.

Russian troops to the City would have meant the immediate capture of the Straits and the extinction of the British plans, concerning their unquestionable superiority in the Mediterranean Sea. Since the early days of the 18th century the main aim of British foreign policy in the Mediterranean was to keep Russia isolated from it. A potential capture of the Straits by the Tsar would have meant not only the entrance of Russia in the region as a key factor, not only the challenge to the British naval trade supremacy, but also the evolution of a new threat, due to the geographical position of the Straits, to the so called *Jewel of the Empire*, India. The prospect of the Russian arrival in the Mediterranean and the British reaction split the Cabinet in London. A small team under Disraeli's influence supported the view that Britain should intervene in favour of the Ottomans. But the absolute majority declared their opposition to aiding the Sublime Porte and threatened to resign if they were overruled. The spirit among the British political circles and the seriousness of the situation during that time forced Queen Victoria to issue a memorandum on January 11, 1878, which was addressed to her Cabinet the following day.

“The state of the Eastern question has become most serious and events are following each other with such rapidity and developing such fearful proportions, that what was decided even two or three days ago seems no longer of much avail. The news of the surrender of the Turkish army at Shipka yesterday and of the intention not to defend Andrianople today show that Constantinople may be attacked very soon, and if there is a panic, not defended! We must therefore, stand by what we have always declared, that any advance on Constantinople would free us from our position of neutrality. Were these mere empty words? If so, England must abdicate her position and retire from having any longer any voice in the Councils of Europe and sink down to a third-rate power! But the Queen feels sure that there is not one amongst her Ministers who, whatever their individual feelings for Turkey and against war may be, would wish us not to support the honour and dignity of Great Britain...There is not a moment to be lost or the whole of our policy of centuries, of our

honour as a great European Power will have received an irreparable blow... ”¹⁸

Victoria's memorandum managed to re-unite the Conservative Cabinet, therefore the parliament was asked for and voted six millions pounds for armaments. Britain was not the only power that expressed her surprise and anxiety concerning the Russian victories. Austria-Hungary, expelled from the north of Italy in 1866, had looked since then upon the western half of the Balkan Peninsula as her sphere of influence. As mentioned above, the Emperor Francis Joseph had promised his neutrality during the war at his meeting with the Tsar at Reichstadt on July 8, 1876, on condition that the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be his reward. Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian side feared these conditions would not be kept by the victorious Russians, who in an analogous case would have been accused of betraying the case of the Slavs. The Austro-Hungarians decided to act rapidly, therefore while the ambassador in Constantinople reassured the Sultan that in the case of Russian troops arriving outside the gates of the Ottoman capital the Austro-Hungarian army would invade Russia, the ambassador in London declared the full support of his country towards the British plans of stopping the Russian aggression.¹⁹ Suddenly, Russia had to face an undesirable situation, finding herself isolated against the rest of the European Powers. The diplomatic pressure upon Tsar Alexander II and the remembrance of the Crimean war, led to the signature of a peace treaty between Russia and Turkey at San Stefano on March 8, 1878.²⁰ According to the treaty, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania obtained their independence, while a large part of Turkish Armenia, including Kars and Batum, was also assigned to Russia. The Treaty of San Stefano brought peace in the Balkans and Constantinople remained under Ottoman control, satisfying the Western plans. Russia, however, was the country that gained the most. The annexation of a large part of Armenia put Turkish security under a constant threat, since in a case of a new war the Russian troops could have been outside Constantinople's gates very shortly. Britain was alarmed by the new developments in the geostrategic arena, and the government was planning its answer. On March 27, Lord Derby wrote in his diary:

¹⁸ G. E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, (London, 1920), vol. VI, pp. 218-19.

¹⁹ E. Foteinopoulos, The Second Period of the Dark Years : The European Diplomacy in the 19th Century, (Thessaloniki, 1951), vol. II, p. 330.

²⁰ R. C. K. Ensor, England: 1870-1914, (Oxford, 1936), p. 48.

“ Cabinet at 12, sat only till 1; but the business done was important both nationally and to me in particular. Lord B. [Disraeli] addressed us in a set speech, to the effect that we must now decide our policy; that our objects have been the maintenance of the Empire, and of peace...that our attempts to be moderate and neutral have only lessened our influence, and caused our power not to be believed in...An emergency had arisen; every state must now look to its own resources; the balance of power in the Mediterranean was destroyed. He proposed to issue a proclamation declaring emergency, to put a force in the field, and simultaneously to send an expedition from India to occupy Cyprus and Scanderoon. Thus, the effect of the Armenian conquests would be neutralized, the influence of England in the Persian Gulf would be maintained and we should hold posts which are the key of Asia.”²¹

Disraeli knew that Russia was not in a state to fight another war at this time, and this was the decisive factor, which determined the British stance. In a case of war with Great Britain and a more than certain defeat, Russia would have had to withdraw from the Balkans and abandon the gains of San Stefano. Therefore, when the Indian troops began to arrive at Malta, before the end of May, the Tsarist government decided that she had no other choice than to sit at the negotiating table. The result of the diplomatic negotiations between Lord Salisbury and the Russian representative Count Schuvaloff was the Protocol of London (30 May, 1878) which put the Treaty of San Stefano under a general reconsideration and proposed the meeting of all the European Powers in Berlin for the final settlement of the diplomatic dispute between them and Russia.²² Britain, however, did not stop there. In order to face the new geostrategic balance of power in the Mediterranean, she searched for a new base of influence in the area. As seen, since the early days of the 19th century Cyprus had attracted British attention, thus in the background of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, Britain put pressure upon the Sultan to cede the island. In return Britain was determined to sign a defensive alliance with the

²¹ B. E. Buckle, op. cit., p. 266.

²² I. G. Katapodis, Four Centuries of Diplomatic Action in Europe: 1648–1959, (Athens, 1996), pp. 424 - 25.

Porte, which could guarantee Asiatic Turkey against a future Russian invasion. Earlier on May 5, B. Disraeli wrote to Queen Victoria analyzing the benefits of such an agreement.

*"If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte and England, at the same time, enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia."*²³

On May 23 he continued, trying to persuade his Queen of the validity of his plans:

*"No delay can be permitted in the negotiations with the Porte. We shall offer a guarantee, a British guarantee, of all the Asiatic provinces to Turkey and Rumelia in Europe, this or any portion of Turkey in Europe is not to be guaranteed. The result, if all be carried as planned, into effect will be that Turkey will still be an independent power with large possessions and resources. She will be as independent, and more powerful, than the Scandinavian Kingdoms, and now, under the protection of England, will be the most effective and indeed only possible barrier against an aggressive Russia."*²⁴

A definitive proposal in this sense was sent to the Sultan on May 24, but as this coincided with an abortive conspiracy against his life, which led to a series of ministerial changes, it was not until June 4 that Sir H. Layard, the British Ambassador at Porte, could obtain the Sultan's signature, concerning the Defensive Alliance between Britain and Turkey. The signature of the Alliance opened the road for the final settlement of the British demands about Cyprus. Nevertheless, while the Congress was in progress and during the secret negotiations about Cyprus, which lasted a month (13 June-13 July), the Sultan had second thoughts as to the surrender of the island to Britain.

²³ B. E. Buckle, op. cit., p. 291.

²⁴ B. E. Buckle, op. cit., pp. 293-94.

The Sultan's hesitation to hand Cyprus to Britain should be examined within the Ottoman social and political framework of the time. The constitutional unlimited and unquestionable power that the Sultan had held since the formation of the Ottoman State was now being challenged by a newly established social movement, the Young Ottomans. The nationalist principles that characterized the new movement and its increasing influence inside the wider framework of the Ottoman middle class, forced the Sultan to reconsider his decision relating to Cyprus, fearing a possible social uprising organized by the Young Ottomans.²⁵ However, the British side overcame those hesitations with a severe telegram, threatening the Sultan that they would support Bismarck's proposals that Thessaly, Epirus and Crete should be given to Greece if Turkey would not hand Cyprus to Britain.²⁶ Britain's counteraction resulted in the signature of a secret agreement, known as Cyprus Convention, on July 13 which fixed the terms for the abdication of Cyprus to Britain. Cyprus did not become a part of the British Empire at once. The island was rented to Britain at the annual price of 93,000 pounds, an arrangement which lasted until 1914, the beginning of the World War I.²⁷ The secret agreement between Britain and Turkey became known to the rest of the Great Powers towards the end of the Congress of Berlin. The news of the surrender of Cyprus had an impressive impact among the rest of the Great Powers, but France was the most alarmed of all. While France had strong economic interests in the Porte, as one of the main creditors of the Ottoman Empire, she had equally strong geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean as a naval power, and could not come to terms with the fact that the Cyprus Convention threatened to transform the Mediterranean Sea into a British lake. Nevertheless, a diplomatic crisis had been avoided by the British promise, through the Marquis of Salisbury to the French Foreign Minister Waddington, that in the event of a French occupation of Tunis Britain would remain silent.²⁸ The Congress of Berlin put an end to Russian expansion in the Balkan peninsula and to the Tsar's plans for the establishment of Russia in the Mediterranean Sea. It was a notable British diplomatic victory, since the Russian army had to evacuate the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire was saved and maintained its role as a bulwark against Russian aggression, and Britain strengthened her position in the Eastern Mediterranean by the cession of Cyprus. While

²⁵ For more concerning the appearance and influence of the Young Ottomans see: S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, (Princeton, 1962).

²⁶ H. Papageorgikos, The Role of Secret Diplomacy in the Geostrategic Transformation of the Mediterranean Nations, (Thessaloniki, 1981), p. 79.

²⁷ For more concerning the legal implications of the issue, concerning International Law see, L.F.L Oppenheim, International Law, (London, 1928), 4th ed., vol. I, p. 363.

the Russian bear returned home defeated, the British lion found a new kingdom over which to exercise its mighty rule.

During the afternoon of 4th July, the British Rear Admiral of the Channel Squadron, Lord J. Hay, received a classified telegram which instructed him to leave at once from the Cretan port of Suda and sail to Cyprus.²⁹ On July 10, Lord Hay landed in the port of Larnaca without facing any opposition from the local guard. The next day a British battleship sailed into Larnaca, carrying the British diplomat W. Baring and his Turkish counterpart Sami Efendi. The two diplomats presented the General Commander of Cyprus, Peshim Pasha, with the document, signed by the Sultan himself, that officially gave Britain the right to occupy the island. In this peaceful way, Cyprus passed under British rule and the Union Jack flew for the first time in Nicosia on July 14. Within five days the British flag hoisted in the two other major cities of the island, Larnaca and Famagusta, while on July 17, 400 Indian troops from Malta were disembarked at Larnaca.³⁰ The British arrival in Cyprus was welcomed by the majority of the Cypriot population. The Muslims saw the British arrival as an opportunity for economic prosperity and security, away from the corrupt Ottoman system. The Greek-Cypriots welcomed the British occupation as the final step to be taken towards the long desired unification of the island with Greece. The pro-Greek British attitude during the Greek War of Independence and the arrival of a Christian governor after centuries of Mohammedanism, convinced the Greek-Cypriots that the period of oppression and national humiliation had ended. The same attitude had been maintained by the Greek government in Athens. During the Congress of Berlin, Greek diplomats were convinced that Britain would demand Crete instead of Cyprus from Turkey. For that reason they welcomed the British arrival in Cyprus, expecting Britain to support their demands for unification of Crete with the metropolitan centre. In addition, the Greek side expected that the arrival of Britain in Cyprus would eventually lead to the cession of the island to Greece, as happened to the islands of the Ionian Sea with the Treaty of London on March, 1864. The spirit and the Greek Cypriots' expectations for their future, can be reviewed in the welcoming speech of Kyprianos, the Bishop of Kition, during the hoist of the British flag in Larnaca:

²⁸ H. Papageorgikos, op. cit., p. 81.

²⁹ Sir R. Storrs & B. J. O'Brien, *The Handbook of Cyprus*, (London, 1930), p. 28.

³⁰ Daily News, 20 July, 1878, p. 5.

*"We accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian islands, to be united with mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected."*³¹

However, the plans of the High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Cyprus, Sir Garnet Wolsely³², did not include the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The refusal of the British authorities to work towards future Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, in order to satisfy the persistent demands of the majority of the Cypriot population, the Greek Cypriots, opened a Pandora's box from the early days of the British presence on the island.

One of the first actions that Sir. G. Wolsely had to take was the establishment of the British presence in Cyprus, as well as the re-organization of the administrative, educational and economic life of the island. Therefore, during his first public proclamation to the Cypriot people, he declared his intention to assist the augmentation of the local agriculture and trade, according to the standards that had been established in the rest of the British Colonies. One of the first preoccupations of the new establishment was to re-organize the administrative system of the island, in order to achieve a tranquil and successful transition from the old regime to the newly established. The British Administration was divided into 3 Councils with the High Commissioner at the head of each of them. First of all, the Legislative Council, where the High Commissioner was the President. The other official members were British citizens, of which there could not be more than 8, and 4 local citizens were unofficial members, appointed by the High Commissioner for a two-year period.³³ The structure of the Legislative Council was preserved until 1882, when London offered a Colonial Constitution to the Cypriot population, which partially altered the status and the structure of the Legislative Council. According to Article 3 of the new Constitution, the High Commissioner legislated for matters of peace, public order, and administration with the acquiescence of the Legislative Council. According to article 6, the Legislative Council was constituted by 18 members (12 elected and 6 appointed). According to article 10, 3 of the elected members of the Legislative Council were to be Muslims and

³¹ Sir R. Storrs, *Orientalism*, (London, 1943), def. ed., p. 465.

³² British officer with Irish origins. He reached the rank of Field Marshal and later received the title of Viscount. A man with great experience in Colonial administration and head of the I.M.Q Army of Egypt.

³³ F. Zanetos, *The History of the Island of Cyprus from 1878 since Today*, (Larnaca, 1911), vol. II, p. 74.

9 non-Muslims, representing the Christian population of the island (Orthodox, Catholic, Gregorian etc). Additionally, the High Commissioner was the head of the Administrative Council, which regulated the central and provincial administration of the island. The other members of the Administrative Council were the Colonial Secretary, the Orthodox Archbishop, 2 Christian and 2 Muslim members. The island was divided into 6 Districts (Nicosia, Larnaca, Famagusta, Paphos, Limassol, Kyrenia) and their Commissioners were appointed directly by the High Commissioner.³⁴ Last but not least, the High Commissioner was the Head of the Executive Council, which was composed of administrative, military and magisterial members. The role of this Council was strictly advisory and it was limited only to matters of high importance.³⁵

British involvement in the function and the structure of the judicial system was regarded as extremely successful. The new establishment indicated from the early days of its arrival that it was prepared to give all its attention to the modernization of the judicial system. Therefore, one of the first actions of the Legislative Council was the establishment of a High Court of Justice.³⁶ This body was composed of the High Commissioner, the Judicial Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioners. The competence of the High Court was both penal and civil, applying to every person and every case, except those that according to the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878 were within the competence of the Ottoman local Courts.³⁷ However, the ordinance for the establishment of a High Court in Cyprus was not strictly limited to organizational matters. It went further, by introducing a set of basic civil liberties that had been systematically violated during the Ottoman era, such as:

- The presentation of the defendant for trial within 48 hours of the arrest.
- A prohibition against torture, threats and promises to the defendant during the interrogation.
- The right of the defendant to remain silent during the proceedings.³⁸

The High Court tried according to the Statue Law of England, while the Islamic courts continued to try according to the Ottoman Law, but only religious cases concerning the Muslim population. However, after a short period of time, it became obvious that the

³⁴ L. Loukaidis, The Administrative System in Cyprus: 1878-1955, (Nicosia, 1986), pp. 67-68.

³⁵ S. Papageorgiou, The First Period of the British Domination in Cyprus: 1878-1914, (Athens, 1996), p. 130.

³⁶ Parliamentary Papers, [Cyprus 2229], Ordinance 1789 for the establishment of a High Court of Justice.

³⁷ See article 1 of the accession of the Treaty concerning the preservation of the Muslim Religious Courts.

High Court by itself could not guarantee the improvement of the Judicial system, according to the wishes of the new establishment. Therefore, in 1882 a Royal decree established:

- a Supreme Court with the Chief Justice as its head. This Court had the jurisdiction of a penal and civil court of appeal.
- 6 Assize Courts, one in each district, with unlimited penal jurisdiction.
- 6 District Courts with limited penal jurisdiction and unlimited civil jurisdiction. The District courts comprised a President [British citizen] and two members [a Muslim and a Christian].
- 6 Magisterial Courts with limited penal and civil jurisdiction.
- Village Judge Courts with limited civil jurisdiction.³⁹

Another area of high importance for the new establishment was the structure and the re-organization of Cypriot education. The Ottoman rule in the island, although anachronistic, was not as much suppressive as in other areas of the Empire, concerning the sphere of education. According to the following table of the number of Christian and Muslim schools in 1878⁴⁰, it becomes obvious that the Greek population enjoyed the same educational rights as the Muslim citizens, and some districts had a larger number of Christian than Muslim schools.

DISTRICT	CHRISTIAN	MUSLIM
NICOSIA	21	28
LARNACA	8	8
LIMASSOL	20	4
FAMAGUSTA	12	12

³⁸ Parliamentary Papers, [Cyprus 2229], op. cit.

³⁹ Sir R. Storrs, opt. cit., pp. 116-117.

⁴⁰ S. Papageorgiou, op. cit., p. 182.

KYRENIA	8	5
PAPHOS	12	12

In 1880, the Anglican vicar J. Spencer, prominent member of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, was appointed by the High Commissioner as the Head of the Educational Council of Cyprus. Both the Commissioner and Spencer wished to introduce the English educational system in Cyprus as a political measure, in order to limit the strong influence of the Orthodox Church in the Christian schools and create a pro-English feeling among the younger ages. However, London did not agree with the cultural imperialistic plans of the Cypriot establishment. According to the Secretary of the Colonies, Lord Kimberley, the introduction of the English language as the official language of Cypriot education would have created a strong anti-British feeling among the local population. Instead, the British Minister ordered Spencer to maintain the Hellenic nature of the education in the Greek schools, urging the Anglican priest to respect the rich cultural heritage of Ancient Greece and the high level of cultural progress that Greece achieved after the liberation from the Ottoman yoke.⁴¹ In general, during the first period of British rule Cyprus witnessed a golden era concerning cultural and educational growth. New schools were opened, even in small villages, and more students attended their classes. The following tables from the official census of 1911 show that the British establishment elevated the educational standards of the island to a remarkably satisfactory level.⁴²

PRIMARY SCHOOLS	CITIES	VILLAGES	PRIVATE	TOTAL
GREEK CYPRIOT	21	401	4	426
TURKISH CYPRIOT	14	174	6	194

⁴¹ C.W.J. Orr, *Cyprus under British Rule*, (London, 1972), p. 123.

⁴² Blue Book [Island of Cyprus], (Nicosia, 1915), Census 1911,

ARMENIAN	4	-	1	5
CATHOLIC	-	-	6	1

**TABLE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS OF PRIMARY
EDUCATION**

SCHOOLS	CITIES	VILLAGES	PRIVATE	TOTAL
	MALE	MALE	MALE	NUMBER
	FEMALE	FEMALE	FEMALE	MALE
				FEMALE
GREEKS	2,267 – 2,153	17,350 – 7,937	160 - 53	19,957-10,145
TURKISH	683 – 643	2,870 – 1,653	413 - 63	3,966 – 2,359
ARMENIANS	59 – 49	-	-	59-49
CATHOLIC	-	-	-	200⁴³

However, the liberal spirit that the British establishment displayed, by allowing the Greek and the Turkish population to preserve their educational heritage, had two negative points for the future historic developments in the island. First of all, by allowing the Orthodox Church to maintain its dominant position in the Greek schools and by preserving and glorifying Greek heritage and history, the British establishment created, unintentionally, strong centres of nationalistic propaganda for the cause of Enosis. On the other hand, the separation of Greek and Turkish students and their different educational evolution laid the foundation for the lack of communication and understanding between the two communities, which was to be dramatically amplified during the first half of the 20th century.

On the other hand, from the early days of the British establishment in Cyprus the new regime showed its interest in the re-organization of the economic life of the island. However, it just partly modified the old Ottoman taxation system, mainly because it did not want an open confrontation with the Cypriot upper class, who had every reason to oppose any tax alterations. For that reason it just banned the old Latin tax for commercial transactions, known as "*Verghi Temettu*", and the Ottoman tax for the military expenses of the Empire.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the British establishment introduced a new tax, that generated a lot of bitter reactions from the local population. Because of the fact that Britain had to pay to the Ottoman Empire the annual amount of 92,799 pounds, the Cypriot establishment decided to introduce a heavy tax in order to raise this amount, known as the Subordination Tax. This decision put a heavy financial burden upon the local population, since the economic capacity of the Cypriots was extremely limited due to the lack of economic growth from the previous regime. Nevertheless, the new establishment made positive steps towards enhancing the infrastructure and the economic life of the island. In 1878, there was only a primitive carriage-way linking Nicosia with Larnaca. In 1898, the construction of a road network was completed that linked even the most isolated villages with the main Cypriot cities. The roads that were constructed during that period were supported by a modern bridge network, and the Cypriot road network became the most advanced in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East.⁴⁵ In 1905, a railway line between Nicosia and Famaghusta was opened (37 miles) and Nicosia–Morfou (14 miles), which in 1915 was extended to Evrichou (76 miles). The above innovations resulted in the substantial growth of agricultural production and agricultural exports. This can be seen in the following table that indicates Cypriot agricultural exports to the West and the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean.

RAISINS	10,815 cwt. (1878)	23,586 cwt. (1897)
BARLEY	130,555 cwt. (1878)	952,000 cwt. (1890)
OATS	90,050 cwt. (1878)	185,015 cwt. (1895)

⁴³ In the Catholic Schools students from other denominations, such as Anglicans or Methodists, were studying as well.

⁴⁴ S. Papageorgiou, op. cit., p. 156.

⁴⁵ Until 1878, there were no bridges in Cyprus. In 1914, there were about 2.000 wooden, stone or iron bridges. For more see: Sir R. Storrs & B. J. O' Brien, op. cit., pp. 201-03.

WHEAT	5,410 cwt. (1878)	517,081 cwt. (1890)
LEATHER	161 cwt. (1878)	2,119 cwt. (1881)
SILK	261 cwt. (1878)	1,069 cwt. (1896)
KOUMANTARIA (Local Alcoholic Drink)	3,780 GALLONS (1878)	136,887 GALLONS (1887)
WINE	1,010,000 GALLONS (1878)	1,576,000 GALLONS (1896)
WOOL	2,693 cwt. (1878)	4,446 cwt. (1886)
Table created by data from the annual <u>Handbook of the Island of Cyprus.</u>	cwt.= Hundred Weight. 1 cwt.= 40 Oke. 1 Oke = 1,280 gr.	1 Gallon = 4.5 litres.

Nevertheless, despite the notable changes that the new establishment put in action in order to limit any social or communal disorder, it was mainly responsible for the accommodation and strengthening of nationalism inside the Cypriot framework. As seen, the national division that occurred in every aspect of the new administration resulted in the collapse of the notion of the religious group and the development of a national awareness. This in turn resulted in the construction of a new political system with nationalism as the basic foundation.⁴⁶ The main representatives of Greek nationalism in Cyprus were the Orthodox Church and the influential merchant and land-owning class, as well as new scientists and intellectuals. The Orthodox Church saw the arrival of the British administration in the island as the end of a series of significant privileges that it enjoyed under the Ottomans. The British side refused to recognize the political leading role of the Orthodox Church (the introduction of the Legislative Council was a successful move towards reducing the political power of the Orthodox

⁴⁶ W. Barham, Enosis: From Ethnic Communalism to Greek Nationalism, 1878-1955, (Columbia Univ, 1982), p. 99.

Church) and at the same time it reviewed the tax-free system for the vast lands of the monasteries and their religious treasures. The Orthodox Church, a respected and powerful institution during the Ottoman era both at the political and religious level, felt threatened and after a short period of re-organization it undertook the leading role in the Enosis movement. The Greek Cypriot merchants and great landowners followed a similar route. While this class asked for a greater deal of political liberalization, it still refused to accept any social reform that threatened its ability to control and manipulate the lower classes, especially the agrarian. Therefore, by adopting the slogan of Enosis it tried to strengthen its political influence, to establish its presence in the higher political posts, and achieve the continuation of its economic prosperity. On the other hand, by transmitting the ideals of Enosis to the lower classes it had the opportunity to divert the latter's attention from the social problems that were tormenting them and avoid any public revolt that could alter the sociological equilibrium of Cyprus. The rise of nationalism in Cyprus did not effect any considerable change in the social scale of the island. The old aristocracy fought fervently to maintain the old social equilibrium of the Ottoman era, in an attempt to preserve their wealth and power. It is a fact that the nationalist and anti-colonial movement in Cyprus did not attract all those liberal and progressive elements as did other movements of the same nature, such as in India, and it was always led by reactionary groups with oligarchic socio-political sentiments and interests. Therefore the national awareness of the Christian population of Cyprus was not followed by the social and economic progression of the vast majority of the Cypriot population. Another reason for the strengthening of nationalism in Cyprus was the British educational structure. As mentioned earlier the establishment of two different educational programs for the Muslims and the Christians of Cyprus supported the polarization of the two communities and the development of two different cultures and approaches to the common history of the island. As A. Pollis quite rightly states:

“The Muslim and Orthodox youth were learning to speak different languages, different history and different ideologies. For the Orthodox community the transition from a non-political religious group to a political nationalist entity was easier since the Greek Orthodox religion is strongly linked

and in a lot of cases legitimizes the concept of Greek nationalism"⁴⁷

In addition, as noted, during the Ottoman era the two important factors for the communal unity of the Cypriots were the family and the village. However, the new educational system played a significant role in ending the previous communal unity by reducing the actual number of mixed villages. In a lot of cases the members of a minority group in a village were moving, mainly for reasons that concerned their children's education, to villages where their nationality was the majority. In this fertile ground for the growth of nationalism, the connection of the Orthodox Christians with the Greek flag was a foreseeable development. The Christians of Cyprus, in an attempt to meet the challenge of nationalism, linked their existence with the past. For centuries slaves, living under totalitarian regimes in conditions of political, economic and social humiliation, they felt secure in the indulgence of a vague but glorified past. They placed themselves into the framework of a "pure" ancient race and adopted, with gratitude and fanaticism, the theory of a common cultural and historic continuation with the people in continental Greece. For centuries pariahs and bastards, they eventually acquired prestigious and racial "pure" ancestors. As Issacs points out:

*"...from the point of racial apotheosis, mythology, identity, psychological security and preposterous deceit...nothing can be compared with pan-Hellenism."*⁴⁸

On the other hand, the establishment of the British administration in the island brought a dramatic change in the Muslim mentality. Until 1878, the Muslim element was the dominant group in Cypriot politics and administration. However, after 1878 they were forced to co-exist with the Christian element inside a new framework, a so-called constitutional equality. This fact led the Muslim population to a historic scepticism, since the constitutional equality was jeopardized by the numerical and economic superiority of the Greek Cypriots. The choices that the Muslims had inside the new Cypriot equilibrium were limited. A small amount of them, mainly members of the Ottoman aristocracy, decided to emigrate to the Ottoman mainland, refusing to come

⁴⁷ Quoted by A. Pollis, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism: Determinants of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, in P. Worsley-P. Kitromilides [ed.], Small States in the Modern World. The Conditions of Survival, (Nicosia, 1979), p. 48.

⁴⁸ Quoted by T. Nairn, Cyprus and the Theory of Nationalism, in P. Worsley-P. Kitromilides [ed.], op. cit., p.32.

to terms with the new reality. On the other hand, the main part of the Muslim population that remained in Cyprus was forced to develop an extraordinary amount of political obedience to the new establishment. A characteristic account comes from a Muslim memorandum to the Minister of Colonies Lord Kimberley (5/4/1881):

*"We, the Muslims, according to our religious doctrines consider as unscrupulous and reactionary any community that through a revolutionary nature and with false arguments is distressing the Government that owns to her absolute obedience"*⁴⁹

During the first period of the British establishment in Cyprus, the Muslim decision for absolute political obedience to the new administration was based upon various factors. The growth of nationalism inside the Greek Cypriot framework did not have the same influence inside the Muslim. The Ottoman Empire was the womb that gave birth to all the modern Balkan and Middle-East states. However, the dominant Ottoman class with political and economic influence remained hemmed in an Empire with a non-national ideology, a super state that was only unified by Islam. Therefore, the absence of a national centre, a country, was the main reason why the Muslim population of Cyprus delayed in developing a national (Turkish) identity. Another reason for this was the absence of a national orientation to the Muslim educational system, that until 1923, was strictly focused upon the analysis of Koran and the teaching of the Arab language. The establishment of Enosis in the Greek Cypriot mentality, on the one hand, and the British arrival in Cyprus, on the other, set the Muslim community a basic question: either to live under British control or to accept its incorporation within the Greek state. The answer to the above dilemma was easy and well expected. As the dominant members of a strong Empire, the Muslims, through the centuries, had developed an elitist mentality, and the fact that they would live in a province under the political control of their former subjects convinced them to rally to the British establishment. Another reason for this decision was the fact that the Muslim population of Cyprus did not trust Greek Cypriot intentions. The lack of trust and the development of an antipathy for the Greek Cypriots can be fully revealed in the following Muslim memorandum to Lord Kimberley (19/7/1881):

⁴⁹ C.W.J. Orr, op cit., p. 164.

“No community can enjoy the basic values of security, life, property, and honour under the Greek administration due to the national vanity concerning the honorary achievements of their ancestors...especially the Muslims who are the subjects of their national revenge [for 400 years of the Ottoman yoke].”⁵⁰

It is important to note here that the allegations of the above memorandum are not totally unfounded. After 1878, the Greek Cypriot community denied the granting of equal political rights to the Muslims, and their actions aimed at the administrative and financial disconnection of the Muslims from the Cypriot reality. The Greek Cypriot majority dealt with the Muslim minority as a “negative necessity” and regarded its existence on Cypriot soil as “historic misfortune”, that they had to neutralize since they did not have the means or the will to incorporate them inside the Greek Cypriot environment. The Greek Cypriot feelings can be fully revealed in a memorandum to the undersecretary of the colonies W. Churchill (1907). According to the memorandum, the Muslim minority opposed the recognition and realization of the Greek Cypriot’s national aspirations, operating under the influence of religious and not national motives. However, due to its limited numerical capacity the Muslim minority did not have the power to contradict the fate of Cyprus or have any involvement in the cultural and economic advancement of Cyprus. As the memorandum concluded:

“Trade, Sciences, Art, Literature, Industry, and any other factor that can be linked with the cultural and economic advancement of the island is a Greek Cypriot activity.”⁵¹

Despite the fact that the official position of the British was not to recognize any national group, they adopted the Ottoman system of separating the Cypriot population into Muslims and non-Muslims⁵², still they seemed to accept the Hellenic nature of the Cypriot Christians in their private conversations and their memoirs. As Sir R. Storrs [Governor of Cyprus 1927-1932] confessed in his memoirs:

“The Greekness of Cypriots is in my opinion indisputable. Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentation of

⁵⁰ S. Prasinos, *Nationalism and Hypocrisy in the Balkan peninsula*, (Athens, 1990), p. 241.

⁵¹ Quoted by S. Prasinos, op. cit, p. 246.

cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French."⁵³

while Gladstone, the British Premier who never hid his pro-Hellenic feelings, once stated that:

*"The bulk of people of Cyprus are Greeks; and rely upon it that if matters continue as they are...instead of earning, even by the benefits you may confer upon them, for less earning by ordinances such as I have described, gratitude and attachment in the form of a disposition to continue in political connection with you, the more you improve their conditions, the quicker will be the development of this strong sentiment of nationality, and the more earnest the desire of the Greeks of Cyprus to be united with the free Greeks of the rest of the world."*⁵⁴

The legitimization of the Greek-Cypriot nationalism by the British officials also influenced the attitude of the establishment towards the Enosis movement. During the first period of British dominance in Cyprus (1878-1914), the establishment did not attempt to eliminate Greek-Cypriot nationalism, as it was expressed through the Enosis slogan. On the contrary, it welcomed and accommodated this in an attempt to develop a status of "*sui-generis*" with the biggest and most influential part of the Cypriot population, the Greek Cypriot community. However, at the same time it appeared to understand the Muslim fears for a Greek-Cypriot dominance in the Cypriot arena and in every opportunity declared its commitment to protect and to elevate the Muslim role inside the Cypriot framework.⁵⁵ The British attitude should not perplex the researcher. It was the application of the traditional British policy of divide and rule on Cypriot soil. The enlargement of Greek nationalism made the Muslims come closer to the British

⁵² See the official demographic catalogues in the Blue Books for Cyprus of that period.

⁵³ Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., pp. 469-70.

⁵⁴ Daily News, 16 September 1880, p. 2.4

⁵⁵ S.P. Papageorgiou, Common Route Different Aspirations. The Greeks and Turks of Cyprus. (Athens, 1991), p. 27.

administration and turn against their old neighbours, while the Muslim attitude outraged the Greek Cypriots and forced even the most moderate figures to develop an anti-Muslim stance. By that, the British establishment managed to come closer to both communities, in different ways and avoided the development of a unified anti-colonial front and placed itself in the centre of the Cypriot political arena as the only factor offering peace, security and stability on a deeply polarized island. However, the well-planned British scheme failed in one point: to identify the intensity of the Enosis movement and control the strengthening of Greek Cypriot nationalism. The British failure resulted in the augmentation of an explosive situation in Cyprus, created mainly by the Greek Cypriot community, that placed the two communities against each other and laid the foundations for the creation of Greek and Turkish guerilla movements after 1955.

From 1878, the Greek Cypriots presented their new rulers with two demands. The first, as has already been mentioned, was Enosis with Greece. The second was the right of self-government. The first demand could not be satisfied for two reasons. First of all, Britain was not willing to hand Cyprus to Greece, especially after the diplomatic guarantees to Turkey and France, and thus put under threat her policy in the Mediterranean. Second, Britain could not permit the unification of the island with Greece because, technically, Cyprus still belonged to the Ottoman Empire. However, the British understood that good relations between them and the Greek Cypriots would prove helpful for a peaceful and better administration of the island, therefore London decided to satisfy, partly, the second demand of the Greek side concerning the development of a Cypriot self-government body. As mentioned, in 1882 a constitution was granted to Cyprus, which permitted the creation of a Legislative Council. Nevertheless, the structure of the Legislative Council was arranged in such a way that the Greek Cypriot members did not have any real power. According to it, the nine elected Christian members of the Council could be outvoted by the High Commissioner and the six ex-officio members with the aid of the three Muslim elected members, who represented 19.4% of the Cypriot population.⁵⁶ In reality, the Legislative Council was under direct British control. In almost every case the Turkish members voted in favour of the British proposals, as mentioned above after 1821 the relations between the two communities had been characterized by hate and fear, and in the rare case that the votes

⁵⁶ W. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors: 1801-1927, (Cambridge, 1936), p. 469.

were equal then the vote of the governor was the decisive one. This British artifice led the Greek Cypriot community to alter its attitude towards its liberators from the Ottoman yoke. A characteristic incident that occurred in 1887 reveals the revision of the Greek Cypriot mentality. The celebration of the Queen's Jubilee in 1887 was meant to be held in a festive atmosphere in Cyprus, and was to be regarded as a research concerning the popularity of the new regime. Nevertheless, the celebrations were boycotted by the Greek Cypriots. In six hundred Orthodox Churches the clergy spoke for union with Greece, and sport meetings were organized by the Church, at the same time as the British festivities, so the arrangements of the governor failed due to lack of attendance.

The demands for Enosis escalated towards the end of 1898, when news arrived in the island that Crete, after a long and bloody uprising, was freed from the Turkish yoke and had been placed under a Greek High Commissioner. To make things worse, the Greek High Commissioner was appointed by the four Protecting Powers, Britain, France, Italy and Russia. The Cretan incident convinced the Greek Cypriots that the long desired Enosis with Greece would be realized only by sword. Therefore, in November 1898, the Patriotic League, "*Patriotiki Omada*", was formed in Athens. It aimed to organise an uprising in Cyprus. It has to be noted that the Patriotic League did not find enough space to flourish inside the Greek Cypriot framework, mainly because the Greek Cypriots were still in favour of peaceful negotiations with the British side, thus the actions of the League were limited to revolutionary pamphlets and speeches, that did not provoke a British reaction. With the arrival of the new century, no considerable change had occurred affecting the unification issue in Cyprus. The British continued to face the Greek Cypriot demands for unification with apathy, fortifying denials with the argument that Cyprus did not belong to Britain and was still under Ottoman proprietorship, while the Greek Cypriot side continued with a remarkable persistence to demand Enosis. However, in 1902, for the first time since 1887, the Turkish Cypriot community became actively involved in the question of the unification with Greece. Meetings started to take place in houses of distinguished members of the Turkish Cypriot community, aiming to declare their support to the British presence in the island, and to organize their defence in the event of a Greek uprising. In one of those meetings, 600 signatures were collected declaring the devotion of the Turkish Cypriot to the Queen and the British

governor in Cyprus⁵⁷, and a telegram had been sent to the British High Commissioner by Ahmed Rashid, ex-member of the Cypriot Legislative Council, declaring that Muslims were against the idea of unification and their “*deliverance to the hands of wild beasts*.”⁵⁸ According to the Turkish Cypriot side, if Britain were to abandon Cyprus, the island had to be returned to Turkey.

While the two communities were seizing any available opportunity to declare their deep differences, they had one thing in common. They were both accusing the British authorities of favouritism for the opposite side. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots were convinced that the British occupation was a political plot of London and Constantinople against Hellenism. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot side was accusing the High Commissioner of a provocative tolerance towards the Greek Cypriot activities and suspected an Anglo-Greek secret agreement about Cyprus' fate. Nevertheless, both sides failed to comprehend that British policy in Cyprus had been determined by one single element: the geostrategic interests of a Great Power in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. The British side demonstrated its apparent interest in Cyprus during the disturbances of May-June 1912. The Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912 was not without its repercussions in Cyprus. The Turkish defeat in Tripoli by the Italian troops was celebrated by the Greek Cypriots in Limassol as a Greek victory. The Turks were insulted and retaliated. The police had to fire on the rioters and troops were called out on May 27 to quell the disturbances. The casualties were 5 killed and 80 wounded, while a detachment of the 2nd Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment (2 officers and 95 men) was landed at Famagusta on June 1, in order to preserve the peace in the city.⁵⁹ The message to every side was clear. Britain was ready to mobilize its forces at any time and under any circumstances, in order to protect its authority in the island.

Further steps were to be taken for the protection of the British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean during 1914, but this time Cyprus was to be offered in return for other services. The assassination of Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, led to the end of the Bismarckian peace between Britain and Germany. Once again the strategic position of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean proved to be negative for the Greek Cypriot aspirations affecting the Enosis issue. The

⁵⁷ Colonial Office Papers, 30 June 1902, 67/131.

⁵⁸ Colonial Office Papers, 23 June 1902, 67/131.

island was officially annexed to Britain on November 5, 1914 in order that Cyprus should be protected against a German invasion or a possible involvement of Turkey in the war on the side of the Central Powers. The British act was interpreted differently by the brilliant leader of the Greek Liberal Party, E. Venizelos. The Cretan politician saw the incorporation of Cyprus as a strategic decision of Lloyd George in order to free Britain from the terms of the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878 and to promise the island to Greece in return for the active involvement of the latter on the Allied side in the war. On November 14, in an interview to the daily *Eleftheria*, Venizelos stated:

*"...the annexation of Cyprus must be characterized as the last stage towards the national restoration of this great Greek island, and according to accurate information on the possession of this government, it may be considered that the unification of Cyprus with its mother Greece will be realized in the near future"*⁶⁰

Once again, the instinct of the experienced politician proved to be accurate. On October 18, 1915 Sir F. Elliot made an official proposal to the Greek government, which guaranteed the unification of Cyprus with Greece on the condition that the Athenian government should fulfill her obligations towards Serbia. According to the Greco-Serbian Treaty, June 1913, Greece had to aid Serbia in a case of a Bulgarian attack. A Greek attack against Bulgaria would have meant the end of the nation's neutrality and the involvement of Greece in the war on the Allied side.⁶¹ Nevertheless, the British diplomatic trick to force Greece against the Central Powers proved to be fruitless. Zaimes' Cabinet and the pro-German palace were unwilling to renounce Greece's neutrality and take action against Bulgaria. As a consequence within few days the British offer lapsed and Greece lost a golden opportunity to settle the Cyprus issue once and for all. Britain on the other hand, missed the opportunity for an honourable and well calculated disengagement from Cyprus. Such a disengagement would not have altered the geostrategic status quo in the province and could not threaten the British position as the leading nation in the Mediterranean, since Greece was her most loyal ally in the region.

⁵⁹ The Times, 3 June 1912, p. 6.

⁶⁰ Venizelos Papers, 350, (14 November, 1914). Interview with L. Papadimitriou editor of *Eleftheria*.

⁶¹ A. Tynbee, *Cyprus, The British Empire and Greece*, (London, 1931), p.p. 358-59.

The Greek refusal to enter the war led Britain to harden its attitude towards the Enosis demands. In May 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement. The agreement pronounced that:

“... in virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French government.”⁶²

The Sykes-Picot agreement had been decided by the British side on two grounds. On the one hand, it was a movement of good will towards France, aiming to strengthen the unity of the Entente. On the other hand, it was a diplomatic decision in order to relieve the Greek Cypriot pressure, which had been aggravated after 1914. The official annexation of Cyprus by Britain and the end of the rental status left London with no excuses and deepened the break in the relations between the rulers and the subjects. In addition, the agreement was a obvious warning to Athens that her hesitations, about which side she should choose, would lead to similar agreements in the future, touching other territories in which Greece had declared her apparent interest, such as Thrace or the Ionian coasts of Western Asia Minor.

The endorsement of the Sykes-Picot agreement did not terminate the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. On the contrary, the signature of the agreement outraged the Greek Cypriots and, during that period, protests against the British authorities became more systematic than ever. The pressure upon the British side intended to prove to the authorities, that whatever the effort and the persistency in keeping Cyprus under their influence, the Greek Cypriots would not rest until the final satisfaction of their demand. As A. Theodotou, a Greek Cypriot intellectual and editor of the daily *Phonē tis Kyprou*, Cyprus' voices, wrote in an article on November 4, 1917:

“We will continue [for the Enosis] until the time for surrendering our souls to God will come. And after us our children will continue the holy duty. We will become a poisonous thorn in the British side until they will be

⁶² H. Papageorgikios, op. cit., p. 119.

*exhausted and return back home. We are not going to be a new India for the British Lords.”*⁶³

In the meanwhile, the Great War reached its final stage. Greece, after a period of internal disturbances, which resulted in the exile of King Constantine and the formation of a government by E. Venizelos, joined the Entente and attacked Bulgaria during June 1917. The end of the Greek neutrality led to the defeat of the Central Powers in the Balkans, a decisive victory for the Allied forces, which hastened the end of the War and the final defeat of Germany and her allies. After peace was restored the decision as to what should happen to Cyprus lay in the hands of the British premier Lloyd George, a personal friend of Venizelos and a committed supporter of Greece. The two men agreed that Greece's role after the Great War should be more decisive than before, when Greece was just a second class power in the Balkans. The transformation of Greece to a great regional power would be proved helpful for Britain's search for a new ally in the region, one that would be powerful enough to protect Britain's interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, after the sound collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Venizelos realized that the ground was prepared, and on December 30, 1918 he submitted to the Allied Powers the complete and formal statement of the Greek territorial claims. It was a pamphlet entitled "*Greece Before the Peace Congress*", which established the territorial demands of Greece including Epirus, Thrace, Western Asia Minor and Cyprus. However, while Venizelos demanded the annexation of all the above territories, he only made a vague proposal for an Enosis of Cyprus with Greece.⁶⁴ Venizelos' attitude should not be misread as a lack of interest concerning Cyprus, but as a brilliant political decision, aiming to fulfil the Greek political appeals and satisfy the Greek Cypriot demands as well. A few days before the submission of the Greek territorial claims, Lloyd George confessed to the Greek Premier that he would like to have his name linked with Cyprus as Gladstone's was with the Ionian islands.⁶⁵ Venizelos regarded Lloyd George's words as an unofficial agreement between gentlemen and he decided to put all his pressure upon Asia Minor, Thrace and Epirus, while he tried, in order not to provoke a diplomatic crisis among the Entente members, to persuade the Allies that Cyprus was not in the front-line for Greece. The experienced politician was rightly convinced that France and Italy would react strongly to a possible unification of Cyprus with Greece.

⁶³ Phones tis Kyprou, 4 November, 1917, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁴ For full text see: E.K. Venizelos, *Greece Before the Peace Congress*, (London, 1919).

⁶⁵ History of the Hellenic Nation, (Athens, 1976), vol. XV, p. 130.

Such a development, in accordance with the satisfaction of the Greek demands about Thrace, Epirus and West Asia Minor, would have created an extremely powerful nation in the Mediterranean that could challenge their geostrategic interests and future plans for the region. Having that in mind, Venizelos chose to move behind the curtains and after a series of secret negotiations with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community, he encouraged them to heighten their struggle. As P. Antoniou, a Greek Cypriot doctor and member of the Legislative Council wrote in his unpublished diary on February 21, 1919:

“... then he looked us in the eyes and with a trembling voice he said. “My friends, I can feel your desire to be free. I can understand your national passion for Enosis with the Motherland. After all I am a Cretan and we experienced the same troubles. But do not fear. The British Premier wants to settle the Cypriot question and he told me that he will assist us. Britain will stand by our side as she did many times in the past. Continue your efforts with great strength. The moment that we are waiting is closer than ever. Use any necessary means but avoid actions of violence. The English are benevolent race but they can be cruel when they are challenged.”

Venizelos' words, relating to the British nature, turned out to be predictive as the development of the Cypriot question reveals during the 50's.

The Greek Cypriot leaders followed Venizelos's instructions, thus on March 5, 1919 they addressed to the House of Commons, the government and the Press a memorandum, titled “The Cypriotes Appeal to the British Nation.” According to that, the Cypriot population declared itself grateful to Britain for having freed Cyprus forty years ago from the oppressive Turkish yoke, but warned that the union with Greece was not to be exchanged with any other consideration, *“either in the form of autonomous government, or of material progress under foreign administrations.”*⁶⁶ The appeal was welcomed in Britain causing the immediate reaction of Lloyd George, who in a letter to E. Venizelos on 30 March wrote:

⁶⁶ The Times, 15 March, 1919, p. 12.

*"...I am convinced that the Cyprus question will be solved and a new era will begin between the two nations. Let Cyprus be the token of a long and prosperous alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean..."*⁶⁷

However, the Cypriot question was not to be solved yet. The Turkish Cypriot side counter-attacked. Disturbances were provoked in Cyprus and incidents of attacks against Greek Cypriot houses were reported. In London, on the other hand, the strong Muslim League and its famous leader the Aga Khan, provided the government on July 25 with a memo protesting against the Greek expansionism *"in an island which historically and geographically was linked with Turkey."*⁶⁸ Faced with a possible confrontation with the Muslim front, Britain decided to turn down once again the Greek Cypriot demands. Britain feared that a possible dispute with the Muslim Front would lead to a series of revolts in her Islamic colonies, supported by the powerful Aga Khan who during the past and in critical moments had bolstered British interests, especially in the Arab world. Britain was not willing to loose such a valuable ally, therefore the Government decided to decline the Greek Cypriot demands using as an official excuse the uncertainty of the situation in the Middle East, which was in transition after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Greece was to be satisfied with the granting of Thrace and West Asia Minor. Once again the demands and the right of the Greek Cypriots were ignored in favour of diplomatic calculations.

A new era began for the Cypriot question after the Greek landing in Smyrna, during the first quarter of May 1919. As is natural, from the first moment the Greek Cypriots supported the Greek landing in the Ionian coasts of West Asia Minor. Committees were formed in the island for the financial support of the Greek troops, while over 1,000 men aged from 18 to 40 joined the Greek army as volunteers.⁶⁹ The last fact has a considerable significance for the Enosis concept. The attempt aimed to prove, first to Britain and then to the other powers of the Entente, that Cyprus was an integral part of Greece, even though beyond the official Greek frontiers. On the other hand, it aimed to proclaim to the Greek government itself that the island was relevant to the great

⁶⁷ Venizelos Papers, 464, (30 March 1919), Letter of Lloyd George to Venizelos about the Cypriot appeal on 5 March 1919.

⁶⁸ T. Veremis & G. Tsitsopoulos, *Greece and Turkey :The Implacable Neighbours*, (Athens, 1987), p. 13. The above argument is still being used by the Turkish side in international meetings about the present status of the island and the illegal Turkish invasion and occupation of the North part of the island since July 1974.

moments of Hellenic history. Nevertheless, the disaster faced by the Greek army in Asia Minor, which culminated on 10 September 1922, caused the Cypriot enthusiasm for union with Greece to cool for a time. Greece was humiliated in Asia Minor by Kemal's troops, had been abandoned by her great ally, Britain, and faced the possibility of bankruptcy due to the arrival in the country of hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians who were forced to abandon their homes, due to Kemal's plan for the creation of a new Turkey free from ethnic minorities. Greece had to struggle for her existence as a nation, therefore it was beyond her powers, now more than ever, either to support or to work towards the final settlement of the Cypriot question. In Cyprus, the Greek defeat effected a radical change to the Greek Cypriot approach to Enosis. Under the present circumstances unification with the wounded Greek nation would have been impossible.

On the other hand, Cyprus had to remain the poisonous thorn in the British side, waiting a more convenient time in the future, regarding its fate. Therefore, the restlessness now found fertile ground to grow in the Greek Cypriot demands for substantial constitutional liberties. The adoption of the new policy resulted in the presentation of a memorandum on December 3, 1922, which did not omit the demand for Union, but instead stated that until the arrival of that moment, self-government or extended constitutional powers should be granted to the Greek Cypriot population.⁶⁹ However, the British position was not to change under any pressure. The issue of the right of self-determination had been rejected from the first moment. If Britain had allowed that it was more than possible that a bloody Civil War would have started between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, and British interests in the island would have been put under threat. Britain's fears were well founded. After the collapse of the Greek army in Asia Minor, the Turkish Cypriot adopted an extremely aggressive attitude towards the Greek Cypriots and they were preparing themselves for a military confrontation with their compatriots in the event that Cyprus' status was to change. On the other hand, the British authorities were not willing to grant any constitutional powers to the Cypriots mainly because, until that moment, plans for the eradication of the Enosis movement in the island had failed. Therefore, they could not trust the governing of Cyprus to people who were not willing to accept British rule and work for the protection of British interests. Especially after the collapse of the British plans for

⁶⁹ Official Archives of the Greek Royal Army: 1900 - 1940, vol. XI, 345/6/890.

⁷⁰ I. G. Katapodis, *op. cit.*, p. 623.

the birth of a powerful Greek state in the Eastern Mediterranean and the formation of modern Turkey, which during World War I fought Britain, Cyprus was a valuable asset for the maintenance of British dominance in the region. Cyprus was a precious card for Britain in the new era that rose after the end of the World War I and she was not willing to jeopardize the advantage that the geostrategic position of the island offered. For all of the above reasons, during the signing of the peace treaty between Greece and Turkey in Lausanne on July 24, 1923 Britain forced Turkey to resign from every right that she had upon Cyprus according to the Anglo-Turkish agreement of 1878. In article 20 of the treaty Turkey recognized the annexation of Cyprus by Britain and resigned from every right concerning the island.⁷¹ The last detail is extremely important and future chapters will review the diplomatic importance of the above article and its contribution to the shaping of Cyprus' fate.

The British refusal to accept or even to negotiate the Greek Cypriot demands created an explosive situation in the political life of the island. The crisis reached its climax on October 18 1931, when the Legislative Council gathered to vote for a new taxation law. The Greek members voted against it and a Turkish representative, unexpectedly, followed the Greek line. The taxation law was outvoted but then the British governor imposed the outvoted law as an administrative measure, challenging the majority and the role of the Legislative Council. The reactions were rapid. The Greek members of the Legislative Council resigned and, as a protest, on October 21 a great crowd was gathered in the central square of Nicosia to demonstrate their disapproval to the British authorities. Speeches were addressed to the protesters urging a general uprising. At the end of the gathering D. Kykkotis, a well-known and popular priest, took a Greek flag in his hands, kissed it and declared revolution. The British authorities who were watching carefully intervened and tried to confiscate the flag and arrest the priest. The crowd regarded it as a national insult and attacked the policemen. Soon enough the riot spread out to the whole of the city and the Government House was burnt down. The riots ended with the decisive intervention of the British army but the still smoking wreck of the Government House marked a new era for the British presence in the island. Until that moment the British attitude in Cyprus was as liberal as it could be comparing it with the attitude of other European Powers in their colonies, i.e. France in Algeria and Spain in Morocco. However, the next day a special law was imposed in Cyprus and a

⁷¹ Treaty of Lausanne, Article 20 (Cmd. 1929, No 16, 1923).

large number of Greek Cypriots were either imprisoned or sent to exile, among them the Bishops of Kition, Nicodemos, and Kyrenia, and prominent members of the Greek Cypriot society such as, Savas Loizides and Alexis Kyrou. Moreover, the Legislative Council was abolished, the Constitution was suspended, and censorship was imposed on the Cypriot Press.⁷² There is no accurate record concerning the precise number of the dead and the wounded during the night of the riots, but the news created a great impact among the Greek Cypriots in the whole of the island and in Athens. The news of the death of many Greek Cypriots alienated the Greek population and violent incidents occurred outside the British Embassy, while 3,000 people gathered outside the Parliament demanding revenge and shouting anti-British slogans. In an event of a diplomatic crisis between Britain and Greece, Venizelos did his best to please Greece's major ally. He announced that the Hellenic government could not interfere in a question which was an internal affair of Great Britain. He continued that there was no Cyprus question between the British and Greek governments and he expressed his sorrow for the attitude of his compatriots.⁷³ Venizelos' statement determined the new attitude of Greece towards the Cypriot question: non-intervention. As will be seen later on, after the end of the World War II the doctrine of non - interference became an official line for the Greek Foreign Office, and established the disbelief and the detestation of the Greek Cypriots towards the Greek politicians. That was one of the major reasons for the later formation of paramilitary units on the island.

Venizelos' attitude satisfied the British side and helped the de-escalation of the crisis. Until the beginning of the War World II, no incident of organized unrest had been reported on the island. The establishment of Metaxas' fascist regime in Athens during the summer of 1936 (August 4) and his undemocratic methods of governing, made Greek Cypriots re-consider their desire for unification under the above preconditions. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots decided to unite their forces with Britain and the rest of the democratic world, unlike the Turkish Cypriots who kept a strict neutrality following the example of Turkey, for the defeat of Nazism and Fascism during the World War II. A Times' report from the island in 1939 illustrates the spirit of that time in Cyprus:

"... the allegation that the island is seething with unrest is not even near the truth...There is no doubt that the loyalty of

⁷² Sir R. Storrs, op. cit., (London, 1943), p.p. 507-09.

*the islanders to Great Britain is much stronger than in 1932...they would unquestionably prefer our rule to that of any other country for there is no conscription and taxation is low.”*⁷⁴

However, even if the British side hastened to celebrate its policy's victory in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots did not forget their national aim. The years that followed the end of World War II witnessed the everlasting Greek Cypriot desire for national vindication.

⁷³ Venizelos Papers 1012 (23 October, 1931), Venizelos statement to all the Greek and British newspapers. See also *The Times*, 24 October 1931, p.7.

⁷⁴ *The Times*, 3 May 1939, p. 13.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST SIGN : THE ROUTE TO THE PLEBISCITE OF 1950.

"As for the gods, it seemed to be the same thing whether one worshipped them or not, when one saw the good and the bad dying indiscriminately"

Thucydides, II: 53.

This chapter will cover the period from the early days of the Second World War until the Plebiscite of January 1950, and the first Greek Cypriot attempt to internationalize the Cypriot question. Throughout this chapter the crucial changes that occurred in the Cypriot political spectrum during the Second World War will be reviewed. The reasons for the transformation of British foreign policy towards her colonies after the end of the Second World War will also be inspected, and its consequences for the Cypriot question. Additionally this chapter will approach the Plebiscite of January 1950 and its international impact, especially in Greece and Britain. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Under which perspective did the British establishment embrace and encourage the formation of AKEL? What was the main result that derived from the formation of AKEL, for the Cypriot political framework? Why did the post-Second World War modus vivendi influence the modification of British colonial policy in Cyprus? To what extent has the Greek Civil War influenced the Greek official line

towards the Enosis movement? What were the main reasons for the collapse of the Consultative Assembly of 1948 and what was its impact on the political developments in Cyprus?

The German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and the Italian seizure of Albania in the following month prompted Britain to accept a substantial military commitment to Europe by confronting Hitler's Germany. Although the Cyprus Regiment was formed in the early 40's by British initiative, the response was at first poor. The silent hostility towards the British authorities of the Greek Cypriot side and the apathy of the Turkish Cypriot side, resulted in a coolness of the local population towards the British recruiting plans. On the one hand, the formation of the Cypriot Regiment had been approached by the Greek Cypriots as another British plot for the extinction of the Enosis movement.¹ On the other hand, for the Turkish Cypriots the formation of the Cypriot Regiment was a clear British attempt to prove to the rest of the world that the Turkish Cypriots were unanimously anglicized and were not influenced by the foreign policy of Ankara.² Nevertheless, the negative attitude of the Greek-Cypriot population towards the British recruiting efforts changed radically after the commencement of the Greco-Italian War. Driven by his aspirations for an independent Mediterranean and Balkan policy for Italy, Mussolini attacked Greece on 28 October 1940. The invasion turned sour for Mussolini as the outnumbered Greek army halted the Italian advance and launched a successful counter attack deep into Albanian territory. For fear of provoking Hitler, in January 1941 Metaxas declined an offer by Churchill to commit British troops to Greece, but his death at the end of the month and the tightening German grip on the Balkans forced the Greeks to change their minds. A British expeditionary force of 57,000 men was sent to Greece, signaling the entry of Greece into the war against Hitler on Britain's side. It is estimated that over 30,000 Greek Cypriots fought side by side with British troops in Crete (the Cypriot Regiment lost 2,300 men during the 30 days of warfare there), Egypt, Libya, in the Italian front of Casino and even in the Battle of Britain.³

¹ As the daily Greek Cypriot *Alithia* wrote in April 20, 1940 (pp. 1-2) "*the Cypriot Regiment is another British trick to prove to the rest of the world that there is not such an issue as the unification of Cyprus with Greece and that the locals are fighting side by side with the colonial powers, demonstrating their loyal feelings to the British Crown.*"

² For more concerning Turkish neutrality during the Second World War, see: W. L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (Oxford, 1994), p.p. 178-79.

³ E. Averof-Tositsas, *A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot Question 1950-1963*, vol. I, p. 14. See also D. Alastos, *Cyprus: Past and Future*, (Committee for Cyprus Affairs, London, 1943), pp. 62-66.

The entrance of Greece into the war on the British side against Germany heralded a considerable modification to the British policy concerning the Cypriot question, at both the domestic and international levels. After the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940, large posters decorated the streets of Larnaca, Famagusta, Nicosia, Limassol and Paphos, written in Greek, calling the Greek Cypriots to “*fight for Greece and Freedom*”, and the British establishment allowed the Greek Cypriots to decorate the balconies of their houses with the Greek flag, an illegal action since the disturbances of 1931. Acts like that and speeches, such as W. Churchill’s message to the Greek Prime Minister on the anniversary of the Italian attack on Greece received great attention in the Greek and Greek Cypriot press. The British Premier stated that:

*“Their [the Greek people] martyrdom will be
avenged by the Pan-Hellenic Army of liberation.
The unity of all her sons and daughters behind their
King and Government in the cause of their Fatherland
will bring its sure reward”⁴*

This created a common feeling among Greeks and Greek Cypriots, that if the Allies were successful, then Enosis with Greece would follow as a matter of course. However, the British colonial line, that Cyprus was a valuable asset of the Empire, had not changed. The pro-Greek acts of the Foreign Office and of Downing St. were simply empty words, aiming to raise the morale of the Greek Cypriot community and not to promise anything for the future. The fact that Britain was not willing to grant Cyprus to Greece, can be revealed by her refusal to associate Cyprus with anything from metropolitan Greece during the whole course of the War. When in May 1941 the Greek government of Tsouderos was seeking a new shelter after the German invasion in Crete, Cyprus was mentioned as a sufficient refuge by the Greek side. Britain refused on the basis that such a development could be used by Turkey as an excuse in order to place herself on the Axis’ side. However, after the Lausanne Treaty (Nov.1922–Jan. 1923) Turkey did not have any legitimate interest upon Cyprus’ fate, while on the other hand, Turkey had not shown any interest regarding island’s status quo since January 1923. In addition, throughout the war, Britain never allowed Greek troops to be stationed in

⁴ The Times, 28 Oct 1941, p.5.

Cyprus, Greek refugees aiming to escape the Nazis' suppression were allowed to enter Syria or Palestine but not Cyprus, even if the latter could be reached more easily.⁵

Despite the fact that British foreign policy towards Cyprus did not change, her internal colonial policy became one of wartime liberalism. This can be fully justified by the geostrategic equilibrium of that time. After the total collapse of the French forces and until the American entrance on the Allied side (Dec. 1941), Britain was the only major power against the united Axis forces in Western Europe. Thus, it would have proven extremely difficult for her wartime efforts if she had been obliged to face an internal opposition front within her empire. For that reason, especially after the Italian invasion in Greece, constitutional reforms were introduced in the Cypriot political arena. In 1941 the decision to restore municipal elections was announced, while the trade union movement was also given official encouragement by the setting up of the first Labour department and the enactment of the Trade Unions and Trades Disputes Law on the pattern of legislation in Britain. The same year the Cypriots formed PTUC⁶ with 3,854 Greek and Turkish Cypriot members. However, the most important political development was the formation of AKEL in 1941⁷ at Skarinou village.⁸ The new party was formed by Socialists and Communists under the common leadership of the ex-Secretary General of KKK, Ploutis Servas and the Secretary-General of EKK, Giannakos Pantelidis. The nature of the new party was anti-colonial but its major concern and task was to defend and represent the Cypriot proletariat. AKEL's manifesto defined the party as Marxist-Leninist, moving within the framework of proletariat internationalism and operating in favour of a socialist society. It is essential to note here that the British authorities welcomed and encouraged the formation of AKEL for two main reasons. First of all, during that time Moscow and London were fighting on the same side, so the allowance and toleration of a left party within the framework of the Empire was a goodwill gesture, aiming to strengthen the unity of the two major European anti-Nazi powers. The second reason is that the views of AKEL about international solidarity, and their anti-nationalist slogans, were viewed by the British authorities as a healthy antidote to the nationalist politicians backed by the

⁵ A. Xydis, *Politics: Cyprus*, (Athens, 1992), p. 24.

⁶ P. Loizou, *The Labour Movement in Cyprus*, (Nicosia, 1987), vol. II, p p. 123-26

⁷ From October 1941 onwards, political meetings were re-allowed in Cyprus. As seen in previous chapter after the disturbances of 1931 special illiberal laws had been introduced in Cyprus aiming to jeopardize the Enosist movement.

⁸ H. K. Giallouridis, *The Political Parties in Cyprus*, (Athens, 1990), vol. II, p. 165. See also T. W. Adams, *The Communist Party of Cyprus*, (Stanford, 1971), p. 23.

Church and their inflexible attitude of “Enosis and nothing but Enosis”. Nevertheless, an important detail, not mentioned in any Greek or British source, is that Mr Pantelidis had been pre-chosen by the British authorities as the only left political figure in Cyprus who could guarantee the party’s non-subjugation to the mighty Soviet Union. As he remembers:

“I was relaxing in my father’s home at Lapithos when the doorbell rang. It was late at night so I was not sure if I should answer the door since times were peculiar and you could not trust anyone...I opened the door and I saw Sir Campbell Woolley [the governor of Cyprus] and another tall man with Mediterranean features. The unknown man introduced himself as Mr. Smith and I realized that he did not want to reveal his real name...I noticed that his accent was Oxfordian. Sir Campbell said to me that Mr. Smith wanted to have a word with me in private, so I led him to my father’s study room. At first he said to me that the authorities knew about my attempts to re-establish the Communist Party and they did not object the idea, as long as I was to be the central figure. After that he offered me money to assist, as he said, my endeavours. I denied the offer and I said to him that I was just a soldier of the International Social movement and that the leadership of the new party would be decided by the first plenary session. He smiled and he said that he already knew the outcome. The British wanted me to be the leader of AKEL because they knew that I was an anti-Stalinist and I would oppose to any attempt of the Soviet Union to control the party. The main concern for them was to keep Stalin’s influence away from the internal affairs of the empire...”⁹

However, the birth of AKEL put considerable pressure on the nationalist circles of the Greek Cypriot community and the Orthodox Church. They considered AKEL to be a

⁹ Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis during July 1998 in Nicosia.

threat to their political dominance in the Cypriot political arena.¹⁰ Therefore, the nationalists, with the moral and financial support of the Church, formed KEK in 1942 under the leadership of a well known and popular political figure, Themistoklis Dervis.¹¹ Unlike AKEL, the new party did not present an ideological manifesto and its only aim was to confront the Communist threat and to continue the struggle for Enosis. Open confrontation between the two political foundations soon developed. In 1943 the Greek trade unions split into nationalist and left-wing groups. As its third conference held in Limassol PTUC declared itself to be an inseparable part of AKEL¹² KEK blamed AKEL for manipulation of the workers and for a short period of time bloody clashes took place inside factories between supporters of the two sides. The situation was so explosive that the authorities were forced to postpone the municipal elections for few months. AKEL's effort to monopolize the trade union movement led to the formation of a small right wing union, SEK, under the leadership of Michael Pissas. Nevertheless, SEK never gained considerable power and its pro-bourgeois attitude led to the unbounded dominance of the left-wing PTUC. During the same year, for the first time the Turkish Cypriot side took a political initiative in order to face the Enosis movement and the rise of the left, which threatened the deeply religious and introvert community. The new political foundation was named KATAK¹³, under the prominent Turkish Cypriot Dr. Kutchuk. The formation of the Turkish party signalled the awakening of the political instinct and the need for organized representation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The appearance of AKEL in the Cypriot political spectrum forced every other side, Right-wing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to escape from their political stagnation and re-organize themselves in order to face the new challenge. This political awakening, as will be seen later on, gave a new moral boost to the Cypriot anti-colonial movement and deeply influenced the methods of the Greek Cypriot leadership to re-introduce the Enosis issue after a long period (since 1931) of awkward silence and political introversion.

According to the spirit of that time, the municipal elections of March 1943 were held in a climate of undoubted democratic procedures and civilized political debates. The

¹⁰ It has to be noted here that the fears of the Nationalist Cypriot circles and the Church were not unfounded. From 1941 until 1945 AKEL had 5,000 organized party members, while inside the Trade Unions its power rose to 11,000 out of 13,000 workers in total. For more see KKE Official Archives, Δ Short Investigation upon Cyprus and AKEL, case 371, files, 14/20/21

¹¹ H. K. Giallouridis, op. cit., p. 166.

¹² Dept of Labour, Annual Report, (Nicosia, 1944), p. 10.

British establishment showed a meritorious political toleration, by giving the candidates the opportunity to advance the cause of Enosis. It must be noted that both KEK and AKEL made use of a pro-Enosist rhetoric, proving that apart from the Greek Cypriot left-wing intelligentsia, the rest of the Greek Cypriot community, irrespective of their political preferences, favoured of the concept of Enosis. As Pantelidis remembered:

*“The illiterate worker who came to our pre-election congregations did not and could not understand the Marxist Leninist rhetoric. He wanted to hear revolutionary slogans against the bourgeois class and pro-Enosist slogans that would make him feel proud to be Greek. I believe that during those years AKEL was one of the most radical and revolutionary left parties in Europe, with the largest number of Nationalist supporters”*¹⁴

In order to face the nationalist coalition of EKE, AKEL formed a coalition with the leftist group PESP. AKEL's great appeal to the masses, mainly due to the Socialist and pro-Enosis slogans, and EKE's failure to propose effective social reforms, led to the triumphant victory of the Left in the four main cities of the island, establishing AKEL as the main political power in Cyprus.¹⁵ The British side was fully satisfied by the results, viewing AKEL's electoral victory as a personal success, which could isolate and gradually eradicate the nationalist movement. Characteristically Sir C. Campbell Woolley sent a personal telegram to G. Pantelidis congratulating him for his party's great appeal to the Cypriot people, claiming that the municipal elections of '43 could be a new beginning for the island's fate.¹⁶ However, the British side incorrectly interpreted AKEL's victory. The victory of the left did not necessarily mean the abandonment of the Enosis ideals. It was more a protest vote against the Greek Cypriot upper class than an acceptance of the Marxist axiom *“Proletarians have no country”*. For that reason some British political figures, who had an absolute lack of knowledge of the Cypriot situation, committed the grave mistake, judging by the electoral results, of challenging

¹³ An Investigation into Matters Concerning and Affecting the Turkish Community in Cyprus: Interim Report of the Committee on Turkish Affairs, (Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1949).

¹⁴ Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis during July 1998 in Nicosia.

¹⁵ AKEL's representatives elected were: Nicosia : Ioannis Kliridis, Limassol : Ploutis Servas, Famagusta: Adamantios Adamantos, Larnaca: Gianakos Pantelidis. See I. Mlios & T. Kyprianidis, The Cypriot Question after the Second World War. The Greek and Greek Cypriot Strategy, Thesis (Athens, Oct-Dec 1988), vol. 25, pp. 29 – 42.

¹⁶ Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis during July 1998 in Nicosia.

the national feelings of the Greek Cypriots. Thus, when Lord Faringdon stated inside the House of Lords that:

*“Although it is true that the majority of the population of Cyprus speak Greek, Cyprus was not, as your Lordships will be aware, really a part of the ancient classical Greek world—that is to say, it was a part of the world, but not in any sense part of the Greek world... Greece which, as I say, is not truly the mother country of the Cypriots, and which is also a country from which they could obtain no possible advantages”*¹⁷

this angered the Greek Cypriot population, in general, and jeopardized the local British efforts to take advantage of the electoral results and implement the well-known doctrine of divide and rule inside the Greek Cypriot community.

Nevertheless, the liberal reforms of the British authorities and the realization of the municipal elections proved negative for the existing regime. The Greek Cypriots could organize public meetings and speak freely again about their everlasting desire for Enosis with Greece. On the other hand, AKEL's formation did not contribute to the isolation of nationalist ideas concerning Enosis, since in many cases AKEL, through its anti-colonial principles, proved to be more radical even than the Church. At the same time, the rise of the left in the island led to the creation of another front as dangerous as the Enosis issue. AKEL was the only legal Communist party in the wider area of the Mediterranean and the Middle East during the war, and one of the most powerful ones. This gave it the freedom to put pressure upon the British government for social reforms and the elevation of living standards on the island, which were extremely low due to economic depression caused by the war. After 1943 and until the end of the war, military force was twice used to deal with disturbances in the island. Incidents of unrest entered daily Cypriot life. The most serious one took place on March 25, 1945. The authorities had given permission for celebration of the Greek Independence Day. Riots broke out in Nicosia, while the police tried to stop an AKEL march heading to the Government House. Police's intervention resulted in 40 dead and 350 wounded.¹⁸

¹⁷ House of Lord Debates, 31 March 1943, vol. 126, col. 1024.

¹⁸ K. Tsoukalas, *La Greque Tragedie*, (Paris, 1968), Sixth ed., p. 74.

Britain had to reconsider the Cypriot question in order to preserve law and order in the island.

However, during that time Cyprus was not the only riddle for Britain. The end of the Second World War brought fundamental transformations to the balance of power in the global spectrum. Instead of Germany challenging the British Empire, a new equilibrium of power was constructed with the USSR challenging the USA¹⁹ The Soviet Union, which in the past represented a great ideological threat for the Western world, was holding the position of a great military power at the end of the war. The Red Army, which liberated the whole of Eastern and Central Europe, was the first army that entered Berlin, and played one of the leading roles in the Nazi's defeat. On the other hand, the American force contributed a lot to the defeat of the Axis forces. American troops were welcomed everywhere as the great liberators and the American economy was at a higher level than ever before, as the main ammunition and food supplier for the Allied army. Nevertheless, the situation was not idyllic for Britain. The end of the Second World War found Britain maintaining a massive military force in the whole of the world, especially in the Middle East. In 1945 the British Army consisted of five million men, while four million held non combatant posts.²⁰ With the end of the Second World War Britain had to decide about her position in the new balance of power. The great social and economic problems facing home, mainly due to the titanic British efforts to face the German forces, were calling for an immediate solution. As Woodhouse mentions, the British policy of that time had to find an equilibrium between two conflicting necessities; economic reconstruction in the domestic sphere and the accomplishment of her duties as a great power in the global political arena.²¹ The British White Paper for Defence in 1946 proposed the immediate need for reduction of the British military force. That simply meant that Britain was adopting a new foreign and colonial policy, since her internal problems were forcing the state to approach the post-war reality by abandoning the old military and diplomatic doctrines. According to the White Paper the number of military personnel had to be reduced to 1,100,000 men by the end of '46, with further reductions thereafter.²² The transformation of the British mentality can be fully revealed in the White Book for Defence in 1948, in which Britain re-defined her overseas colonies, abandoning the term Empire and adopting the term

¹⁹ P.J. Taylor , Britain and the Cold War, 1945 as Geopolitical Transition , (London, 1990), p. 17.

²⁰ C.W. Woodhouse , British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War , (London , 1961), p. 77.

²¹ *ibid*, p. 77

Commonwealth.²³ Nevertheless, British moderate views for the Empire could not refer to the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus in particular. After the British evacuation from India, the Foreign Office continued to regard the Eastern Mediterranean as a top priority region for the British geostrategic interests. This can be explained by the fact that through the maintenance of British control in the area, London could preserve and safeguard links with other countries of the Commonwealth, where she had vital strategic and economic interests. The need for the safeguarding of the communication routes with the rest of the Commonwealth had been emphasised successfully inside the House of Commons by a well-known member of the hard-liners of the Conservative Party. As Mr. Maitland said:

*“... It is not only a question of oil...Inward bound there are Indian manganese and tin; Malayan tin, bauxite and rubber; Australian wheat, zinc and wool; Pakistani jute and cotton; East African chrome and Indonesian rubber...Then there are the Burmese rice, Mauritian sugar and soon outward bound there is our own export of capital goods of one kind and another. Metal goods and cars, capital goods for Australia, India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. It is commerce on which we live and on which our capacity to deal with inflation depends. Protection of that commerce is vital and critical to our national policy...To protect our sea lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean, we simply must be in Cyprus.”*²⁴

In addition, the region of the Eastern Mediterranean remained strategically important for Britain mainly because of the oil resources of the Middle East. Accepting the fact that oil was one of the mainstays of the British economy, the Middle East oil resources were the main suppliers for Britain and the rest of Western Europe. Britain could keep the Middle Eastern oil resources under close surveillance by maintaining its presence in Cyprus. Additionally, the awakening of Arab nationalism, after the end of the Second World War, just strengthened the British urge to focus on Cyprus as the only secure bastion of her interests in the region. However, the main reason for British persistence in keeping Cyprus under British control was to avoid the unpleasant process of rapid de-

²² C.W. Woodhouse, op.cit., pp. 77-78.

²³ C.W. Woodhouse, op.cit., p. 79.

colonisation in the rest of the British colonies. India's independence in 1947 was viewed by many of the British colonies as a brilliant example to follow. Nevertheless, despite the peaceful withdrawal of the British forces from India the strategic and psychological consequences of the loss of the "Jewel of the Empire" were enormous. Strategists from Wellington to Attlee's chiefs-of-staff agreed, and the latter feared that Britain's future as a world power would be in jeopardy without India's reserve of manpower, which had proved so vital in two world wars and sundry smaller imperial campaigns throughout the Middle East, East Africa and the Far East.²⁵ Although the British officials, and in particular the ruling Labour party, had come to terms with the idea that de-colonisation was a political necessity, they still desired to proceed to this gradually, in their own time and agenda. With that, they wanted to preserve British geostrategic interests in the global spectrum and at the same give the British public time to come to terms with the idea that the Empire was no more. Therefore, if they were to accept the Greek Cypriot demand for Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, they would create a dangerous example for other British colonies with the same separatist aspirations. As Sir Arthur Dawe, the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office stated:

*"If we handed over Cyprus it would result in a clamour for the handing over of other colonial territory, e.g. the Falkland Islands, Hong Kong, etc."*²⁶

The end of the war found Cyprus in a state of alert. The realization of the municipal elections of 1943, the return of the exiled leaders of the disturbances of '31, and the defeat of the Axis forces, created the feeling among Greek Cypriots that the decisive moment concerning the national vindication had arrived. The Greek Cypriots, unaware of the new post-war reality, strongly believed that their war efforts on the Allied side would be rewarded. However, their Enosis demands were ignored again during the Paris Peace Conference (July–October 1946), where the Dodecanese (a group of twelve islands situated in the southeast Aegean) passed under Greek control but Cyprus was not even mentioned during the official negotiations.²⁷ The Dodecanese issue had some similarities with the Cypriot question. Until the end of the Second World War it was an Italian dominion while the majority of the population was Greek. In addition those

²⁴ Patrick Maitland: House of Commons, (July 15, 1957), vol.573, col.848-851.

²⁵ J. Lawrence, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, (London, 1998), p. 556.

²⁶ F.O Papers 371/55761, 12 Sept. 1946.

islands were close to the Turkish coast of Ionia and were under Turkish occupation until Italians arrived. However, things were much simpler for the Dodecanese. The twelve islands were not close to the oil resources of the Middle East, their geostrategic position could not cause problems to Turkey, and in addition, the islands did not have a numerous Turkish population which could oppose the Enosis with Greece. Furthermore, the Cypriot question was not even mentioned by the Greek side for reasons that can be justified by the internal situation in the country. Since Greece had been liberated from the German-Italian-Bulgarian yoke during April 1944, a great antagonism had arisen between the royalists and the Communists. During the occupation, the Communists formed the backbone of the resistance, while the majority of the royalist side collaborated with the invaders. After the end of the Second World War, KKE demanded, as a reward, a place in the first coalition government, as had happened in Italy, and refused to accept the return of the King without holding a plebiscite first. The Greek Communist Party, mainly because of its own isolationist mistakes and the inflexible attitude of the royalists, chose the solution of the armed confrontation, leading the country to a civil war. Britain's main concern was to keep her loyal ally in the Western camp, therefore, during those critical moments, she supported the royalist side by providing economic aid to the royalist troops.²⁸ In 1946, the Greek Civil War was at a critical turning point and Greece did not want to discontent her main ally by raising the Cypriot question in an International summit. Once again, Cyprus had been sacrificed on the altar of secret diplomacy by the same country, that was looked upon as a loving mother.

The Greek failure to represent the Greek Cypriot demands did not make the latter abandon their everlasting ambitions for Enosis. At the end of December 1946, a representative delegation, composed of members of the left and the right (such as the Bishop of Paphos Leontios, and I. Klerides KC) left for Athens. Their prime aim was to put pressure upon the Greek government, and remind her of her national duty, as the metropolitan centre of Hellenism, concerning the Cypriot question. The presence of the Greek Cypriot delegation in Athens was an embarrassment to the Greek government but

²⁷ The official cession of Dodecanese took place on March 8, 1948. For more concerning the issue see J. Huntzinger, *Europe of the Past, the Present and the Future*, (Athens, 1978), vol. II, p.p. 357 – 62.

²⁸ The bibliography concerning the British attitude during the Greek Civil War is vast. However, a valuable source for this period, which deals quite successfully with the complexities of the issue, can be found in D.H. Close, *The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization*, (London, 1993). See also the detailed study of B. Kontis, *The Anglo-American Policy and the Greek issue: 1945-1949*, (Thessaloniki, 1984).

a source of enthusiasm to the press and the public. Except for some empty words of admiration about their national devotion and endurance, the delegation failed to achieve a definite promise of diplomatic support.²⁹ The Greek government could not abandon the policy of non-intervention concerning the Cypriot question and argue with her valuable ally and champion, especially during that particular period when the Communist guerillas were in control of the most parts of central and north Greece. Despite the negative development, the Greek Cypriot delegation was prepared to send a clear message to all sides. Therefore, the next station was London. The Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, refused to see them, but on February 7, 1947, they presented the Colonial Secretary, Creech Jones, with a memorandum concerning their position towards the Cypriot status quo.³⁰ The memorandum stated the case for Enosis and suggested that the Turkish minority could be fully safeguarded inside the Greek framework. C. Jones made it clear yet again that no change in the island's status was contemplated. The timing of the rejection of the Greek Cypriot proposals, in such a definite way, proved to be unlucky since a new governor was ready to come to Cyprus. Lord Winster arrived in Cyprus on March 27, 1947. As has already been mentioned, Britain's emergence from the Second World War forced the officials in the Foreign Office to re-consider their policies in Cyprus. The new geo-strategic facts that rose from the ruins of the Second World War were calling for a more liberal policy-line in the island. Therefore, the new governor had the special task of negotiating with the Greek Cypriots for the introduction of a new constitution, that would bridge the gap between the British and the Greek Cypriot side, and silence the reactionary forces that were promoting the Enosis cause by accusing the British establishment of illiberal methods of governing. However, the Greek Cypriots, mainly due to the British attitude one month earlier in London, developed a hostile atmosphere to the newly arrived Governor. The Church Council ordered a boycott of the reception for the new Governor, and AKEL organized a general union strike demanding the end of the colonial era in Cyprus.³¹ Lord Winster, an experienced politician, in order to reverse the negative Greek Cypriot attitude towards him, invited the municipalities and the Press on July 9 to nominate representatives for a Consultative Assembly, which would make recommendations on the type of constitution to be adopted, so that the Cypriots might

²⁹ Eleftheria, 30 Dec, 1946, p. 2.

³⁰ The Times, 8 February, 1947, p. 4.

³¹ I. Milios & T. Kyprianidis, op. cit., pp. 45-70.

play a greater part in the island's internal affairs.³² It was an excellent political move which aimed to smash the unity of the Greek Cypriots, stressing the deep difference between the inflexibility of the Greek Cypriot Right and the flexibility of the Left. While the first side declared that any negotiations with the British side would have been an act of treason for the ultimate national cause, the second viewed the negotiations as a decisive step towards control of the power and the gradual realization of self-determination and unification with Greece. The Church rejected the negotiation proposals and accused AKEL of being members of the British Intelligence. AKEL responded to the nationalist accusations, blaming the Church leadership as an anti-communist organization which was sabotaging the efforts for Enosis.³³ On July 12, Archbishop Leontios, in an open letter to the Cypriot people, urged them to resist the British and Communist plans, while AKEL decided on July 20 to participate in the Consultative Assembly. In that schizophrenic atmosphere, on July 26 Leontios died. Macarios II took his place on December 27. Because of Leontios' death the meeting of the Consultative Assembly had been postponed until May 7, 1948, when a new Cypriot Constitution had been proposed by the British authorities. The new Constitution proposed the formation of a Legislative Council with 4 appointed and 22 elected members. From the 22 elected members, 18 would have been Greeks and 4 Turkish. According to the British proposals, the Legislative Council did not have the right to vote on the colonial status quo of the island, monetary issues, defence, international affairs, minority issues, or constitutional issues, without the Governor's permission. In addition, an Executive Council was proposed with 4 official and 4 unofficial members, 3 Greeks and 1 Turkish, as the Governor's advisory body.³⁴ There is no doubt that the British proposals could have brought considerable benefits to the Greek Cypriot side. For the first time the Greek Cypriots had the advantage of the absolute majority inside the Legislative Council, and even if the new Constitution was deeply pro-colonial, it gave the Greek Cypriots the opportunity to influence the colonial authorities and gradually lead the island, as had happened in other British colonies, to a self-determining status. Eventually the British proposals were turned down and a historic opportunity for both Britain and Cyprus to take a decisive step towards the final settlement of the Cypriot question was lost. The reasons for this historic failure can be found in the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the Greek Communist Party. As mentioned

³² G. Kirk, *The Middle East, 1945 – 1950*, (London, 1954), p. 175.

³³ N. Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years*, (Athens, 1981), pp. 24 – 25.

³⁴ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 7-14 1948, p. 9438.

in chapter I, the influence of the Orthodox Church upon the Greek Cypriot population was unquestionably extensive. Thus, by using her close links with civil society, the Orthodox Church, through the newly elected Archbishop Makarios II, managed to turn the masses against AKEL. As G. Pantelidis argued:

"During the days of the Consultative Assembly, the hostility of the Greek Cypriots towards us was great even inside AKEL's ranks. Archbishop Makarios II was a great orator and eventually we found ourselves with our backs to the wall. We had two choices. Either to accept the British proposals and to annihilate our electoral power, or to abandon the Assembly and harm the efforts for a satisfactory solution concerning the Cypriot status quo."

The leadership of AKEL was faced with a historic dilemma, but a letter that arrived from Greece made things simpler for them. As Pantelidis continues:

"... However, a letter arrived from Greece convincing us of what we should decide. The letter was from the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, Nikos Zahariadis. He was urging us to abandon the negotiations and work towards the Enosis with Greece. He said that it was our national duty not to collaborate with the forces of Imperialism. We did not have any other choice. N. Zahariadis was a legendary figure for the International Communist movement, and the leader of the guerilla troops that were fighting for a Socialist Greece. We did not have the moral strength to reject his suggestions..."³⁵

It must be noted here, that this was the first time that the Greek Communist Party had intervened in the Cypriot question. Some historians who examined Zahariadis' letter to AKEL insist that Zahariadis was Stalin's messenger, connecting that with the Soviet expansionist plans in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to those historians, Stalin's intention towards Cyprus was to place the island under Soviet influence, fulfilling the

³⁵ Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis in Nicosia during July 1998.

Soviet desire for a power base in the Mediterranean.³⁶ However, it would be a great mistake to accept the above view. It is well proven that after the Percentages Agreement on the Balkans³⁷ and Yalta's agreement, Stalin did not doubt the English dominance in Greece and Cyprus. For that reason he did not assist the Greek Communists' guerillas during the Greek Civil War, even if he had been asked to by the Greek Communist leadership. In addition, it must not be forgotten that during that time, Stalin's main task was to secure Eastern Europe in the Soviet camp. Looking closely at Zahariadis' memoirs, it becomes obvious that the Secretary-General of the Communist Party was in favour of the collapse of the negotiations, insisting that Britain could not maintain two open fronts at the same time both in Greece and Cyprus. According to his calculations, if Britain had to choose between Greece and Cyprus, she would prefer the second giving the Communist guerillas the opportunity to win the war and establish their dominance over the first. Zahariadis' letter was a primitive effort of an mediocre leader to create social unrest in Cyprus, in order to divert the British attention from the Greek Civil War theatre to Aphrodite's island. History, as Herodotus said, does not repeat itself. Thus a golden opportunity had been lost for the island and its people for a gradual improvement of the political conditions, which could have led to the final settlement of the Cypriot question. Once more, Cyprus had been sacrificed to political necessities in order to support a cause that was irrelevant to the anti-colonial movement on the island.

The impact of the collapse of the Consultative Assembly was as great for the British side. As the result of the fiasco of the Consultative Assembly, the Greek Cypriot nationalist side gained great advantage, not through an enlightened policy of their own, but because of the British miscalculations and the Communists' mistakes. AKEL, trying to preserve its unity, altered its anti-nationalist policy and tried to bridge the gap between itself and the Church. The British authorities acted irrationally, panicked at the prospect of an alliance between the Church and the Communists, and on January 24, 1949, through a special issue of the official Government's Gazette, threatened the Cypriots that in any case of disturbances the illiberal laws of 1931 would be enforced.³⁸ The British warnings provoked the Greek Cypriot feelings, and resulted in the

³⁶ For more concerning that view which, unfortunately, had been adopted by many Greek politicians of the old guard, see D. Dimitrakos, Kostas Mitsotakis, A Political Biography, (Athens, 1989), vol. I, pp. 441 – 47.

³⁷ On the evening of 9 October 1944, Stalin and Churchill met in Moscow. The meeting concluded the notorious Percentages Agreement on the Balkans, which granted Britain 90% dominance in Greece at the price of an equal percentage for Stalin in Romania.

invigoration of the Enosist movement. In addition, as a result of the British provocation, the moderate leadership of AKEL was forced to surrender power as an admittance of their mistake in negotiating with the Imperialists, and a new leadership arrived with strong pro-Enosist ideas.³⁹ Ezekias Papaioannou, a prominent Communist figure and a member of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, emerged as the new leader of AKEL, while a new political council was formed consisting of the leaders of the Trade Unions, such as Andreas Ziatridis, Alexandros Fantis, Savas Ioannou, Georgios Hristodoulidis and Pavlos Georgiou. From the first day in office the new leadership confirmed its intentions with the release of a leaflet, blaming the previous administration for political mistakes and demanding Enosis with Greece.⁴⁰ Now Britain had to face a powerful nationalist coalition, consisting of the Church, the Communists and the Right-wing parties. The failure of the British policy to maintain the rivalry between the Left and the Right in Cyprus was taken as Lord Winster's personal defeat, thus on May 10, 1949, Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright replaced him as governor of Cyprus.

The arrival of the new Governor found Cyprus in an electoral fever. The new municipal elections were in the centre of the Cypriot concern, and the new arrival did not create a sound impact. The result of the municipal elections showed the transformation of the Greek Cypriot attitude towards the extreme ideas of the nationalist side. The nationalists managed to elect T. Dervis in Nicosia, C. Galatopoulos in Paphos and H. Dimitriadis in Famagusta, while in the rest of the Cypriot cities the Left managed to elect their representatives with reduced majorities.⁴¹ The results of the municipal elections was the final blow for the already few moderate figures inside the Greek Cypriot framework who were in favour of political negotiations with the British authorities. The Greek Cypriots, tired of their long and fruitless struggle about their national vindication, wanted more radical approaches that could persuade the British authorities to abandon the island. In that particular moment the Orthodox Church manifested its great influence upon the Greek Cypriots and proposed a Plebiscite about the Enosis issue. The idea of holding a plebiscite in Cyprus had been mentioned several times since the war. Platts-Mills, a spokesman for the left-wing Cypriots, had raised

³⁸ Cypriot Government Gazette, 24 January 1949, Nicosia. A full text can still be found in the University of Cyprus archives in Nicosia.

³⁹ N. Kranidiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁴⁰ Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis in Nicosia during July 1998.

⁴¹ H. K. Giallouridis, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

the question in the House of Commons on July 7, 1948, with no further effect whatsoever.⁴² One month after Wright's arrival, AKEL, in an attempt to establish itself as an Enosist sympathizer, seized the initiative with an appeal to the Church to co-operate in sending a joint memorandum and an all party delegation to the United Nations. The invitation was rebuffed, not because of the blind hostility of the Church towards the Communists as some Greek historians claimed, but because of the political situation that had been established at international level.⁴³

The main preoccupation of the Church was to keep the Cypriot question away from the new reality that was rising in the global arena, the Cold War reality. A joint Cypriot delegation to the United Nations, consisting of Communists and Right wingers, would have embarrassed the right-wing government in Greece and made the major anti-Communist forces, such as USA or France suspicious. However, AKEL's proposal forced the Church to take the initiative, fearing that a delay could drive the Greek Cypriots against her. Therefore, on December 5th the Ethnarchy Council decided to hold the plebiscite on January 15, 1950 unless the Government in the meantime held its own referendum. On December 12, the Archbishop asked the Governor to do so. He wrote that during seventy-one years of British rule, the Cypriots had never stopped demanding the island's national restoration through union with Greece and that Great Britain was disregarding the island's Hellenic character and the principle of self-determination.⁴⁴ The British side kept its nerve, and on December 17, the Governor wrote to the Archbishop commenting on his use of the word "plebiscite"

*"Mass petitions of this character have been organized in Cyprus on various occasions in the past, but I know of no instance in which the Government was concerned except to receive them; and I can conceive of no circumstances in which the Government could be associated with their promotion."*⁴⁵

The Turkish Cypriots grew increasingly uneasy at these developments. Thousands of Turks held a rally in Nicosia on December 12, and adopted a five-point resolution,

⁴² Platts-Mills: House of Commons, July 7 1948, vol. 453, col. 365-66.

⁴³ For more concerning the above view see : A.E. Rokopoulos, Religion and Propaganda in Modern Greece, (Athens, 1984), vol. III, pp. 217-21.

⁴⁴ Cyprus Mail, 20 December 1949, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

protesting against Enosis. Its authors claimed that Enosis would bring economic ruin, racial and social disorders and would eventually lead Cyprus to a civil bloodshed. Stressing that a plebiscite was pointless, they reaffirmed that the continuation of the status quo was essential for the protection of the minorities and the preservation of peace. If Britain wanted to abandon Cyprus, they added, then it should be returned to Turkey, the only Near Eastern country capable of defending it. Finally they authorized Dr. Kutchuk to submit the resolution to the UN, the British Colonial and Foreign Secretaries, and to the various political parties and associations in Britain and Turkey.⁴⁶ By that, the Turkish side excluded herself from the plebiscite, and at the same time outraged the Greek Cypriot side with her historic inaccuracies concerning Turkish rights upon Cyprus.

The news for the forthcoming plebiscite in Cyprus raised national enthusiasm in Greece. The Greek newspapers dedicated full pages to the Cypriot question, praising the leadership of the Orthodox Church for its initiative. Nevertheless, the Greek government did not react in the same way. After a sudden visit of the British Ambassador in Athens to the house of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. Pipinelis, the official spokesman of the Greek Foreign Office stated that:

“The Plebiscite in Cyprus is being held by irresponsible people. Under the present circumstances, initiatives like that, could be destructive for the Greek interests.”⁴⁷

It is more than obvious that the above declaration was made under British pressure and is indicative of the extent of foreign involvement in the internal Greek affairs, a fact which proved to be catastrophic for Enosis, as will be seen in the following chapters.

Despite the Athenian response, the plebiscite was held, in an atmosphere of general enthusiasm, on January 15, 1950. The voting was not to be secret, since the Greek Cypriots had to sign in an open book under the label Enosis or non-Enosis. Of course this method is beyond any democratic procedure, but it is important to note that the Plebiscite was unofficial and the Church did not have the means to provide every isolated village with electoral polls. At the same time, it was a tactical movement of the

⁴⁶ Cyprus Mail, 13 December 1949, p. 3.

⁴⁷ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 41.

Church in order to put pressure upon the moderates to vote in favour of Enosis. N. Kranidiotis provides a lyrical description of that historic day:

*"The night before snow had covered Nicosia, Limassol and Paphos, giving a sign of purity to the national effort. [Snow is quite unique for Cyprus, due to the island's tropical climate, so one can imagine its impact on the Greek Cypriot mentality]. I had the supervision of a group of villages, south and south-east of Nicosia. I can not forget the emotion and the national pride of the villagers from Latsion, Pera Horiou, Nisou, Idaliou and Lympion, who were coming dressed in full fig, in order to sign the Enosis petition. As long as I live, I will not forget that scene."*⁴⁸

On January 29, an encyclical signed by all the Cypriot bishops announced a 95.7 percent vote in favour of Enosis.⁴⁹ It must be noted here, that all the Greek Cypriots who held civil service positions were not allowed to vote by the British authorities, since they were under oath of allegiance to the British Crown. The Archbishop challenged the Cyprus government either to accept the results or else conduct its own plebiscite, and received the customary reply that the subject was closed. The Plebiscite was a personal victory of the Greek Orthodox Church, which managed to put under its own influence over the Communists and proclaim itself the champion of the Greek Cypriot demands for national vindication. The Plebiscite was the first step, a ticket towards the internationalization of the Cypriot issue. On February 14, the Ethnarchy Council announced its intention to promote the cause in Greece, Great Britain and the US on the basis of the plebiscite results. The Akkellists also decided to campaign abroad but their representatives, Adamos Adamantos, Ezekias Papaioannou and Evodoros Ioannides, could not as Communists get visas for Greece or the United States, so their efforts were restricted in Britain and countries behind the Iron Curtain. In Athens, the delegation met the Greek Prime Minister, Nikolaos Plastiras. The Greek Premier refused to accept the plebiscite results and stated that the Greek government would negotiate with Britain on Cyprus, when the circumstances were in favour of Enosis. The Greek Prime Minister, a true patriot and a prominent military figure, had no other choice. Greece,

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁹ Cyprus Mail, 29 January 1950.

after a catastrophic occupation and a disastrous Civil War, had neither the economic nor the political means to confront Britain at an international level about the Cypriot question. As Plastiras wrote in his memoirs:

*"I heard the cries of our enslaved brothers but I could do nothing. It was in our best interest not to confront London in such a serious matter, as Cyprus. We had to wait and hope that one day Cyprus will not serve the British interests any more..."*⁵⁰

The Cypriot delegation reached England in August. The Cypriot nationalists had a direct link with Classical scholars and Romantics, versed in the Byronic tradition, and with the British Parliament through the Socialists. Members of Parliament, such as Kenneth Robinson and Lena Jeger, and prominent Socialist sympathizers including Tom Driberg, Woodrow Wyatt and Philip Noel Baker, were ready to put themselves at the service of Enosis.⁵¹ Therefore, the Cyprus case was assured of press publicity. However, that was not enough. The Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, refused to see the Cypriot delegation, stating that it would have been pointless to hear their requests concerning a subject which did not exist.

The next move was towards the United States. The US was important, first as a source of funds and secondly for its inherent anti-colonialism, which could be exploited to sway international opinion. The Greek Americans, concentrated largely in New York State, Illinois, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, were geographically well placed to work on American public opinion.⁵² Many of them were wealthy and influential, while many Greek Americans held posts in the administration, in the Attorney-General's Office, the United Nations Secretariat in New York etc.⁵³ The delegation, which arrived in the US early in September, lost no time in depositing the plebiscite signatures at the United Nations Headquarters. The acknowledgement sent by the Public Information Office was encouraging but misleading. This stated that the plebiscite results would be brought before the Secretary-General for any action which he might consider desirable:

⁵⁰ N. Plastiras, My Life as a Soldier and as a Politician : Memoirs, (Athens, 1966), Limited edition for Plastiras' personal friends, p. 322,

⁵¹ See Greek Bulletin (Greek Information Office, Greek Embassy, London), 14 August 1950.

⁵² For more concerning the geographic position and the influence of the Greek minority in the United States see: F. J. Brown & J. S. Roucek, Our Ethnic Minorities, (New York, 1939)

⁵³ F. H. Walton, A State Within A State: The Greek Nation Within the American Federal Framework, (Massachusetts, 1974), p. 259.

however, it refused to clarify whether the latter was willing to raise the Cypriot question in the next UN assembly. The Greek Cypriot delegation worked tirelessly interviewing the delegations of the member states. The spokesman for the British delegation gave the customary reply that no change in the island's sovereignty was contemplated. Mr. Cabot Lodge, on behalf of the Americans, was reported to have assured them that the documents would receive the most careful consideration. Sweden's delegate stated categorically that his country could not support the Cypriot case, giving as a reason the non-intervention clause in the UN Charter.⁵⁴ Many delegates proclaimed full support for self-determination, shifting responsibility onto the Greek government, stating that their attitude would be determined by the course it adopted. Afghanistan promised help and the anti-colonial powers, such as India, gave unqualified support.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the outcome of the visit to the United Nations was on the whole disappointing. Ignorant of procedures, the Cypriots found that without a member state to sponsor them, since as noted Greece denied any association with the delegation, no progress could be made in raising the Cyprus question.

The Western states' behaviour aimed to clip the Cypriot wings and force them to return back to their island. Despite the fact they succeeded in sending back the delegation, they did not manage to persuade the Greek Cypriots that their struggle was in vain. As will be seen in the next chapter new forces appeared in the Cypriot political spectrum, full of moral strength, determined to lift up the banner of Enosis and continue the national cause.

⁵⁴ T. Saloutos, The Real Problem of Cyprus, The Yale Review, June 1952, vol. 43, No 4.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CYPRIOT QUESTION: FROM AN INTERNAL ISSUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS .

The Athenians to the Melians
*"It is a general and necessary law
of nature to rule whatever one
can."*
Thucydides , V: 105

This chapter will cover the period from the appearance of Makarios III as a decisive factor in the Cypriot affairs to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (September-December 1954). It will be divided in two equal parts. The first part will examine Makarios' entry in the Cypriot political arena as the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of the island, his plans for the re-organization of the Greek Cypriot community according to the demands of the Enosis movement, and his methods towards the internationalization of the Cypriot question. Additionally, the first part of this chapter will review the diplomatic situation between Greece and Britain over the Cypriot issue, as well as the geostrategic and political developments that occurred during that time for the aforementioned countries and influenced their approaches to the Cypriot question. The main question that the first part of this chapter will answer is: Under which circumstances and under the influence of which factors did the Cypriot question became an international issue of the United Nations? Secondary questions that will be answered are: How can the negative attitude of the Greek government, at first, towards Makarios' demands to take the Cypriot question to the United Nations be justified in accordance with the diplomatic aims of Athens during that time? Why did Britain decide to turn down the Greek proposals for bipartite negotiations over Cyprus? To what extent did the Suez Treaty influence the British line towards the Cypriot question? The second part of this chapter will be a detailed analysis of the Ninth

Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the Greek appeal for Cyprus. The legal and diplomatic arguments of Britain, Greece and Turkey will be presented and examined in the second part, while an overall evaluation of the Ninth Assembly will be presented for all three countries. The questions that the second part will answer are: What are the theoretical complications of the terms “self-government” and “self-determination” within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations? What were the legal obligations that derived from the Lausanne Treaty for Britain, Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus? How can the role of the United States concerning the final outcome of the Greek appeal in the United Nations be justified within the geostrategic framework of the Cold War? Which factors influenced Athens to apply to the Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and was that a positive or a negative decision?

Tiberius Claudius Drusus Nero Germanicus, best known as Claudius the Stammerer, the Roman Emperor and notable historian, said that history’s best acquaintance is the unexpected. In the Cypriot case the occurrence of the unexpected played a significant role, by giving the opportunity for new forces to enter the political arena. On June 28, 1950, the charismatic yet old Makarios II died at the age of 80. As mentioned in previous chapters the Orthodox Church in Cyprus was the most powerful institution, therefore the vacant place of the Archbishopric throne attracted the interest of many candidates. The two main contestants for the Archbishopric throne were the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, and the Bishop of Kition, Makarios. Both were fervent supporters of the slogan “Enosis and nothing but Enosis” and were well known among the Greek Cypriot circles for their anti-communist feelings. The extreme-right lobbied hard in support of the Bishop of Kyrenia, while AKEL supported Kyprianos as well, despite his anti-communist feelings, regarding him as a figure who could be easier to outmanoeuvre than the formidable young Bishop of Kition. However, Makarios had made an impact on many Greek Cypriots with his youth, his energy, his charismatic personality and his educational status.¹ Makarios’ early role as a Bishop of Kition was mainly concentrated on issues such as education and the appeal of the Orthodox Church to young Greek Cypriots. Under his supervision, in 1949, the Cypriot Church began to publish a monthly magazine, “Greek Cyprus”, while he re-wrote the religious course

¹ Makarios graduated from the Theological School of the University of Athens, was enrolled in the Law School of the University of Athens and commenced post-graduate studies in the Methodist Theological College at the University of Boston, Massachusetts in the field of religious sociology. During those times only a few had the opportunity to commence undergraduate studies, so the cosmopolitan post-graduate Makarios charmed the poorly educated Greek Cypriots.

books for the Greek Cypriot Gymnasium.² In due course the Greek Cypriots chose their local representatives, who then nominated delegates to sit with the bishops and abbots on the electoral board. Makarios' personality played an important role in the Archbishopric elections, therefore on October 18, 1950, the Bishop of Kitium was elected Archbishop as Makarios III, by a majority of 97 per cent.³ So, at the age of thirty-seven, Makarios became the spiritual leader of a small but powerful Church and the political leader of the absolute majority of the island. From the first day in office, Makarios exposed his cards. At his enthronement speech he proclaimed that he would fight, however long and difficult the struggle, for the national rehabilitation of Cyprus through the desired union with Greece.

Archbishop Makarios saw two important tasks ahead of him at the beginning of his reign. The first was to consolidate the power of the Nationalists, the second to internationalize the Cypriot question, so that it was no longer a domestic issue between the Greek Cypriots and Britain. In order to fulfill his first objective, Makarios had to re-organize the Greek Cypriot Council, known as Ethnarchy. The Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy was the political organization of the Greek Cypriot community, established in the late 19th century after the arrival of Britain in the island. The primary aim of the Ethnarchy was to coordinate and promote Enosis. It also represented the Greek Cypriot community in secondary political and economic issues, such as taxation, education, trade, etc. The Orthodox Church held the main influence inside the Ethnarchy, while prominent members of the Greek Cypriot community were also included. For example, some of the Ethnarchy's members of 1948, excluding the Orthodox intelligentsia of the island, were: Z. Rossides, lawyer, B. Markidis, journalist and publisher of the "Ethnos" newspaper, K. Spyridakis, head of school of the Pangyprian Gymnasium, S. Hristidis, lawyer, D. Stavrinides, publisher of "Eleftheria" newspaper, and T. Dervis, president of KEK.⁴ Makarios did nothing to modify the political orientation of the Ethnarchy. The Council remained loyal to its political past as the front line of the Enosis movement. The newly elected Archbishop wished to intensify its political force and establish it as the only and most dynamic element of the anti-colonial front in the island. The character of the Council became even more right-wing extremist, while Makarios demonstrated his ambitions for the Ethnarchy by excluding from it all the moderates

² E. Flogeros, Makarios: A political Leader, (Nicosia, 1983), pp. 45-47.

³ H.D Purcell, Cyprus, (London, 1989), p. 252. See also E. Averof - Tositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot Question, 1950 - 1963, (Athens, 1982.), vol. I, p. 29.

⁴ N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years: Cyprus 1950-1960, (Athens, 1981), p. 28.

and left-wing figures, such as O. Xontosidas, D. Kosdites and K. Fliaros. G. Pantelidis remembers:

*"I met Makarios for the first time back in 1945. I was impressed by his appearance, he looked like a Byzantine Emperor, and by his way of speaking...When he excluded all AKEL's members from the Ethnarchy Council, everybody was surprised but me. I knew his commitment to the political demise of AKEL. In an emergency meeting the leadership of the party decided to open a front against the new enemy. However, when they tried to organize a general strike, they failed. The Trade Unions, an area where we had absolute dominance, betrayed us. The people adored Makarios, looking upon him as the only champion of their national dreams. Makarios had the absolute majority of the Greek Cypriots and he knew it. Otherwise he would not have dared to question AKEL's right to represent its voters in the Council."*⁵

Despite his despotic decision to exclude AKEL from the front line of the Cypriot political spectrum, Makarios gave a new quality to the Ethnarchy Council and its members now included, apart from the bishops and abbots, most of the leading right-wing politicians, lawyers, journalists and scholars. In this, he wanted to ensure the nationalist character of the Council, and to improve its intellectual nature. During the early days of Makarios in office he appointed N. Kranidiotis⁶ as the secretary-general of the Ethnarchy, and V. Papalios⁷, S. Zosimos⁸, A. Vlontos⁹ as ex-officio members, enlarging the intellectual capacity of the Ethnarchic Council that until that time was dominated by wealthy but not enlightened figures. In the meantime, Makarios began to strengthen the Church's influence over other nationalist organizations. For that reason he used all his influence to appoint Michael Pissas, a close friend of his, as secretary-general of SEK and Socrates Loizides as secretary-general of PEK. In that way, Makarios wanted to control the nationalist Trade Unions, to assist them in order to gain more strength than the Left, and finally to establish close contacts with the Trade Union

⁵ Personal interview with Mr. G. Pantelidis during July 1998, Nicosia.

⁶ A prominent intellectual and a skillful diplomat with studies in Harvard.

⁷ A well known painter and later head of the department of Modern Art in the Faculty of Arts of the University of Athens.

⁸ A well known architect and poet. His intellectual work had been recognized by the Academy of Athens which had given him the title of "Free Philosopher".

⁹ Well known Political philosopher and later on Dean of the graduate school of Politics and International Affairs of the University of Athens.

movement in Greece, which was purely right-wing and nationalistic after the Communist defeat in the Greek Civil War. Nevertheless, Makarios knew that all his efforts to secure the Church's dominance would be fruitless if he did not construct strong nationalist foundations within the framework of the Greek Cypriot society: in other words, establish a youth movement which would continue the difficult and long struggle for national vindication. Thus, in 1951, a few months after his enthronement, he founded PEON. It drew its members from the top classes of the Greek gymnasium and from young workers of the same age.¹⁰ PEON's mission was to inculcate pride in being Greek and to sharpen the desire for Enosis. At the same time, the purpose of the youth movement was to combat AKEL's influence, which before PEON's appearance was extremely popular among young Greek Cypriots. It must be noted here that the success of the youth movement exceeded every expectation, and a few years later many members of PEON joined the military guerilla group EOKA. In addition, Makarios' plans did not exclude the female part of the Greek Cypriot youth. Therefore, he personally organized OXEN, an organization which succeeded in bringing Greek Cypriot women, for the first time, to the front line of the Enosis cause, as equal members with the men. In such a short time Makarios managed to monopolize the Cypriot political arena, giving the other powers inside Cyprus (AKEL, the British authorities and the Turkish Cypriots) no space to develop their own policies. AKEL, after the changes in its leadership and the defeat of the Communist Party in the Greek Civil War, was trapped inside the paranoia of the first years of the Cold War. AKEL's new leadership failed in keeping the party away from the Soviet influence, a development which did not please the majority of the party's followers and the British authorities. As mentioned previously chapters, the ideology of the Greek Cypriot Communists was totally different to that of their Western comrades, giving greater importance to their national vindication than the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship.¹¹ On the other hand, after the failure of the proposed constitution in 1948, the British authorities kept a low profile in an attempt to avoid giving the Nationalists a new moral victory, allowing their opponents to develop their policies without confrontation. Last but not least, Makarios' appearance in the Cypriot political spectrum brought the Turkish Cypriot side to a state of alert. Their response, however, was of no importance, limiting actions to peaceful rallies and to protesting articles in the

¹⁰ For more concerning the PEON movement see the only book that deals with the Organization from inside: P. Vlastos, The Best Years of our Lives: PEON and Enosis, (Nicosia, 1980).

minority newspapers. Without any doubt, Makarios was the dominant figure in Cypriot political life, always one step ahead of his opponents.

However, Makarios' main aim was the internationalization of the Cypriot question. As is natural, his first attempt took place in Athens on March 1951. In the Greek capital he had many official meetings with the Greek monarch, Pavlos, the Prime Minister and son of the great Cretan politician, Sofoklis Venizelos, the Greek Archbishop, Spyridon and with other members of the Greek political scene. Makarios had only one demand. He asked for Greek support in the United Nations, if Britain persisted in her refusal to negotiate with Greece about Cyprus' fate. S. Venizelos, a clever politician, understood that he could not turn down Makarios' demands as easily as previous Greek premiers had turned down the latter's predecessors. From the first day that Makarios arrived in Athens the national press dedicated full pages to him, calling him the saviour of the enslaved island, while student rallies were organized outside his hotel calling for Enosis and nothing but Enosis. Venizelos reached the conclusion that he could not jeopardize the position of his newly elected government by opposing public feeling. Therefore, he decided to call an urgent meeting, including the leaders of the opposition, in order to reach for a common decision about the Greek attitude towards Makarios' proposals. On March 21, he invited to the Premier's residence P. Kanelopoulos, K. Maniadakis, G. Papandreou, N. Plastiras, A. Svolos, I. Sofianopoulos, S. Stefanopoulos, K. Tsaldaris and E. Tsouderos, in order to hear their views about the Cypriot question.¹² During the meeting a great quarrel occurred between S. Stefanopoulos, the leader of the extreme right, and A. Svolos, a prominent figure of the Socialist Democrats. While the former was seeking immediate action in support of the Greek Cypriot demands, the latter insisted that such a development would jeopardize attempts to win Cyprus' self-determination and would lead the island to a catastrophic Civil War. The meeting decided that Greece would propose a bipartite conference with Britain, in order to support the Greek Cypriot demands of Enosis. In addition, the Greek side was willing to offer Britain, as compensation in the case of Cyprus' unification with Greece, locations on the island and in the rest of the country that could be used as military bases. However, the meeting decided that Greece could not support a Greek Cypriot appeal to the United Nations, because such a development could jeopardize the friendly relations between the two countries. As the official document states:

¹¹ We can find greater ideological similarities of AKEL's supporters to the nationalist left beliefs of the Irish Republican Army and the preaching of Ho Chi Min, than to the internationalism of the Greek, French and Italian Communist parties.

¹² Official Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Internal Affairs, no. 5678, col. 3451.

*"The meeting decided that the timing for the expression of the Greek support to the Cypriot appeal to the United Nations is not right, and such an action should be postponed for the future since it could be harmful for the sterling relations between Greece and Britain. The government will exercise her influence over the Cypriot Ethnarchy in order to avoid an appeal to the United Nations...The government may support such an initiative in the future, but only if other vital Greek interests would not be imperilled by such an action."*¹³

It was also decided to send official representations to London, the British Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Athens, informing the British side of their decisions and plans. It must be noted here that the representation's document ended with a plea:

*"at least give a vague promise, which will calm the spirits both in Cyprus and Greece."*¹⁴

The Greek government maintained a moderate attitude. However its effort did not receive the right response from the British side. London's attitude was negative, leaving the government of a friendly nation exposed in the eyes of its people. A characteristic incident illustrates this. During November 1951, Eden was in Athens and the Greek government saw that as a great opportunity to resolve the Cypriot question within the framework of the Anglo-Greek friendship. A meeting was arranged between Eden and Averof on the 26 of the month at the residence of the British Ambassador in Athens. During the meeting Averof stated:

"The Greek people are fond of Britain and the Greek government wishes to be by Britain's side, as a loyal ally, for ever. During the past the Greek government dealt with the Cypriot issue in such a way that the Anglo-Greek friendship would not be harmed. But now the issue is fired up. Something has to be done. Greece is ready to offer Britain some of the best strategic locations in the Mediterranean if London decides to offer Cyprus the right of self-determination. If again this is

¹³ Official Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 March 1951, Meeting of the Greek political leaders in the Premier Residence, vol. XXI, col. 1245-47.

¹⁴ E. Averof – Tositsas, op. cit., p. 32.

impossible, at least the two sides have to reach a common agreement, which will satisfy them both."

Nevertheless, Eden had only one answer:

*"The British Empire is not for sale... In every country the government has to stand the pressure... The issue is not only closed but does not exist either and if I had known that we would speak about fictional issues I would have not accepted the invitation."*¹⁵

The explanation for the moderate attitude of the Greek government during those times lies in the Greek attempts to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Greece saw NATO as a powerful shield against her internal and external problems. There was always the possibility of a resurgence of the Civil War, since the exiled leadership of the Communist Party still spoke of a war that did not end, while Greece was surrounded by hostile nations of the Eastern block, which, except for Yugoslavia, did not recognize the status of the King and the government. Therefore, since the signature of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949 and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Greece began a diplomatic race in order to incorporate herself into the Western defensive framework. Since Britain, the closest ally of the United States in Europe, was one of the leading nations in NATO, Greece did not want to provoke her by raising the Cypriot question in the United Nations. Britain's refusal, on the other hand, to assist the moderate and clearly pro-British proposals of the Greek government, can be explained by the position that Turkey held in the British plans during the first period of the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Turkish state (a personal creation of Kemal Attaturk) the country had been ruled by a dictatorial government of the Republican Party. During May 1950, the first free elections took place in Turkey, an historic development which transformed the political scene by giving power to A. Menderes and his Democratic Party. The transition of the Turkish political life from a dictatorial to a multi-party system was one of the most radical but peaceful revolutions in global parliamentary history. From the first day in office the newly elected Turkish government was supported by the United States. Turkey's geographical position, sharing common borders with the Soviet Union and the Arab world, made the political and military circles of the White House regard Attaturk's country as their most important ally in the region. Since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of Cold War in the geostrategic equilibrium of the global political scale, the US had searched for a useful ally in the Middle East that would be

¹⁵ E. Averof – Tositsas., op. cit., pp. 38 – 9.

able to influence and control the Arab world in favour of the West, assist and support the newly founded state of Israel¹⁶, and function as a natural barrier between the Soviet Union and the naval trade routes of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was able to fulfill all the above tasks and successfully play the role of Western agent in the Near East, therefore the US was prepared to support and assist its regional protégé. As the Turkish scholar Nuri Eren argues:

*"Since President Truman, the United States stood by the Turkish side more than any other power in the international spectrum"*¹⁷

However, the US was not the only Western power that was favourably inclined towards Turkey. Traditionally, the Conservative party had a positive attitude towards the Ottoman Empire and, later on, Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's geographic position made the Foreign Office regard the former as a decisive factor for Middle East security and capable guardian of its interests in the region. Britain's main aspiration was to use Turkey as a link between the Western and the Arab world, making use of the common religion, cultural and historic past that the Turkish and the Arabs shared. By that Britain was hoping that the Middle East oil resources, vital for the survival of the Western world in general and for Britain in particular, would remain under her control. A characteristic British view concerning Turkey's role in the region during that time can be found in Bickham Sweet-Escott's programme in the BBC:

*"Turkish diplomacy was considerably successful in the region ...During autumn Turkey succeeded in signing an allied pact with Pakistan, which resulted in the strengthening of the links between Pakistan and the Western world. A month ago Turkey signed an alliance pact with Iraq...and it is more than certain that in the near future Iran, Lebanon and Jordan will follow."*¹⁸

Turkey turned out to be the most valuable ally for Britain in the region during the first years of the Cold War. As Eden wrote in his memoirs:

*"I consider our alliance with Turkey as the major preoccupation of our policy in that part of the world."*¹⁹

Therefore, Britain did not want to jeopardize her friendly relations with Turkey by even showing sympathy to the Greek proposals about the fate of Cyprus. However, the

¹⁶ Turkey was one of the first nations worldwide that recognized the Israeli State in 1949.

¹⁷ N. Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, (New York, 1963), p. 237.

¹⁸ B. Sweet-Escott, *Turkey's Key Position in the Middle East*, (The Listener, 17 March 1955), vol. LIII, no. 1359, pp. 459–460.

British side committed a grave mistake by not considering the Greek proposals, forcing, as will be seen later, the Greek government to abandon her moderate views and adopt more radical ones.

Back in 1952, Makarios adopted a new strategy in order to achieve the internationalization of the Cypriot question. Since the Western world was trapped inside the narrow logic of the Cold War, Makarios decided to approach the Arab world instead. That decision can be explained by bearing in mind two important factors: the increasing influence of the Arab world in the global political spectrum, due to the oil sources of the Middle East; and Arab anti-colonial feelings since, during the past, Arabs had also experienced British rule. During May Makarios visited Egypt, Lebanon and Syria.²⁰ Apart from making contact with the Greek and other Christian Orthodox communities in those countries, Makarios began to lobby Arab politicians and journalists, promoting the Greek Cypriot struggle. In spite of the fact that the result of Makarios' visit was not as sound as he hoped, mainly due to the fact that during that particular time the Arab world had to face great internal problems with the emergence of the modern state of Israel, these were still the first soundings of what was beginning to emerge as the "Third World", that grouping of non-aligned countries on which he afterwards came to rely so much for support. His trip helped Makarios to assess the internal situation in the Middle East and draw vital conclusions for the intensification of the Greek Cypriot diplomatic race for the cause of Enosis. As he wrote in his memoirs:

*"The Middle East is in flames. The officials that I met with did not want to admit it but it is common knowledge that the Arabs would not allow and could not permit the establishment of their traditional enemy, Israel, in the region... I am more than certain that the explosive situation there will force the British to adjust their geostrategic plans in the region. Now it is the right time for us to open another diplomatic front and make London feel even more vulnerable."*²¹

In order to put more pressure on the Greek government, Makarios visited Athens again in June of the same year. He asked to see S. Venizelos again, in order to inform him about his trip in the Arab countries and to persuade the Cretan politician to make an

¹⁹ Sir A. Eden, *Full Circle*, (London, 1960), p. 44.

²⁰ It is important to note here the strong anti-Turkish feelings of those countries, a well rooted animosity which goes back in history and continues even today. Nowadays Syria is the main ally of Greece in the region, forming an anti-Turkish coalition at the heart of the Turkish sphere of influence, while Egypt maintains a cautious position towards Turkish offers of economic and military consortium.

appeal to the United Nations about the Cypriot question. However, soon enough the meeting turned to a serious quarrel. During April 1956, in a speech inside the Greek parliament S. Venizelos gave a detailed account of his meeting with Makarios:

*"I have to admit that in 1951 as a president of the government, I refused to appeal to the United Nations in favour of Enosis. In 1952, I refused again. As a result of my attitude, Makarios threatened me that he would report me to the Greek people for negligence towards Enosis. My answer was that he was free to act as he thought was right, but he had no right to manipulate the foreign affairs of Greece."*²²

It was the first blow that occurred in the relations between the Greek state and Makarios. In the years that followed Makarios repeatedly accused the Greek politicians of ignorance and lack of interest about Cyprus, and the Greek governments accused Makarios of arrogance and interference in the internal affairs of the state. Makarios had meetings with other important elements of political life in Greece, however the most important one was with E. Averof-Tositsas. The experienced politician tried to calm the Cypriot Archbishop through an analysis of the Greek situation. He spoke about the titanic effort of the country to heal the wounds from the destructive Civil War of 46–49, and he also stated that neither the national stand nor the national existence of the Greek Cypriots was in danger from the British authorities. Cyprus had to wait her turn. Averof explained to Makarios that the main preoccupation of the Greek government during that time was to feed the hungry, shelter the homeless and raise the living standards of the population. On top of that, Averof stated that the Greek government could not do anything that could harm the existence of the Greek minority in Constantinople, since Turkey was ready to exercise force if Greece decided to wound the sensitive Greco-Turkish alliance by raising the Cypriot issue. As will be seen later on Averof's words were prophetic and the Greeks in Constantinople suffered a lot from Turkish brutality. Makarios' response took Averof by surprise. As he confessed in his memoirs:

"...and the representative of God upon the earth answered me that national issues have greater importance than the social ones and that the Greeks in Constantinople were doomed in an unavoidable

²¹ Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios and his Struggle: Memoirs, (Nicosia, 1984), vol. I, no. 4590, p. 490.

²² Official Records of the Parliament of Hellenes, (25 April 1956), Sofoklis Venizelos' speech about the Cypriot question, vol. XII, col. 459-60.

way.”²³

The above discussion between the Greek politician and the Greek Cypriot Archbishop shows the different ways in which both Greeks and Greek Cypriots were approaching the same issue. While Greece was paying greater importance to other topics, taking for granted Greek Cypriot patience, Makarios was putting the Cypriot question in the front line in a 19th century nationalist style, failing to link the Cypriot question with the international status quo. The miscalculated approach both of Greece and Makarios resulted in an open confrontation, a development which divided the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots and gave Britain the opportunity, as will be seen later on, to continue her non-negotiation policy concerning the Cypriot question.

The refusal of the Greek government to assist the Greek Cypriot efforts resulted in the alteration of Makarios' policy, a development which was beneficial for the British side. On June 28, 1953, after the rejection of Makarios' proposal to organize a rally in the Stadium of Nicosia by the British authorities, a mass meeting was organized in the Church of Phaneromeni. In front of a large audience Makarios gave a patriotic speech, informing the Greek Cypriots of the course of the Enosis issue. However, the main point of Makarios' speech was an open accusation of the Greek government, and for the first time ever a suggestion of continuing the struggle drawing a line independent of the official one of the Greek state. During the speech Makarios stated:

*“...We will fulfill what the Greek government hesitates to do. We will apply to the United Nations, by using our own influence... After all, we are not under the control of the Greek government...but we believe on our own dreams for the fulfillment of our national duty and we depend upon our own efforts in the internal of Cyprus. United under the Enosis flag, we will continue our struggle night and day by using any mean, awaiting for the moment that we will be united with the beloved motherland.”*²⁴

It was the first time a Greek Cypriot leader had suggested that the Cypriot question could be presented in the international arena as an internal issue of the island, and it was the first time that a Greek Cypriot leader had the power to keep the government of Athens away from the policy planning. Makarios' speech, for the first time in public,

²³ E. Averof – Tositsas, op. cit., p. 35.

²⁴ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 82 – 3.

questioned the cornerstone of the Hellenic unity over the Cypriot question, giving the British side the opportunity to solidify, even more, her attitude towards the Greek Cypriots' demands. In that electric atmosphere, on August 10, Makarios asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination in the Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the Organization. The Greek government remained loyal to her wish for bipartite negotiations with Britain, therefore when the issue appeared during the Session the Greek representative stated:

"The Cypriot question cannot be included with the other issues of this Session... usually no-one appeals to a court or to an international organization, without first giving an opportunity for direct diplomatic negotiations."

However, the Greek representative continued giving a clear warning to the British side:

*"The door will be always open for us to appear in front of a judge, in the case that the procedure of the friendly negotiations turned out to be fruitless."*²⁵

The Greek government was faced with a diplomatic dilemma. On the one hand, she had to preserve the traditional diplomatic Anglo-Greek friendship, but on the other hand she had to defend the unity of Hellenism. Makarios' threats for an independent line and the Greek Cypriot appeal to the United Nations, persuaded Athens about the seriousness of the situation in Aphrodite's island, conveying the message that Greek Cypriot patience was extremely limited. Makarios' first attempt to internationalize the Cypriot question failed. However, it sent a clear message to every implicated side that this was the commencement of a long struggle.

In the meantime, the tactics of the Greek government had no results. London, yet again, dealt with the Greek invitations for amicable talks with total complacency. Returning from an informal trip, Eden arrived in Athens. The Greek Premier of that time, A. Papagos, expressed his desire to meet with the British politician. Papagos was the Commander in Chief of the Greek army during the Greco-Italian war of 1940–41, and his reputation as a brave soldier forced Eden, as a sign of respect and admiration, to invite him to the Ambassadorial residence. A lot of things have been said about that meeting: that Eden was looking outside the window playing nervously with his fingers, and that Papagos left saying that everyone who served in the Greek army had seen only the backs of the opponents who were fleeing the battle. However, this belongs to the sphere of fiction and was mainly used, by Greek newspapers in order to raise their daily

²⁵ Kyrou: General Assembly, Eight Session, 439th Plenary Meeting, September 21, 1953.

circulation²⁶. Papagos gave a detailed account of the events of that night in his speech in the Greek Parliament on February 7, 1955:

"On December 22, 1953 I went to the British Embassy in order to meet Mr. Eden, whom I knew since the war [the Second World War]. During the meeting the British Ambassador was there as well. At the beginning Mr. Eden invited me to London on behalf of his government. After that we spoke about the Cypriot question. I fully developed the sensitivity of the issue and I spoke about the difficult position of the Greek government, after Makarios' speech in Phaneromeni and the Cypriot appeal to the United Nations. I also spoke about the need of a solution of the Cypriot question through bipartite negotiations between Greece and Britain. Mr. Eden heard me carefully and after a while he said to me that for the British government there is no Cypriot question neither now nor in the future. I answered him that under that attitude the Greek government will alter her policy and will make use of her legitimate right to protect her national interests."

However, the Greek government still hoped for a British sign of goodwill. For that reason she did not take any diplomatic steps towards the Cypriot question yet. However, British inflexibility and arrogance forced Athens to abandon her moderate stance. Papagos, in the same speech in the Greek Parliament, justified his decision:

"After some time, when Mr. Eden had re-assumed his position in the Foreign Office [Eden visited Greece in order to recover after a serious operation] I called the British Ambassador and I said to him that I accept to visit London, after the official invitation of the British government, if the Cypriot question would have been among the remaining issues for discussion. A possible refusal of the British to discuss about Cyprus would have forced me to reject the invitation. The British ambassador informed Eden of my terms and after few days he gave me a telegram from him saying that he hoped to meet me in London, and he would have been really sorry

²⁶ For days the main political newspapers in Greece claimed to be providing a detailed account, of the unknown details of the meeting. Without any doubt the researcher should not pay attention to that promotional trick and should make use of the official archives. The credibility of the Greek newspapers during that time was below average and written works that fortify their argumentation by using the above sources, such as F.D. Athanasoulas, The Greek Prime Ministers after the end of the Second World War, (Larissa, 1984), lack a scientific approach.

if the Cypriot question would have stopped me from going to Britain but he was not willing to modify his position. After that fellow members of the Parliament I decided to appeal to the United Nations, on behalf of Cyprus"²⁷

However, the reasons that forced the Greek government to appeal to the United Nations cannot be limited to Eden's refusal to negotiate. Greek public opinion could not accept the hesitation of the Greek government in support of their compatriots in Cyprus. Only in 1953, 9 students had been killed during extensive student demonstrations outside the Parliament House and the British Embassy, by armed policemen.²⁸ A detailed account of the electric atmosphere in Greece during that time can be found in T. Anthem's article in the Contemporary Review:

*"The bloody student demonstrations in Athens, Thessaloniki and Cyprus, the breaking of the windows of the British Consulate in Rhodes...all of the events are clearly showing that the Greek emotions are ready to explode and that the traditional Anglo-Greek friendship, lasting from Lord Byron, is under a hard testing."*²⁹

The situation was extremely serious and the Greek government feared that she did not have the power to control the reaction of the masses, especially after the dynamic entrance of the Unified Democratic Left (EDA) in the Cypriot question. EDA was the only legal left-wing party in the Greek political arena, which had been controlled by the exiled leadership of KKE from the Eastern block. EDA's pro-Enosis position alarmed the right-wing government, which was convinced that further delay of action would force the electorate to turn towards EDA in order to appease its patriotic fever.³⁰ Another reason that influenced Papagos to resort to the United Nations was the judgment of Greek diplomatic circles, who until this point were against such a movement, that the United Nations would accept the Greek appeal. According to their theory, a propitious decision of the United Nations on the Greek Cypriot demands would have forced Britain to modify her strategy. However, the diplomatic arguments lacked in realism, as

²⁷ Official Records of the Parliament of Hellenes, vol. X, col. 345, (7 February, 1955), Papagos' speech about the Greek appeal to the United Nations on behalf of Cyprus. See also The Times, 8 February 1955, p. 9.

²⁸ K. Tsoukalas, *La Greque Tragedie*, (Paris, 1968), p. 78.

²⁹ T. Anthem, *The Cyprus Challenge*, (The Contemporary Review, July 1954), no. 1063, p. 16.

³⁰ The above theory should not be taken as another schizophrenic conspiracy theory of the Greek Right. In the elections of 1958 EDA seized the second position in the Greek Parliament, 9 years after the end of the Civil War and the sound defeat of the Communist guerillas. One of the main reasons for the spectacular appeal of EDA to the Greek electorate was her pro-Enosis position.

will be seen later on. They were giving greater importance to the United Nations than they should have, since they insisted that a possible pro-Cypriot decision would have forced Britain to modify her entire policy in a region that was vital for her geostrategic interests. The Greek decision was a grave mistake. By proposing an appeal to the United Nations, the Greek side jeopardized her own efforts to keep the Cypriot question inside the Anglo-Greek framework, offering Turkey the opportunity to develop her views concerning the Cypriot question in front of an international audience.

Britain's reaction to the Greek initiative was immediate, yet she did not abandon her inflexible approach. The secret hopes of the Greek side that the Conservative government of London would modify her attitude, given the possibility of a discussion about Cyprus' fate in the General Assembly of the United Nations, turned out to be erroneous. On July 28, 1954, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs Mr. H. Hopkinson (later Lord Colyton) informed the House of Commons that his government decided to offer Cyprus a modified version of the constitution of '48, which was to be introduced as the first step in associating the people of Cyprus with the management of their own affairs. He continued by clarifying that no change of sovereignty was contemplated concerning the island's fate.³¹ His statement aroused no comment. It was only after some blundering but persistent questioning from the deputy leader of the Labour opposition, Mr. J. Griffiths, as to whether the Cypriots would eventually have the right to decide their own future, that Hopkinson gave an extreme answer:

*"...My statement has made it quite clear that there can be no question of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus...it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent."*³²

Hopkinson's words resulted in cries of disavowal, coming even from the Conservative benches. The Minister understood his diplomatic slip and he tried to rectify his statement:

*"I am not going as far as that this afternoon, but I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise-the British sovereignty will remain."*³³

Despite Hopkinson's effort to ameliorate his statement, he never succeeded in erasing the negative impact of his undiplomatic statement concerning Cyprus' future.

³¹ H. Hopkinson: House of Commons, 28 July 1954, vol. 531, no. 158, col. 504.

³² H. Hopkinson, op. cit., col. 507-08.

Hopkinson's words became known in Greece and Cyprus, during a sensitive period for Britain in that area, raising a storm of protests both from prominent and ordinary citizens. Hopkinson's notorious "*never*" not only infuriated the Greeks but split the Government and opposition in Britain after years of bipartisan policy over the Cypriot question. A number of MPs from all the parties were concerned at the Government's flat refusal to negotiate with the moderate Greek side about Cyprus. Britain was soon going to be arraigned before the United Nations for refusing self determination to a small territory, after she had granted India its freedom and begun to dismantle her Empire. As A. Bevan said in the heated exchanges that followed Hopkinson's statement:

*"If we are leaving Egypt for the reasons that we all know about and if we are to take up residence in Cyprus, surely it is the duty of the Government so to adjust their policy as to produce as friendly an atmosphere as possible in Cyprus. Instead, what have they done? The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs bluntly tells the Cypriots that they can only get their own way by doing what the Egyptians have done."*³⁴

For many experts dealing with the Cypriot issue, Hopkinson's statement was the main reason for the appearance, after few months, of the Greek Cypriot guerilla group, EOKA, in the island. Without any doubt this is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, Hopkinson's statement gave the Greek Cypriot nationalist side the opportunity to justify her acts of violence, as will be seen in the next chapter.

As mentioned above, Hopkinson announced the issue of a new constitution for Cyprus. Under the new constitution a new Legislative body would have been formed, with official and appointed members, who would have been the majority, as well as elected ones. On the other hand, according to the new constitution a number of unofficial members of the Executive Council would have assumed the management of the new ministries.³⁵ The new constitution was not completed yet, therefore a series of points were unsettled and vague. For example, it was still unknown what kind of ministries would have been founded, as well as the powers of the new Ministers towards the Cypriot government. However, the only clear indication of the proposed constitution was that the elected members in the Legislative Council would have been the minority, a development that for the Greek Cypriots was a step back from the

³³ H. Hopkinson, op. cit., col. 508.

³⁴ A. Bevan, op. cit., col. 565-66.

proposed constitution of 1948 and even more so from the political situation in the island before 1931. On the one hand, the political line of the Conservative government towards the Cypriot question was unrealistic. Instead of trying to calm the Greek Cypriot side by modifying her internal policy, she proposed a constitution that was provoking the majority of the Cypriot population. Nevertheless, the unrealistic British policy was not unjustifiable either. The total domination of the Greek Cypriot nationalist side in the political spectrum of the island, and Makarios' inflexibility of "*Enosis and nothing but Enosis*" left no space for conciliation to the British side. The Greek Cypriots had already turned down the constitution of 1948, and there was no indication that they would have accepted another, even if more favourable than the old one. In fact, it was more than clear that the Greek Cypriots, during that period, were not interested in the concept of self-determination. Makarios' influence was paramount so that only Enosis was acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. However, the most important reason for the continuation of London's non-negotiation policy with the Greek government concerning Cyprus was the signature of the Suez Treaty on July 27, 1954, just one day before Hopkinson's "*never*" in the House of Commons. According to the treaty, Britain had to withdraw her troops from Egypt within twenty months from the signature.³⁶ After the loss of Suez, Cyprus was the only valuable alternative solution for the British geostrategic interests in the region. As a matter of fact, the day after the signature of the Suez Treaty British troops, previously stationed in Suez, began to arrive in Cyprus. Cyprus became the life-jacket of British foreign policy in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the British troops, who were in retreat in that region, found a secure shelter to take refuge in. Characteristically, the political journal "*The New Statement and Nation*" wrote of the move of the British troops from Suez to Cyprus:

*"Even if the Tories lost the battle of Suez, it seems to win a brilliant victory in Cyprus. After British Imperialism was superseded, violently, by Palestine, Persia and Egypt, and right now is facing a new threat in Iraq, it decided to commit an emergency landing in the Greek island [Cyprus]."*³⁷

The news of the signature of the Suez Treaty had a negative impact for the Conservative government among British diplomatic and military circles. Britain always regarded Suez's military base as an asset of valuable importance and Churchill, during the past,

³⁵ Hopkinson: op cit., col. 505.

³⁶ House of Commons, 28 July 1954, vol. 531, col. 497.

had repeatedly stated the importance of the above location for the survival and the continuation of the empire. However, Churchill, in an attempt to justify to the British people the foreign line of his government concerning Suez, admitted inside the House of Commons that the signature of the Treaty was “*absolutely necessary*.”³⁸ Nevertheless, the explanations that Churchill gave were not satisfactory for the British people, who day by day were seeing traditional British spheres of influence fade away from the British framework. The Observer, in a characteristic way, gave a detailed account of the impact of the signature of the Suez treaty in Britain:

*“The Conservative government, headed by Sir Winston, gave its consent to the evacuation of Suez, but many members of the party expressed their opposition to the above decision. The majority of them voted in favour of the settlement only because it had been supported by Sir Winston.”*³⁹

In the discussion that took place inside the House of Commons, Churchill's government faced strong criticisms from members of its party. A characteristic statement came from Captain Waterhouse, which reveals the feelings of his colleagues as well. He said:

*“I and my friends [sic] had feared that there would be a sell-out. This is not a sell-out. It is a give-away. Instead of having physical control of a great base, instead of having troops on the major waterway of the world, we have got this piece of paper in our hands. It is indeed a hard day for anybody on this side of the House [the Tory benches] to have to sit and support this Government which has as we believe, not taken a wise decision on the Suez canal”*⁴⁰

As is understandable, it would have been impossible for the Conservative government to modify her policy about Cyprus at that particular moment. Apart from the fact that Cyprus could guarantee the British presence in the region, it could also be used, as a territorial substitute in order to regularize the situation inside the party.

The months that followed Hopkinson's statement in the House of Commons established a new reality in Cyprus. Makarios called the Greek Cypriots to oppose the “*new British plot*”, while at the same time he protested to the Secretary-General of the

³⁷ The New Statement and Nation, Out of Suez and into Cyprus, 7 August 1954.

³⁸ Churchill: House of Commons, 28 July 1954, vol. 531, no. 158, col. 499.

³⁹ The Observer, How it Happened, (13 January 1957).

⁴⁰ Captain Waterhouse: House of Commons, 29 July 1954, vol. 531, col. 739.

United Nations against the arrival of British troops from the military base of Suez.⁴¹ Bloody riots took place in every great Cypriot city between the police and Greek Cypriots, while in many cases the army had to intervene to restrain the rioters. The seriousness of the situation forced the British government on the island to commit a momentous mistake, which brought the island back to the dark period of 1931. On 2 August, the Cyprus government announced the enforcement of the sedition laws of 1931. Under the above laws every action that aimed to modify the existing status quo on the island was illegal.⁴² In an emergency meeting the Ethnarchy decided to react by asking the Greek government to refer to the issue in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and by organizing a general strike in all the main cities of the island on August 12. As a result new riots erupted in every corner of the island. The police were stoned and in Limassol three youths were wounded when British troops opened fire to disperse a rioting crowd. Cyprus had its new martyrs.

On August 16, under the influence of the electrified atmosphere in Cyprus, Greece asked for the Cyprus question to be put on the agenda for the United Nations' Ninth General Assembly, under the heading "*Application...of the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples in the case of the population of Cyprus*".⁴³ In an explanatory document that followed the Greek application, Papagos stated that the population of the island had been Greek for thousands of years. He based his statement upon an extended demographic survey, as well as an historic account of the Greek Cypriot efforts for Enosis with Greece. He also referred to Hopkinson's "never" and he compared the British attitude concerning the Cypriot question with the Greek efforts to find a common and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides. Finally, he justified the Greek appeal by emphasising the fact that the absolute majority of the Cypriot population had repeatedly expressed the wish for Enosis with Greece.⁴⁴ It must be noted here that the Greek appeal was based upon article 1, paragraph 2 of the "*Charter of the United Nations*", which establishes the right of the peoples to self-determination. As article 1 states:

*"The purposes of the United Nations are...
to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, and to take*

⁴¹ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴² N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 121.

⁴³ General Assembly, Ninth Session, Agenda item 62, Annexes, Document A/2703.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ”⁴⁵

However, Cyprus was a colony, or as the Charter of the United Nations indicated “a non-self-governing territory”. The Charter refers especially to the non-self-governing countries in chapter XI. In particular, article 73 specifies the duties of the members of the United Nations, that have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. Among other legal obligations the members have to:

*“...develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and their varying stages of advancement.”*⁴⁶

However, what is the exact meaning of self-government? Global history presents a lot of cases where the aforementioned issue has been identified with terms such as self-determination or independence, while in other cases the same term has been used in order to describe the internal political system, having no relation to the international status quo of that non self-governing territory. The Charter of the United Nations offers no help as to the explanation of the complexities of the concept. As seen, according to the Charter every territory under the control of another country, yet outside her national frontiers, is a non self-governing one. Therefore, simple logic leads to the conclusion that every self-governing country is also independent. However, at the same time the Charter stresses the duty of every member state to develop the concept of self-government within every non-self-governing state under its control. The terminology of the Charter of the United Nations is vague concerning the above concept, which gave the ruling countries an opportunity to delay the development of self-government, by using their opposition to a fully independence status quo as an excuse, while a different approach to the same concept gave the enslaved people the impression that self-government would lead, eventually, to full independence.⁴⁷ Characteristically, in the Cypriot case the two main British parties gave different interpretations to the concept of self government, creating a great controversy within the official foreign line of the state. While the Conservative party was in favour of the development of self-government in

⁴⁵ Charter of the United Nations, article 1, paragraph 2.

⁴⁶ Chapter of the United Nations, article 73, paragraph 6.

⁴⁷ For more concerning the complexities of the issue see: J. Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government, (London, 1960), pp. 75-111 and 113-165.

the interior of Cyprus, the Labour party gave a broader meaning to the term, identifying it with full independence.

As is becoming obvious from the foregoing discussion, the great difficulty of the issue can be focused on the two following questions: What is the definition of self-determination, and who can claim that right? As noted, the Charter of the United Nations clearly speaks of the right of the peoples to self-government. However, a broader interpretation of that principle can justify the right of self determination of a minority within other minorities, until the point that every parish or every house can decide freely which country it wants to belong to, or even declare sovereignty.⁴⁸ Yet the above conclusion cannot represent the spirit of the United Nations for the reinforcement of global peace and order. Rivlin, in an attempt to answer the question of who has the right to self-determination, cites Baron's definition:

*"...every national and cultural group of people
that is forming the majority in a territory, has the
right to establish an independent state."*⁴⁹

However, while theoretically the above definition offers a solution, within the academic framework of International Relations, this is still an Idealist view, failing to approach the topic by not considering the implications to the foreign policy of the great colonial powers. Therefore, Rivlin opposes Baron's interpretation by stating that "*there is no agreement of where the line should be drawn*"⁵⁰, meaning that the decision of a state to grant the right of self-determination to the people of a territory cannot be regulated by any legal procedure, but only by the particular circumstances of every case. The Greek appeal to the United Nations about the Cypriot question had been made in terms of a vague appeal to self determination, which gave Turkey and Britain the opportunity, as will be seen, to discredit the Greek arguments.

During the talks before the General Committee of the United Nations, both Greece and Britain presented a series of arguments, in favour and against the presentation of the Cypriot question to the General Assembly. The Greek delegation, in order to support its appeal, referred to article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations. The above article clearly states that:

*"The General Assembly may discuss any questions
or any matters within the scope of the present Charter*

⁴⁸ A. Ross, Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Function, (New York, 1950), p. 135.

⁴⁹ B. Rivlin, Self - Determination and Dependent Areas, (International Conciliation, January 1955), no. 501, p. 199.

*or relating to the powers and functions of any organs, provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.”*⁵¹

The Greek side supported the view that the Cypriot question fell within the scope of the Charter, and for that reason it had to be included in the discussions of the Ninth Session. The Greek delegation also used article 14, which states:

*“ Subject to the provisions of article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”*⁵²

The Greek delegation claimed that the above article could be implemented in the Cypriot case, since the British government was not willing to recommend any measures for the peaceful adjustment of the Cypriot question.⁵³

On the other hand, the British side based its argument upon the principle of domestic jurisdiction, in order to confront the Greek appeal. According to the British side a discussion of the Cypriot question in the General Assembly of the United Nations was in violation of article 2, paragraph 7, which clearly states that:

“ Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essential within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...”

According to the British representative in the United Nations, S. Lloyd, the British presence in Cyprus had been internationally recognized, therefore the discussion of Cyprus' fate in the General Assembly was violating article 2, and was an infringement of the spirit of the United Nations.⁵⁴ The British argument was supported by the Turkish delegation. The Turkish representative, S. Sarper, declared that his government

⁵⁰ B. Rivlin, op. cit., p. 200.

⁵¹ Charter of the United Nations, article 10.

⁵² Charter of the United Nations, article 14.

⁵³ Kyrou: Gen. Ass. Ninth Session, General Committee, 93rd meeting, September 23, 1954.

regarded the governing of Cyprus as an internal issue of the United Kingdom, and according to article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the United Nations had no authorization to intervene. As Sarper concluded *"The United Nations had been established in order to maintain peace and protect the independence of its members."*⁵⁵

Another argument of the British side against the discussion of the Cypriot question in the General Assembly were the legal obligations deriving from the Lausanne Treaty. The Treaty recognized British dominance in Cyprus and had been signed by Greece as well.⁵⁶ The discussion of the Greek appeal in the United Nations would have been a violation of the principle of non-revision of past treaties. Therefore, the British side declared its opposition to the presentation of the Greek appeal in the General Assembly, on the basis that this would allowed every member nation to ask for the revision of a treaty that it recognised in the past.⁵⁷ By accusing the Greek side for not respecting international treaties and the international law, the British delegation tried to discredit the Greek integrity and present the Greek appeal as a threat to the international order. The Greek response to the British argument was immediate. It declared that through its appeal, the Athenian government did not want to revise the Lausanne Treaty or to determine, unilaterally, the future of Cyprus. The Greek Foreign Minister, S. Stefanopoulos, said in response to the British accusations:

*"Greece never tried to prove the Greek nature of Cyprus,
neither asked for the devolution of mastership [of the island].
Greece appealed for the freedom and the right of self-determination
for the people of Cyprus. The Greek appeal aims to [sic] the abolition
of the colonial status from a territory that is inhabited by Greeks.
We are asking no more from the Assembly than the attribution of
the right of freedom to Greeks"*⁵⁸

After that, the Greek side tried to discredit the British argument concerning the Lausanne Treaty. For the Greek side the above Treaty could not be used as an obstacle for the discussion of the Cypriot question in the United Nations, since according to article 103 of the Charter:

*"In the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international*

⁵⁴ Lloyd: Gen. Ass. Ninth Session, 477th Plenary Meeting, Sept 24, 1954.

⁵⁵ Sarper: Gen. Ass. Ninth Session, 477th Plenary Meeting, Sept 24, 1954.

⁵⁶ See Lausanne Treaty, article 20.

⁵⁷ Lloyd: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, Gen. Com., 93rd meeting, Sept 23, 1954.

*agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”*⁵⁹

On the other hand, the Greek side insisted that many articles of the Lausanne Treaty were bipartite agreements between the Allied powers and Turkey. Therefore, according to the Greek arguments Greece had signed a treaty that included Turkey's recognition of the annexation of Cyprus by Britain, but she had never accepted the above recognition as an agreement between her and Britain. Nevertheless, once again the Greek argument was opposed by the Turkish delegation. The Turkish representative, referring to the Lausanne Treaty, contradicted the Greek statement concerning the bipartite nature of the Treaty, by stressing the fact that Greece was a fervent supporter of the annexation of Cyprus by Britain.⁶⁰

As becomes obvious from the above arguments, Britain, by using various diplomatic means, tried to prove to the General Committee that Greece, against every international law, was trying to place Cyprus under her dominance. On the other hand, Greece, responding to those accusations by presenting her arguments, declared that its appeal was simply giving voice to the legitimate demands of the Cypriot people. The researcher can assert the validity of the arguments of both sides, since they are both covered by the Charter of the United Nations. From the one side, article 1, paragraph 2 in co-operation with article 73 introduces the principle that the demands of non-self – governing territories should be taken into account by the United Nations and are subject of international interest. Therefore, one can assume that the Charter gave Cyprus every right to demand its self-determination. Nevertheless, Cyprus was not an independent state, therefore it could not be a member of the United Nations. The Cypriot demand for self-determination had to be presented in the General Assembly by an independent member-state. From this one can justify the view that the Greek appeal was just giving voice to the Cypriot demands, functioning inside the legal framework of the Charter of the United Nations. However, the British argument should not be ignored. It was common knowledge that behind the Cypriot demand for self-determination was the vivid desire of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis. Therefore, the Cypriot question was not

⁵⁸ Stefanopoulos: Gen.Ass., Ninth Session, 477th Plenary Meeting, Sept 24, 1954.

⁵⁹ Kyrou: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 750th meeting, December 14, 1954.

⁶⁰ Sarper: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 750th meeting, December 14, 1954. It must be said here that the Turkish statement is utterly valid. As seen in a previous chapter the Greek side supported and welcomed the annexation of Cyprus by Britain. However, what the Turkish representative, intentionally, failed to refer to, is the fact that Greece evaluated the annexation of Cyprus by Britain as the final step towards the unification of the island with her, and not as a step concerning international recognition by the British Empire.

only a case for self-determination, but at the same time an Anglo-Greek confrontation concerning a territory which was under British dominance.

The debate between the British and the Greek delegations continued beyond the legal arguments. The British side continuously declared to the General Assembly, that Cyprus was a vital element for the successful fulfillment of the British military obligations in the area of the Middle East. As the British representative mentioned:

“Cyprus is a military necessity for us, if we want to pursue our military obligations. The power of our country in that part of the world is still one of the main bulwarks of global peace. We have diplomatic obligations towards the Arab nations. We are interested in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s southern flank and in Turkey’s and even Greece’s defence. We have great responsibilities that derive from the Charter. Cyprus is of great importance for us, in order to carry out our responsibilities”

The experienced diplomat tried to anticipate Greek opposition to the above argument by mentioning the Greek offer of military bases in Cyprus to Britain, in the event that Britain would have agreed to end its dominance over the island. He continued by stating:

“...as I mentioned yesterday, under the present circumstances there cannot be another solution than the absolute dominance... the rental periods are expiring, the treaties can not be satisfactory implemented and the Greek governments, as other governments, are changing”⁶¹

The Greek side did not try to oppose the above view. After all, Greece belonged to the Western camp and it could not confront the security arguments of one of the main Western powers, especially inside the United Nations where countries of the opposite camp were witnessing the discussion. It just tried, by using Hitler’s example⁶², to present the view that Cyprus did not hold a position of great geostrategic importance. The question that derives from the above argument is: What was more important? The British geostrategic interests, on the one side, or the will of the majority of the people

⁶¹ Lloyd: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 477th plenary meeting, September 24, 1954.

⁶² The Greek side mentioned that the fact that Hitler did not attack Cyprus during the Second World War proves that the island does not hold a key position in the geostrategic global arena. As a matter of fact

living in that territory? An attempt to answer such a question will lack scientific validity. However, it must be noted that from a legal point of view the British arguments were inconsistent with the spirit of the Charter, especially during a period of peace, such as this one.

Another British argument against the Greek appeal was the Turkish minority in Cyprus. As already mentioned in previous chapters, 100,000 Turks were in Cyprus and constituted 18% of the local population. The British side used the existence of the Turkish minority in Cyprus as an argument against the implementation of the principle of self-determination on the island. The Turkish Cypriots opposed the Greek appeal to the United Nations by organizing huge protest marches in the great Cypriot cities, while in Constantinople and Ankara the Greek Embassies had been stoned by Turkish students, as an action of solidarity towards their compatriots in Cyprus. The above situation was used by the British side as a diplomatic card in the discussions. As the British representative said:

“The Turkish speaking Cypriots, who are Muslims are opposing the possibility of unification of Cyprus with Greece... Until now Cyprus had not witnessed any kind of inter-communal conflict. The Turkish Cypriots constitute a solid Muslim society, with their own mufti [priest] their own religious institutes and funds. It [the Turkish Cypriot community] has a great role in the development of the economic life of the island... As I said, until now, there were no inter communal conflicts in the island. So maybe now the Assembly wants to create them by discussing that issue... I call for every country that in the past experienced inter-communal disturbances to think hard concerning the Cypriot case”⁶³

The Greek side responded to the British argument by referring to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. According to the Greek side the Turkish minority was enjoying the principle of absolute equality and its relation with the Greek citizens were in complete harmony.⁶⁴ The Greek side continued by emphasising the fact that the Turkish minority

Hitler considered the ports of Piraeus and Alexandria as far more important naval bases for the domination of the German navy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁶³ Lloyd: Gen.Ass, Ninth Session, 477th plenary meeting, September 24, 1954.

⁶⁴ It is important to mention here that the above statement is not a diplomatic exaggeration, but a valid statement. The Turkish minority of Western Thrace, since the Lausanne Treaty, had been used by the Greek government as a negotiation card for the establishment of better relations with the Turkish state. herefore, the living and political conditions of the Turkish minority were of a high standard, a fact that changed during the establishment of the military dictatorship in Greece in 1967.

in Cyprus had nothing to be afraid of, and that the issue of self-determination would be a beneficial development, not only for the Greek citizens of the island but for the whole of the local population.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the Greek argument was opposed, again, by the Turkish side. The Turkish representative, taking for granted the opposition of the 100,000 Turkish Cypriots to the Enosis, stated that the fact that the Greek Cypriots were the majority in the island was not enough to justify such a radical alteration to Cypriot status quo. There are certain difficulties that arise by approaching the above conclusions. On the one hand, the Greek side had a great diplomatic advantage by controlling the 80 per cent of the Cypriot population. The General Assembly, through Resolution 637, had adopted the majority principle as a legitimate means of exercising the right of self determination.⁶⁶ However, despite the fact that the above principle is fully recognized by the United Nations, it cannot be applied in every case, especially in territories with conflicting populations. Despite the fact that the Greek side supported the view that Greeks and Turkish could peacefully co-exist together,⁶⁷ no-one could predict the outcome of such a development. Therefore, the British argument that in cases like the Cypriot question the majority principle should not count more than the feelings of both sides was accurate, since the willingness of the Turkish Cypriots to adopt every means in order to oppose a possible change to their territory's status quo was a clear threat to the region's peace and order.

The outcome of the discussions was a setback for the Greek government. The General Assembly, on December 17, issued a text which among other things stated:

*"The General Assembly considering that for the time being it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus, decided not to discuss any further the issue..."*⁶⁸

Fifty nations voted in favour of the text to none, with eight abstentions. The British and Turkish delegates stressed that their support for the resolution did not imply that they recognized the competence of the U.N to deal with Cyprus on any future occasion. The

⁶⁵ Kyrou: Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, 750th meeting, December 14, 1954.

⁶⁶ Resolution 637 (VII), Gen. Ass., Seventh Session, 403rd plenary meeting, December 16, 1952.

⁶⁷ There is a great conflict among the Greek academia concerning the above issue. The majority accept the Greek delegation's statement for peaceful co-existence between the Greek and the Turkish community in Cyprus. However, they are failing to separate a diplomatic statement from an historic fact. As seen, until now the differences between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots were deep and well rooted in the island's past. Therefore, it would have been a immense mistake for someone to positively claim that a possible evacuation of the British troops from Cyprus could not have resulted in an eruption of hate until the point of a civil war. Unfortunately, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, until that point, had given various proofs of their pure nationalist nature, an attitude that could not guarantee the preservation of peace and order on the island.

Greek side, that voted in favour of the text, justified her attitude by stating that the text's insertion "*for the time being*" meant that the above statement was just a postponement and not a final decision for Cyprus' fate. However, it was a pure diplomatic defeat for the government of Athens. Two factors played the most important role in the failure of the Greek appeal: the attitude of the United States and Turkey. As *The Times* quite rightly wrote:

*"A resounding moral victory was scored by the United Kingdom, with substantial support from Turkey and the United States..."*⁶⁹

Until April 1954, the American attitude, although neutral, was encouraging the moderate attitude of the Athenian government. However, when the State Department was informed about the Greek intention to appeal to the United Nation concerning the Cypriot question, it expressed its opposition to such an initiative. The Greek side, knowing that another postponement of its appeal to the United Nations would have created an explosive situation in the internal politics of the country, ignored the American warnings and tried to secure American neutrality. According to Kyrou, on 16 September the State Department reassured the Greek government that she did not intend to support any side during the discussions in the United Nations.⁷⁰ Indeed, during the discussions about whether or not the Greek appeal could be put on the agenda for the United Nation's Ninth General Assembly, the American delegation kept a neutral position by not participating in any of the debates. However, when the issue was put on the agenda the United States maintained a pro-British position, influencing the attitude of the whole of the Western world. Greek historiography fails to identify the reasons that led the United States to adopt such a pro-British attitude. However, the answer to that question can be found into the Cold War framework. First of all, one of the major American concerns was to preserve the unity of the Southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty. By voting in favour of Cypriot self-determination, it would automatically not be considering the Lausanne Treaty to be valid. Such a development would have given a legitimate right to Turkey to seek new negotiations concerning the status quo of the islands of the Aegean Sea and of Western Thrace. Greece would have never accepted such a development and a new Greco-Turkish war would surely have occurred, jeopardizing the American efforts for economic and political rehabilitation of the two main Balkan nations as bulwarks against Soviet expansionism, while on the

⁶⁸ Gen. Ass., Ninth Session, Agenda item 62, Annexes, Document A/Resolution/292.

⁶⁹ *The Times*, December 16, 1954, p. 8.

other hand it would have wounded NATO's image in the rest of the world. In addition, the geostrategic importance of Cyprus did not allow America to support the evacuation of the British troops that were stationed there. The maintenance of the British presence in Cyprus was an unquestionable bastion, according to the American side, against Soviet expansionism to the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey played an equal important role in the failure of the Greek appeal. In an expert way the British side presented arguments such as the Turkish minority issue and the Lausanne Treaty that offered a great opportunity to Turkey to present herself as a third, decisive factor for the shaping of Cyprus' future. On the other hand, the Turkish delegation supported every British argument, forming a powerful coalition with Britain that was really hard for the Greek side to bypass.

The end of the Ninth Session of the General Assembly found Britain in a stronger position, than before. She succeeded in attracting American support and securing her position as a decisive factor of stability in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean, while she re-enforced her diplomatic relations with Turkey. On the other side, Greece found herself in a worse position than before. She had been abandoned even by the United States, while her diplomatic relations with Turkey became even worse, opening another diplomatic front for the Athenian government. As an evaluation of the Greek appeal to the United Nations it can be said that it was one of the main mistakes of Greek diplomacy since the formation of the Greek state. The appeal gave Britain the opportunity to develop her arguments against the Greek Cypriot demands in front of an international audience, while it jeopardized any future Greek intention for the beginning of bipartite talks with London concerning Cyprus' fate. On the other hand, the Greek government, quite irresponsibly, gave a brilliant opportunity to Turkey to enter the Cypriot question as a decisive and equally important power, an opportunity that was not wasted as will be seen in future chapters. Without any doubt, it was a weighty error of Athens, however it would be a methodological mistake to blame only Papagos and his cabinet. Theoretically, the elected government of a nation should have the moral strength to rise above the circumstances and maintain its calm, no matter what. Nevertheless, in many cases theory differs from reality. Only 5 years after the end of the Civil War, Greece was struggling to stand on her own feet again. By October 1953 the cost of living was 115 times higher than that of the prewar years, while no less than

⁷⁰ A. Kyrou, The Greek Foreign Policy, (Athens, 1955), p. 278.

1,000,000 Greeks were believed to be one step from starvation.⁷¹ At the same time, by September 1954, more than 200,000 Greeks were either in prison or in exile within the Greek perimeter due to their pro-left beliefs and action, while until 1962 the Greek courts continued to try Communists and Socialist according to the emergency legislation of 1947-49.⁷² While Papagos' government had the special task of healing the social and political wounds of the Civil War, at the same time it had to resolve a diplomatic crisis concerning Cyprus. The nationalist and irresponsible attitude of Makarios, who was ignorant of the diplomatic situation of that time and applied considerable pressure upon Athens by using ethical rhetoric and political threats; the reckless stance of the parties of the opposition who manipulated the Cypriot question and turned the public opinion against Papagos for their own political benefit; and the British refusal to assist Papagos' moderate policy concerning the Cypriot question, all created such a pressurizing situation that the only visible exit for Athens seemed to be New York. As K. Karamanlis confessed to N. Kranidiotis during a private talk:

*"it is more than certain that when Papagos decided to internationalize the Cypriot question, he did not predict the tremendous consequences of such an action for the foreign relations of the country... The provocative British attitude and the pressure from the Greek people, both in Greece and Cyprus, can partly justify it, but as a political decision it was unfortunate"*⁷³

However, what the British failed to understand was the strength of the Greek Cypriot desire to be unified with Greece. The failure of the diplomatic discussions persuaded the Greek Cypriots that there was only one solution left for the accomplishment of their national vindication: violence and murder.

⁷¹ A. Dimitriadis, The Incurable Trauma: Greece after the end of the Civil War, (Thessaloniki, 1978), pp. 79-82.

⁷² According the emergency legislation of 1947-49 Socialists and Communists were regarded by the state as traitors and they had either to sign a petition declaring their loyalty to the King or to face life imprisonment. If there were proofs that a person fought during the Civil War with the Communist side then he could face the death penalty by a firing squad. No Socialist or Communist, even if he had signed the petition, could be hired in the Public Sector, while he did not have the right to leave the country under any circumstances.

⁷³ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p.72.



CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNING OF THE TROUBLES: THE FORMATION OF EOKA AND THE BRITISH NON-INTERVENTION.

The Melians to the Athenians
"We see that you have come prepared to judge the arguments yourselves...If we surrender, then all our hope is lost at once, whereas as long as we remain in action, there is still a hope that we may yet stand upright."
Thucydides, V:86, 102, 112.

This chapter will explain the appearance and significance of the Greek Cypriot guerilla group EOKA in Cyprus. A great number of researchers both in Greece and England have dealt analytically with this issue providing us with a detailed examination of the historic route of EOKA through the stormy period of 1955-1960. Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the above analysis by adding new evidence concerning EOKA, especially the issue of British surveillance and penetration into the organization. This chapter will approach the process of EOKA's formation, covering the period from EOKA's first action until the beginning of the Tripartite Conference in London, on 11 July 1955. However, the primary focus of this chapter is not to give a

detailed account of EOKA's guerilla action or of its internal organization¹, but to question the views of the majority of Greek academics, who approach the appearance of EOKA as a progressive factor and an anti-colonial phenomenon. According to them, the strategic abilities of the leader of EOKA, General G. Grivas, the bravery of EOKA's fighters and, most important, the success of EOKA in keeping the British Intelligence in absolute darkness concerning the organization, forced the British side to move towards the final solution of the Cypriot question. Based on their views, this settlement would have been delayed indefinitely without the catalytic appearance of Grivas and his fighters. Through the use of primary sources and a series of personal interviews with key actors of that time, I will attempt to show that EOKA had a negative influence upon the Cypriot question. I will seek to approach and analyse the plans of the British Intelligence, which was aware of EOKA's plot and actions from the very first moment and sought to manipulate the organization for London's geostrategic and political interests. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Why was EOKA's formation a negative development for the Enosis movement and for the inter-communal unity of the island? Why did the British side not protect peace and order in Cyprus by arresting Grivas and preventing the formation of EOKA? What were the geo-strategic gains for London in allowing Grivas and EOKA to establish themselves in the Cypriot political arena and, more importantly in the Greek Cypriot mentality?

In the early hours of 1 April 1955, a series of bomb explosions occurred all over Cyprus. It was not an irrational act of some irresponsible youths. On the contrary, it was the maiden action of a newly founded underground organization, called EOKA, against the British authorities in Cyprus. The next day the island was full of leaflets proclaiming that with God's help and the support of all the forces of Hellenism, the struggle to throw off the British yoke had now begun.² Warnings under the same signature were sent to the police advising them on pain of execution not to interfere with EOKA's activities. It was not a hoax. It was a reality intended to play a historic role in the Cypriot drama, affecting not only the lives of the inhabitants of the island, but the diplomatic relations of Greece, Turkey and Britain.

As mentioned in previous chapters, the idea of the creation of a military group which would fight for the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece was an old one. The formation of the Patriotic League in 1898 and E. Venizelos' rejection of the proposals of a team of

¹ For more concerning this aspect see: The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964) and N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, (London, 1978).

young officers who asked his permission for the creation of a guerilla movement in Cyprus (1921), justifying his decision by saying that Greece could not afford to provoke British wrath at that time, visibly show that the inspiration for the violent overthrow of the British establishment from Cyprus was well established in the minds of the Greek and Greek Cypriot extremists. The turbulent years, on the political and social level, that followed Metaxas' dictatorship and the Axis occupation in Greece, did not allow those intemperate ideas to be developed: however, they were not forgotten. After the end of the Greek Civil War, leading members of the Greek extreme right began once more to prepare the ground for a guerilla confrontation with Britain in Cyprus. The most active was G. Grivas, the leader of the notorious military group "X" which played an important role in the defeat of the Communist guerillas during the battle of Athens in December 1944.³ G. Grivas was born in Cyprus in the village of Trikomo on 23 May 1898. At the age of 18 he joined the Military Academy of Athens and participated in the Asia Minor campaign and the Greco-Italian war, gaining fame and medals for his bravery and his undoubted strategic and leadership skills. However, after the defeat of the Greek army by the German troops and the capture of Athens, Grivas, a fervent pro-German and a fanatic anti – communist, formed the secret organization "X" and tried to approach the Axis powers in order to offer his services against the Greek Resistance movement that had been dominated by the Communists. According to Professor H. Fleischer, "X" avoided the stigma of the traitor because of a lack of German interest. As Professor Fleischer states, in 1943 the leader of "X" Colonel Grivas, offered the services of his group to the Occupational forces stressing his Anglophobia and his strong anti-Communist beliefs. Nevertheless, the German General Staff answered that it could not speak with a chief of brigands, since the Colonel was unimportant⁴ Grivas and his organization gained importance after the liberation of Greece from the Axis powers and during its co-operation with the British forces against the Greek Communists. During that period Grivas' military group had been transformed from an insignificant paramilitary organization into a well established private army, due to the recruiting of royalists, supporters of Metaxas' fascist regime and collaborators of the Nazis during the years of the Axis occupation. According to a secret report of the British Military Intelligence (MI3), during March 1946 the allocation of the "X" forces

² For full text see: General G. Grivas, The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. by Charles Foley, (London, 1964), p.208.

³ The battle of Athens is one of the most important and tragic moments of Greek history, mainly because its legacy set the foundations for the outbreak of the Civil War two years later. For more concerning the Battle of Athens see: L. Baerentzen, The Demonstrations in Syntagma Square on Sunday the 3rd of December, 1944, (Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek 2, 1978), pp. 3-52.

were: 13,000 in Pelloponesos, 10,000 in Thrace and Macedonia, and 20,000 in central Greece.⁵ In only a few years time, due to the "X" cruelty against individual left-wing citizens and even whole villages, G. Grivas managed to become the most hated extreme right-wing personality for the Greek Communists and an unethical and opportunist figure for the British authorities. Characteristically, Major C. Woodhouse, who led the British sabotage expeditions in Greece during the Axis occupation, wrote in his memoirs that the "X" action could only be compared with the notorious Ku Klux Klan.⁶

Grivas had never hidden his political aspirations. He was an ambitious man, therefore he tried to enter the Parliament by using his influence and notoriety as the leader of the "X" and his anti-communist action during the battle of Athens. However, Grivas failed to persuade the Greek electorate of his abilities, and as a result, at the election of 31 March 1946 his party, X-KEA, received only 0.080% of the votes all over the country. He did not accept his sound political failure. He believed that he was the victim of a political plot and he decided to gain fame and glory by searching for another field of honour. According to Mr. Andrianos Promeletitos, Grivas' close associate during the Axis occupation and a candidate member of the Parliament with Grivas' party in the constituency of Halandri:

"We were hearing the results together on the radio in my house in Halandri and the news was not so good. During the night Giorgos [Grivas] kept drinking a lot. It was unusual for him because he was always Spartan in food and alcohol but it was obvious that he was really depressed... I remember when he turned to me and with his eyes full of tears he told me " I had been abandoned by everyone but I still have not been beaten. There is always Cyprus and one day all of those who let me down will call me hero. History still has an empty page for me..."⁷

In that way the notorious leader of the "X", well known both to the British and to Greek Communists, turned to his place of origin searching for a new field of glory.

After his electoral failure Grivas began to meet with members of the Cypriot and the Greek extreme right, moving towards the creation of a guerilla group in Cyprus that could challenge the British presence in the island. Therefore, as written in his memoirs, after some meetings with the Greek diplomat A. Kyrou and the Cypriot lawyer and

⁴ H. Fleischer, Greece During 1940-1950, (Athens, 1988), p. 92.

⁵ R. Heinz, The British Intervention in Greece, (Athens, 1997), p. 452.

⁶ C.M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in their International Setting (London, 1948), p. 57.

prominent member of the Greek Cypriot right H. Papadopoulos, he decided to visit the Chief of the General Staff General G. Kosmas in order to inform him of his intentions. As Grivas continues, General Kosmas invited him on 27 January 1951 declaring his full support for his plans.⁸ However, during that period Grivas was not the only one who was working towards the formation of a guerilla army in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot Right was extremely suspicious of the electoral influence of AKEL and did not particularly welcome the ideological deviation of the party towards a pro-Enosis standpoint. The Cypriot right was afraid that AKEL was getting prepared for the synthesis of a guerilla army in order to liberate the island from the British presence. In such a case, the Right was fearful that AKEL would monopolize the national struggle of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis, as the Communists did during the Axis occupation in Greece, aiming to eliminate any other opponent in the Cypriot political spectrum. However, as Mr. G. Pantelidis confessed:

*“ The reactionary forces of the Church and the bourgeoisie class could not apprehend the nationalist turn of AKEL. They could not understand that it was simply a strategic decision in order to maintain its electoral influence. They believed that we were considering the commencement of an armed struggle in Cyprus and they were anxious that they might be left out of the course of the Cypriot question. However, as a party we neither had the means nor the desire to complicate further the obscure situation of the Cypriot case, at this particular moment... ”*⁹

Therefore, in order to control the political developments, the Greek Cypriot Right was prompted to start preparations for an armed uprising in the island through the Secretary-General of PEK, S. Loizidis. Loizidis was one of the leading figures of the Cypriot Right and had close links with the powerful Orthodox Church on the island. In 1950, because of his unionist activity, he was forced by the British authorities to abandon Cyprus. However, before his departure, Loizidis met Makarios, then Bishop of Kition, in order to discuss the possibilities of an armed uprising against the British in Cyprus. Makarios gave him his approval, directing him to establish in Athens a preparatory committee that would move towards the creation of a liberation front in Cyprus.¹⁰

⁷ Personal interview with Mr. Andrianos Promeletios in Athens during December 1998.

⁸ *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, op. cit., p. 13.

⁹ Personal interview with G. Pantelidis during July 1998, Nicosia.

¹⁰ *Historic Encyclopedia of Cyprus*, (Nicosia, 1983), vol. X, p. 363.

As soon as Loizidis arrived in Athens, he came in contact with the well known academics of that time, G. Konidiaris and D. Vezanis. Both belonged to the extreme right, while Vezanis was an old comrade of Grivas in "X" during the Axis occupation, specializing in intelligence.¹¹ When Makarios visited Athens during March 1951 as the Cypriot Archbishop, he met S. Loizidis in the well-known hotel "Grand Britannia" and they discussed the prerequisites for the organization of a liberation movement in Cyprus.¹² Loizides informed Makarios of his connections and secured the agreement of the latter to approach G. Stratos, former Minister of War in Tsaldaris' government and one of the closest associates of the Greek monarch, Georgios II. Stratos accepted Loizidis' proposal to participate in the committee for the liberation of Cyprus, and on his own suggestion Grivas, the colonel H. Alexopoulos, the lawyer A. Avgikos, the craftsman H. Tsatsomoiros and the railway official D. Stavropoulos were approached as well.¹³ The first meeting of all the participants took place in the famous Athenian café named Tsitsas, still favourable to students and politicians, placed in Panepistimiou St. with an exceptional view of the Parthenon.¹⁴ There under the shadow of Gladstone's statue, Grivas' initiation ceremony to the Liberation Committee was successfully concluded. One of the most urgent problems concerned the financing of the struggle. Despite the fact that all the members of the committee were prominent members of the Athenian society with great financial power, it was still impossible for them to maintain such a costly campaign. Therefore, with Makarios' permission, the members of the Committee began to search for economic contributors among the Greek upper class. S. Loizides approached the well-known ship owner A. Onasis and his cousin-in-law S. Niarchos. Both were strong supporters of the Right and committed patriots. Onasis was especially well known for his anti-British feelings, mainly due to his place of origin¹⁵. They both promised to assist the creation of a guerilla movement in Cyprus. It was impossible to find reliable evidence of the actual amount that Onasis and Niarchos donated to EOKA. However, in Onasis' interview for Greek National Television it became obvious that he firmly supported EOKA, without asking for anything in return. As he said:

"First of all and above all is God and country, and everybody has the duty to serve them both as much as he can. I never hid

¹¹ C. Foley & I.W. Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus, (Stanford, 1975), p. 15.

¹² S. Loizidis, Hapless Cyprus, (Athens, 1980), p. 96.

¹³ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p.20.

¹⁴ C. Foley & W. I. Scobie, op. cit., p. 10.

the fact that I am Greek and my country comes first even before family and money. I supported and I will continue to support every effort for the greatness of my country, on a cultural, economic, political and military level, and as I have proven in the past I will never hesitate to offer even my self for a national cause... After all a man with no patriotism is a man with no identity.”¹⁶

Another businessman that Loizides approached was A. Bodosakis. Bodosakis was the owner of an ammunition factory and was the main supplier of the Greek army. Bodosakis agreed to contribute to the establishment of an anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus, and he became the main supplier to EOKA of ammunitions, guns and explosive substances. It has to be noted here that Bodosakis played, successfully, the role of the double agent. While he was assisting Grivas' and his comrades, he established strong links with London and with the British embassy in Athens. In the public eye Bodosakis appeared to be against Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, and he was offering his advice to the British side about the best ways to deal with the Greek Cypriot demands. Characteristically, the British ambassador of that time in Athens, J. Young, sent a secret memo to London about Bodosakis, praising the virtues of the Greek businessman. As he said:

“...I add that everything that Bodosakis says is valuable. He does not appear much in the front line of public life, but still he has a great influence over many people, and he is one of the few Greeks who are against the Enosis.”¹⁷

On 6 June 1951, Makarios and Grivas met in the house of Stratos in order to discuss the following steps of the Committee. Makarios already knew Grivas since the dark years of the Axis occupation in Greece. The Cypriot Archbishop, a young priest at that time, had close relations with Z. Valvis, the political consultant of Grivas in the “X”. Through Valvis the two men came in contact and positive feelings were induced by both sides.¹⁸ Makarios favoured Grivas' anti-communist ideas and action and Grivas appreciated his young but well educated compatriot. Their affinity was so good, that in 1946 Makarios published some of his articles in the “X” news sheet, attacking

¹⁵ Onasis was born in the Greek island of Tenedos. However, under the Lausanne Treaty this island was given to Turkey together with Imbros. Onasis never forgot that and he held the British side responsible for the fate of his island.

¹⁶ Written Archives of the Hellenic Radio & Television: Onasis interview, 23 June 1972.

¹⁷ M. Drousiotis, *EOKA: The Dark Side*, (Athens, 1998) p. 73.

¹⁸ C. Foley & W. I. Scobie, op. cit., p. 7.

Communism from a Christian viewpoint.¹⁹ Due to their personal relationship, Makarios did not have any objection regarding the appointment of Grivas as the military leader of a future guerilla group on Cyprus. During the meeting at Stratos' residence it was decided that it was essential for Grivas to visit Cyprus in order to inspect the situation and infer conclusions for the emergence of a guerilla movement in the island. Thus, on 5 July, Grivas left the port of Piraeus, taking his wife Kiki with him to avoid raising suspicions. However, what Greek and British scholars fail to consider, concerning Grivas' first visit to Cyprus, is the fact that he applied for a visa from the British Embassy in Athens. This was likely to have raised suspicions since the British were aware of his paramilitary past. Contrary to the mainstream view of the Greek academia concerning Grivas' success in manipulating the authorities, from the first moment that he arrived in Cyprus he had been followed by members of the British Intelligence. This can be confirmed by two factors. Firstly, the firm refusal of the British Embassy in Athens to grant my request to study their records concerning Grivas' visa application for his trip to Cyprus²⁰, and secondly, the personal confession of Mr. A. Hatzandreou, a Greek Cypriot permanent resident of Athens, who during that time was driving his father's taxi in Nicosia. In a personal interview he said:

*"During that period [summer of 51] I was driving my father's taxi in Nicosia due to an accident that he had... I had been approached by an Englishman and he asked to rent me and my taxi for 3 hours every day. He said to me that he was suspecting his wife and he wanted to follow her without raising any suspicions... I accepted the offer and during the first days we were just driving around Nicosia's main streets. However, one day the Englishman told me to stop the car and he started to take photos of a middle-aged man with a thick moustache. He later told me that he was the lover of his wife... However, after some years I understood that the supposed lover that we were following was G. Grivas."*²¹

As soon as Grivas arrived in Cyprus he began to visit the mountainous country, learning the nature of the Cypriot landscape and the material conditions for establishing guerilla warfare in the Cypriot perimeter. On 3 August Grivas met Makarios in Nicosia in order to inform him about the results of his reconnaissance. As Grivas wrote in his memoirs, during the meeting he realized that the Archbishop had grave doubts

¹⁹ C. Foley & W. I. Scobie, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁰ It has to be noted here that every Embassy keeps records of all the visa applications received, as well as comments concerning each individual applicant.

²¹ Personal interview with Mr. Andreas Hatzandreou in Athens during January 1999.

concerning Grivas' report.²² It is obvious that Grivas through his memoirs tried to accuse Makarios of faint-heartedness, however it would have been a great mistake if the assessment of Makarios' role in the Cypriot question during that time was based only on Grivas' personal judgement.²³ Makarios, due to the fact that he was not a natural-born warlord but a spiritual as well as the political leader of the Greek Cypriots, felt a great responsibility for the fate of his people.

Despite the negative aspects of his meeting with Makarios, Grivas returned to Athens in order to conclude his plans for the creation of a secret organization in Cyprus, which would be patterned upon "X". On July 1952, Makarios visited Athens in order to put pressure upon the Greek government concerning the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. Makarios' visit gave the Liberation Committee the opportunity to hold a meeting in D. Venzanis' residence. Apart from Makarios and the host, the other participants were: G. Grivas, G. Stratos, the Major-General of the Greek army N. Papadopoulos, Colonel S. Alexopoulos, Professor G. Konidiaris, Loizidis brothers, the lawyer A. Avgikos, I Tsatsomoiros and D. Stavropoulos.²⁴ During the meeting Grivas, as the military leader, informed the Committee of his plans that involved the armed uprising against the British forces through the creation of a guerilla group. Makarios, again, showed his doubts about the realization of such a plan. Makarios, during that period, was still in favour of a peaceful settlement of the Cypriot question and for that reason he informed the rest of the members of the Liberation Committee to wait for the results of his meetings with the Greek officials. However, as mentioned in a previous chapter the Greek government was reluctant to confront Britain during that period, mainly due to the country's NATO application. A characteristic event that underlines the Greek unwillingness to confront Britain concerning Cyprus, occurred during a meeting between Makarios and the Greek Premier, N. Plastiras, when the latter answered Makarios' demands for his support for the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis:

"Listen your excellency. If you were coming to my humble residence and you were asking me to go and fight for Cyprus, I would have gone because I am a soldier. However, you are coming to the office of the Prime Minister of the Greeks and you are asking me

²² The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p.17.

²³ One of the main mistakes of the Greek scholars who are dealing with Cyprus is the absolute trust in Grivas' personal judgements concerning other personalities that played an important role in the course of the Cypriot question. As E. Tositsas Averof says in his memoirs A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot question 1950-1963, Grivas' memoirs are lacking in objective judgement, therefore it should be used by every researcher as an accurate chronological diary of the events and not as a credible source.

to burn Greece without serving Cyprus. For that reason I am asking to reconsider your position."²⁵

The Liberation Committee met for a second time on 21 July in S. Loizidis' residence. The second meeting gave Makarios an opportunity to inform the other members of the hesitations of the Greek government to support the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. After a long discussion until the early hours, the Committee decided to pursue the preparations for the beginning of the armed struggle on the island. Hence, two committees were set up, a military and a political one, to study the practical problems of starting the uprising. It was also decided that Stratos, in Makarios' absence, would preside over both committees and coordinate their efforts.²⁶

On 3 October 1952, Grivas made his second trip to Cyprus and he had a series of meetings with Makarios in order to discuss the strategy and the methods of the struggle. Makarios brought Grivas in contact with the leaders of the youth organizations that were under the influence of the Church, so in that way the first cell of the committee had been formed in Cyprus. The people that Grivas met were, S. Poskotis from PEON, P. Papagathagelou from OXEN and A. Azinas from PEK. Those people had been given the task of propagandizing in favour of the armed struggle among the Greek Cypriot youth, as well as of finding young volunteers from their organizations who were willing to become guerillas for the cause. On 25 February 1953, Grivas returned to Athens and began to provide guns from the stock of the "X", which he donated to the new organization.²⁷ However, on 10 March, Makarios, returning from the headquarters of the United Nations, stopped in Athens in order to meet Grivas. The Archbishop had been informed about Grivas' initiative in providing guns and he asked to see the colonel as soon as possible. The two men met in S. Loizidis' apartment in the center of Athens and Makarios expressed his disagreement with Grivas' desire to send guns to Cyprus. The Archbishop was against any form of bloodshed and he insisted that the actions of the guerilla group should be limited only to sabotage operations. Grivas, on the other hand, insisted on guerilla warfare, as the only effective way of challenging the British authority in Cyprus. In the end, Makarios, by using his authority as the leading figure of the Committee, imposed his views and Grivas promised that he would follow them. As Makarios states concerning that meeting:

²⁴ M. Drousiotis, op. cit., p. 52.

²⁵ E. Tositsas Averof, op. cit., vol. I, p. 96.

²⁶ C. Foley & W.I. Scobie, op. cit., p.p. 15-16.

²⁷ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 19. That fact is another proof for the nature of the "X" as a paramilitary extreme right wing group even after the end of the Greek Civil War. According to special

*"I said they could only fight back in self-defence if they found themselves in difficulties. I said that Grivas must take his orders from me as the Ethnarch and leader of the political struggle. We would discuss everything, but I would have the final word. He promised this, and obeyed for as long as I was in Cyprus."*²⁸

Makarios was determined not to lose the control and the leadership of the Committee. Therefore, on 7 June he sent Azinas to Athens, in order to organize the first consignment to Cyprus. Azinas had strict orders from Makarios to send only sabotage materials and to inform Grivas that no-one from Greece should arrive in Cyprus yet.²⁹

In the early days of January 1954 the Liberation Committee decided that action in Cyprus should begin, since diplomacy had failed due to the British inflexibility towards the Greek demands for a final settlement of the Cypriot question. With Makarios' economic assistance the preparations for the sending of explosives and a small amount of guns began. The leadership of the first expedition was given to Admiral Sakelarios, a well-known hero of the Second World War and a strong Anglophile. During the war he had served with the commander of the British navy in the Mediterranean, Admiral J. Cunningham, and had been decorated with the KCB, the highest British honour ever given to a Greek officer. On 20 March the caique "Sirina" left from Lavrio, a port outside of Athens, carrying 34 pistols with 656 rounds, 4 Steiger automatics with 4,000 rounds, 4,000 rounds of 9mm ammunition, 350 kilos of dynamite, 300 lb of Nobel 808 explosives, 100 mines, 300 hand grenades, 700 canisters of fulminate of mercury, 100 smoke bombs, 1,100 metres of slow burning fuse, and 120 coloured flares.³⁰ The caique reached Cyprus on 25 March and its load was collected by Azinas' team. The next problem that had to be faced was the arrival of Grivas in Cyprus for the beginning of the armed struggle. On June 1954, Grivas requested, for the second time, a visa permit in order to travel to Cyprus. His application was forwarded, first, to Nicosia and then to the headquarters of the Intelligence Service in London. The Intelligence Service collected all the information from Grivas' first two visits to the island and even located a small group of Greek Cypriots preparing for a revolt against the British government. The British embassy in Athens was informed of all of the above and Grivas' application was refused. Byford-Jones, who gave the above information, criticized the decision of

agreements after the end of the Greek Civil War (spring of 1949) all the paramilitary groups that developed an anti-communist action had to hand in their guns and ammunitions.

²⁸ C. Foley & W. I. Scobie, op. cit., p. 20.

²⁹ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 20.

the British government as a major mistake, because if it had issued Grivas' visa, it could have had him under surveillance from his first moment in Cyprus, so four years of terror and murder could have been avoided.³¹ However, as will be argued later on, the British did have Grivas under close surveillance and knew all his moves from the first moment that he stepped onto Cyprus.

On 9 October, Grivas met Makarios and urged him to allow him to arrive in Cyprus. Makarios had still great misgivings, but he was eventually convinced since Grivas promised that he would accept his command and not take any initiative towards the commencement of the operations. Grivas, since he did not have a visa permit, decided to enter Cyprus clandestinely. On 27 October, Grivas, accompanied by S. Loizides, arrived in Rhodes. The plan was to reach Cyprus by caique, but the weather was really bad and they waited on the island for more than a week. Nevertheless, on 10 November after two stormy days at sea they reached the island and met Azinas, who hid them for few days in his uncle's house in Chlorakas. After a few days, Grivas arrived in Nicosia in order to organize the armed struggle. In Nicosia, Grivas formed three groups of six men each and began to train them in sabotage actions. Among those men were P. Georgatzis, M. Drakos, S. Lenas, G. Drousiotis, E. Evagelakis and G. Afsentiou. All those young men played a leading role in EOKA's struggle later on. One of Grivas' first associates in Nicosia was P. Papadopoulos, the secretary general of PEO. Papadopoulos found a secure house for Grivas to stay in and bought a car for Grivas', using Union money.³² In that way, Grivas claimed, the first resistance cell was created in Nicosia in complete secrecy.

However, the truth was completely different. The British Intelligence was aware of Grivas' moves from his first day on the island, as well as the names of his close associates. As P. Stokkos, a Greek Cypriot policeman, confessed to Makarios after 1960:

*"It was late autumn 1954 and I was working in police headquarters at the Special Branch when I noticed a circular about the presence of Grivas in Cyprus. According to that circular, Grivas was hiding in the monastery of "Mesa Potamou" in the province of Salta and was organizing a liberation movement."*³³

³⁰ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 23.

³¹ W. Byford-Jones, Grivas and the Story of EOKA, (London, 1959), p. 47.

³² M. Drousiotis, op. cit., p. 63.

³³ M. Drousiotis, op. cit., p. 62.

What Stokkos told Makarios was not a product of his imagination. As soon as Grivas arrived in Cyprus, the British side began to organize an information network in order to discover his moves. During that time, Philip Tei, a special agent of the Minister of the State for Colonies, arrived on the island in order to re-organize the structure of the Special Branch.³⁴ In addition, on 1 January 1955, Dr. Satchell, a member of the Intelligence Service, arrived on Cyprus to lecture 50 Cypriot policeman in guerilla warfare methods.³⁵ The British side not only knew that Grivas had arrived in Cyprus, but they were following his steps in great detail, since an agent of the Intelligence Service was among Grivas' closer associates. This man was P. Papadopoulos, who later left Cyprus in 1956 when his double role was revealed. As mentioned, it was Papadopoulos who rented a house for Grivas in Nicosia, and also bought him a car and became his personal driver. It was Papadopoulos who drove Grivas to Kakopetria, when the latter decided to hide in the mountains because he was feeling insecure in Nicosia, and Papadopoulos was the man to whom Grivas gave his diary and documents of EOKA, which fell into British hands.³⁶ The conclusion is that Grivas was exposed and could be arrested whenever the British authorities desired. A possible arrest of Grivas would not create a diplomatic incident with Greece, since the Liberation Committee did not have any support from the Greek state, nor could it provoke a series of revolts from the Greek Cypriot community of the island, since Grivas' plans were known only to a handful of men. So why was Grivas not arrested? Why did the British not prevent the formation of EOKA? Why did the British not protect peace and order in the island? Those questions will be answered later on in this chapter.

On 31 January 1955, Makarios invited Grivas to Nicosia in order to discuss the opening of the struggle. Makarios was disappointed by the collapse of the Greek appeal in the United Nations and he decided that the only solution for the Cypriot question was to begin limited sabotage guerilla actions against British targets on the island. Makarios believed that through this form of struggle the British side would be forcibly persuaded to evacuate Cyprus. The two men met in Kykos' Metohi and Makarios gave his permission for the beginning of EOKA's actions. The Archbishop insisted that he did not want any victims from the attacks and approved only sabotage actions against

³⁴ The Special Branch of the Police was responsible for the information section, under the authority of MI5 which was responsible for issues of internal security of the state. In Cyprus the Special Branch was dealing mostly with the local Communist party. However, after the beginning of EOKA's struggle it was redeployed and began to gather information for the actions of the organization.

³⁵ M. Drousiotis, op. cit., p. 87.

³⁶ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 127.

military targets.³⁷ The first action of EOKA had been set for 25 March³⁸ but because this particular night would have been bright, due to the full moon, it was decided to commence the struggle on 1 April. Despite the attempts of Makarios' biographers to present this decision as a result of a long prepared research of the Archbishop concerning the geostrategic and political factors of the Cypriot question, it was one of his gravest mistakes in his career as the leader of the Greek Cypriot community in the island. The conditions for the beginning of such a stratagem during that period were the worse possible. Cyprus during that period was more useful to the British than ever. On the south coast of the island, the British had began to build new military bases in order to balance the loss of the Suez. It was an ambitious plan involving the building of a spacious cantonment at Dhekelia, 7 miles east of Larnaca, where some 5,000 troops would be accommodated, and the construction of a large airfield at Akrotiri (near Limassol) by the Royal Air Force.³⁹ In addition, Greece, as a Western protectorate had neither the means nor the will to support such a struggle. Furthermore, the size and the landscape of the island were not suitable for the establishment of a long guerilla war. Cyprus had neither high mountains nor vast forests, to allow guerilla forces to hide, nor unlimited natural resources to support the movement. Additionally, another negative factor for the beginning of the struggle was the small number of EOKA's volunteers. Despite the fact that nowadays almost everybody in Cyprus claims to be an EOKA guerilla, the real number of EOKA fighters never exceeded 300, most of them still students in the last classes of the Gymnasium. This force was able to cause minor problems for the British establishment, but it was impossible to force an empire with a well trained and well equipped army to retreat. On 1 December 1954 the first elements of the Middle East Land Forces and the Middle East Air Force moved from the Suez Canal Zone to Cyprus. During that time the British garrison in Cyprus amounted to about 4,000 soldiers, while Griva's men had to face not only the British but also 2,324 men of the Regular Cypriot Police Force; and 1,770 men belonging to the Auxiliary Police and Special Constables, the majority of whom were Turkish Cypriots.⁴⁰ In addition, the guerilla endeavor had been organized by the Church and extreme right wing elements and had a clear chauvinist and anti-Communist nature. The Communists

³⁷ Terrorism in Cyprus: Grivas' Diary, ed. by the H.M.'S Government Printing Office, (Nicosia, 1957), p. 11.

³⁸ For Greek history this particular day has an exceptional significance, since on 25 March 1821 the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire began from the monastery of Agia Lavra in Peloponesos.

³⁹ The total expenditure of the various projects amounted to 40-50 million pounds. For more see: H.M. Stationery Office: Colonial Reports, Cyprus 1955, (London, 1956), pp. 8-9.

⁴⁰ The Government of Cyprus (July 1958) quoted by N. Crawshaw, op. cit., Appendices 5.

had been excluded from it, and it was clear that it was not the intention of the Liberation Committee to organize a massive anti-colonial guerilla movement. Thus, the Greek Cypriot Communists and the Turkish Cypriots that represented more than 50% of the total population had been regarded as enemies of the cause from the beginning. The nationalist elements that organized the struggle regarded the Communists and the Turkish community as greater enemies than the British. Another of Makarios' great mistakes was the selection of Grivas as the military leader of the cause. Grivas represented the greatest threat to the Cypriot Communists, due to his role during the Greek Civil War, while, due to his nationalist feelings and his anti-Turkish convictions, as a fervent devotee of the Great Idea, it was inevitable that the two communities would be brought in conflict. For all the above reasons, the anti-colonial struggle was beginning with the worst omens and was to divide the local population, thus it was doomed to failure. When I asked the ex-secretary general of the Greek Communist Party, G. Farakos, to evaluate the appearance of EOKA in the Cypriot spectrum he said:

*"The main mistake of Makarios and Grivas was that they left the Communists out of the struggle. Cyprus' fate would have been completely different if the colonial authorities had to face a united front, instead of a handful of men and children... Global history shows that every guerilla movement that did not appeal to the masses, was predestined to defeat. Consider Che Guevara and his revolutionary attempt in Bolivia... In general I believe that Makarios and Grivas managed to divide the Greek Cypriots and demolished the Enosis movement that had a great appeal both to the Nationalists and Communists."*⁴¹

After Makarios gave Grivas the green light, the latter began his search for targets in every main Cypriot city. He appointed as heads of the operation M. Drakos in Nicosia, G. Afxentiou in Famagusta, S. Poskotis in Larnaca and N. Petropouleas in Limassol. Grivas' intention was to attack, at the same time, all the main cities of the island, in order to arouse fear in the British and raise Greek Cypriot morale. Drakos' group had as its target the Government radio station in Nicosia, Haralabos Mouskos' group had to raid the Secreteriat in Nicosia, and Christakis Eleftheriou had to sabotage Wolseley barracks, also in the Cypriot capital. However, the results of EOKA's first attack were, at least, unsatisfactory. Except for the attacks in Nicosia, the operations in every other

⁴¹ Personal interview with the ex-Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party, Mr. Grigoris Farakos, in Athens during August 1998.

Cypriot town failed completely. In Famagusta, the police discovered a car containing explosives and EOKA's pamphlets. At the same time Afxentiou's identity had been revealed and a reward offered for his arrest. In Larnaca, Poskotis' group had to attack the Courts, the Commissioner's Office and Police HQ, however the explosion at the local police station caused only minor damage, and the police arrested Poskotis and two of his comrades. In Limassol, Petropouleas' group had to bomb the two main police stations and dynamite the Episkopi power plant, but several members of the group were arrested. Ironically, the only casualty from EOKA's operations was an EOKA guerilla, Pantelis Modestos, who was electrocuted in Famagusta while attempting to cut the electricity supply.⁴² The results of EOKA's first attack reveal the lack of co-ordination and experience of its members in guerilla sabotage actions. So, how can anyone claim, especially since the British knew of Grivas' moves, that the powerful British military machine could not have stopped E.O.K.A right at the beginning and before its first attack? The answer can be detected in the British geostrategic plans for the Eastern Mediterranean and for Cyprus itself.

The British authorities could have arrested Grivas and his associates from the first day of the colonel's arrival. However, such a development would not have brought them any diplomatic gain, whereas the formation of EOKA could have proven useful to the establishment. Since the arrival of Makarios in the Cypriot political spectrum, and the transition of AKEL's policy towards a more nationalist stand, concerning the Enosis, the British, from the first time since 1878, had to face a united front with the same aspirations towards the Cypriot question. Grivas' arrival and the formation of EOKA, due to his inflexibility towards the Communists, was the best guarantee that the Enosis' united front would come to an end. However, the most important gain for British foreign policy was that EOKA could facilitate the entrance of Turkey into the Cypriot question. As seen in previous chapters, during the early period of the Cold War in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey became a valuable ally for British interests in the Middle East. That alliance had been sealed during the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations, when the Greek appeal in favour of Cyprus collapsed in front of the united Anglo-Turkish diplomatic front. After the failure of the Greek appeal in the United Nations, the Foreign Office had clear indications that Greece would attempt to appeal again. Therefore, Britain wanted to secure Turkish support, knowing that diplomatic alliances can be modified within a day, by giving Turkey the opportunity to enter the Cypriot question as an equal power with Greece. Cyprus, due to its

⁴² The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 33.

geographic position, was valuable for the Turkish aspirations to dominate the geostrategic area of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In such a development Greece would have reacted strongly, causing a diplomatic incident and threatening the unity of the Southern flank of NATO, since according to the Lausanne Treaty (1923) article 16, Turkey had abandoned every sovereign right upon Cyprus. However, the formation of EOKA and the beginning of its actions could give Turkey the legitimate right to enter the Cypriot question in order to protect the Turkish minority. It follows from all this that, Britain would not have gained from arresting Grivas and closing EOKA's chapter. On the contrary, she could gain a lot from EOKA in the diplomatic field.

As a matter of fact, from 1 April and onwards the British government began a diplomatic race in order to include Turkey in the Cypriot question. On 30 June, the British Premier revealed to the House of Commons that his government had sent the following invitation to the Greek and the Turkish governments:

*"Her Majesty's Government have been giving further consideration to the strategic and other problems affecting alike the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. They consider that the association of the 3 countries in that area based on mutual confidence is essential to their common interests. Her Majesty's Government accordingly invite the Greek and the Turkish Governments to send representatives to confer with them in London at an early date on political and defence questions, which affect the Eastern Mediterranean including Cyprus"*⁴³

As is clear from the text of the invitation, except the Cypriot question, other issues would have been discussed at that meeting as well. However, as will be seen in the following chapter, the only discussions that were held concerned Cyprus and no other regional issue. It can be speculated that the invitation had been formulated in such a way that Greece would not oppose the Turkish invitation. As was expected the Turkish side could not throw away such a great opportunity, therefore after two days she declared that she accepted the invitation. The Greek side, on the other hand, hesitated to accept it. Athens was afraid that the Foreign Office would come up with a new plan in order to postpone the Greek appeal to the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the United Nations, therefore the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs asked their British counterparts to

⁴³ A. Eden: House of Commons, 30 June 1955, vol. 543, col. 511.

hasten the date of the conference.⁴⁴ However, things were not as simple as the Greek diplomats thought. What the Greek diplomats did not consider was the inclusion of Turkey in the conference. They presumed that the conference had been decided under the shadow of the eruption of violence in Cyprus and that it indicated the abandonment of the British inflexibility towards the Cypriot question.⁴⁵ Many Greek and Greek Cypriot scholars accuse Papagos of political naivety, since he did not oppose the participation of Turkey in the conference.⁴⁶ In order to establish their hypothesis they make use of Papagos' statement the day before the commencement of the Conference in London. As Papagos said concerning Turkey's inclusion in the Conference:

*"We do not consider the preservation of the Greco-Turkish friendship incompatible with a satisfactory solution for the Cypriot question. Quite on the contrary, I am confident that the settlement of this question will strengthen even more the existing bonds between our two countries."*⁴⁷

However, the truth is that the Greek Premier had no choice but to accept Turkish inclusion in the talks concerning Cyprus. Once again the Foreign Office had set up a successful diplomatic trap for Papagos and his government. If Papagos turned down the British invitation, then Greece would have been exposed at an international level as the only element that was in favour of the continuation of the troubles in Cyprus. Such a development would have been extremely negative for a future Greek appeal in the United Nations. The country would have carried the stigma of political inflexibility in a crisis in the interior politics of another member of the United Nations, while Greece could also have been accused by the international community as the instigator of the troubles. On the other hand, Greece could not ask for the exclusion of Turkey from the Conference, especially after a bomb attack of EOKA in the Turkish sector of Nicosia in June, since the Turkish minority was under a real threat due to Grivas' guerillas and, in accordance with international law, Turkey had the legitimate right to protect its minority through diplomacy. Greece had no choice but to accept the invitation, despite Makarios' strong objections and the criticisms of the opposition. Papagos was trapped in a diplomatic labyrinth, and a new chapter opened for Cyprus, but this time with the

⁴⁴ A. Eden, Full Circle, (London, 1960), p. 398.

⁴⁵ *ibid.* p. 398.

⁴⁶ Many go as far as to accuse Papagos, one of the most honest and patriotic Greek Premiers, of treachery. For more concerning the issue see: A. Poulos, The Darkest Page in the Modern Greek History: Papagos and the Tripartite Conference in London, Notebooks of Political Dialogue, Research and Analysis, (Athens, 1995), vol. 36 pp. 89-139. See also B. Linardos, Papagos' Government: A Place in History?, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-64.

⁴⁷ The Times, 29 August 1955, p. 7.

entrance of a new factor, Turkey. Despite the criticisms of Papagos, those really responsible for this negative turn of the Cypriot question were Makarios and Grivas. With their anachronistic 19th century nationalism, they managed to expose the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis and leave Greece with no choice but to accept the well-planned British proposition. The All Fools Day of 1955 turned out to be a great reverse for the Greek Cypriot dream of Enosis.

CHAPTER VI

THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE IN LONDON: THE CHRONICLE OF A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

"Two can seek for happiness. Three would find misery"
Old Greek saying.

This chapter will examine the so-called Tripartite Conference in London, (29 August–7 September 1955), and its diplomatic results concerning the course of the Cypriot question. Additionally, it will evaluate the influence of the Conference on the diplomatic relations of Britain, Greece and Turkey. The main concern of this chapter is not to present an accurate chronological diary of the events during the Conference. On the contrary, it will attempt to approach the Conference by presenting and evaluating the arguments of the three powers concerning the nature and the fate of the Cypriot question on the basis of their foreign policies in the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean, and will assess the diplomatic gains and losses of this conference for Britain, Greece and Turkey.¹ The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: What was the

¹ The research in this chapter will be based, mainly, upon primary sources such as H.M Stationery Office: The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmd. 9594, 1955, while diaries and

extent of the American influence on the Tripartite Conference? How can the Greek acceptance of the British invitation to London be justified? To what extent did the evacuation of the British military base from Suez and the protection of the Middle East oil resources influence British policy towards the Cypriot question? What were the main reasons for the failure of the Tripartite Conference? What were the main factors that influenced Turkish policy concerning Cyprus?

As was presented in the previous chapter, on 30 June, 1955, the British government issued an official invitation to Greece and Turkey to attend a conference in London on political and defense questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus. Although the invitation was an exclusively British initiative, it was designed to please the American side as well. Since 1952 and the internationalization of the Cypriot question by the Greek Cypriot and the Greek side, the US had felt that the unity of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean was under great risk. The State Department wanted to see a Conference that would include all the sides involved in the Cypriot question, instead of watching Britain, Turkey and Greece exchanging diplomatic insults in the UN, under the vigilant gaze of the Soviet Union and her satellites. American dissatisfaction at the lack of communication between Britain, Turkey and Greece concerning Cyprus can be revealed in the telegram of the Ambassador in Turkey, A.M Warren, to the Department of State in 30 March 1954:

*"In light of existing strategic and political consideration, discussions this issue in UN can only serve weaken existing friendly relations and close co-operation between Greece, UK and Turkey, and thus further Soviet effort disrupt western unity."*²

or in the remark of the Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, W.O. Baxter:

"It [the raising of the Cypriot question in the Ninth General Assembly of the UN] would give the Soviet Union and its satellites a tailor-made opportunity to achieve one of their main present objectives, which is to create dissension among NATO partners in an attempt to destroy European unity. It will also reverse the trend towards closer relationships in the

memoirs of key figures who played an important role in the final outcome of the Conference will be used whenever appropriate to support any conclusion and assumption.

² Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954: Eastern Europe: Soviet Union: Eastern Mediterranean, ed. by W.Z. Slany, (Washington, 1988), vol. VIII, p. 683.

Aegean area which has been so encouraging to us in the past year."³

The American accusation was addressed equally to the three sides involved in the Cypriot riddle, however it mostly affected the British position. During that period Britain was struggling to keep American trust and remain the leading Western power in the Middle East. The Foreign Office desired to keep American involvement out of the political developments of the Middle East, an area that was still then regarded by London as its traditional sphere of influence. Nevertheless, the Greek appeals to the UN and the resulting American unease were making the accomplishment of the British plans even harder. Therefore, London aimed to alter the gloomy atmosphere by organizing a Conference that would bring all the sides involved in the Cypriot question together to communicate without being exposed to the Soviets, in a Conference that would demonstrate the unity of NATO's Eastern flank and the British ability to influence the diplomatic equilibrium of this sensitive area of the globe.

The Turkish side accepted the invitation almost immediately, while the Greek side expressed its reluctance to do the same. The main reason for the Greek hesitation to accept the British invitation was the firm opposition of the Greek Cypriot side to embrace any diplomatic negotiations about the Cypriot question, that would include Turkey. The Greek diplomats feared Makarios' reaction in the event of Greek acceptance of the invitation to London, given the fact that the Cypriot Archbishop had a great influence upon the Greek masses and could easily turn them against their government, generating vast social unrest. However, as was argued earlier, Greece did not have the freedom to turn down the British invitation. The recent developments in Cyprus, EOKA's appearance and the commencement of its anti-colonial struggle left the Greek diplomacy with only two options: either to accept the invitation or reject it. In the first case the Greek government would have to face internal opposition and the fury of the public opinion that would have regarded it as an ultimate action of national submission to the wishes of 10 Downing St, while in the second case it would have to face the uneasiness of the international community and the diplomatic isolation of the country for a long period. As Akropolis wrote in a central article:

"Papagos and his officials are facing a crisis. Either they will try to appease the pro-Cypriot and anti-British sentiments of the Greek public, or they will have to accept the British

³ op. cit., p. 686.

*invitation and sit at the same table with Turkey. Either decision will displease one of the two sides."*⁴

The Greek government decided that it was more appropriate for the national interest to attend the Conference and therefore, on 8 July, informed London that a Greek delegation would represent the country in the Conference. The Greek decision displeased Makarios, therefore he sent to Athens his closest associate N. Kranidiotis in order to meet the Prime Minister and persuade him to alter his decision. On 10 July Kranidiotis met Papagos in his villa in Ekali. Despite his illness the Greek Premier accepted Kranidiotis in his residence and asked to be informed about the situation in Cyprus. Kranidiotis spoke about Makarios' views concerning the British invitation and he informed his interlocutor about EOKA's action. The Greek Premier did not say much. He just advised Kranidiotis that the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus should end.⁵ According to Kranidiotis the Greek Premier tried to discourage the Greek Cypriots from the liberation struggle of Enosis, a typical policy of the officials in Athens, who wanted to control the political developments in the Cypriot island. Nevertheless, the weak old soldier, even in his last moments⁶, tried to justify his decision to send a delegation to London by confessing to Kranidiotis the responsibilities of the Greek Cypriot leadership for that development. Through his short advice to stop EOKA's action in Cyprus, it was obvious that he blamed Makarios for the negative turn of the Cypriot question. EOKA's appearance, and Makarios' passionate speeches about the need to revolt against the British oppression, had exposed the Greek state in the eyes of the international community and associated the official line of Greek foreign policy with the needless pomposity of Grivas and his associates. Papagos' admonition was the last and desperate attempt of an experienced soldier, who spent all his life fighting for his country, to put an end to the pointless bloodshed in Cyprus. His guidance, however, was misinterpreted by Kranidiotis, who later on accused Papagos of inflexibility and lack of consideration towards the Greek Cypriot demands for national vindication.⁷ Kranidiotis returned to Nicosia without succeeding in his purpose and the Greek delegation prepared itself for the trip to Albion.

The Conference opened at Lancaster House at 4 p.m. on 29 August, when questions of procedures were settled. The heads of the three delegations were H. Macmillan⁸ for

⁴ Akropolis, 6 July 1955.

⁵ N. Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years*, (Athens, 1981), pp. 96 – 97.

⁶ Papagos died after two months on 4 October 1955,

⁷ For more concerning Kranidiotis' criticisms see: N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 240-69.

⁸ The other members of the British delegation were: the under-secretary of the Colonies H. Hopkinson and the British ambassadors in Athens and Ankara.

Britain, F. Zorlu⁹ for Turkey, and S. Stefanopoulos¹⁰ for Greece. The first speaker was H. Macmillan, who referred to Cypriot history. Macmillan wanted to connect the strategic necessities that dictated the British arrival in Cyprus back in 1878 with those which still existed in the geostrategic equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean. He pointed out that Cyprus had been ceded to Britain by Turkey when the peace of the world seemed seriously threatened, and as a repayment Britain entered into a defensive alliance with the Sultan to protect his Asian empire from the Russian threat. Comparing that alliance with the post-war role of Turkey as a member of the North-Atlantic Treaty, Macmillan stated:

*"Now once again Great Britain is linked by treaty with Turkey, and with other nations, in defence of the free world. In 1878 it was necessary for Britain to occupy and administer Cyprus in order to execute her engagements towards Turkey. So it is again today; but with even greater force. Indeed, Britain's engagements and responsibilities have been multiplied and diversified."*¹¹

Following that statement, Macmillan continued by reciting the responsibilities of his country in the Middle East, towards the Arab countries.¹² He also supported the view that Cyprus was the only location in the Eastern Mediterranean from which Britain could fulfill her diplomatic and military obligations towards NATO.¹³ In the end of his speech, he confronted the idea that it was sufficient for the geostrategic interests of his country to control a military base in Cyprus, stating that the island was the heart of the British defense system in that part of the world and for that reason he regarded it as imperative that Britain should maintain the right to control Cyprus, not simply a small part of it.¹⁴ Answering Macmillan's arguments, the head of the Greek delegation, S. Stefanopoulos, said that his government was aware of the British diplomatic and

⁹ The other members of the Turkish delegation were: the Minister of National Defense E. Menderes, the secretary-general of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Birgi and the ambassador in Athens I. Zetar.

¹⁰ The other members of the Greek delegation were: the under-secretary of the Minister of National Defense D. Vourdoumpas, the diplomats G. Melas, B. Mostras, G. Koustas, and the General Dovas.

¹¹ Macmillan: The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmd. 9594, August 30, 1955, p. 8.

¹² Apart from the North-Atlantic Treaty, Britain's diplomatic commitments to which the secretary of Foreign Affairs referred were: I) The Baghdad Pact between Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, see: W. L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, (Oxford, 1994), p. 261. II) The Tripartite declaration for peace and stability in Middle East in 1950 from the governments of the United States, Britain and France. III) The Special agreement with the government of Iraq, see: Cmd. 9544, 1955. IV) The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, see: Cmd. 7404, 1948.

¹³ Macmillan: op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁴ Macmillan, op. cit., p. 12.

military aims and obligations in the Middle East, therefore his government recognized the British right to maintain a military base in Cyprus, following the introduction of the principle of self-determination to the island. In addition, according to the Greek government in view of the withdrawal of the British forces from Suez, the necessity for such a base was more evident then than ever before. Stefanopoulos went even further to reassure his British counterpart that

*"In sponsoring the Cypriot people's demand for their right of self determination, Greece has never (and I emphasize never) for a single moment entertained the idea of a withdrawal from Cyprus of the British forces."*¹⁵

Nevertheless, in an attempt to clarify the Greek position, Stefanopoulos insisted that a territory essential to the security and defence of a given country need not necessarily live under the sovereignty of that country. In order to reinforce his argument, the Greek Minister used as an example NATO, whose system of collective defence necessitated the utilization of a territory belonging to one country for the defensive needs of another country, without raising any question of sovereignty. Stefanopoulos concluded by advising the rest of the delegates that it was in the British interest to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people of Cyprus, since a friendly population would strengthen the defensive value of a British military base and would enhance the strategic importance of the island.¹⁶ The third speaker of the Conference was the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, F. Zorlu. In an attempt to analyse the Turkish position towards the Cypriot question, he declared that:

*"...this is an island [Cyprus] which, above all things, is of vital importance for the defence of Turkey, to such an extent that it is impossible to calculate the defence potential and capacity of Turkey in case of war without taking Cyprus into consideration"*¹⁷

He also supported the view that Cyprus, geographically, was the extension of Anatolia, therefore, from the military point of view, the island should belong either to Turkey or to a country which would be as closely interested as Turkey in the fate of Eastern countries in the vicinity of Turkey. Additionally, Zorlu said that in a case of war, outside assistance to the war potential of Turkey could only come through her Western and Southern ports in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the Western ports of Turkey were

¹⁵ Stefanopoulos: Cmd, 9594, August 31, 1955, p. 15.

¹⁶ Stefanopoulos: *ibid.*, p. 15.

within the effective operations area of the potential enemy and Turkey at war could only be supplied through her Southern ports, which were under the shadow of Cyprus. And he continued by saying that:

“Whoever controls this island is in a position to control these Turkish ports. If the power that control this island is also in control of the Western Islands it will have effectively surrounded Turkey. No country should be allowed to leave its entire security at the mercy of any one country, no matter how great a friend and ally the latter may be”¹⁸

Nevertheless, despite the Turkish claims concerning Cyprus’ vital role in the Turkish defensive structure, Zorlu presented no argument concerning the return of the island to Turkish influence. On the contrary, he declared that his government was fully satisfied with the existing status quo, and only if this was to be modified, should the island be brought under Turkish administration.

Judging from Zorlu’s speech, the researcher will inevitably come to the conclusion that Turkish foreign policy had traditionally been influenced by the “threat from the North”, Russia. In case of war, during the Ottoman era, Turkey could be supplied by her Balkan or African dominions. However, the independence of those dominions and the demise of the Ottoman empire meant that the above possibility was no longer practicable, therefore Cyprus held a position of vital importance for the Turkish defensive system. In general the above argument is valid, though anachronistic. If it is examined within the Cold War framework then it loses its credibility. A possible confrontation between Turkey and the Soviet Union would automatically mean a general confrontation between the Western and the Eastern block. Therefore, in such a case, even if Cyprus was united with Greece it would be useful for Turkey’s defensive line as a part of NATO. The above argument can be supported by the fact that in 1953 Greece allowed the establishment of air bases for the United States forces on her territory. They were designed to be fully used in case of Soviet aggression in the wide area of the Balkans (Yugoslavia) or in the Eastern Mediterranean, in conjunction with the American Atlas Thor Missile System that was installed in the US military bases in Turkey.¹⁹ Still, the explanation for the Turkish position can be found somewhere else. It is a fact that

¹⁷ Zorlu: Cmd, 9594, September 1, 1955, p. 20.

¹⁸ Zorlu: op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁹ T. Anthem, The US-Greek Agreement, (Contemporary Review, February 1954), no 1058, p.p. 83-89. For full text of the announcement of the signing on 12 October 1953 concerning the agreement between the American and the Greek side concerning the air bases see: Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, 21 December 1953), p. 863.

both Turkey and Greece were equal members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, however, was an alliance among many countries and due to the short period of its existence, nobody could have predicted its development. History teaches the impermanence of every alliance, and that was the basic fear of the Turkish side. Greece was the traditional rival of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore, since no one could reassure the latter of the chronological life time of NATO, Ankara was rightly motivated to encourage the maintenance of British control in Cyprus and confront the claims of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis with their main opponent in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean. As Sir T. Rapp quite rightly stated in a BBC programme concerning Turkish foreign policy:

*"Despite the fact that those countries [Greece and Turkey] are both members of NATO and the Balkan Alliance, due to the historic past there is a great rooted disbelief of Turkey for the future course of the Greek policy"*²⁰

It is a fact that Greco-Turkish relations have never been established on the grounds of sincere friendship and co-operation between the two countries. The Greeks have never forgotten the capture of Constantinople and four centuries of enslavement under the Ottoman yoke, while the Turkish have never forgotten the landing of the Greek Army in the Ionic coasts in 1919 and the occupation of a large part of European Turkey for 3 years. The restoration of friendly relations after the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor (1922), with the common agreement between Attaturk and Venizelos in Ankara in 10 June 1930, and their mutual entrance in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1952) was political, forced by geostrategic necessities, not trust or free will. Characteristically, a Greek minister speaking about Greco-Turkish relations had once stated that the Greco-Turkish friendship derives from the head and not from the heart.²¹

On the other side of the table, Macmillan tried to persuade his interlocutors that Cyprus was a vital military base, that could reinforce the British defensive role in the Middle East. However, the basic question deriving from Macmillan's arguments is, against whom was the Middle East to be defended? The argument that in a possible Soviet attack the defensive system of the Middle East would be based in Cyprus is, at the least, preposterous, since in such a case NATO could made use of its military bases in Greece and Turkey in order to face Soviet aggression. Therefore, a British military

²⁰ Sir T. Rapp, The Real problem of Cyprus, (The Listener, September 22, 1955), vol. LIV, no 1386, p. 449.

base in Cyprus was more than sufficient for the defensive needs of Britain in the Middle East, especially since Britain was a member of NATO. Nevertheless, the official line of the Foreign Office was that nothing less than absolute administrative control of Cyprus and the exploitation of the whole of the territory of the island could allow Britain to fulfill her diplomatic commitments in the Middle East. The Egyptian experience and the hostility of the Greek Cypriots persuaded London that a military base in Cyprus would not have been permanent. The British fears had been reinforced by the strengthening of the political parties in the Greek interior that were asking for the withdrawal of the country from the North Atlantic Treaty and the adoption of a neutral policy towards the Western and Eastern block. Indeed, parties such as the Unified Democratic Left (EDA), under the leadership of I. Iliou, and the Liberal Party, under the leadership of G. Papandreou and S. Venizelos, were the two main factors that were forcing the government to put an end to the American control of the country. The two aforementioned parties, mainly due to their pro-trade unions economic manifestos and their liberal nature, were gaining in influence and power day by day. An electoral victory by one of those parties would bring to power politicians who would adopt a different approach to NATO, compared to Papagos' pro-NATO policies. As G. Farakos remembers:

*"It was a common secret that during that period EDA had been controlled by the exiled leadership of the Communist party from the Eastern block. I was then living in Czechoslovakia and I was responsible for drawing up the foreign policy of the party. Our main goal was to put obstacles before the official Greek line for absolute co-operation with the West, and eventually force the country out of NATO. It was a difficult task, since Greece was a vital pawn for the geostrategic interests of the US, however we then believed that the fragile political stability of the country was not able to survive continuous pressure from the Greek masses."*²²

In fact, the British answer to the Greek offer of a British military base in Cyprus was that governments change.²³

In addition, apart from the argument for the fulfilment of British commitments in the Middle East, there were other more important reasons, outside the framework of British

²¹ C. Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War*, (London, 1964), p. 99.

²² Personal interview with Mr. Farakos, June 1999, Athens.

international diplomatic commitments, that influenced the British policy towards the Cypriot question. Macmillan's argument that his country needed the Cypriot ground in order to protect the free world was just the one side of the coin. First of all, the Conservatives regarded Cyprus as a vast base which would allow London to maintain its influence in the Middle East, and more specifically to protect the national interests in the oil-producing countries of that area. Therefore, A. Eden, in a spontaneous statement in the House of Commons, tried to defend the decisions of his government concerning the Cypriot question by saying:

*"Her Majesty's Government must be concerned, as every other government is concerned, to protect the vital interests of its own citizens. The welfare and indeed the lives of our people depend on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those interests, oil above all. This is not imperialism. It should be the plain duty of any government, and we intend to discharge it."*²⁴

Without any doubt, Eden's statement was more sincere than Macmillan's during the London Conference. On the other hand, C.M. Woodhouse came to the conclusion that the main orientation of British foreign policy in the Middle East was to protect the country's interests from the newly established nationalist governments and chauvinist dictators who appeared in the area after the end of the Second World War. At the strategic level the above policy meant that Britain, unlike the US, regarded the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union in the Middle East as a secondary issue, compared to the danger coming from the local nationalist movements, such the cases of Egypt and Jordan that will be reviewed later on.²⁵

Undoubtedly, the issue of the Middle East oil resources was one of the greatest importance for the British and Western European industry. The British interest in these resources arose at the beginning of the century, but intensified after the end of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. During the 30's and 40's, after a series of explorations in the subsoil of the Middle East, it was a common secret that the territory had the largest quantities of oil deposits in the world, while in 1955 the Middle East contributed 21% of the global oil production.²⁶ However, what is even more important than the above was the conclusion of the specialists that, of the global oil

²³ S. Lloyd: U.N. General Assembly, 9th Session, 477th Plenary Meeting, September 24, 1954.

²⁴ A. Eden: House of Commons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col. 421.

²⁵ C.M Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy since the Second World War, (London, 1961), pp. 134-35.

²⁶ M. Patrick, Oil and the Middle East, (The Political Quarterly, 1957), vol. 28, p. 169.

stock, 60%-70% was in the Middle East. Therefore, British interests in that territory were immense. The Kuwait Oil Company, which had the monopoly in the Kuwait oil resources, belonged to the British Petroleum Company (54%) and the American Gulf Exploration Company.²⁷ Additionally, Britain had equally high interests in Iran, as well. In 1954 the Iranian government signed a special economic pact with international oil companies, known as Iran Oil Participant Limited. The British Petroleum Company controlled 40% of the total share, while the Royal Dutch/Shell, of which 40% was in turn controlled by Britain, owned 14%. In neighbouring Iraq the situation was the same. In 1956 the British Petroleum Company and the Royal Dutch/Shell were each operating 23.75% of the oil production of the country. Another fact that demonstrates the great importance of the Middle East for Britain, is that the British Petroleum Company had been supplied with oil exclusively from countries of that area. In 1956, for example, 49,500,000 tons out of 50,000,000 tons of the company's crude oil supplies came from the countries of the Middle East.²⁸

The above figures should be studied with reference to the fact that the oil from the Middle East was transported through the Suez Canal. During the 50's, small tankers had been used for the transportation of oil, therefore a trip round Africa instead of Suez would have created a series of problems. Not only would the transportation cost have been doubled, but also at the same time it would not have been enough to cover the needs of Britain and the rest of Western Europe. According to *The Economist*, during that period, 8.5 million tonnes of oil had been transported to Europe from the Middle East every month. If the same number of tankers had used the African route instead of Suez, then Europe would have received over the same chronological period less than 4 million tonnes.²⁹

From the above one can conclude that the Middle East oil resources were critical for the British economy. The evacuation of the British military base in Suez and the appearance of nationalist movements in the heart of the Middle East, made Britain regard Cyprus as the only secure ground for the defence of the national interest in the Middle East and of the transportation routes. Therefore, if Cyprus were united with Greece Britain could not be sure that her own national interests would be in accord with the policies and diplomatic obligations of Athens.

²⁷ The Kuwait Oil Company had been established in 1951 after a special agreement with the Sheik who received 25% of the annual profit in American dollars.

²⁸ *The Economist*, Kings in Oil, May 11, 1957.

²⁹ *The Economist*, Oil is Critical, November 10, 1956.

Another argument that had been used by the three powers during the Conference in order to support their own approach towards the Cypriot question was the Treaty of Lausanne. The British and the Greek position towards that argument has been presented in a previous chapter, therefore I intend to dedicate more space to the Turkish position. The British position had not changed since the 9th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations. According to Macmillan, the annexation of Cyprus by Britain was recognized internationally by means of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923 both by the Greek and the Turkish governments.³⁰ The Greek Foreign Minister avoided referring directly to the Lausanne Treaty, but he stated that the British control over Cyprus was unchangeable. Nevertheless, he stated that the Cypriot question was an international problem and not a crisis that had been provoked by the government of Athens, since the majority of the Cypriot people were asking for their self determination.³¹ The Turkish Minister, on the other hand, spoke about the Treaty of Lausanne in great detail. He admitted that according to article 20, the Turkish sovereignty upon Cyprus came to an end on November 1914, when the island passed under British rule. However, he added that according to article 21, the people of Cyprus had either Turkish or British nationality.³² Using article 21 as the base for his argument, Zorlu supported the view that the fate of Cyprus could only be determined between Turkey and Britain. He established his argument by stating that at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne the parties concerned in Cyprus were, exclusively, Turkey and Great Britain. Zorlu finished his speech by reminding the other powers that were present in the Lancaster House that:

*"...the "abnegation" and "sacrifice" of Turkey in the matter of Cyprus was only in favour of Great Britain and under certain conditions, if there is any attempt to alter this situation, the Turkish Government will demand a return to the status prior to such abnegation."*³³

Even if Zorlu's arguments have a certain degree of validity, they are not well based on the Treaty of Lausanne. A precise analysis of the Treaty can lead to entirely different conclusions. Starting from article 20, which recognizes the total domination of Britain over Cyprus without any objection from the Turkish side, one can clearly support the view that Britain had every legitimate right to alter the Cypriot status quo without

³⁰ Macmillan: Cmd. 9594, August 30, 1955, p. 9.

³¹ Stefanopoulos: Cmd 9594, August 31, 1955, p. 17.

³² Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 1, 1955, p. 20.

³³ Zorlu: op. cit., p. 21.

involving Ankara. This conclusion can be supported by article 16, which clearly states that Turkey abandoned every right upon the territories that were under her control but remained outside her national frontiers. Indeed, since the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey had not opposed changes to the status quo of other territories outside her national frontiers, such as the Dodecanese that passed under Greek control after the end of the Second World War. Therefore, if the Conference of London had recognized any right of Turkey over Cyprus, deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne, then the Turkish side would have had every legitimate right to preserve its rights upon every territory outside her national frontiers that had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire in the past. On the other hand, Zorlu's argument, that at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne the parties concerned in Cyprus were Britain and Turkey, can find many supporters. It is true that the Treaty of Lausanne had been signed by the Entente powers on the one hand, and Turkey on the other. Therefore, many articles of the Treaty have a bipartite nature. However, this argument could be used by the Greek side as a forceful diplomatic weapon. The Greek side could have claimed that since the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne concerning Cyprus did not involve her, then the international status quo of Cyprus was an agreement between Britain and Turkey, therefore she did not have any legal obligation to accept it. In such a case, the fragile peace in the Eastern Mediterranean would have been under threat, while every diplomatic agreement in the area would have been subject to reconsideration. Finally, the statement of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs that the concession of Cyprus to Britain was the result of a Turkish abnegation and sacrifice, is an exaggeration rather than a valid historic conclusion. In 1878, the Ottoman Empire gave Cyprus to Britain in return for British protection against the Russian threat, but typically it remained under the Sultan's control. However, during the First World War Britain and the Ottoman Empire were in different camps and as a result Cyprus had been annexed by Britain by a colonial decree in 1914, a development that was finally recognized by Kemal in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In that way, Turkey abandoned every right of sovereignty upon Cyprus and recognized the de facto annexation of Cyprus by Britain, giving it a de jure stance through the signature of the Lausanne Treaty.

Another issue discussed during the Conference in London was the topic of self-determination and self-government. In spite of the fact that the three Ministers primarily appeared to agree concerning the principle of self-government, in essence their different approaches were totally opposite. Regarding the concept of self-determination the disagreement among the three ministers was total. According to the British side, the

principle of self-determination could have not been accepted as one of universal application. As Macmillan said:

*"We think that exceptions must be made in view of geographical, traditional, historical, strategical and other considerations."*³⁴

This time, however, the British side tried to avoid the consequences of a new "never" and for that reason it stated that there was no prospect of any change in the status quo of Cyprus in the foreseeable future. In an attempt to clarify the position of his government, Macmillan stated that:

*"We are a very empirical people. We try to deal with facts as we see them. There is nothing permanent in the world and especially in the nuclear world, and in the long story of mankind, no-one knows it better than the races and countries bordering the Mediterranean, there are many changes and permutations which take place; but we face facts as they are."*³⁵

The Greek position, as expressed by Stefanopoulos, was in favour of the recognition of the right of self-determination for the Cypriot people by London, which would be implemented in a democratic manner and within a reasonable period of time. Moreover, Stefanopoulos expressed his regrets, because the British government had chosen to pursue a policy of discrimination towards the people of Cyprus compared to other British colonies, but he concluded by offering the other sides an olive branch with the following words:

*"We have stated our position with complete frankness and much moderation despite the differences of point of view revealed, we shall part with the resolve to continue our joint effort for the defense of the Free World and the preservation of peace."*³⁶

The Turkish side, on the other hand, adopted a solid and inflexible position, even reaching the point of threatening, indirectly, the fragile peace between Turkey and Greece. Zorlu demanded that his British colleague reassure him that the British government would not adopt any policy which could eventually lead to the independence of the island, or its unification with another country. The argument that

³⁴ Macmillan: Cmd. 9594, September 6, 1955, p. 37.

³⁵ Macmillan: op. cit., p. 36.

the Turkish Minister presented for his negative attitude towards any alteration to the Cypriot status quo, was that such a development would amount to a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne and would certainly impair Greek–Turkish friendship.³⁷ Without any doubt, Zorlu’s statement was a great antithesis compared with the statements of his colleagues who, even though they did not show any sign of reconsidering their positions, still tried to present a more flexible and moderate attitude. Concerning the principle of self-government, the British side appeared to be fervent supporters of such a scheme. In addition, Macmillan expressed his disappointment that such a scheme had not been implemented in the Cypriot case yet. Indeed, the British side presented at the Conference new constitutional proposals for Cyprus. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed with the British proposals and denounced the British side for failing to implement that policy in the past.³⁸ Nevertheless, for the Greek side the implementation of internal self-government should lead eventually to self-determination, within a reasonable period of time.³⁹ It is obvious that the British side did not accept the Greek position. The Turkish Minister, on the other hand, was against an immediate implementation of the principle of self-government. According to Zorlu, the political situation in Cyprus was not ready to accept such an ambitious plan and for that reason any political development should be postponed until the return of absolute peace and quiet in Cyprus.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Zorlu went even further, revealing the Turkish position towards self-government and the political rights of the Turkish minority. Zorlu stated that:

“Even when the circumstances change in Cyprus and the climate eventually becomes suitable for self-government as explained above, it must still be borne in mind that, on such a small parcel of land where two different communities live who vary in so many ways, the guiding principle should not be the consideration of majorities and minorities, but rather the granting of full equality to the two groups.”⁴¹

³⁶ Stefanopoulos: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 36.

³⁷ Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 38.

³⁸ It is important to note at this point that Stefanopoulos was wrong to accuse the British side of failing to implement the principle of self-government in Cyprus. As seen in a previous chapter, the British tried to negotiate with the Greek Cypriot community regarding self government but in almost every case they faced the inflexible position of the Church and the Greek Cypriot Right, on the one hand, and the political hesitation and lack of courage of AKEL, on the other.

³⁹ Stefanopoulos: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 36.

⁴⁰ Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 1, 1955, p. 24.

⁴¹ Zorlu: op. cit., p. 25.

On 6 September, when all the three Ministers had presented their views concerning the Cypriot question, Macmillan supplied the other two delegations with the constitutional proposals for Cyprus, which were in favour of internal self-government. The London government knew, even before the beginning of the Conference, that the Turkish and Greek positions towards the Cypriot question were uncompromisingly opposed. Therefore the tactic of the British side, inspired by Macmillan⁴², was to delay the announcement of the proposals until the point when the different approaches of Athens and Ankara would have been clearly stated and noted by the international community. This tactical move would have helped the Conservative government of London, by revealing to the international community that the British side was in the middle of a Greco-Turkish dispute and that the constitutional proposals were the last chance of peace and order in the Eastern Mediterranean. Characteristically, Eden in his memoirs wrote about Macmillan's method of presenting the British constitutional approaches:

*"He [Macmillan] did not put forward our proposals for the future at this stage, but said he would disclose them after the Greek and Turkish representatives had stated their views. We knew how wide the difference of opinion was between the Greeks and the Turks but the world did not. Too many thought our troubles due to old fashioned British colonialism. By securing a precise definition of these differences we hoped to show the true nature of the problem. The exact terms of our proposals for the future could then be presented."*⁴³

The constitutional proposals offered Cyprus an Assembly with an elected majority, while a proportionate quota of seats would have been reserved for the Turkish community. All Departments of the Cyprus government would have been progressively transferred to Cypriot Ministers, with the exception of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Security, which would have been reserved to the Governor. Moreover, in order to safeguard the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, a proportion of the Ministerial portfolios would have been reserved for that community.⁴⁴ In addition, a Cypriot Chief Minister to head the new Cypriot administration would have been chosen by the Assembly with the approval of the Governor. It is more than obvious that the above constitutional proposals were formulated in vague terminology, leaving many points

⁴² H. Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*, (London, 1969), p.p. 666-67.

⁴³ A. Eden, *Full Circle*, (London, 1960), p. 400.

unclear. For example, the British proposals did not specify the exact number of seats in the Assembly, and more specifically the number of elected and appointed ones. They did not specify how many seats would have been reserved for the Turkish community and how many of those seats would have been elected or appointed. This particular point was of vital importance to the Greek side, because if the reserved Turkish seats were included in the elected ones, then the Greek Cypriots were facing the possibility of being the minority in the Assembly, since the British establishment would have controlled the appointed seats with their own people. The clarification of all the dark corners of the constitutional proposals and the appropriate method of their implementation in the Cypriot political arena would have been the duty of a Tripartite Committee, which would have consisted of a British, a Turkish and a Greek representative. The formation of the Tripartite Committee was a British proposal.⁴⁵ In addition, after the completion of its initial task, the Tripartite Committee would be maintained in order to receive reports regarding the development of self-government in Cyprus, and to act as a centre for discussing problems or differences arising out of self-government, which would have been impossible to resolve locally in Cyprus.

Concerning the principle of self-determination, the British side stated that a divergence of view was apparent between the three delegations, therefore it should be set aside. However, according to the British side, the failure to settle this aspect of the problem should not be allowed to destroy the wide measure of agreement established in regard to the other main problem of internal self-government.⁴⁶ The Turkish Minister had already stated in the Conference that his government was not able to accept the constitutional proposals of the British side. Zorlu had insisted that the British government had gone so far with their aspiration to establish internal self-government in Cyprus, that the Turkish side had some doubts as to the real purpose of London.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the Greek side could not find the British proposals acceptable, since they excluded the possibility of the implementation of self-determination in Cyprus, while the proposal for the establishment of a Tripartite Committee would give Turkey the right to supervise and intervene in Cypriot political life, making Athens anxious about the possible formation of an Anglo-Turkish alliance concerning the Cypriot question. For all those reasons it was impossible for the British proposals to be accepted by the Greek side. Despite the fact that Stefanopoulos did not give any definite answer concerning the

⁴⁴ Text of Proposals: Cmd. 9594, Appendix I, p. 42.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁷ Zorlu: Cmd. 9594, September 7, 1955, p. 39.

British constitutional proposals, he still expressed the opinion that the procedure for working out a constitution for Cyprus could not be described as democratic if Cypriots were not associated with that task. Moreover, he expressed his fears that the proposed Tripartite Conference was bound to interfere with the working of the freely elected Cypriot government and would conflict with the proper functioning of democracy in the island. Last but not least, the Greek representative asked his interlocutors why the traditional British principle, applied elsewhere in the Commonwealth, of allowing the ultimate exercise of self-determination by dependent territories, could not be applied in the case of Cyprus.⁴⁸ As a result, the final answer of the Greek delegation regarding the British proposals was negative. The Greek side turned down the British proposals because they failed to satisfy the requests of the principle of self-determination and because the proposed constitution was of a type that could not be regarded as adequate for so highly developed and civilized people as the Cypriots.⁴⁹ However, at this particular point extraneous factors influenced the final outcome of the Tripartite Conference. The same day (6 September) that H. Macmillan announced the British constitutional proposals, anti-Greek riots burst out in Smyrna (Izmir) and Constantinople. The next day the negotiations broke down and the Conference was never able to re-convene.

Despite the fact that the Conference had been interrupted due to the anti-Greek riots in Turkey, in reality, as The Economist stated:

*"The London Conference on Cyprus is officially said to stand suspended; but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that has in fact failed."*⁵⁰

One of the major reasons for the failure of the Tripartite Conference was timing. The sectarian violence in Cyprus had been well established by then, and the relations between the two communities in the island were not at their highest point. As The Manchester Guardian observed in an article, the Conference should have taken place months earlier before the Turks run wild and the Greek government and the rest of the Greek parties succumbed to their feelings and allowed the Greek Cypriots to gain so much power.⁵¹ The wrong timing and the great divergence in the views of the three countries that participated in the Conference resulted in its failure. Another equally important factor in that failure was the fact that the Cypriots had not been invited to

⁴⁸ Stefanopoulos: Cmd. 9594, September 6, 1955, p. 35.

⁴⁹ Reply of the Greek Government: Cmd. 9594, Athens, September 17, 1955, p. 43.

⁵⁰ The Economist, No Progress on Cyprus, September 10, 1955.

⁵¹ The Manchester Guardian, Failure, September 8, 1955.

London. As T. Driberg said in an article in Tribune *"the Turkish presence and the Cypriot absence were the two main reasons for the failure of the London Conference"*⁵² Leaving aside the argument for the Turkish presence in the Conference, the observation regarding the absence of the Cypriots from the Conference is fully justified. As seen above, the discussions during the Conference concerned the future of Cyprus, so the absence of the Cypriot people was a major disadvantage, keeping them away from the negotiations for their own future. On the other hand, the non-invitation of the Cypriot people to the Conference meant that even if the delegations had reached an agreement, this would not have restored peace and order in the island if one of the two communities was not satisfied by it.⁵³ Last but not least, another reason for the failure of the Conference lies in the uncompromising tactic of the three nations that participated in it. The British side, on the one hand, took the initiative to organize a Conference without being ready to alter any point of its traditional policy towards the Cypriot question. The new constitutional proposals were called "liberal"⁵⁴, and it has to be said that they were more reformist than those proposed in the House of Commons by Hopkinson, a year earlier. However, if the proposals are evaluated in light of the establishment of a Tripartite Committee, then the Greek hesitations can be justified. Additionally, Macmillan's phrase *"not in the foreseeable future"*, even if it sounded better, had the same meaning as Hopkinson's *"never"*. The Greek side, on the other hand, given the fact that it accepted the invitation to the Conference would be expected to show some signs of flexibility. On the contrary, the Greek delegation arrived in London in order to fulfill the maximum of the Greek Cypriot desires, and it proved weak and unwilling to accept any solution that would provoke the Cypriot Church and Makarios. According to The Times' correspondent in Athens, a month before the beginning of the Conference in London Makarios visited Athens and secured Papagos' promise that no solution would be accepted by the Greek delegation if it did not include the principle of self-determination.⁵⁵ The Greek delegation arrived in Cyprus dominated by a figure who was not present, Makarios, and this fact is one of the greatest historic responsibilities of Athens, both to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot: that Greece designed its policy

⁵² The Herald Tribune The Talks That Were Bound to Fail, September 16, 1955.

⁵³ The above argument applies more to the Greek Cypriots, since the fact that the Greek government, as seen in a previous chapter, had no authority over the Cypriot Orthodox Church and EOKA. Characteristically, Makarios in a Press statement in Athens on July 16, 1955, declared that *"the people of Cyprus will never accept any decision of the London Conference which do not accord with their rights and aspirations even if those decisions are endorsed by the Greek government."* N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 89. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 27 August-3 September 1955 p. 14396.

⁵⁴ The Economist, No Progress on Cyprus, September 10, 1955.

⁵⁵ The Times, August 29, 1955, p. 7.

towards the Cypriot question according to domestic considerations, without considering the fragile status of the peace and order in the island. Therefore, Macmillan's words that "*the Greeks are too weak to make a concession*"⁵⁶ sound accurate and just. Fortified behind the forceful moral, but inflexible, argument that the Greeks were the absolute majority in Cyprus, the Greek delegation was determined to achieve the implementation of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, within a small period of time.

Nevertheless, the inflexible position of the Turkish side was even more intensified and flamboyant. Even before the beginning of the Conference the Turkish government clearly stated that it would not accept any solution for the Cypriot question, except the maintenance of the existing status quo. As the Turkish Prime Minister Adan Menderes said in a statement on August 24, before the Turkish delegation left Istanbul for the London Conference:

*"the Turkish thesis which will be put forward at the London Conference is that the maintenance of the status quo is the minimum acceptable to Turkey. If a change occurs in the status of the island, it should revert to Turkey"*⁵⁷

Additionally, diplomatic circles in Athens insisted that some of the Turkish prominent politicians had unofficially stated that the Turkish army was ready to intervene in Cyprus, if necessary.⁵⁸ Under the spirit of non-negotiation, the Turkish officials began a convincing anti-Greek propaganda in Turkey, aiming to arouse public rage. As Macmillan quite rightly wrote in his memoirs, "*the Turks are too tough to make a concession*".⁵⁹ A comment characteristic of the internal Turkish situation during that period can be found in C. Legoum's article in The Observer. As the reporter wrote:

*"According to official sources the most alarming side of the current situation in Cyprus is the hysterical propaganda especially in Turkey for the danger of slaughters in Cyprus. The Turkish side appears to believe a totally baseless rumour that EOKA is planning to hit the Turkish-Cypriots the following weekend. Rumors like that can cause a great distress among the masses in Cyprus and Turkey and the consequences will be felt in Greece, immediately."*⁶⁰

⁵⁶ H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 669.

⁵⁷ Keesing's: ibid.

⁵⁸ Akropolis, August 30, 1955, p. 3.

⁵⁹ H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 669.

⁶⁰ The Observer, Conflicting Demands at Cyprus Talks, August 28, 1955.

The above words turned out to be prophetic, as a few days later on 6 September great anti-Greek riots broke out in Constantinople and Smyrna that resulted in the destruction of the property of a great number of the Greek minority in Turkey and the collapse of the Tripartite Conference in London.

On the afternoon of 6 September serious anti-Greek riots occurred in Constantinople and Smyrna and to a lesser degree in Ankara, following incidents in Thessaloniki on the previous day in which the windows of the Turkish Consulate, and also of a house next to the Consulate, in which Kemal Atatürk was born, were smashed by the explosion of a stick of dynamite. Five persons were detained in connection with the Thessaloniki incident, which caused no casualties and only minor damage.⁶¹ When the news became known in Turkey, mobs of Turkish youths roamed the streets of Istanbul smashing and looting Greek-owned shops and houses and setting fire to Greek property, including a number of Greek Orthodox churches dating from the Byzantine era. Churches such as the St. Trinity, St. Athanasios, St. Dimitrios and St. Theodoron were looted and priceless icons destroyed, while the Greek cemetery of Sisla was despoiled. Many Greek shopkeepers and householders, with their families, were driven into the streets or were forced to hoist the Turkish flag above their premises, whilst attacks were also made on foreign-owned property of Armenian and Jewish citizens. In Smyrna (headquarters of the NATO South East European Command) mobs attacked houses occupied by Greek officers and wrecked a Greek pavilion at a trade fair, whilst in Ankara tear-gas was used to disperse several thousand demonstrators, who attempted to march on the Greek Embassy. The international community was outraged by the Turkish excesses, and Turkish officials felt the need to invent an excuse by accusing the Communists of the incidents. The Turkish Government issued a statement on 7 September, attributing responsibility for the riots to Communist agitators, and describing the disturbances as a Communist plot.⁶² However, the above argument is not valid since even today Communism is illegal in Turkey, and the illegal Communist organization does not have the power to organize incidents to such a great extent. A.H. Hanson, quite rightly, said that the influence of the Communist movement was limited even among the Turkish proletariat. He continues by stating that the anti-Greek riots were not spontaneous, but had been encouraged by the Turkish government.⁶³ Moreover, Macmillan wrote about the role of the Turkish government that "*the Turkish riots in Istanbul and Smyrna, were*

⁶¹ Keesing's: September 10-17 1955, p. 14424.

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ A.H. Hanson, Democracy Transplanted: Reflections on a Turkish Election, (Parliamentary Affairs, The Hansard Society, vol. IX, 1955-56).4

undoubtedly connived at if not promoted by the Government”⁶⁴ However, what the West failed to understand, quite naturally though, is that even the incident in the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki was caused by the Turkish Intelligence following the personal instructions of Menderes. The role of the Turkish Prime Minister was revealed during his trial after the successful coup of General Cemal Gursel, on 27 May, 1960.⁶⁵ Despite the fact that Menderes did not give any explanation for his actions concerning the incident in Thessaloniki, that fact demonstrates the willingness of the Turkish establishment to use any means in order to block any negotiations concerning the Cypriot status quo.

Nevertheless, the question that both the British and Greek specialists dealing with the Cypriot question are failing to answer is the following one: Had the Turkish interest in Cyprus been provoked by the British government as a tactic to secure Turkey by its side and strengthen its position in Cyprus even further, or it was a genuine and purely Turkish decision?

During the first years of the British presence in Cyprus, the Ottoman Empire did not show any particular interest in Cyprus, even though it was still an Ottoman province.⁶⁶ The first time that the Turkish side presented strong arguments against the Greek Cypriot demands was in the United Nations during the Greek appeal. The same principle applies to the Turkish Cypriots. Even if the Greek Cypriot demand for Enosis with Greece dates back to the 19th century, nothing showed that the relations between the two communities in Cyprus were hostile, with the exception of limited incidents that cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, the situation changed after the Greek appeal in the United Nations. It is quite interesting to refer to Eden's observation that dates the Turkish Cypriot psychological change to 1955. As Eden is said:

*“ The Turkish-speaking Cypriots were strongly opposed to Union with Greece. In early 1955 their passions were not yet inflamed for the Turk is slow to anger, but once roused he is implacable ”*⁶⁷

In general, every time that British officials referred to the Cypriot case, they seemed either to promote the Turkish interests or to calculate the Turkish reactions in the case of

⁶⁴ H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 672.

⁶⁵ E. Averof Tositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot question 1950 – 1963, (Athens, 1982), vol. I, p. 72. For more concerning the coup in Turkey on 27 May 1960 see : W.L Cleveland, op. cit., pp. 264-65.

⁶⁶ For more concerning the Turkish attitude during the first period of Cyprus under British control see: S. Litsas, Turkey and Cyprus: When Apathy turns into Obsession, (Athens, 2000), Centre of Social and Economic Studies, vol. X, ser. 89, pp. 4-9

⁶⁷ Sir A. Eden, op. cit., p. 396.

a solution to the Cypriot question that would encourage the Enosis. While, the British officials were fault-finding towards every Greek demand, they seemed to regard the even more extremist Turkish positions as simply realistic. Therefore, it should not cause any surprises that the newly established Turkish interest in Cyprus persuaded not only the Greeks but many other observers, that this interest had been shaped not by Ankara but by London.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the above argument by itself does not provide a complete answer to the basic question. It fails to present the whole picture of the situation. Beside the fact that the Conservative government of London can be held responsible for the shaping of Turkish interest towards the Cypriot question, there were other factors that should be mentioned, in order to give a full answer to the basic question. Apart from the military Turkish interests examined in a previous paragraph of this chapter, other factors that shaped the Turkish interest concerning the Cypriot question were the internal difficulties that Menderes' government had to face in the economic and political spectrum. This argument can be based on a fundamental law of International Relations, that when a government is facing great internal problems then it becomes quite sensitive or even aggressive in its foreign policy. Characteristically, The Spectator's correspondent in Turkey, referring to the Turkish interest in Cyprus, wrote that the geostrategic importance of Cyprus was possibly not the main factor that shaped the Turkish position, but the low position of the Turkish pound in the international monetary scale.⁶⁹ Moreover, concerning the above argument, it was the Labour MP Robinson that once stated inside the House of Commons that:

"What is better in a situation like this than an external issue by which the government can divert the attention of the people from the problems which they are incapable of solving, an issue with a chauvinistic appeal such as this has for the Turks? It is

⁶⁸ This arguments is proven by the following speeches from the House of Commons:

Mr. K. Robinson (Labour Party): *"The Turkish position is a Frankenstein created by Her Majesty's Government"*. House of Commons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col. 421.

Mrs. Lena Jeger (Labour Party): *"I am sure that there has been gross exaggeration of Turkish objections and that a great deal of the trouble which we are now experiencing from the Turks in Cyprus and Turkey itself has been created by the Government, who are now confronted with a sort of Frankenstein monster with which they do not know what to do"* House of Commons, July 19, 1956, vol. 556, col. 1502.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker (Labour Party): *"I believe that the difficulties about the Turks have been very much increased by speeches made on the Government benches and from the Government box, speeches expressing the Turks strong opposition before the Turks had spoken of it themselves"* House of Commons, September 14, 1956, vol. 558, col. 357.

⁶⁹ For more concerning the Turkish economic situation see: The Spectator, *Cypriot and Turks*, September 20, 1957

the classic situation we have seen in Egypt, in Persia and in many other countries."⁷⁰

On the other hand, an equally important factor for the shaping of the Turkish policy towards Cyprus was the position of the country in the international arena. It is widely accepted that Turkey did not present many arguments in the case of the Dodecanese and their union with Greece, after the end of the Second World War. Without any doubt, there are many differences between the two cases. However, no-one can deny the great geostrategic importance of the Dodecanese for Turkish security. Therefore, in order to identify the differences between Turkish policy in the Dodecanese and in the Cypriot question, one must evaluate the Turkish position in the global scale immediately after the end of the Second World War and during the 1950's. In the one case, Turkey had to face the unfriendliness of the Western world over its hesitation to declare war against the Axis power, while in the second case Turkey had been regarded by the West as the last frontier of democracy and their most valuable ally against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Without any doubt, Turkish influence had been reinforced since the end of the Second World War, and this was a factor that Turkish diplomacy had used successfully in many cases, in order to protect national interests or to secure new ones.

Last but not least, another factor that played a decisive role in the Turkish position towards the Cypriot question was the method of Greek diplomacy. Despite the fact that this issue had been ignored by the Greek academia, nevertheless it played an important role concerning the shaping of the Turkish inflexible stance. In their attempt to promote Enosis, the Greeks seemed to ignore the Turkish reactions. As has been mentioned above, the Turkish and international political climate implied that a strong Turkish reaction towards Enosis was on the cards. Therefore, Greek diplomacy should first have approached the Turks in Cyprus and in Turkey, before taking the initiative for an open discussion of the Cypriot question in the United Nations. It is true that someone can argue against Makarios' role concerning the Greek appeal in the United Nations. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Makarios' pressure upon the Greek government was one of the major reasons for the Greek decision to appeal to the United Nations. However, this argument does not imply that the Greek government had no chance to negotiate with the Turkish side. Kyrou, the well-known Greek diplomat, argued that the Greek government had decided to approach Turkey about Cyprus during June 1954, when Papagos invited Menderes to visit Athens on his way back from Washington. Nevertheless, Kyrou reveals that the Turkish ambassador in Athens stated his worries

⁷⁰ K. Robinson: House of Commons, July 19, 1956, vol. 556, col. 1455.

that any mention of the Cypriot case would have threatened Greco-Turkish relations. Therefore, the Greek Prime Minister thought that it was best not to mention anything about Cyprus during Menderes' stay in the Greek capital.⁷¹ Kyrrou uses the above story as an excuse for the Greek failure to negotiate with Turkey, but it is an invalid excuse. It cannot be used as an excuse for a Prime Minister at Papagos' level for the fact that he decided not to speak about Cyprus when he met his Turkish colleague in a close and confidential environment, in order to protect Greco-Turkish relations, when two months later he raised the same issue in the United Nations. In this case, Greek foreign policy emulated the ostrich, however in international politics this tactic cannot bring any results. On the other hand, no one can say with certainty that the Turkish position would have been different even if the Greek side had informed them concerning their plans for the Cypriot question. However, in such a case the Greek side would have had the opportunity to measure the Turkish reaction and adjust her policy accordingly.

During the Tripartite Conference and the anti-Greek riots in Turkey the political situation concerning the Cypriot question was more perplexing than ever before. As a result Greco-Turkish relations were seriously shaken. In both countries the political thermometer was extremely high. Greek air services to Istanbul were suspended until further notice, Greek ships were instructed not to call at Turkish ports for the time being, and the Greek government announced that it would not participate in joint Greco-Turkish NATO exercises, which it had been planned to hold in the near future. Moreover, M. Kanelopoulos, the Minister of Finance, had informed the Turkish Charge d' Affaires on Sept. 7 that Greece would not participate in a meeting of the International Bank and Monetary Fund to be held in Istanbul during September of the same year.⁷² Without any doubt, Greece was in the worst situation. The Greek diplomats began to comprehend that the Cypriot question was not as simple as they believed before, that the British invitation to the Conference did not mean the abandonment of "never", and that the initiative for the Conference was not an attempt to bridge the different approaches towards the Cypriot question, but an effort to manifest them and possibly intensify them. The outcome of the Tripartite Conference meant that from that time Greece would have to face Turkey at the negotiating table, concerning the Cypriot question. It was certainly true that after the failure of the Conference the relations among Athens, London and Ankara were getting worse and the road to Enosis was securely blocked. On the other hand, Turkey had improved her position significantly. Her participation in the London

⁷¹ A. Kyrrou, Greek Foreign Policy, (Athens, 1955), p. 279.

⁷² Keessing's: op. cit., p. 14424.

Conference meant that the international community recognized her rights over Cyprus. The same can be said about the anti-Greek riots in Constantinople and Smyrna. Independently of the fact that the riots had been organized by the Turkish establishment, they persuaded and convinced the international community of the great importance of Cyprus in Turkish public opinion.

The anti-Greek riots in Turkey had a great impact on Cyprus. There was valid evidence of the worsening of the relations between the two communities, while during those days pamphlets flooded the roads of the main Cypriot cities propagandizing for the establishment of a Turkish underground organization, which was named "VOLCAN". Those pamphlets informed the Turkish community that EOKA had prepared lists with the names of prominent members of the Turkish-Cypriot community and warned that if the organization were to attack any Turkish official or any Turkish policeman, then they would hit back.⁷³

Without any doubt, the British side was the one that had benefited the most from the outcome of the Conference and the riots in Turkey. Macmillan, in an attempt to evaluate the Conference, said:

*"It has at least proved that Cyprus is not a colonial problem but a great international issue. The Turkish position has never been understood. Most English people do not look at maps and few have realized its key position both for us and for the Turks. Whoever holds Cyprus, commands the port of Alexandretta and the back door of Turkey."*⁷⁴

On the other hand, the news of the riots in Turkey had been welcomed by certain Conservative circles as a development which would have increased the diplomatic influence of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean even further. According to the British Premier, the eruption of Turkish public feeling meant that the Cypriot question could be solved only through diplomatic negotiations among Britain, Greece and Turkey.⁷⁵ Obviously such a development favoured Britain since it ensured the leading position of the country in every diplomatic negotiation concerning the Cypriot question, and on the other hand, it was a clear and sound proof to the rest of the international community that the British initiative for organizing the Conference was fully justified and necessary. In that way, Britain gained another diplomatic victory, proving herself a useful diplomatic negotiator in that stormy period. Therefore, the Conference was a successful move for

⁷³ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 105.

⁷⁴ H. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 672.

the Conservative government, since Britain used Turkey as her defensive line, without provoking international public opinion as an inflexible colonialist power. It was Britain that organized the Conference but it was Turkey that insisted that the British status quo in Cyprus should be maintained as the only acceptable solution to the Cypriot question. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the basic Turkish demand was the preservation of the British establishment in Cyprus, therefore the Conservatives had every excuse to avoid any alteration to the Cypriot constitutional formula which could have granted a greater degree of self-government to the island, presenting it not as an inflexible and colonial policy but as an attempt to maintain the fragile peace and order in the Eastern Mediterranean and the unity of NATO's southeastern flank. Undoubtedly, the nature of the Cypriot question had been altered. It was not a colonial problem any more that caused internal and external problems of public opinion to the Conservative government. It was an international dispute between two countries that had historic differences through the centuries. The Conference of London changed the balance of the Cypriot question. To public opinion, Britain before August was the colonial power that denied the legitimate right of self-determination to a small territory that had been tormented through the centuries, whilst after the collapse of the Conference Britain was the country that was trapped in the middle of a dispute between two traditional enemies. The Conference of London can be seen as the end of the obsolete 19th century-style British foreign policy, characterised by imperial arrogance, and the adoption of a modern and dynamic foreign line that learnt from the mistakes of the past and had been adjusted accordingly to the developments of the time. Through a series of successful diplomatic tactics Britain, in the eyes of the international community, was not the aggressor any more in Cyprus, but the negotiator and the peace-keeper in an area with a bloody past and a gloomy future.

⁷⁵ Sir A. Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

CHAPTER VII
THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN HARDING AND MAKARIOS.

The Politics of Aristotle
"Reasons of this nature will serve to explain why democratic states institute the rule of ostracism... and with that aim in view they used to pass a sentence of ostracism on those whom they regarded as having too much influence owing to their wealth or the number of their connexions or any other form of political strength."
Aristotle, III: 15.

This chapter is concerned with the period of the direct diplomatic negotiations between the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios and the governor of Cyprus, Sir J. Harding, until Makarios' arrest and exile in Seychelles, on 9 March 1956. Throughout the chapter a detailed analysis of the talks will be presented, examining the diplomatic arguments of the two sides, as well as their intentions concerning the determination of the Cypriot question, and the internal and external political developments that resulted in Makarios' arrest and exile. However, it would be a methodological mistake if the analysis remained totally focused upon the two personalities that led the discussions. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to present the role of external factors, such as the

government of Athens and the Kyrenia circles, and their contribution to the final outcome of the talks.¹ The main task of this chapter is to evaluate Harding's constitutional proposals and assess the reasons for the Greek Cypriot refusal to accept them. Secondary questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: How was the decision of Athens to appeal again to the UN justified within the framework of Greece's internal situation during that time? Why did the American position towards Harding's proposals change? Which were the main reasons that influenced London to order Makarios' arrest and exile?

After the dramatic collapse of the Tripartite Conference in London, the Greek government decided to appeal again to the United Nations in favour of the Cypriot question. The Greek decision was a desperate diplomatic action that aimed not to accomplish a diplomatic victory in New York, but to elevate low Greek morale and put an end to the accusations of the opposition parties of governmental inability and hesitation to promote the Greek Cypriot demands and protect the Greek minority in Turkey.² After the end of the anti-Greek riots in Constantinople and Smyrna, Greek public opinion towards Papagos' government was at its lowest point, while inside the Parliament the leaders of the opposition demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister and the announcement of general elections. Characteristically, the historic leader of the Liberals, G. Papandreou, accused the government over its position during the riots in Turkey by stating during an emotional meeting, inside the parliament:

*"The Greek citizens are aware of the great responsibilities of the government concerning the Turkish insults during the Tripartite Conference and the Turkish vandalism in Constantinople and Smyrna. This government is dangerous and the Greek people are demanding its resignation before it is too late."*³

In addition the Unified Democratic Left (EDA) did not waste such a brilliant opportunity to afflict Papagos' government. As Z. Argyros, one of the leading figures of EDA's student organization and now general manager of the Property Bank in Greece, remembers:

¹ Because much important information from the discussions has never been revealed, the author will make extended use of memoirs and diaries of the key factors of the talks as well as Keessing's Contemporary Archives and the official correspondence between Harding and Makarios.

² E. Averof-Tositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot Question 1950-1963, (Athens, 1982), vol. II, p. 86.

³ P.B. Petridis, Georgios Papandreou and the Cypriot question 1954-1965, (Thessaloniki, 1998), pp. 19-20.

*"We seized the opportunity to paralyze the nation. The tragic events in Constantinople outraged the absolute majority of the Greek population, who felt deeply insulted and threatened by the Turkish vulgarity. Therefore, EDA's anti-state actions became legitimate through the great public support. We had the power and we succeed in keeping the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki locked up for 4 months, we organized enormous student demonstrations outside the parliament and we instructed the Trade Unions to announce continuous general strikes in every major Greek city. The government was in a very difficult position and we were pushing them even more."*⁴

Therefore, due to the crisis the government decided to appeal to the United Nations over the Cypriot question one more time, knowing the outcome of the appeal even before the commencement of the talks in New York. As a matter of fact, the Greek appeal was turned down by the General Assembly of the Tenth Session of UN (23 Sept. 1955), a result that was expected both by the Greek and the British side. On the one hand, it would have been irrational for the General Assembly to accept the Greek appeal, just a few weeks after the collapse of the Conference in London and the riots in Turkey. A possible acceptance of the Greek appeal would have created a new crisis in the already wounded Greco-Turkish relations and would have brought closer the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war with devastating consequences for the peace and order in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Balkans. On the other hand, another reason for the rejection of the Greek appeal was the American diplomatic support for Britain. Despite the fact that the Tripartite Conference was a great British diplomatic triumph, still the continuous Greek appeals in the United Nations annoyed London. According to the British Prime Minister the Greek side would have been discouraged by a sound diplomatic defeat in the United Nations. However, for such a development Eden recognized the fact that American support was essential.⁵ After explaining to the Americans that a new Greek appeal would have inflamed the situation on Cyprus, the British side obtained American backing. This resulted in the rejection of the Greek motion by a majority of the General Committee of the Assembly and subsequently by the Assembly itself.⁶

⁴ Personal Interview with Mr. Z. Argyros, Athens, July 1999.

⁵ A. Eden, *Full Circle*, (London, 1960), p. 401.

⁶ A. Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 402. See also: Gen. Ass., Tenth Session, 521 Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1955.

After securing an easy and convenient victory in the United Nations, the Conservative government concentrated its attention upon Cyprus, where the hostilities were expanding rapidly and were threatening the British diplomatic achievement. The ethnic unrest in the island alerted the international community and gave an opportunity to the Opposition in the House of Commons to commence a series of intense attacks against Eden and his Cabinet. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the main argument of London concerning the Cypriot question was that the existing establishment was the only means that guaranteed peace and order on the island. However, the internal situation in Cyprus was far from peaceful, therefore, the main task of the Conservative government was to restore peace and order in the island. However, this task was not simple. As mentioned in a previous chapter the British side had Grivas under close surveillance, but the situation had changed since the early days of EOKA. Grivas' guerilla movement had become strongly established in the Cypriot political spectrum, while the role of P. Papadopoulos, Grivas' closest associate and British informer, had been revealed and he left the island in the early days of 1956.⁷ Therefore, Eden decided to make use of larger quantities of the British military mechanism in order to eliminate Grivas and EOKA, while he was willing to offer the Greek Cypriot side direct negotiations concerning Macmillan's constitutional proposals, as they had been presented during the Tripartite Conference in London, for the final solution of the Cypriot question. However, Eden's plans required a skilful diplomat and an experienced soldier, therefore the British Premier decided to appoint Field-Marshal Sir John Harding as the new governor of Cyprus. Harding was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, while his qualities had been well proven in the Second World War as a commander of the 7th Armored Division at Alamein, and during the uprising of the Mau-Mau in Kenya and its successful suppression. As Eden argued in his memoirs:

*"With such a programme in mind I began to consider the Governorship of the island. Intelligent and faithful service was being given by the present incumbent, Sir Robert Armitage, but the position seemed to call for a rare blend of military and diplomatic qualities. I thought I knew the man... I had in mind Field-Marshal Sir John Harding..."*⁸

⁷ Grivas' issued a warrant for Papadopoulos, therefore the latter had to abandon Cyprus in order to protect his life. With the assistance of the British Intelligence Papadopoulos established himself in London, where he died in 1996.

⁸ A. Eden, op. cit., p. 402.

The new Governor arrived on the island on 3 October 1955 and after he was sworn in, he announced his three main objectives as Governor of Cyprus: i) the maintenance of law and order, so that people could go about their business in peace without fear of threats and oppression; ii) social and economic progress; and iii) a readiness at all times to discuss the constitutional developments of the island in the terms of the proposals already made by the British Government.⁹

The new governor was not a man of pompous statements, therefore the very next day he met leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community at the Government House, while Makarios and Harding met in Nikosia's hotel, Ledra Palace, on 5 October. The Greek Cypriot delegation consisted of the Archbishop, P. Pashalidis, the deputy secretary of the Ethnarchy, and N. Kranidiotis, the secretary-general of the Ethnarchy. The British delegation consisted of the new governor and his special advisor J. Redaway.¹⁰ At the beginning of the meeting Sir John Harding proposed the same constitutional proposals that had been suggested by Macmillan during the Tripartite Conference in London. Makarios replied that the above constitutional proposals had been turned down, both by Athens and by the Ethnarchy, and in an attempt to gain the diplomatic advantage by surprising his interlocutor, he presented his own proposals: i) Recognition by the British Government of the right of the Cyprus people to self-determination constituted the indispensable basis for the solution of the Cyprus question. ii) After the official recognition, the Archbishop would be willing to co-operate with the British Government in framing a constitution of self-government and putting it into immediate operation iii) The time of the application of the principle of self-determination should constitute a subject of discussion between the British Government and the representatives of the Cyprus people, who would be elected on the basis of the constitution.¹¹ Makarios' proposals clearly show that the main obstacle for the adoption of an agreement between the British and the Greek Cypriot side was the principle of self-determination. On the one hand, the new Governor was not willing to search for a diplomatic solution outside of the framework of the Tripartite Conference, while the proposals of the Greek Cypriot Archbishop revealed the ever-lasting and uncompromising desire of the Greek Cypriot community for the application of the principle of self-determination on the island. However, it is important to note that for the first time since his appointment as an Archbishop, Makarios showed clear signs of a desire to find a common settlement with the British side concerning the Cypriot question. According to the aforementioned

⁹ Keesing's Archives, November 5-12, 1955, p. 14513.

¹⁰ N. Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years*, (Athens, 1981), p. 112.

proposals, Makarios abandoned, for the first time, the demand for immediate Enosis with Greece and he accepted the introduction of a transitional constitution of self-government that would have led, eventually, to self-determination. Makarios, through his proposals, tried to oblige the Conservative government of London to recognize the principle of self-determination but he offered the olive-branch by not demanding a specific date for the application of it. Without any doubt, Makarios' proposals were not in complete opposition to the British constitutional proposals. However, in response Harding answered that he was not authorized by his government to discuss such solutions, but he promised the Archbishop that he would forward his proposals to London.¹² Nevertheless, Makarios' propositions were not welcomed by the hard-liners of the Ethnarchy, Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, and Grivas. Their inflexible position was well established and they accused Makarios of undermining the Greek Cypriot struggle for Enosis by negotiating with the British. As Kranidiotis writes:

*"Makarios' proposals, that surprised even us, received a silent acceptance by the Greek Cypriot people, who supported the Archbishop and regarded him as the leading figure of the Enosis movement. The new line, however, caused the forceful criticisms of the intolerant circles of the Ethnarchy, Kyrenias' Bishop and General Grivas, who expressed the opinion that through the talks, Harding aimed to gain some time in order to reinforce his powers and crush the liberation struggle."*¹³

It was the first time that members of the Etharchy challenged the unquestionable leadership of Makarios, and this development was to play an important role in the final outcome of the talks.

Harding and Makarios met again on 7 and 11 October in Ledra Palace. In the meeting of 7 October, Harding insisted on Macmillan's constitutional proposals. As he explained to Makarios, the British diplomatic and military obligations did not allow any other development except the already proposed one. During the third meeting, on 11 October Makarios turned down the British proposals again and he repeated his demand for recognition from the British side of the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. Due to the different approaches of the two sides, the talks between Makarios and Harding ended on 11 October, but the experienced Governor stated that he was ready to meet Makarios again in the future, in an attempt to leave the door open for negotiations and

¹¹ S. Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, (London, 1981), pp. 73-4.

¹² E. Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

to prevent the international community from accusing London of inflexibility. However, Makarios, in order to justify his position to the international community, issued a statement on the breakdown of the discussions on 12 October, analyzing the Greek Cypriot perspective.

"The Archbishop said that he had submitted to Sir John Harding a plan which declared the right of self determination to be the indispensable basis for a solution of the Cyprus question. After recognition of this principle, he continued that he would be ready to co-operate with the British government in framing a Constitution for Cyprus which would operate during the transitional period pending the application of the principle of self-determination. Sir John Harding had conveyed these views to London, and at their second meeting had informed the Archbishop that H.M Government rejected them and insisted on the Macmillan proposals. He (the Archbishop) had replied that these proposals had already been rejected by the Greek government and by the people of Cyprus, and that in no circumstances should a solution to the question be sought within the framework of the tripartite conference, "the consequences of which have been so sad". Continuing, Archbishop Makarios said that he had suggested to Sir John Harding that the question should be placed on a new basis, and in no circumstances on "implacable British plans which have already been tried and failed". After declaring that he could not discern in the "Macmillan plan" any possibility of development from a colonial constitution to self-government and self-determination, the Archbishop claimed that his views were fully supported by the Ethnarchy Council and by all Greek Cypriots. At his meeting with the Governor on the previous meeting [11 Oct] he had made it clear that new discussions would only be possible "on the basis of self-determination". The Archbishop expressed his sincere regrets at the breakdown of his talks with Sir John Harding, and added: "We realize that the consequences will be unpleasant,

¹³ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 115.

both to H.M. Government and to the people of Cyprus, but our conscience remains clear." In reply to questions, he said that he would always be ready to meet the Governor if another basis for discussion could be found, but that the initiative would have to come from the Government."¹⁴

Makarios' statement was a successful attempt to expose British diplomacy, therefore the Foreign Office, on October 20, prepared an improved proposal that was closer to the Greek Cypriot demands. The new proposals included the following:

*"It is not their position [H.M. government] that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic importance of the island and on account of the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the eastern Mediterranean. Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when sufficient progress had been made and self-government has proved itself a workable position capable of safeguarding the interests of all elements of the people of Cyprus. In view of the considerations set out in paragraph one, Her Majesty's Government consider that the Greek and Turkish Governments should also be associated with these discussions by whatever method seems most appropriate."*¹⁵

However, before going any further with the analysis it will be useful to compare the views and the proposals of the British and the Greek Cypriot side. As indicated on all the previously mentioned issues, the two sides were in agreement for the introduction of the principle of self-government in the Cypriot case. On the other hand, the different approach of the two sides concerning the principle of self-determination was still the main obstacle preventing a possible agreement. While the new British proposal was substantially improved concerning that issue, it still did not give any definite promise to

¹⁴ Keesing's Archives, *ibid*.

¹⁵ A. Eden, *op. cit.*, pp. 403-04.

the Greek Cypriot side for the introduction of self-determination. In this point lies the main disagreement between the two sides. While Makarios requested a definite promise from the British side concerning the introduction of self-determination, London answered that self-determination could be established in Cyprus but for the moment it was not a practical proposition. Until this point the British and the Greek Cypriot views were in absolute agreement, since Makarios did not ask for a definite date for the establishment of self-determination in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the British side, by asserting the non-practicality of the introduction of self-determination in Cyprus, the strategic importance of Cyprus, and the negative consequences this would have brought to the relations of Greece and Turkey and to the equilibrium of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, triggered Greek Cypriot hesitation. By the way the explanation had been presented, there was not any difference between the new proposals and Macmillan's proposals during the Conference in London. Therefore, it was a clear indication to the Greek Cypriot side that the British would always object to the introduction of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. The other main difference between the Greek Cypriot and the British side was the clear intention of the Conservative government to include the Greek and the Turkish government in discussions on the Cypriot future. However, the legacy of the Tripartite Conference was itself enough to provoke the Greek Cypriots' objection, especially when they were against the inclusion of Turkey in the Conference of London from the outset. However, the Greek Cypriots' objection to the inclusion of Turkey in future talks concerning the Cypriot question could have not been accepted by the British side, since Turkey was the front line of the British defence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. As Eden reveals in his memoirs:

*"I consider it capital that we should carry the Turks with us in any new move. We had now to convince them that our purpose was not to abandon our interests or theirs in Cyprus, but to find a solution which would meet Western defense needs in the Eastern Mediterranean."*¹⁶

The above differences played an important role for the outcome of the fourth meeting of Makarios and Harding. After the failure of the third meeting, the Ethnarchy Council asked, through the Labour M.P F. Noel-Baker, for a new secret meeting between Makarios and Harding in order to hold back the press and the internal criticisms from the

¹⁶ A. Eden, op. cit., p. 404.

hard-liners of the Ethnarchy. The new meeting was to be held in Kranidiotis' residence in Nicosia, 5 Santaroza st.¹⁷ Kranidiotis gives a detailed analysis of the meeting :

*"Harding arrived ten minutes earlier than Makarios. As soon as Makarios entered the house Harding gave him an envelope saying "Your Beatitude I have very good news for you" Makarios took the envelope and read its content without expressing any view. After a while he gave me the envelope saying that he wanted my opinion. I took it and I immediately noticed that for the first time the British recognized the possibility of the introduction of the principle of self-determination... As soon as I read the text I said to Makarios with a low voice that its spirit was a clear progression of the British position. The Archbishop without hearing my comments said to Harding that " I am really sorry. I can not accept your proposals. I cannot link the self-determination of the Cypriot people with the strategic plans of Great Britain, and I cannot accept that any other developments or obligations of Great Britain may possibly influence the rightful demands of self-determination for Cyprus. Harding, obviously shaken, stood up and answered: "I am really sorry for what you are doing", he saluted us and he left. In reply to my question to the Archbishop of why he had answered Harding immediately, Makarios said: "I turned it down in order to return the negative answer of the Governor to my own proposals. However, I believe that as a base the new proposal is good. Of course we can not accept it as it is but we can negotiate upon it."*¹⁸

Many analysts accused Makarios of stubbornness and vanity because of his answer to Kranidiotis, and partly they are right. It is widely known that Makarios accepted criticisms from nobody, and he perceived the rejection of his proposals not as a diplomatic answer but as a personal insult. Nevertheless, at the same time Makarios just tried to gain some time in order to discuss the new British proposals with the other members of the Ethnarchy, while he used an old diplomatic trick to take the initiative

¹⁷ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 133.

¹⁸ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 133-35.

from Harding and gain the upper hand in the discussions. As a matter of fact, the next day he sent Kranidiotis to Kyrenia in order to meet the hard-liners and inform them about the new proposals. It is obvious that Makarios wanted to accept the new proposals and begin a series of new negotiations with Harding, but he had to notify the internal opposition, as well as get its approval. What the British side failed to comprehend, at this stage, was that the internal political situation in Cyprus had changed. Makarios was not the indisputable leader of the Greek Cypriots any more. His influence among the Greek Cypriot population was still at its highest point. Even members of AKEL regarded Makarios as the true leader. However, Kyprianos had managed to form a strong front inside the Ethnarchy against Makarios and above all he secured Grivas' support, a decisive factor for the political balance inside the Greek Cypriot community. Grivas had all the military power, therefore he could gain the support of prominent members of the Greek Cypriot community, either by persuasion or by force. Grivas' personality could not stand the fact that Makarios was superior to him and theoretically he was his subordinate. Therefore by uniting his powers with Kyprianos, Grivas believed that he could isolate Makarios and take the leadership of the Ethnarchy, a development that would allow him to organize a more extensive guerilla war against the British, while also satisfying his personal ambitions. When Kranidiotis arrived in Kyrenia, he met with Kyprianos and the secretary of the Bishopric P. Ioannides. Their reaction to what Kranidiotis said was negative, while Grivas' reply was that, if the Archbishop continued the talks with Harding he could no longer guarantee the safety of Makarios.¹⁹ It was obvious that Grivas' had reached the point of threatening the life of Makarios, while Kyprianos was not willing to accept any other solution than Enosis and nothing but Enosis. Makarios did not have any other choice but to stop any negotiations with the British side, in order to protect his life and position, as well as the internal unity of the Ethnarchy Council. In such a way a golden opportunity was lost for the Greek Cypriot side to enter into new negotiations with Harding, using as a diplomatic weapon the British recognition of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. Yet again, the Church and the extreme nationalists of the Ethnarchic Council played their role successfully as the reactionary forces against any progress on the Cypriot question.

Due to the recent developments, Britain decided to put pressure upon Makarios through diplomatic means. Eden decided to use American and Greek influence in order to persuade the Archbishop to alter his position and accept the recent British proposals. For that reason the American consul in Nicosia, Mr. Courtney, visited the Archbishop

¹⁹ N. Kranidiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

twice to inform him that the State Department regarded the last British proposals as satisfactory enough, while Eden with a personal letter to the Greek Premier tried to persuade the Greek side to put more pressure upon Makarios in order to accept his proposals.

*"I appeal to your Excellency to take a bold initiative and recommend our statement to the Archbishop. I believe that if you would do this, there would still be a chance of persuading the ethnarchy not to reject our offer. It would then be possible for Cyprus to take the first steps towards a happier future and for us to restore the friendly relations which have been traditional between our countries and which are indispensable to the whole enterprise of Western defence."*²⁰

However, the British side failed to reconsider the internal political situation in Greece and to modify her policy accordingly. On 5 October, A. Papagos died. The very next morning King Pavlos appointed K. Karamanlis, then Minister of Development, Prime Minister. The days that followed caused an extended crisis in Greek political life, with all the parties of the opposition accusing the Greek monarch of favouritism and intervention in the democratic procedures of the state, while the newspaper of the opposition accused Karamanlis of accepting the intervention of the Anglophile King, in order to bring a favourable solution to the British side concerning the Cypriot question.²¹ Great demonstrations had been organized by the left-wing student organizations, where 35 students were killed, while the government declared a state of emergency that made all demonstrations illegal. Despite the measures, Karamanlis did not have the power to put an end to the crisis. Pavlos' intervention woke up old debates concerning the constitutional role of the monarch, dating from the Greek Civil War, while the M.Ps of EDA threatened that they would abandon their seats in Parliament, bringing the country closer to a new Civil War with catastrophic consequences not only for peace in the Balkans but for international law and order as well. During that time, Eden asked Karamanlis, a non-elected Prime Minister, to persuade Makarios to accept the British solution. However, Karamanlis did not have that power and even if he had, he would not have made use of it, since it would have resulted in the worsening of the internal situation in Greece and in his personal political demise. Without any doubt, the parties

²⁰ A. Eden, op. cit., p. 406.

²¹ E. Tositsas Averof, op. cit., p. 85.

of the opposition would have used such a development as propaganda against Karamanlis, while the latter would have remained, in Greek history, as the non-elected Premier who had been appointed with one and only duty, to resolve the Cypriot question at any cost for the nation and without regarding the views of the Greek community in Cyprus. Karamanlis did not follow Eden's calls. However, the American side continued to put pressure upon Makarios until 4 December, when the State Department showed signs of changing its policy. As Eden confesses:

*"Then as so often happens, a new voice was heard from the American side. Their Ambassador in Athens began to see matters rather differently. He thought that Archbishop Makarios was a prisoner of the extremists and that it was important to extract him from that position. Accordingly, the Archbishop was to be helped, and the way to help him was for us to make further modifications in the formula which we had already put forward and which the United States Government had strongly approved."*²²

The alteration of American policy towards the Cypriot question proves the argument that had already been presented above, that Makarios was a prisoner of the internal opposition. However, there is the other side of the coin that has not been examined by those who have dealt analytically with the Cypriot question. The sudden and unexpected American change was not an irrational thought of some romantic humanitarians inside the State Department, who ignored the political reality of that time. On the contrary it was a well planned decision, fully justified by the dominant political factor of that era, the Cold War. The political situation had not improved in Greece, and Karamanlis' position was in clear danger. If the Americans had allowed the British to continue with their political and diplomatic pressure upon Makarios, then the Archbishop would have been forced to accept their proposals, but Karamanlis would have lost his position. The internal situation in Greece was so intense that the masses, in the event of a negative development for the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis and self-determination, would have demanded the overthrow of Karamanlis and the announcement of new elections. It was more than certain that in the case of new elections the pro-Western Right would have been beaten by the anti-NATO Liberal party or the pro-Communist Democratic Left. In both situations, the fragile political and military balance in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, a balance that the West was anxious to maintain as a bulwark

²² A. Eden, op. cit., p. 407.

against Soviet expansion, would have been overturned, while all the American dollars from the introduction of the Truman Doctrine in Greece, a scheme that aimed to strengthen the pro-Western parties and weaken the pro-Left ones, would have been spent in vain. The State Department quite rightly believed, that a possible radical political alteration in the political system of Greece would have meant the loss of the existing status quo in the Mediterranean and the possible application of the well-known "Domino Theory" in the countries of the Mediterranean. Therefore, their decision to put an end to the British pressure upon Makarios and begin to apply pressure on Eden for the adoption of new proposals was a helping hand to Karamanlis and his government, in order to survive the political storm and safeguard the Western route of the country against the Eastern bloc. The American spirit can be fully revealed in a letter from the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, R.D. Murphy, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, G. Gray, on 25 November 1955. According to the former, the Greco-American relations during that time were strained over the Cyprus question, therefore he suggested that Washington should support the newly elected Greek government over the political developments in Cyprus. As he said:

*"The present friendly Karamanlis government is in effect a "caretaker" which... is anxious to subdue the anti-American emotions in Greece, and to begin rebuilding Greek-Turkish relations. It deserves our full support."*²³

Eden followed the American instruction, therefore after a few days a new text appeared that stated:

"Her Majesty's Government adhere to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution which will satisfy the

²³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957: Soviet Union-Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. by J. P. Glennon, (Washington, 1989), vol. XXIV, p. 558.

*wishes of the people of Cyprus, be consistent with the strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies and have regard to the existing treaties to which Her Majesty's Government are a party. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community."*²⁴

At first glance, the above statement does not contain any substantial alterations to the previous ones, however the researcher should concentrate not on the content of the text but on what is missing. The fact that this text did not include an invitation to the Turkish and the Greek government to participate in the talks for the future of the Cypriot case was a goodwill gesture to Makarios, who as already mentioned, opposed such a development. In addition, the terminology of the text was less vague than any of the previous ones. *"The final solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus"* was a definite pledge of the British side of its commitment towards the finding of an acceptable solution for the Cypriot question, and it was even stronger than the vague promises for a solution *"in the future"* of the previous British text. With the new text, Harding sent a letter to Makarios, asking the Archbishop to accept the new statement as a base for co-operation and to make use of his influence, in order to put an end to violence. As the letter continues:

"I need not point out to you the grave consequences of a failure to reach agreement on the basis now proposed. Her Majesty's Government consider that they have now taken every possible step to meet the views you have expressed during our conversations regarding the form which their statement should take. It is in the interest of everyone, and not least of the people of Cyprus, that the uncertainty which has surrounded the question of our reaching an agreement should not be prolonged. Her Majesty's Government are of the opinion that without any undue delay, an announcement of their position in this matter must be made so that opinion here and abroad can judge the efforts which they have made to reach an agreement-

²⁴ Correspondence exchanged between the Governor, Sir J. Harding and Archbishop Makarios, Cmd. 9708, 1956. See also A. Eden, op. cit., p. 408.

efforts which, they feel sure, will commend themselves to fair minded people everywhere."²⁵

Makarios approached the new statement in a positive way. He believed that for the first time since 1878, there was potential to finally resolve the Cypriot question. However, he knew that he had to fight a great battle in the Ethnarchy in order to persuade the opposition to modify its position of Enosis and nothing but Enosis and accept the negotiations. As Makarios confessed to his closest associate N. Kranidiotis:

*"I believe that the new statement should be accepted by the Ethnarchy. It is time to sit once again at the negotiating table, before the British get tired and return back to the old days. However, in this long and painful road I do not have to face only Harding. Kyprianos is the main obstacle for the finding of a solution in Cyprus and I have to move quickly. There is little time left."*²⁶

The Greek Cypriot Archbishop realized that it would have been difficult for Kyprianos to change his views concerning the negotiations with the British side. For Kyprianos, an ambitious priest with strong nationalist beliefs, every other development except the Enosis was a simple failure, an act of treason to the high ideals of Hellenism. Therefore, Makarios recognized that the only possibility for persuading the Ethnarchic Council to accept Harding's proposals was to approach Grivas, who was the key-figure in the internal Cypriot political scene. If Makarios succeeded in securing Grivas' support, then he would have the luxury of proceeding with the negotiations without fearing the internal opposition. Grivas had under his control the military power and he could influence other members of the Council. Therefore, Makarios asked for a meeting with the leader of EOKA, hoping that he could persuade the latter to support him. The meeting took place in Kyko monastery, with great precautions. Makarios examined the outcome of the negotiations between him and Harding, and he strongly supported the view that with the latest proposals of the British side Cyprus could have enjoyed the principle of self-determination, the main step to Enosis, within a short period. Grivas argued that the British proposals were still written in a vague way, therefore the British side could have insisted in turning down the demand for the introduction of self-determination for the Cypriot case in the future, as they had done during the past. Makarios' reply to Grivas was that there was no other solution apart from negotiating

²⁵ Sir J. Harding's letter to Makarios, 28 January 1956, Cmd 9708.

²⁶ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 156.

with Harding, and he supported his view by saying that the Greek Cypriots were getting tired of the uncertainty of the situation around the Cypriot question and the danger of losing their support was greater than ever. Grivas remained immovable and warned Makarios that, should he accept Harding's proposals, he (Grivas) would fulfil his previous threats to inform the Greek Cypriot population of Makarios' treacherous role against the Enosis struggle.²⁷ It is convenient for the specialists who are dealing with the Cypriot question to accuse Grivas of inflexibility, however they fail to take into account with Makarios' role. Grivas' obstacle to any developments concerning the Cypriot question was a personal creation of the Archbishop, a Frankenstein that became stronger than his creator and threatened, not only the course of the negotiations, but the whole of the Cypriot structure as well.

Makarios was left with no other solution but to ask Harding, with a new letter on 2 February, for detailed clarifications concerning the constitutional proposals. By that, Makarios believed that he could gain more time in order to regularize the internal situation in the Ethnarchic Council. Makarios wrote to Harding that the new statements were not satisfactory enough for the Greek Cypriot side, since the principle of self-determination was the only reliable and acceptable solution for the Cypriot question. According to Makarios a new constitution should have included the following principles:

"1) All Legislative Executive and Judicial powers, with the exception of those expressly exempted, will originate from the people of Cyprus and will be exercised by them through their elected representatives and other organs. 2) Responsibility for the defence and external political relations of the island will be excepted from the above principle and will be vested in the Governor in his capacity as representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. 3) The Governor, beyond the powers mentioned in the previous paragraph ii) will exercise the normal duties of a constitutional head of State; thus he will sign, without having the right of veto, laws which are enacted by the Assembly within the framework of the Constitution, including the budget, and will sign the decrees which are lawfully issued by the Government. He will entrust the duty of forming the Government to the person enjoying the confidence

²⁷ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 157-58.

*of the House, and will dissolve the House on his advice. Ministers will be chosen by the Prime Minister and will, like him, be responsible only to the Assembly. 4) Representation in the Assembly will be proportional to the composition of the population. Otherwise there will be absolute equality of all citizens and everyone will be eligible to any public Office. Exceptions to this rule may be provided for only in the case of special offices which are exclusively connected with the religious and educational rights of the island's communities. Such rights will be fully safeguarded and protected by the Constitution. 5) A procedure will be defined for the impartial settlement of any difference arising out of the interpretation of constitutional provisions, in particular on questions of disputed authority between the Governor on the one hand and the Assembly or the Government on the other."*²⁸

Harding replied it was impossible for his government to be committed to any of Makarios' proposals before the commencement of the talks. However, in an attempt not to jeopardize diplomacy, Harding suggested some new elements that could form bases of future negotiations. According to Harding:

" a) Her Majesty's Government offer a wide measure of democratic self-government now. To this end a new and liberal constitution would be drawn up in consultation with all sections of the community. b) The constitution would enable the people of Cyprus through responsible Cypriot Ministers to assume control by a suitably phased process over the departments of Government except those relating to foreign affairs and defence which would be reserved to the Governor for as long as he deems necessary. c) The constitution would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority. d) A Cypriot Premier to head the new administration would be chosen by the Assembly with the approval of the Governor. Ministerial portfolios would be allocated by the Premier. e) The constitution would provide for Turkish membership in the Council of Ministers. f) There would be proper safeguards for

²⁸ Makarios' letter to Sir J. Harding, 2 February 1956, Cmd 9708.

the rights of individual citizens, the interests of all sections of the community, and the integrity and independence of the public service."²⁹

Despite the fact that the new text was even closer to Makarios' proposals, the Archbishop still hesitated to accept it. The main reason was that he still did not have the approval of Kyprianos and Grivas. In addition, in the light of the previous experience of the Colonial Assembly in Cyprus, Makarios feared that the appointed members in the Assembly together with the Turkish Cypriots would form the clear majority once again, isolating the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, Makarios could not have accepted a constitution where the internal security of the state would have remained under the Governor. Makarios had justified fears concerning the last detail, mainly due to the fact that since the appearance of EOKA in Cyprus, the structure of the Cypriot police had been modified in favour of the Turkish Cypriot community. In an attempt to secure the pro-British nature of the police force, the ex-governor had dismissed hundreds of Greek Cypriot policemen, hiring Turkish Cypriots instead, who saw in EOKA the main threat to the survival of their community. According to a survey of the Greek government, this resulted in the fact that, in early 1956, 87% of the entire Cypriot police force was Turkish.³⁰ Makarios sent a new letter to Harding, asking him to modify again all the points of the new proposal that could cause controversy, but the British side did not agree this time. Concerning the concept of public security, Eden was particularly unprepared to make any compromise. As he wrote in his memoirs "*we could not agree that the security of the island should depend on the Archbishop's timing.*"³¹

During that difficult time for the survival of the talks between Makarios and Harding, the Colonial Secretary, A. Lennox-Boyd, arrived in Cyprus. As soon as the arrival of the Colonial Secretary became known to Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader asked for a meeting. The meeting was held on the night of 29th February, at the residence of the Archdeacon of the Anglican Church in Cyprus. N. Kranidiotis was present and provides a detailed narration of that night in his memoirs:

"I remember when Lennox-Boyd, with his high and captivating presence, entered the room together with Sir J. Martin. He gave a typical handshake to Makarios, while Harding was watching the scene with a strict look. The atmosphere on that

²⁹ Sir J. Harding's letter to Makarios. 14 February 1956, Cmd 9708.

³⁰ The Statistics Service of the Parliament of the Hellenes, The Cypriot Public Sector, (Athens, 1956), vol. I, no. 345.

³¹ A. Eden, op. cit., p. 411.

night, the last day of February of the leap year 1956, was electric. Lennox-Boyd, after a short speech concerning the course of the talks between Harding and Makarios, read a statement that he was to announce in the House of Commons few days later, defining the British policy towards the Cypriot question. According to the statement, the British government was to recognize the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, that would have followed after the establishment of a self-government constitution. Makarios accepted Lennox-Boyd's statement but he asked the British government to clarify with an official statement that the Greek Cypriots would form the majority in the new Assembly. He also asked the Colonial Secretary to define the period under which the Governor would have the control of the internal security of the island, and for the first time he required the Conservative government to define the chronological period of the transitional constitution of self-government until the introduction of the principle of self-determination. Lennox-Boyd refused to discuss from the beginning any issue and he clearly stated that he was not willing to modify even one word from the statement that he had just read. Makarios then said that he had no other choice than to insist on his position. Lennox-Boyd gave him a strict look without giving him an answer. For some seconds nobody dared to break the deadly silence. Then the Colonial Secretary stood up and said to Makarios "God save your people". Then he left the room."³²

It was the final collapse of the discussions. Without any doubt, Lennox-Boyd's statement was the closest to Makarios' aspirations. For the researcher, the lack of flexibility and diplomatic tolerance that Makarios showed during that critical moment for the future of the Cypriot question is really surprising. However, the explanation for Makarios' poor performance during that night can be found again in the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy. The night before the meeting, Kyprianos arrived in the Archbishopric palace in Nicosia. Makarios received him immediately in his office, excluding Kranidiotis. After the end of the meeting with Kyprianos he looked exhausted and the only words

³² N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 170-71.

that he said to Kranidiotis were *"Go to your home and rest because tomorrow a dark day is coming for Cyprus and we have to be strong."*³³ From Makarios' words it is easy to understand that Kyprianos, once again, played a crucial role in the inflexible position that the Archbishop presented the following night. As soon as Lennox-Boyd returned to London, he informed his colleagues in the House of Commons, as well as the international community, of the final collapse of the talks in Cyprus. As he said:

*"The government's view has been forward over the last five months, and we have made a series of concessions to the Archbishop's point of view. I must confess with distress that, as soon as one obstacle is out of the way, another one, unheard of until a week or two before, rears its head."*³⁴

On the other side of the fence, Makarios tried to clear his position as well. On 5 March he issued a statement declaring that the British side had shown no signs of goodwill. He also added that:

*"In short the Cypriots were called upon to accept a regime under which it would be doubtful whether they would control their own Assembly, and on a basis in which a colonial ruling power would be able to interfere indefinitely in everything under the pretext of public security"*³⁵

The collapse of the talks between Makarios and Harding was the final blow in the diplomatic effort concerning the finding of an acceptable solution for the Cypriot question. Nevertheless, the crisis escalated even further. Makarios was planning to visit Athens, in order to ask Karamanlis to apply once again to the United Nations concerning the Cypriot question. The Archbishop did not hide his positive feelings for the new Greek Premier. Unlike Papagos, Karamanlis had adopted a pro-Cypriot stance that encouraged the Archbishop to visit him and ask for official Greek support for the Greek Cypriot struggle. However, there were more reasons for that trip to Athens. Makarios was really disappointed with the internal war against his authority and had already decided to resolve the problems inside the Ethnarchy by attacking Kyprianos and approaching Grivas. Therefore, he planned to demand that the Greek Premier put pressure upon the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, traditionally strongly linked

³³ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 168.

³⁴ Lennox-Boyd: House of Commons, March 5, 1956, vol. 549, col. 1723. For full text of Lennox-Boyd's statement concerning the collapse of the discussions see: op. cit. col. 1715-719.

³⁵ Keesing's: March 17-24, 1956, pp. 14757-758.

with the Greek state, either to replace Kyprianos as Bishop of Kyrenia or to appoint him to another post away from Cyprus. Makarios hoped that if Kyprianos were removed from his duties, then the internal opposition would be fatally wounded and Grivas would have been left with no other choice than to co-operate with the Archbishop. However, all those plans were never realized because Makarios never arrived in Athens. On 9 March, while Makarios was ready to enter the plane to Athens in Nicosia's airport, he was arrested by the British authorities. Along with the Archbishop, Kyprianos, P. Papagathagelos, and P. Ioannides were arrested and were all exiled to the tropical island of the Indian Ocean, Seychelles. The news of Makarios arrest became known almost immediately, all over the world. In an attempt to justify his decision, Harding presented a secret report that linked Makarios with Grivas and EOKA. As Harding said, Makarios was the main obstacle facing the establishment of peace and order in Cyprus, therefore he had *"to be removed from the island in the interest of promoting peace, order and good government."*³⁶ On the other hand, the Conservative government in London tried to justify Makarios' arrest by commenting upon his inflexible position during the talks and his close links with the EOKA organization. As Eden said inside the House of Commons:

"After months of watching these negotiations[Makarios-Harding] and seeing their course, that my own impression was that had we been able to yield on these points other demands would have followed upon them... For some time past we had recognised that it might become necessary, in the interests of restoring law and order to remove the Archbishop and the Bishop of Kyrenia from the island. The Government, however, were determined to make every effort to reach an agreed settlement. That is why we continued to negotiate with the Archbishop in the hope that he might be persuaded at some time to condemn the use of violence. While these negotiations were going on, more and more evidence came to hand about the extent of the Archbishop's own activity in connection with some of these organisations. At any rate, it became clear-all too clear-that so long as the Archbishop would not condemn

³⁶ Keesing's: op. cit., pp. 14759-760.

violence in any way, order could not be restored in the island while he was at large there."³⁷

However, despite the explanations of the government, the opposition accused Eden and his associates regarding the collapse of the talks. As Mr. Bevan stated:

*"I should have thought that hon. Members...would agree that a classic assumption underlying the beginning of negotiations of that sort is that there would be Cypriot self-government with a military base on Cyprus. Or are we to understand that one of the reasons why agreement was not reached was because it was always in the mind of the Government that they wished to have Cyprus as a base and never seriously intended carrying the negotiations to a successful conclusion?"*³⁸

while referring to the claims of the Conservatives concerning the collapse of the talks due to Makarios' links with EOKA and his inflexibility, A. Bevan stated:

"Furthermore, it had been known to Sir John Harding-he said so in the statement he made when Archbishop Makarios was arrested and deported-that Archbishop Makarios had been engaged in close association with those responsible for disorder on the island. He knew that; he said so. He did not, therefore, break off negotiations because of the Archbishop's alleged illegal conduct, because he knew all about that before... The main point I am making is that it is always essential, in matters of this sort, for us to remember that the persons whom we look upon here as terrorists are looked upon by their fellow nationals as patriots. It really is not good enough to use language of that sort, because we always have to swallow it afterwards... I hope that the Colonial Secretary, in particular, will tell us what he meant by his statement that after one point had been settled the Archbishop always raised others. I can see no evidence of that in the letters that have passed between them. I went through this correspondence very closely

³⁷ A. Eden: House of Commons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col. 415-16.

³⁸ A. Bevan: House of Commons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col. 392.

and tried to find what sort of case the Government had, but it is very hard to find it in these letters... ”³⁹

Another member of the Labour Party, commenting on Makarios' arrest said:

“It is almost unprecedented for a Government to enter into negotiations, to conduct them for five months with a man whom they acknowledge as the representative leader and spokesman of his people, and then, when negotiations are broken off, presumably because of an impression which the Prime Minister had that further difficulties would arise, brand him as a criminal and arrest and deport him.”⁴⁰

Without any doubt the Opposition tried to benefit from the decision of the Conservative government, to arrest and deport Makarios. It has to be noted here that the above verbal attacks, coming from the Labour party, were unjust and prejudiced, aiming not to resolve the crisis but to incapacitate the government in the eyes of the British electorate body. As mentioned above, the Conservative government genuinely committed itself during the talks to the finding of a solution that would have been accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, but every proposal that had been presented had been turned down by Makarios. Nevertheless, the tragic mistake of the British side can be found in the arrest of Makarios. During the talks between Makarios and Harding, the Archbishop was the only leading figure of the Ethnarchy that really wished to find a settlement concerning the Cypriot question. However, his attempts had been strongly opposed by the internal opposition, leaving Makarios with only two options: either to dissolve the Council or to accept the views of the internal opposition in favour of the unity of the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial front. Makarios was extremely sensitive about his public image and without any doubt he did not want his name to be linked with the disintegration of the Ethnarchic Council and face the outrage of his compatriots. The British establishment had been informed about the internal situation in the Ethnarchy, but instead of assisting Makarios with his plans to regularize the internal situation in the Greek Cypriot political scene, they exiled him to Seychelles isolating him from the Cypriot developments.

At this point it is essential to ask the following question: Why did the Conservative party decide to isolate Makarios on Seychelles? The answer can be found in the internal situation of the Conservative Party. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Britain focused

³⁹ A. Bevan: op. cit., col. 393-95.

⁴⁰ K. Robinson: House of Commons, March 14, 1956, vol. 550, col.424.

on the geopolitical area of the Middle East as her main preoccupation concerning her foreign policy. Therefore, during the late months of 1955, London intensified its attempts to link Jordan with the Baghdad Pact.⁴¹ According to the London government, such a development would have reinforced the role of the Baghdad Pact, forming a strong front of pro-Western nations in the heart of the Middle East and in Asia able to withstand Soviet expansionism, as well as her own role in that area, that had been put under strong question by the American officials, who wanted to take the leading political role in the Middle East. However, Jordan had tuned down the British proposals. As Eden said, King Hussein was ready to join the Pact but eventually he did not because of Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money.⁴² The situation in Jordan worsened when, on 1 March, 1956, Hussein decided to discharge General Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion, as well as other British officials from the Jordan army and the public sector of the state.⁴³ According to *The Observer*, the right wing of the Conservative party found an opportunity to commence a series of new attacks against Eden and the role that he played as Secretary of the Foreign Office during the signature of the Suez Treaty.⁴⁴ Eden was confronted with a crisis within his party, whilst also facing attacks from the Opposition concerning his policy in Cyprus. The Conservative press and the hard-liners inside the party believed that the way that Hussein behaved towards Glubb was an outcome of the defensive policy of the Government to evacuate the military base of Suez.⁴⁵ It was obvious that Eden was in the eye of the storm because of his personal role in the signature of the Treaty of Suez, and now more than ever the internal opposition demanded from him an act that would persuade them that the Prime Minister was able to safeguard the interests of Britain. Two days after the end of the talks in the House of Commons concerning the situation in Jordan, Makarios was arrested and exiled to Seychelles. According to *The Observer*, this was Eden's first tough move and Tory criticism was immediately silenced."⁴⁶

⁴¹ C. Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War*, (London, 1964), p. 48.

⁴² A. Eden, op. cit., p. 341. King Hussein was anxious to repair the wounded economy of his country, therefore he decided that it was in the national interest to stay out of the Pact, since he secured the economic assistance of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia who opposed British dominance in the Middle East. For more concerning the internal political situation in Jordan and the foreign policy of the nation see: W. L. Cleveland, *A History of the Middle East*, (Oxford, 1994), p.p. 311-13.

⁴³ The Arab Legion had been founded after the end of the First World War with the military and economic assistance of Britain. In 1950 the importance of the Arab Legion had increased, since it was regarded as the only reliable military force in the Arab World, while the man who commanded it had such great political power that in reality was the true governor of the country.

⁴⁴ *The Observer*, *How it Happened*, 13 January, 1957.

⁴⁵ For more concerning the accusations against Eden's government see: *Middle East Debate: House of Commons*, March 7, 1956, vol. 549.

⁴⁶ *The Observer* op cit.

Without any doubt, Makarios, arrest was the biggest mistake of Eden, sacrificing the only key factor of the Greek Cypriot side who could have ensured the solution of the Cypriot question, to silence the internal criticisms of the hard-liners of the Conservative party concerning a situation that had no connection with the Cypriot question. Makarios' exile gave extremists inside the Greek Cypriot community the excuse to intensify their struggle against the British establishment in Cyprus, while on the other hand it put an end to any possible negotiation concerning the fate of the island, since Makarios was the only personality who had wide support of the Greek Cypriots. As a matter of fact, a few weeks after Makarios' arrest all the elected Greek Cypriot mayors in Cyprus issued a statement, which made clear to the British side that every negotiation concerning the Cypriot question without the release and return of Makarios would be out of the question. According to the statement:

*"We declare that we will never participate in any negotiations concerning the island's political future and reaffirm that there can be no possibility for the solution of the problem so long as His Beatitude is held down [sic] in forced confinement"*⁴⁷

Once again external factors played a decisive role in the final outcome of the talks between Makarios and Harding, putting an end to an ambitious effort to resolve the Cypriot question without the loss of any more lives. Once again, a golden opportunity had been lost for Cyprus, and the island returned back to the days of sectarian attacks, blood and violence, a dark tunnel where the exit was not visible yet.

⁴⁷ The Statement of the Greek Cypriot Mayors of Cyprus, quoted by Mr. Robinson: House of Commons, July 19, 1956, vol. 556, col. 1458.

CHAPTER VIII

THE OPENING OF PANDORA'S BOX: THE SUEZ CRISIS, LORD RADCLIFFE'S PROPOSALS AND THE IDEA OF PARTITION.

The Politics of Aristotle
"Ordinary men cannot see
the beginning of troubles
ahead; it requires the
genuine statesman."
 Aristotle, VIII: 9.

This chapter will examine the constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe concerning the Cypriot question. It will analyse the diplomatic background that led to Lord Radcliffe's dispatch to Cyprus and the constitutional proposals of the British side. It will also present the political and diplomatic situation in the Middle East during that time, and will attempt to link it with internal developments in Cyprus. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the outcome of Lord Radcliffe's proposals. Lord Radcliffe's proposals have aroused a great academic debate among the researchers who dealt with the Cypriot question. While some argue that the proposals were a genuine British attempt to find of a compromise¹, other argue that they were a diplomatic trick of London in order to reverse the negative climate that had been established against it after Makarios' arrest and exile to Seychelles.² In an attempt to contribute to the academic debate, the main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Was London truly motivated to resolve the Cypriot crisis by sending Lord Radcliffe to the island? Why did Athens decide to turn down Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals? Secondary questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: Why did London turn down Averof's proposals concerning the Cypriot question? What was the Greek role during

¹ N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, (London, 1978), p. 208.

² E. Hatzivasileiou, The Cypriot Question, 1878-1960: The Constitutional Side, (Athens, 1998), p. 83.

the Suez crisis and how did this influence the British attitude towards the Cypriot question? Why was the idea of partition negative for the peace and unity of Cyprus?

After Makarios' arrest and his exile to Seychelles, the Conservative government of London had to face two fronts. The first one was in the House of Commons, where the Opposition commenced a great attack against Eden and the members of his cabinet, over their decision to isolate Makarios in Seychelles, while the second one was on Cyprus, where law and order were threatened with total collapse, due to the increasing attacks against the establishment by EOKA, and the worsening of relations between the Greek and the Turkish communities. The Labour party accused Eden of jeopardizing all previous attempts to resolve the Cypriot question by arresting Makarios. According to the Labour party, Makarios' arrest was the main proof that the Conservative government was not ready to commit itself to any serious negotiations concerning the fate of Cyprus, while Eden's decision to arrest Makarios was a serious blow to British credibility at the international level as well as to the internal balance of Cyprus. A characteristic statement came from J. Griffiths during a stormy session in the House of Commons. According to the Labour MP due to the policies of the Conservative government:

*"We have created between ourselves and the Greek people of Cyprus a feeling of deep bitterness and resentment which may take many years to erase. A friendly people have been transformed into a hostile people who day by day in every way are showing ever greater hatred of us. What are we to gain by creating amongst those friendly people a hostile population who are coming to hate us by creating this deep well of bitterness which may last, who knows how long? It is quite clear that there is scarcely anyone –I know of no one– among the Greek community in Cyprus who is friendly towards us. Not one... We have created bitterness between those two communities [Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot]... We have seriously impaired the relations between ourselves and the friendly ally and country of Greece... We have gravely weakened the position of NATO in a vital part of the world."*³

On the other hand, the Labour opposition was not the only source of criticism concerning the methods of the Conservative government in Cyprus. A large part of the

³ J. Griffiths: House of Commons, May 14, 1956, vol. 552, col. 1656-657.

British press attacked the Prime Minister and his cabinet severely. In an ironic article The Manchester Guardian wrote:

*"It is not always possible to agree with Mr. Bevan, but on Cyprus he is right. The Tories are becoming "bloody-minded" and are reverting to the eighteenth-century type"*⁴

while the Spectator in a bitter article emphasized that:

*"The rapidly worsening situation brought about by the British policy in Cyprus, could not see any alternative other than the return of Makarios to resume negotiations."*⁵

This was not a political argument that was intended to discredit the Conservatives in the eyes of the British public, but a reference to everyday reality in Cyprus. During March, EOKA committed twenty-five attacks against military targets, killing seven and injuring twenty British soldiers, while on 21 March an explosive device had been found inside Harding's bedroom.⁶ The British authorities were unable to control the situation, and this became even more obvious on 10 May, 1956, when in an attempt to put an end to the social unrest in the island, the British Crown Court condemned two young fighters of EOKA, M. Karaolis and A. Dimitriou, to be hanged, charged with conspiracy against the Crown. As was expected this act outraged the international community and put Eden in an even more difficult position. The Anglican Church made an official complaint to the British Premier, while in the American Senate 18 Senators condemned British violence in Cyprus and asked for intervention in the White House for the implementation of the principle of self-determination in the island. The execution of the two young men in Cyprus outraged the American government as well. Through an official letter of the American Ambassador in Athens to Karamanlis, the following day of the execution, the State Department expressed its anger concerning the British methods in Cyprus and promised the Greek Premier that the American establishment was ready and willing to commence a series of diplomatic actions in order to establish peace and order on the island.⁷ The conclusion that follows from the above is that the Conservative government faced a serious diplomatic crisis, that affected not only law and order in Cyprus, but also its public image in Britain and diplomatic relations with its main ally, the United States. As seen in previous chapters, the main British argument concerning the maintenance of the Cypriot status quo was that Britain was the only factor of stability on the island.

⁴ The Manchester Guardian, Bloody Minded, May 29, 1956.

⁵ The Spectator, A Policy for Cyprus, June 1, 1956.

⁶ For more concerning EOKA's action during that period see: The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964), pp. 66-87.

However, Makarios' arrest discredited this argument, therefore Eden and the Foreign Office had to take a diplomatic initiative in order to prove to the rest of the international community that they had still the power and the influence to re-establish peace and order in the island.

On 19 June, "The Times" published the information that the British government was ready to take a new diplomatic initiative over the Cypriot question.⁸ According to the article the Conservative government was ready to set a specific day for the implementation of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, therefore it was the government's intention to approach the Turkish and Greek governments for a series of negotiations through a new Tripartite Conference. However, on 30 June the Turkish Premier, during a meeting with the international press in Ankara, clearly stated that his country opposed the alteration of the international status quo of Cyprus. He continued by analyzing the main reasons for the objection of his country towards such a development and he concluded by stating that a possible withdrawal of Britain from Cyprus would result in Soviet expansion in the Middle East.⁹ Although it seemed that Menderes' interview was a continuation of the traditional position of Turkey concerning the Cypriot question, it was still a direct warning to the British government not to pursue its plans to implement the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. By stating that the British withdrawal would have opened the way to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, the Turkish Premier gave a direct warning to Britain that his country was ready to create problems concerning the unity of the Baghdad Pact, during a difficult period for the region due to the political developments in Jordan. As mentioned earlier, the Baghdad Pact was one of the most important strategic and diplomatic assets of British foreign policy, safeguarding the British presence in the Middle East. Eden was not ready to sacrifice the British presence in the region and access to the valuable oil resources for the national economy. As a result, after a few days he announced in the House of Commons that his government had abandoned this initiative. According to Mr. Eden:

"It has become plain that steps to create conditions which might lead to the application of self-determination for Cyprus would raise far wider issues for our Turkish allies as parties to the Lausanne Treaty settlement... Her Majesty's Government

⁷ K. Karamanlis, Archive: Facts and Documents, (Athens, 1993), vol. II, p p. 26-27.

⁸ The Times, June 19, 1956, p. 10.

⁹ Keesing's Archives: September 1-8, 1956, pp. 15065-066.

*have to accept that for the present progress by this means cannot be realised."*¹⁰

It was the first time in the constitutional history of Britain that a Prime Minister had adopted such a pro-Turkish position and had declared it in a such obvious way inside the House of Commons. The admission that the Conservative government had abandoned its diplomatic plans because Ankara had objected to them, gave the Opposition the opportunity to commence a new series of bitter attacks against Eden and his cabinet. As Mrs. L. Jeger stated ironically:

*"The Prime Minister showed a great tenderness in his statement for our parvenu ally, Turkey."*¹¹

while R. Churchill wrote in a bitter article in the Spectator that *"The man in charge of British foreign policy is a Turkish gentleman, Mr. Menderes"*¹² A careful examination of all the facts leads to only one conclusion. The diplomatic initiative of the Conservative government was just a tactical decision in order to satisfy public opinion and not a genuine attempt to put an end in the bloodshed in Cyprus. As Eden admitted, the British side only approached the Turkish government. The plan had not been presented to the Greeks, most likely because London feared that Athens would have accepted it. Instead, London approached Ankara because it was sure that Turkey would again have rejected any proposal concerning the alteration of the status quo in Cyprus, giving Britain the opportunity to claim that although she was genuinely committed to resolving the Cypriot question, other forces were not allowing that. As Churchill argued:

*"If the British Government was sure that the Turks would repudiate the plan, and if it meant to subject itself to a Turkish veto, what on earth was the point of propounding the plan...If it was done with the knowledge that the Turks would spit on it and the prior conviction that a Turkish veto would be accepted as mandatory, then the British Government faces a charge of duplicity and hypocrisy."*¹³

Eden had planned everything well. He aimed to reverse the negative climate against his government, internally and externally, and continue with his policy in Cyprus.

¹⁰ Eden: House of Commons, July 12, 1956, vol. 556, col. 596.

¹¹ L. Jeger: House Of Commons, July 12, 1956, vol. 556, col. 600.

¹² The Spectator, Our Turkish Foreign Secretary, July 13, 1956

¹³ *ibid.*

However, a new initiative meant to change the established diplomatic scenery concerning the Cypriot question.

From Makarios' arrest until the early days of the summer of 1956, Athens observed the situation in Cyprus with great anxiety. The new Prime Minister was decisive that Greece had to lead the diplomatic initiatives for the finding of a solution to the Cypriot question, therefore he strengthened the links of the Greek state with the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy. Karamanlis wanted to open a new page for Greek involvement in the Cypriot question, therefore he decided to appoint E. Averof-Tositsas as the new Foreign Affairs Minister in the place of S. Theotokis, an experienced politician but with little or no sympathies among the Greek Cypriots, mainly due to his pro-British views.¹⁴ Averof-Tositsas arrived in office during the last days of June and began to work towards a new scheme that would allow Greece to play a greater role in the Cypriot question. On 12 July, Karamanlis invited the American ambassador in Athens, K. Cannon, to the Premier's residence in order to inform him of the new initiatives of the Greek state concerning the Cypriot question. At the end of the meeting Karamanlis gave Cannon a memorandum entitled "The Cyprus Question. What can be done?". The memorandum was a personal creation of Averof-Tositsas which aimed to take the British Foreign Office by surprise and form the new basis for the settlement of the Cypriot question. The proposals that were presented in the memorandum can be summarized in the following points:

"a) Recognition of the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. b) Introduction of a liberal constitution based upon the democratic principles of the Free World. c) The introduction of a general amnesty in order to impose and preserve the internal peace and order in Cyprus. d) Concerning the setting of a definite date for the introduction of the principle of self determination in Cyprus, either 1) it will be decided by the NATO's Council or 2) it will be a subject of special negotiations between the British Government and the Cypriot Government, which will be appointed by the Legislative Council of the island. e) In both cases, the British military interests, the

¹⁴ Theotokis had been portrayed by the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy as a British figure, who played a decisive role to the arrest of Makarios. Despite the fact that those accusations were unfounded, it has to be noted that Theotokis came from an old Greek family with close links with the British state. His great-grand father, G. Theotokis, was one of the leaders of the pro-British fraction during the Greek War of Independence, while S. Theotokis, educated in Oxford University, played an important role during the

minority issues, the public security and the Turkish trade rights will be safeguarded through official treaties, which will remain in force during and after the implementation of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus. f) Any solution concerning the Cypriot question would be accepted by the majority of the island, only if Archbishop Makarios supports it. As far as the Greek government knows, Archbishop Makarios is ready to agree to the above proposals, therefore his release and return from Seychelles is a matter of great importance.

*The above proposals give Britain the opportunity to maintain its control upon Cyprus for a long period of time, during which Britain can safeguard its geostrategic interests in the island. On the other hand, the Turkish security and the rights of the Turkish minority will be safeguarded by treaties and concessions, in many cases incompatible with the existing ones."*¹⁵

A careful examination of the Greek proposals indicates that the Greek plan did not differ greatly from some of the British proposals of the recent past. According to the plan, the British side would have had a substantial period of time to adjust her foreign policy in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean according to the new status quo, while the agreement for the maintenance of a British military base on Cypriot territory would have been monitored and safeguarded by NATO and not by the Greek state.¹⁶ In addition, it was the first time that the Greek side recognized the importance of the Turkish factor in the Cypriot question. The Greek plan was structured in such a way that secured the political rights of the Turkish minority in Cyprus, while it offered an olive branch to Ankara by speaking about the protection of Turkish trade routes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the Greek proposals seemed promising enough to establish a final settlement concerning the Cypriot question, they were nevertheless turned down by London on the basis that the Greek scheme could not safeguard the maintenance of British interests in Cyprus. It was an uncompromising position of the Foreign Office, that British interests could not be safeguarded only through a military base in Cypriot

Greek Civil War as a British agent. For more concerning the Greek Cypriot accusations against S. Theotokis, see: N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years, (Athens, 1981), pp.190-195.

¹⁵ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., pp. 129-30.

¹⁶ As already mentioned in previous chapters, the main objection of the British side concerning the maintenance of a military base in Cyprus was that this agreement could have not been followed by an

territory, therefore the Greek proposals were unsatisfactory. However, the true reasons for the British rejection of the Greek plan can be found in the diplomatic relations, during that time, between London and Cairo concerning Suez.

After the coup of 1952, Nasser and his economic planners committed themselves to stabilizing the Egyptian economy. Nasser's greatest aspiration was to increase the political and military influence of Egypt among the rest of the Arab nations, therefore a strong and flourishing economy was essential. Since ancient times the economic prosperity of Egypt had been based upon the river Nile and agriculture. Egypt did not have the oil resources of the Gulf states, while the long subjection of the country to the control of the Ottoman Empire had shielded it from the influence of the Industrial Revolution, resulting in a lack of heavy industry. Nasser concluded that the country urgently needed a second dam across the Nile at Aswan. With such an ambitious plan Nasser aimed to enhance the new regime's prestige among the Egyptian population, and it would also have very real economic benefits by increasing the amount of land that could be irrigated and by providing enough hydroelectric power to supply the needs of the entire country. However, the estimated construction costs of at least \$ 1 billion were well beyond Egypt's financial ability, therefore the country applied to the World Bank for a loan package. The US and Britain were among the leading nations in the World Bank, and seized the opportunity to put pressure upon Nasser in order to put an end in his political and diplomatic relations with the USSR.¹⁷ Nasser hesitated to accept the Western terms. As a result, in an attempt to increase the pressure upon him, on 17 July 1956, the Secretary General of the State Department, J.F.Dalles, informed the Egyptian ambassador in Washington that his country had decided to reject Nasser's loan request. However, this had the opposite effect to that intended by the Americans. Nasser regarded it as a hostile action, and on 26 July, the anniversary of his revolution, he announced the nationalization of the Suez canal. The revenue from it was to fund the development projects that the West refused to sponsor.¹⁸ Nasser's decision was a tremendous blow to Western economy and security. As mentioned in previous chapters,

anti-NATO Greek government. However, with the new proposals this argument was groundless, since NATO had the political and military influence to safeguard this agreement.

¹⁷ In September 1955 Egypt concluded an agreement with Czechoslovakia to purchase \$200 million worth of advanced Soviet military equipment (50 MiG 15 fighters, 45 Illyushin bombers and 115 heavy tanks) in exchange for Egyptian cotton, while in early February, Moscow agreed to help build an atomic energy station in Egypt. See: B. O' Malley & I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, (London, 1999), pp. 25-29.

¹⁸ There is a vast bibliography concerning the nationalization of the Suez Canal, however a good introductory overview can be found in D. Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1984, (London, 1985), while a more detailed analysis of Nasser's era can be found in P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his generation, (New York, 1978), and P. Woodward, Nasser, (London, 1992).

the Suez Canal was the main route for oil tankers from the Middle Eastern oil resources to the West. With the Suez canal under Egyptian or, even worse, Soviet control, Western oil tankers would be forced to change their route, taking a substantially longer trip around Africa and causing a considerable rise to oil prices in the Western countries. The Western world was facing a great economic threat, a danger that affected the European countries most, since the US had the oil resources of Alaska and Texas to limit the economic consequences of Nasser's action. While efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the crisis were under way, Britain, France and Israel concluded a secret agreement for joint military action against Egypt under the code name "Operation Musketeer". Their agreement was activated on 29 October, with an Israel strike into Sinai, while on 31 October, the British air force began heavy bombing raids on military targets near Cairo and along the canal zone and Anglo-French paratroopers landed at the north end of the canal and began to advance on Suez city. As was expected, the tripartite attack was condemned by the Soviet Union which threatened to strike London and Paris if the Israeli-Anglo-French troops were not withdrawn from Egypt. The fragile peaceful co-existence between the Western and the Eastern camp was under an unequivocal threat and desperate diplomatic initiatives from the American camp aimed to resolve the crisis.

The crisis of the Suez Canal played a decisive role in the British response towards the Greek proposals for the resolution of the Cypriot question. On the one hand, the British mentality was strongly influenced by Nasser's action to nationalize the Suez canal. According to the treaty of 1954, Britain had agreed to evacuate the military base in Suez, but retained the right to reoccupy the base in the event of an attack by an outside power on an Arab League state or Turkey. However, Nasser's interference in the canal's international status quo had invalidated the above agreement. On top of that, the American attitude concerning the Suez crisis deeply wounded the British conscience. London approached Nasser's operation as a hostile action against the country and expected the US to support any military action against Egypt, on the basis of articles 4 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.¹⁹ However, the US decided not to be militarily involved in the Suez crisis, a decision which was interpreted as a deep insult by the officials in the Foreign Office. Following this, London did not want to create a new

¹⁹ According to Article 4 "*The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened*", and Article 6 "*For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack...on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area of Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the*

Suez, this time in Cyprus. Nasser's action was a bitter lesson to the Foreign Office, that international agreements can be easily forgotten, while the American attitude towards Suez undermined the Greek proposals concerning the safeguarding by NATO of an agreement between Britain and Greece about Cyprus. On the other hand, due to the Suez crisis Eden was not in a position to accept the Greek initiative. As already mentioned the hard-liners inside the Conservative party held the British Premier responsible for the signature of the Suez treaty. The political developments in Egypt justified the attacks of the extreme right-wingers against Eden, allowing the Conservative government no room for new negotiations concerning a territory that was vital for British strategic interests. Eden could not afford a new diplomatic defeat and was unwilling to offer new arguments against the internal opposition of the Conservative party towards his leadership. Nevertheless, there is another reason why the British government turned down the Greek proposals, which has never been raised by the specialists who have dealt with the Cypriot question. After the nationalization of the Suez canal, all the Western technicians assigned to the preservation and the operation of the canal were retired, either forcibly or voluntarily. However, almost 85% of those technicians were either Greek or Greek Egyptians.²⁰ Therefore, it is no exaggeration to propose that the fate of the Suez canal was placed in Greek hands. If the Greek technicians decided to abandon the canal then Nasser's plans would have been sabotaged and the canal would have been non-operational for months or even years, since Nasser would have been obliged to take a long time to train and assign Egyptians to the Suez canal. However, Athens decided to assist Nasser, by instructing the Greek technicians through the Greek embassy in Cairo to continue with their duties under the new status quo.²¹ The Greek decision should puzzle the specialists, since it is one of the main anti-Western actions in Greek history. Since the end of the Greek Civil War, the main doctrine of Greek foreign policy was that "Greece belongs to the West". So, was Karamanlis an anti-Westerner and a secret admirer of the Soviet Union? There is only one answer to this question and it is a direct no. Karamanlis was a committed pro-Westerner and a fervent opponent of Communism, not only at an international level but in the internal politics of the country as well.²² By this decision the Greek Premier

Treaty entered into force or in the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer".

²⁰ E. Averof-Tositsas, A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Cypriot Question 1950-1963, (Athens, 1982), vol. II, p.137.

²¹ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 147.

²² During Karamanlis' era the prosecution of the supporters of the illegal Greek Communist Party was as systematic as ever, while Karamanlis was held responsible by the international community for the

simply tried to accomplish two targets. On the one hand, he tried to protect the rights of the Greek minority in Egypt. The Greek presence in Egypt was well established through the centuries, since the arrival of Alexander the Great and the later Byzantine expansionism during the Dark Years. The Greek minority in Egypt was extremely wealthy and had Egyptian trade under its control. In cities like Alexandria Egyptians were the minority, and the Greek influence was so powerful, politically and economically, that the Greek community in Egypt was like a state within a state. Due to its great wealth and influence the Greek community managed to survive through the centuries and numerous different regimes, however, the arrival of Nasser threatened to alter this fact. The revolutionary ideology of the new regime, the attempt to modify Egypt's social and economic profile, and the nationalist orientation of Nasser, embodied within slogans such as "Egypt for the Egyptians", threatened the Greek minority and its survival within the new Egyptian framework. Karamanlis, by instructing his compatriots to continue with their duties in the Suez canal, hoped to shield the Greek minority by securing the gratitude of the Egyptian leader. On the other hand, Karamanlis was aware of Arab solidarity. By standing by the side of an Arab nation, the Greek Premier hoped to safeguard the sympathy of the Arab world concerning the Cypriot question and the anti-colonial struggle of the Greek Cypriots against Britain, a sympathy that could be translated into extra votes in favour of Greece in a future assembly of the United Nations. For those reasons, Karamanlis turned down the invitation of the British government to a conference in London concerning the Suez crisis that was to be held on 16 August, by issuing the following response:

*"The Greek government, after a careful review of all the relevant subjects concerning her participation in the Conference in London, decided not to be represented. Due to international circumstances and their implications for the Greek interests, the Greek government decided that the arrival of a Greek delegation in the Conference would be a negative development for the finding of a peaceful solution in Suez."*²³

From the above analysis it can be concluded that the Greek role during the Suez crisis was decisively anti-British, providing Nasser with all the moral and actual support required to achieve his goals. Eden was deeply offended and the crisis in diplomatic relations between Greece and Britain escalated, therefore the rejection of the Greek plan

assassination of G. Lambrakis, a member of the Greek parliament and of the Greek Democratic Left (EDA), in 1964.

for the resolution of the Cypriot question was, to a great extent, a categorical and explicit expression of British displeasure regarding Greek foreign policy.

Although the British officials in the Foreign Office were occupied with the crisis in the Suez canal, the political and diplomatic developments concerning the Cypriot question had not been de-activated. Although London had to divide its attention between two different, though equally important diplomatic fronts, the Foreign Office officials had no other choice but to follow, at the same time, the political course in both Suez and Cyprus. This was because of the Greek proposals concerning the Cypriot question. As mentioned earlier, one of the main arguments concerning the continuation of the British presence in Cyprus, was that Britain was the only involved power that was unequivocally committed to the finding of a satisfactory solution to the Cypriot question, a solution that could safeguard peace and order in the wide area of the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the Greek initiative threatened to discredit the above argument, especially since it had been turned down by the British side. In the eyes of the international community, the Greeks offered an escape from the Cypriot deadlock, therefore Britain ought to respond and take certain diplomatic action towards the resolution of the Cypriot question. Therefore, London decided to send Lord Radcliffe, a specialist in the constitutional questions, to Cyprus in order to formulate a liberal constitution that would re-impose peace and order on the island. However, the British government showed no signs of goodwill in order to assist Lord Radcliffe in this strenuous task. On the contrary, London seemed to put obstacles in the path of its representative by imposing the following terms on the British expert. Lord Radcliffe was not authorised to propose any alteration to the sovereignty status quo of Cyprus. His duties were limited to proposing modifications concerning the internal Cypriot administration. All the issues concerning foreign affairs, defence and the security of Cyprus were to remain under the jurisdiction of the governor. In general, all the requirements that had been imposed on Lord Radcliffe, even before he arrived in Cyprus, are as follows:

“a) During the period of the Constitution Cyprus is to remain under British sovereignty. b) The use of Cyprus as a base is necessary for the fulfillment by Her Majesty’s Government of their international obligations and for the defense of British interests in the Middle East and the interests of other Powers allied or associated with the United Kingdom. c) All matters

²³ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 148.

*relating to external affairs, defence and internal security are retained in the hands of Her Majesty's Government or the Governor. d) Subject to this, the Constitution is to be based on the principles of liberal democracy and is to confer a wide measure of responsible self-government on elected representatives of the people of Cyprus, but is at the same time to contain such reservations, provisions and guarantees as may be necessary to give a just protection to the special interests of the various communities, religions and races in the island."*²⁴

In addition, Lord Radcliffe's duties were made even harder by the fact that the Greek Cypriot community stood by its decision not to discuss any proposals concerning the Cypriot political status quo before the return of Makarios to the island. However, London was not ready to reconsider Makarios' exile in Seychelles. Without any doubt, Radcliffe's involvement in the Cypriot question began with the worst omens, which raises various questions about the sincerity of London's willingness to see Lord Radcliffe's success in his assigned duty.

However, despite all the aforementioned difficulties, Lord Radcliffe provided his government in London with his proposals for the introduction of a new constitution in Cyprus. His proposals were presented to the House of Commons on 19 December 1956 by Lennox-Boyd, who had also visited Athens and Ankara in order to inform the two governments concerning the new developments in the Cypriot question. It is widely accepted that Lord Radcliffe proposed the most complete constitutional scheme of the British side during the 1950's concerning the Cypriot question. The proposed constitution would have given the Greek Cypriots a sufficient majority in the Legislative Assembly, although for matters affecting Turkish communal affairs the consent of two-thirds of the Turkish Cypriot members in the Chamber would be required.²⁵ The Assembly would consist of a Speaker, a Deputy Speaker and 36 other members. Six members of the Assembly would be nominated by the Governor at his discretion. Six other members would be elected by vote on a Turkish Cypriot communal roll. The other 24 members would be elected by vote on a general roll, that is to say, on the Greek Cypriot roll, for the Turks would be excluded from the general roll.²⁶ In the executive department there would be a Cypriot Prime Minister as the head of the Government in self-governing matters. He would be appointed by the Governor, but it would be the

²⁴ Lord Radcliffe: Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus, Cmnd. 42, p. 6.

²⁵ Lord Radcliffe: op. cit., pp. 14, & 34.

duty of the Governor to select the person who seemed to have the general support of the Assembly. The Governor, on the recommendations of the Prime Minister, would also appoint the other ministers. There would also be a Turkish minister in the cabinet "ex officio". He was to be the head of an office for Turkish Cypriot affairs, with its own budget.²⁷ To the authority of the Governor would be reserved matters dealing with external affairs, the defence of Cyprus (either directly or indirectly, as involved in the fulfilment by the British government of their international obligations and the defence of British interests in the Middle East or the interests of other powers allied or associated with Britain), and internal security. In all the above matters, the Governor would retain the power of law-making and the conduct of all aspects of the executive administration.²⁸ In addition, no bill passed by the Legislative Assembly could be valid as law unless the Governor had signified his assent.²⁹ In all other matters lying within the field of self-governing matters, the Governor would have the duty of a constitutional head of government.³⁰ The constitutional proposals included the establishment of a Supreme Court in Cyprus, having jurisdiction in all proceedings in which the validity of any law of the Assembly was called into question as violating the provisions of the constitution which restricted its legislative power. The Supreme Court would comprise a president (Chief Justice) and two other judges—one Greek and one Turkish. The Chief Justice, who must not be a Cypriot citizen, would be appointed by the Governor at his discretion but after consultation with the Prime Minister. The other two judges would also be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Justice.³¹ In case the Legislative Assembly increased the number of judges, it was provided that there would always be an equal number of Greeks and Turks. Another court called the "Tribunal of Guarantees" would also be established, mainly in order to protect individual rights guaranteed by the constitution. The members of this court would also be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.³² The jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Guarantees would not extend to laws enacted by the Assembly or to Ordinances made by the Governor, but only to orders and regulations

²⁶ Lord Radcliffe: *op. cit.*, p. 31.

²⁷ Lord Radcliffe: *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 34 & 35.

²⁸ Lord Radcliffe: *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²⁹ The categories of legislation in which the Governor was to be free to reserve his assent were Bills that sought to alter the constitution, Bills affecting currency, coinage or foreign exchange, Bills affecting the Royal prerogative, and Bills affecting the trustee status of Cyprus government stock. See: Lord Radcliffe: *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 39.

³¹ Lord Radcliffe: *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

³² Lord Radcliffe: *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

having the force of law, and to executive acts. The Tribunal of Guarantees was a reflection of the "Conseil d' Etat" in France.³³

From the above analysis, it can be argued that Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals were more progressive than any previous ones. The Greek Cypriots were guaranteed to hold a substantial majority in the Legislative Assembly, therefore one of the main obstacles during the talks between Harding and Makarios was to be removed. However, many Greek scholars dealing with the Cypriot question support the view that Lord Radcliffe's proposals would have created a constitutional dictatorship in Cyprus, by granting unlimited constitutional powers to the Governor.³⁴ As a matter of fact, the Governor would control the internal security of the island and he would have a veto for every proposed Bill. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that the new proposals were a great step closer to the application of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, and that the proposed constitution was a transitional one, imposing no permanent restrictions on the political fate of the island.

Nevertheless, the Greek government rejected Lord Radcliffe's proposals. The reason for the reaction of Athens to the British initiative cannot be detected in the Greek inflexibility concerning the resolution of the Cypriot question, but in the British desire to block any diplomatic development concerning the Cypriot question. The Greek government was forced to reject Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals, mainly due to the attitude of Lennox Boyd during the presentation of those constitutional proposals inside the House of Commons. Despite the fact that Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals dealt only with the internal Cypriot status quo, the Secretary of Colonies spoke about the international status quo of the island in such a way that the Greek government was left with no other decision but to declare its opposition to such a scheme. During his speech, Lennox-Boyd introduced the idea of partition. It was the first time since 1878 that a British official had spoken about such a matter. In his speech, the Secretary of the Colonies said that the principle of self-determination had been recognized by his government, but he added that when the time for its application came, the Turkish Cypriots should also be free to decide for themselves their own future status. As Lennox Boyd said:

"When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of

³³ A comparable court exists in Greece and is called the "Council of State".

the application of self-determination. When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognize that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options."³⁵

Lennox-Boyd's speech provoked a bitter response from the Opposition. The Labour M.P J. Callaghan called the Radcliffe constitution "*built-in guarantees*" for the Turkish Cypriots and asked the Colonial Secretary why he considered it necessary to introduce at this stage—"to throw into the pot"—this "*irritant of partition*".³⁶ Bevan regarded it as dangerous, poisoning the atmosphere and once more preventing a settlement of the question.³⁷ After Lennox-Boyd's speech in the House of Commons the Greek government, as predicted, issued the following declaration:

*"The Greek government, due to the political and diplomatic background of Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals, declares that it not her intention to accept the British proposals. The Greek government would also like to inform all the powers involved in the Cypriot question, that the introduction of partition for Cyprus will escalate the already tense situation in the island and will destabilize the region of the Eastern Mediterranean."*³⁸

On the other hand, Lennox Boyd's speech in the House of Commons had been welcomed by Ankara. In an official statement, the Turkish Prime Minister declared that his Government regarded Lord Radcliffe's report, together with the Colonial Secretary's statement, as "*a reasonable basis for discussion*", and he reserved the right to make some suggestions after detailed study of the whole matter. In addition, referring

³⁴ For more concerning this academic approach see: N. Psiroukis, *The Cypriot Drama*, (Athens, 1987), pp. 78-90.

³⁵ Lennox-Boyd: House of Commons, December 19, 1956, vol. 562, col. 1268.

³⁶ Callaghan: House of Commons, December 19, 1956, vol. 562, col. 1269.

³⁷ Bevan: House of Commons, December 19, 1956, vol. 562, col. 1271.

³⁸ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 244

specifically to Lennox-Boyd's statement on Cyprus' future status, Menderes stated that it contained "*points of departure which could lead to a final settlement*" of the problem, and that Turkey would continue her discussions with Britain on this basis.³⁹ A few days latter, however, during a speech in the Turkish Parliament, Menderes declared that only partition or the continuation of the existing status quo was acceptable to his government and therefore Lord Radcliffe's proposals, providing for a unitary state, were unacceptable. As he said:

*"Partition of Cyprus half and half, is a self-sacrifice for Turkey
and we will never consent to a greater sacrifice than that."*⁴⁰

Without any doubt, Lennox-Boyd's statement inside the House of Commons was catastrophic for the finding of a valid solution for the Cypriot question. On the one hand, it validated the Greek fears of a secret and unofficial alliance between Britain and Turkey concerning the Cypriot question, resulting in a diplomatic deadlock between Athens and London. On the other hand, it just offered official recognition of the Turkish desire to obtain Cyprus, at least in part, in the future. In addition, Lennox-Boyd's proposal for partition could not safeguard peace and order in Cyprus. If such a plan was to be implemented in Cyprus, it could only have been achieved through an exchange of the population, since the Greek and Turkish communities were living in the same territories all over the island.⁴¹ Therefore, the idea of partition would have caused an extended civil war, a great number of refugees from both sides, and the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, all this occurred in 1974, when Turkey invaded the north part of the island, creating great turmoil in her

³⁹ Keesing's Archive: April 6-13, 1957, p. 15472.

⁴⁰ Keesing's: op. cit., p. 15473.

⁴¹ According to a survey prepared by the Department of Lands and Surveys of Cyprus, on the basis of the 1960 census of population :

Towns and villages in Cyprus (total number)

Purely or predominantly Greek: 393 (63.35 %)

Purely or predominantly Turkish: 120 (19.40%)

Mixed (Greek and Turkish): 106 (17.15)

Total number of towns and villages: 619.

Population of towns and villages (total number)

Purely or predominantly Greek: 50.30%

Purely or predominantly Turkish: 6.70%

Mixed (Greek or Turkish): 43%.

Total number of population: 573,566.

Population of mixed (Greek and Turkish) towns and villages (Mixed population only)

Greeks: 71.80%

Turks: 28.20%

As the statistical data show, there are local centres where one ethnic group or the other predominates. But they also reveal that those villages and towns where the population is purely Greek or purely Turkish are rather small local concentrations.

relations with Greece until the present day. It is more than clear that the British side did not desire the alteration of the Cypriot status quo. The sending of Lord Radcliffe to Cyprus was just a diversion, in order to justify the rejection of the Greek proposals to the international community. Therefore, in order to secure the Greek refusal to the new constitutional proposals, London decided to introduce the idea of partition. In such a way, Turkey would have been used as a shield against Greek diplomatic activities, the international community would have been satisfied by the new British proposal, and the Cypriot status quo would have remained unaltered, serving British geostrategic interests in the region. Nevertheless, the British side, in their attempt to secure their interests in the region, opened the Pandora's box, allowing the spirit of partition to escape and be established in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot mentality, and further destabilising the Cypriot political spectrum, with grave consequences for the future unity of the island.

CHAPTER IX
THE OPENING OF THE LAST ACT IN THE CYPRIOT DRAMA:
MAKARIOS' LIBERATION AND THE FOOT-MACMILLAN PLAN.

The Politics of Aristotle
"Taking our analogy from war, where the dividing line of a ditch, however small it may be, makes a regiment scatter in crossing, we may say that every difference is apt to create a division. The greatest division is perhaps between virtue and vice; then there is the division between wealth and poverty; and there are also other divisions, some greater and some smaller, arising from other differences. Among these last we may count the division by difference of territory."
 Aristotle, V:16.

This chapter will examine the period from Makarios' liberation from Seychelles to the introduction of Foot's and Macmillan's proposals, for a solution to the Cypriot question. It will present the diplomatic background to Makarios' liberation from the place of his exile, attempting to analyse the reasons that forced London to modify its policy towards Makarios' isolation from the Cypriot political arena. In addition, it will consider the Foot and Macmillan plans concerning the Cypriot question, by evaluating their context, as well as their final outcome and influence upon the internal political scene of Cyprus. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: How can the researcher evaluate the Foot-Macmillan plan? How can Athens' attitude towards Foot's proposals be justified? Under what circumstances did London decide to present

Macmillan's proposals concerning the Cypriot question? Secondary questions that will be presented in this chapter are: Under what circumstances did London decide to release Makarios from Seychelles? Why did the United States support the Greek initiative that resulted in Makarios' release? What was the political significance of Harding's replacement by Foot in Cyprus?

As already mentioned in previous chapters, the arrest and exile of the Archbishop Makarios had been imposed upon Eden's cabinet by the hard-liners of the Conservative party. Makarios' exile was Eden's ultimate action to raise his popularity in the internal politics of his party, after the negative political developments for British geostrategic interests in Jordan.¹ Eden, however, in his attempt to unify his party, destabilized the Cypriot political scene beyond every expectation. Makarios' isolation in Seychelles resulted in the strengthening of the position of the hard-liners inside the Ethnarchic Council, while many of the moderate figures inside the Ethnarchy were prompted to unite their forces with Grivas, since after the departure of Makarios, the Greek Cypriot warlord found the opportunity to fill the leadership gap that had appeared in the Enosis movement. Eden's decision to remove Makarios from the political developments in Cyprus brought the Cypriot question to a diplomatic deadlock and was a severe blow to Anglo-Greek relations, since the Greek Cypriot community had refused to recognize any negotiations concerning the fate of the Cypriot question and the Greek government had recalled her ambassador from London as an act of high protest. Despite this, and although Eden's cabinet had to face the calls of the Labour party and the international community concerning the release of Makarios, Eden showed no signs of reconsidering the Archbishop's return to the island. For Eden, Makarios' stay in Seychelles was the last opportunity for the old politician to impose his will upon the Conservative party, the last chance of the British Premier to safeguard his political survival. However, it is of course impossible to predict the unexpected, and chance played a decisive role in the course of the Cypriot question.

The British military involvement in Suez caused the biggest financial crisis in Britain since 1945. Britain lost on balance \$400 million during the last quarter of 1956; withdrawals were probably half as much again but were partly offset by one or two exceptional influxes which were credited during the quarter.² Sterling was healthy and the reserves more than adequate for ordinary purposes, but losses of this magnitude could only be borne for a number of weeks without external aid to preserve the

¹ The Observer, How it Happened, 13 January 1957.

² P. Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945, (London, 1991), sixth ed., p.308.

exchange value of the pound. It became clear that Britain would have to borrow to save the pound and that neither the United States nor the International Monetary Fund would lend the necessary sums until the fighting in Suez was called off. The United States was anxious to preserve the fragile peaceful co-existence between the Western and the Eastern block, however, Soviet support for Nasser's regime was the main American preoccupation. Nevertheless, after a series of diplomatic negotiations among Washington, London, Paris and Tel Aviv, Britain and France withdrew their forces in December, and the Israelis finally evacuated Sinai in March 1957. The Suez crisis was ended, yet Eden was the only figure who emerged defeated from the sands of Suez. The final outcome of the Suez crisis gave all the political opponents of the British Premier the opportunity to commence a series of bitter political attacks against him. The internal opposition reminded people once again of Eden's role during the signature of the Suez treaty; the Labour party questioned his political abilities to govern the nation and safeguard British interests at international level; while even the pro-Conservative press dedicated sharp articles to Eden's personal role before and during the crisis. Characteristically, the most bitter anathema for Britain in Suez was provided in the *Observers'* description of the effect of Eden's decision upon the nation's profile to invade Egypt. According to the editorial:

*"Never since 1873 has Great Britain made herself so universally disliked"*³

while Lord Carrington in October 1956 said about Eden that he *"was nervous and his manner neurotic. It was easy to see he was a sick man"*⁴

As a result of this chaotic situation Eden resigned on 9 January 1957 on medical advice.⁵ At the final Cabinet meeting he broke down in tears and cried: *"You are all deserting me, deserting me."*⁶ On 10 January 1957, Macmillan became the new resident of 10 Downing St. The new Prime Minister had little in common with the previous one. While Eden was strongly attached to the 19th century foreign policy style, Macmillan was more realistic and willing to respond to the new times. His arrival in 10 Downing St brought a change to the established political scenery of the Cypriot question.

The consequences of the political developments in London affected not only Britain but also Greece. Averof, as an experienced politician, realized that the arrival of

³ The Observer, 4 November 1956, p.7.

⁴ Lord Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington*, (London, 1988), p. 119.

⁵ As quoted from A. Sked & C. Cook, *Post-War Britain: A Political History*, (London, 1993), p. 137: *"This at least was the official version. Eden's latest biographer, however, has suggested that Eisenhower demanded the Prime Minister's resignation and that Macmillan, Butler and Churchill dutifully helped to engineer it."*

Macmillan in 10 Downing St would affect political developments in Cyprus. Therefore, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs decided that it was in the Greek interest to commence a new diplomatic initiative about the Cypriot case. As Averof admits in his memoirs:

*"Eden's resignation and Macmillan's arrival worried a lot of associates. However, I have to admit that I welcomed this change. I knew Macmillan and I believed that he had more moderate views than Eden, who belonged to the old Conservative school of thought. Nevertheless, I came to the conclusion that if we wanted to contribute to the resolving of the Cypriot question, now was the right time for us. One of the main rules in diplomacy is to take your opponent by surprise in order to prevent any negative developments, and this was what I intended to do."*⁷

What the Greek politician intended to do was to use EOKA, in order to force the British government to allow Makarios' return to Cyprus. One of the main British arguments, quite rightly, was that EOKA was the principal obstacle to a permanent solution for the Cypriot question. According to the British side, the continuation of violence in Cyprus prevented the establishment of any diplomatic initiative for the island, therefore Averof decided to use his influence and his connections with Grivas, in order to put pressure on the latter to declare a cease-fire. The importance of Averof's plan can be sufficiently revealed only if it linked to the political agenda of Macmillan. According to Macmillan's agenda, the new Prime Minister planned to meet President Eisenhower in Bermuda on 14 March. What the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted, was to obtain Grivas' declaration of cease-fire during this meeting in order to leave no other option to the British Premier than to accept it, since the latter would have been in a vulnerable position to do the opposite in front of the American President. Therefore, on 20 February Averof sent two senior diplomats to Cyprus, A. Vlachos and A. Frydas, in order to persuade Grivas that it was in the interest of the Enosis movement to declare a general cease-fire. Averof knew that it was a hard task to achieve, but he also knew that during this particular time Grivas was in a vulnerable position because Harding had achieved some successes against EOKA. As Grivas writes in his memoirs:

⁶ J. Margach, *The Abuse of Power*, (London, 1978), pp. 113-14.

⁷ E. Averof-Tositsas, *A Story of Missed Opportunities*, (Athens, 1982), vol. I, p. 186.

*"So far Harding had concentrated on destroying our guerilla army, but at the start of February 1957 several leading members of my Nicosia groups were arrested, among them the town commander, A. Chartas, the execution group leader, N. Sampson, and the head of the courier network, a young theologian called P. Kareolemos. Harding was throwing everything into this attack on every sector of the front. My own headquarters in Limassol were endangered on 7 February, when the area was searched for several hours."*⁸

Averof knew that Grivas had no other choice than to accept his proposal, therefore on 14 March, the same day that Macmillan met with Eisenhower in Bermudas, Grivas issued the following declaration:

*"...in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations between the British Government and the only representative of the Cypriot people, Archbishop Makarios, our Organization declares that it is willing to order the suspension of operations as soon as the Ethnarch Makarios is released."*⁹

Grivas' declaration highlights that the proposed cease-fire was based upon two preconditions. The release of Makarios from Seychelles, and the commencement of new negotiations between the Greek Cypriot community and the British government concerning the Cypriot question. The Conservative government had been trapped by Averof's tactic. Grivas' offer created a new diplomatic predicament that could not be ignored by London, since if Macmillan's government had rejected the offer, it would have been accused by the international community and especially the United States of inflexibility and opportunism concerning the Cypriot case. As a matter of fact, as soon as Eisenhower had been informed about the proposed cease-fire, he sent a confidential message to Karamanlis declaring his approval of the Greek initiative. As Eisenhower wrote:

"I would like to reassure your excellency that my government is sincerely committed to assist the involved governments and the people to find a suitable method of approach concerning the Cypriot question. I would also like to reassure you that we will

⁸ The Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964), p. 110. For more concerning the military success of Harding against E.O.K.A see also: C. Foley, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War, (London, 1964), pp. 90-99.

⁹ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 115.

take into account your proposals about Archbishop Makarios."¹⁰

Moreover, Grivas' offer was welcomed not only by the American government but by the majority of the British press, increasing the pressure upon Macmillan's government. Characteristically, "The Times", a newspaper that in the past bitterly criticized Eden and his cabinet for their hesitation to act drastically against EOKA, dedicated a full article under the title "No further delay" that urged the Conservative government to act bravely and release Makarios from Seychelles.¹¹

Under those circumstances, six days after Grivas' proposed cease-fire, Lennox-Boyd declared inside the House of Commons that it was the intention of his government to ask Makarios to issue an official statement, denouncing EOKA's violent actions. If Makarios were willing to make such a statement the Conservative government would be prepared to end his exile in Seychelles, return him to Athens, and later return him to Cyprus.¹² It was an obvious trick of the Conservative government that aimed to lift the pressure from its shoulders, since in the past Makarios had been asked to issue such a declaration and had refused firmly. Macmillan and the members of his cabinet expected that Makarios would refuse once again to denounce EOKA's actions, so they could jeopardize the Greek initiative and at the same time blame the Greek Cypriot Ethnarch for inflexibility and lack of co-operation, justifying the continuation of his exile in Seychelles. However, this time Makarios proved that his period of isolation in Seychelles had influenced his political personality drastically. Eight days after his first statement inside the House of Commons, Lennox-Boyd stated that Makarios had issued a statement:

*"While Her Majesty's government cannot regard this statement...as the clear appeal for which they asked, nevertheless they considered that in present circumstances it is no longer necessary to continue the Archbishop's detention"*¹³

Lennox-Boyd, perhaps deliberately, did not announce the text of Makarios' statement, for fear of Conservative back-benchers' reactions. He simply said:

*"The Archbishop has now made a statement, copies of which will be available in the Vote Office when I sit down."*¹⁴

¹⁰ K. Karamanlis, Archive: Facts and Papers, (Athens, 1993), vol. II, p. 310.

¹¹ The Times, March 15, 1957, p. 7.

¹² Lennox Boyd: House of Commons, March 20, 1957, vol. 567, col. 395.

¹³ Lennox Boyd: House of Commons, March 28, 1957, vol. 567, col. 1355-356.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

Lennox-Boyd was right not to announce Makarios' statement inside the House of Commons. Even if the statement spoke about the necessity of ending EOKA's actions, it still spoke about the necessity of goodwill gestures from the British side as well. Despite the fact that the declaration was not what London wanted, the Conservative government still had no other choice but to accept it without further consideration. The American side supported the idea of Makarios' release, and the financial stagnation of Britain and its economic subjugation to the United States, a result of the Suez crisis, played a catalytic role in Makarios' release. As the full text of the statement said:

*"I invite EOKA to declare a general cease-fire, taking into account the fact that the British government will show a high spirit of understanding and co-operation by lifting the state of high emergency in Cyprus. EOKA had declared that she is ready to stop her actions if am released. This statement is opening the road to the restoration of peace. The Secretary of the Colonies stated that if I were to call upon EOKA to end her violent actions, I would be free to go wherever I want, except Cyprus. My personal liberation will not be a subject for bargaining. If the British government believes it can find any Greek Cypriot that will be willing to lead any negotiations during my absence, then it is mistaken."*¹⁵

The release of Makarios from Seychelles was the first important gesture of Macmillan's government towards the Cypriot question. However, this gesture had its dramatic side. Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council and Conservative leader in the House of Lords, resigned from the cabinet, protesting that Makarios had deliberately refrained from making the appeal for which he had been asked and which was regarded as the essential prerequisite for his release.¹⁶ Turkey also reacted bitterly. A telegram protesting against Makarios' release was sent to the Turkish Prime Minister by the Turkish Cypriot leader Kutchuk, while the Turkish Press and official circles expressed their uneasiness about the action of the British Government. The official Anatolian News Agency said that the Archbishop's release was less important in itself than its eventual repercussions for the Cyprus problem. The statement added that Turkey was following developments in Cyprus with keen interest.¹⁷

¹⁵ N. Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years*, (Athens, 1981), p. 252.

¹⁶ For more concerning this issue and the reactions of the other members of the House of Lords see: House of Lords Debates, 2 April 1957, vol. 202, col. 953-59.

¹⁷ Keesing's Archive: April 6-13, 1957, p. 15475.

The news of Makarios' release brought great exhilaration to the Greek Cypriot community. Thousands of people packed the roads of Nicosia and other Cypriot cities, celebrating the release of their leader. N. Kranidiotis gives his account of that day:

*"It was a wet afternoon and a cold wind cleared the grey sky over Nicosia. From the balcony of my house I heard a great uproar coming from the centre of the city. Suddenly an enormous wave of women, children and men with flags and Makarios' pictures arrived in front of my balcony and began to cheer and applaud. It was a festival of enjoyment and hope. A peculiar thrill was in the air."*¹⁸

Makarios left Seychelles on one of Onassis' tankers, and arrived in Athens on 17 April. In the Greek capital thousands of people were gathered in Syntagma square, and in front of the Greek Parliament Makarios praised the Greek Cypriot struggle and the sacrifices of his people. However, he did not mention or express thanks for the role of the Greek government and especially the contribution of Averof and Karamanlis in his release, a fact that passed unnoticed by the gathered crowd, but did not escape the attention of the Greek officials. Without any doubt, Makarios' deliberate amnesia had to do with the personality of the Greek Cypriot Archbishop. Makarios, even if he were the central figure of the Greek Cypriot question, wanted history to portray him as the only decisive actor in the Cypriot case. On the other hand, it was a direct expression of his disappointment towards the Greek political establishment that, according to Makarios, did not do whatever was possible to protect him and his people from the British tactics. Nevertheless, it would have been a great methodological mistake not to mention Averof's great role in Makarios' release. It was a personal triumph of the Greek politician, that in a short period of time he transformed the Greek foreign policy from an unorganized, and in many cases irresponsible, expression of personal beliefs into a modern and accurate approach to the national foreign interests. At the same time, it would be a great omission not to mention the decisive role of the American factor in Makarios' release from Seychelles. During that period, the majority of the pro-right wing Greek press dedicated many leading articles to the humanitarian role of the United States, and spoke in favour of the so-called champion of liberal democratic values, Eisenhower.¹⁹ However, the American support for the Greek initiative that resulted in

¹⁸ N.Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 253.

¹⁹ Characteristic titles: Eleftheria: The United States versus the Colonial Ghosts of the Past, April 2, 1957. Akropolis: It was a Victory of the Free World, April 8, 1957. Estia: President Eisenhower: The new Lloyd George, April 24, 1957.

Makarios' release had nothing to do with the humanitarian values of the American political scene, but concerned the geostrategic interests of the leading nation of the Western World. From early 1954, the United States planned to expand its influence in the Middle East, a traditional British sphere of influence, while the State Department objected to the continuation of British colonialism in Cyprus. Characteristically, in a secret letter from the State Department to the British Embassy in Washington, on 12 July 1954, American officials stated that they were unable to confirm that there would be "*no change in sovereignty over Cyprus*"²⁰, while during the same period, Eisenhower wrote to Churchill personally to voice his concern about the effects of Britain's Cyprus policy on the American people, who believed Greece and Cyprus "*were ready to be reasonable and conciliatory*".²¹ However, after the Suez crisis the Americans had come to the conclusion that it was essential for their geostrategic interests to limit the leading British role in the area and control it by themselves. As far as Cyprus was concerned, the State Department did not want to see the island put to use in ways which interfered with their own interests, as at Suez.²² The American interest concerning Cyprus can be supported by the classified memorandum handed by G. Allen, the American ambassador in Athens, to Karamanlis on 17 January 1957. According to the memorandum, the American side informed Karamanlis that the Cypriot question would be solved only if the Greek side openly invited the United States to intervene. As the memorandum continued, Cyprus would have been proclaimed an independent state under NATO's protection and specific areas of the island were to be used as "*advanced military settlements*" for the protection of the Free World.²³ Nevertheless, the Americans did not want to commit London's mistakes in Cyprus by opposing the Greek Cypriot sentiments. By putting pressure upon Britain concerning Makarios' release, Washington tried to strengthen its diplomatic links with the Greek Cypriot Archbishop, a valuable asset for the future judging from Makarios' personal appeal among his compatriots. Nevertheless, despite the decisive American involvement, Makarios' release was Averof's great personal victory. Through his finesse, he managed to end the period of stagnation for the Cypriot question, persuading Britain and the international community that only diplomacy could re-establish peace and order on the island. Makarios' release was the first step towards a

²⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-54, Eastern Europe: Soviet Union: Eastern Mediterranean, (Washington, 1988), vol. VIII, p. 695.

²¹ op. cit., p. 709.

²² British Colonial Office Papers: CO 926/626, 13-2-1957.

²³ "To Vima", May 24, 1996. The weekly newspaper published some classified documents from Karamanlis correspondence with G. Allen concerning the Cypriot question.

new approach to the Cypriot question, a development that played a momentous role for the opening of the last chapter of the Cypriot question.

Makarios' release from Seychelles generated much optimism in Cyprus. However, soon enough it became obvious that it was just a brief spell of peace and quiet, a welcome but temporary calm before the storm. Grivas continued to provoke the British establishment on the island, though only through pamphlets that were thrown during the early hours in the streets of the Cypriot cities and villages, while Harding extended his activities for the capture of EOKA's leader and the final annihilation of the organization. As the Cypriot governor had announced on Empire Day, 24 May, "*while Grivas and his few remaining associates remain at large we cannot lower our guard.*"²⁴ Nevertheless, Harding's stance was not in accord with the new spirit of governing that Macmillan wanted to adopt in Cyprus. Despite his failure, until this point, to overcome EOKA's guerilla movement, Harding still believed that Cyprus should be governed with an iron fist. Macmillan, on the other hand, strongly believed that it was time to re-approach the Cypriot question, this time from a different diplomatic perspective. Macmillan knew that despite the unquestionable qualities of the Cypriot governor, he was not the right figure to implement a more moderate policy on the island. Harding, for the Greek Cypriot community, was a hated and tyrannical figure, responsible for the hanging and the imprisonment of many Greek Cypriots and the arrest and exile of the Archbishop Makarios. As Foley writes:

*"Harding, who hated injustice, repression and brutality, was now identified with all three in Greek Cypriot minds, and there could be no change of mood while he remained in charge"*²⁵

As long as Harding was present on the island, diplomacy was condemned to failure and Macmillan's plans to re-approach the Cypriot question would have remained incomplete. Therefore, on 22 October 1957, the Colonial Office issued a statement announcing the appointment of a new Governor in Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot. Foot was the governor of Jamaica and his appointment signalled the new approach that Macmillan wanted to introduce in Cyprus. The new governor was a successful diplomat with moderate views and methods, and not an experienced soldier such as Harding. The news of Foot's appointment was welcomed by the Greek Cypriot community as a sign of reconciliation from the British side. The Bishop of Kition welcomed the change of Governor, if "*his arrival heralds a change in British Government policy towards the*

²⁴ The Memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., p. 119.

²⁵ C. Foley, op. cit., p. 97.

Cyprus problem", while the Turkish Cypriot side greeted Foot's appointment if "*it does not indicate a change in the policies carried out by Sir John Harding.*"²⁶ As became clear, the new governor had before him an extremely difficult and controversial task. He had to win back the Greek Cypriot trust, but at the same time he had to preserve the good relations between the Cypriot establishment and the Turkish Cypriot community in a way that would not provoke Greek Cypriot sentiments.

The new Governor arrived in Nicosia on 3 December 1957. During his first press conference, Foot appealed for a new start and added that it was his belief that an overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people would wish to accept the offer of friendship, understanding and co-operation which he made. He also stated his readiness to meet any Cypriot who wanted to see him and expressed his intention to make a tour of the island to see things for himself.²⁷ It was apparent that the new Governor, from his first official statement, was offering an olive branch to Grivas and his organization. However, Grivas did not share the optimism of the other Greek Cypriots towards the arrival of Foot. He firmly believed that the arrival of a new face in the governor's post was just another political trick of London in order to trap him and jeopardize the Enosis movement. As he reveals in his memoirs:

*"The advent of a new civilian governor was widely forecast as the start of a new era for Cyprus and politicians both in and out of the island declared that a permanent peace would soon be achieved... I was less optimistic... Harding, a blunt and forthright man, had failed; and in his place the British were putting a diplomat whose task would be to lead the people astray with fine words and trick their leaders with lying promises... From the outset of our conflict I lacked respect for Foot and regarded the self-created aura of liberalism surrounding him with distaste: I was sure it was fraudulent"*²⁸

According to many specialists in the Cypriot question, Grivas' approach to the arrival of Foot in Cyprus can be justified by the deep hostility between EOKA's leader and Harding. According to their view, Grivas had lost his trust and respect for the British establishment, due to the hard and sometimes inhumane methods of the previous governor to beat the Greek Cypriot Enosis movement.²⁹ However, the truth is more

²⁶ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 269.

²⁷ Keesing's: June 7-14, 1958, p. 16219.

²⁸ *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, op. cit., p. 129.

²⁹ For more concerning this view see: N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 316-321.

complicated. In reality Grivas had a deep respect for Harding. He regarded him as an equal opponent, since the latter was an experienced soldier with great experience in warfare.³⁰ On the other hand, Grivas lacked respect for Foot mainly because he did not regard him as an equal. Since it is a common secret worldwide that the relations between the military and the diplomatic service are based upon a lack of trust and respect for each other, Grivas' opinion of Foot is therefore simply the re-confirmation of that rule. Grivas' obsession concerning his fame after death led him to react so bitterly towards the arrival of a diplomat in Cyprus. He regarded it as a personal offence, since his romantic military nature could not have accepted that his opponent from now on would not be a soldier but a civil servant. And this bitterness was to play a great role in the future course of the Cypriot question.

The new Governor, from the first week in office, decided to show his strong commitment towards the gradual return of Cyprus to peace and order. He began a tour around the island in order to assess the situation and speak with ordinary people, and he organized meetings with the local leaders of the Greek and the Turkish community, trying to establish an equal approach between the two sides. However, soon enough the new governor underwent his baptism of fire in the Cypriot question. During the second week of December the Cypriot question was to be discussed in the United Nations. On this occasion, EOKA organized a 24-hour general strike and demonstrations in every Cypriot city, despite the fact that this kind of protest was still illegal. In Nicosia the demonstrators clashed with the police and the disturbances ended with the death of a Turkish Cypriot policeman. The Turkish community regarded that as a direct provocation that needed to be answered, therefore hundreds of outraged young Turks entered the Greek sector of the Cypriot capital, looting and burning houses and shops. An interesting and vivid description of the disturbances inside Nicosia's Greek sector can be found inside C. Foley's *Legacy and Strife*³¹, plus an interesting point that needs further analysis. According to Foley, the Turkish Cypriot policeman had been killed accidentally during the Greek Cypriot demonstration by another policeman, but the British authorities did not officially recognise that event.³² The explanation for that comes from the new status that Foot wanted to impose in Cyprus. A peaceful island would have offered the new governor the opportunity to approach the two communities for direct negotiations. Until that point the difficult task was to approach the Greek

³⁰ For more concerning Grivas' opinion of Harding see: The memoirs of General Grivas, op. cit., pp. 125-26.

³¹ C. Foley, op. cit., pp. 105-108.

³² C. Foley, op. cit., pp. 106-07.

Cypriots, therefore it was not in Foot's intentions to distance the approachable Turkish community by admitting responsibility for the death of a Turkish Cypriot, even by accident. This method, as will be reviewed later on, became the main strategy of the new Governor in his attempt to resolve the Cypriot question.

Despite the worsening of the relations between the two communities, Foot did not try to resolve the crisis by further strengthening military measures in the island. On the contrary, he continued his tour of Cyprus and during a broadcasting message on New Year's Eve he announced the liberation of 100 political prisoners and the end of the restriction law for 600 Cypriots, as a goodwill gesture. In an attempt to justify his act, Foot added, in his broadcast:

*"You may say that these actions do not solve anything, Certainly, they don't. I do not for a moment suggest that what I have already decided solves any of our problems. I do, however, believe that these decisions give an indication of my desire to re-establish confidence and trust, and I hope and believe that these gestures will be received by the people of Cyprus in a spirit of goodwill."*³³

As became obvious, Foot and his associates knew that all these actions were not enough to offer a reliable solution to the Cypriot question. Maybe the Cypriot people, in general, liked the new Governor more, and maybe Foot's popularity was increasing, especially among the Greek Cypriots, however more radical solutions were needed in order to heal the wounds from Harding's era. A new diplomatic initiative was more than necessary and the experienced Governor knew that.

On New Year's Day Foot left the island to go to London, in order to inform Macmillan and the Foreign Office of his first impression, concerning the Cypriot question. According to his memoirs, after ten days of endless negotiations and talks with the officials in London he managed to persuade them to approve his proposals concerning the Cypriot question.³⁴ The main points of his recommendations were: a)the requirement for an interval of five or seven years before any final decision, b)an assertion that no final decision would be taken at the end of the five or seven year period which was not acceptable to Greeks and Turks alike, c)an immediate abolition of the Emergency and the return of Archbishop Makarios to the island, and d)the opening of negotiations in Cyprus with the leaders of the two communities to develop a system of

³³ H. Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, (London, 1964), p. 161.

³⁴ H. Foot, op. cit., p. 163.

self-government.³⁵ Foley, attempting to justify Foot's proposals, stated that the above recommendations derived from Foot's theory that the best way to exit a deadlock was to reduce temperatures and work on whatever was practicable, leaving an ultimate solution until political passions were spent.³⁶ Therefore Foot's suggestions should and could not be regarded as a proposition for the final solution of the Cypriot question, but as a scheme attempting to regularize the Cypriot political and social climate in order, after a transitional period, to lead to the final settlement. Indeed, it was an ambitious plan that could have reconciled the two communities, after a period of three violent years that had influenced the fragile peaceful co-existence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a negative way, and re-establish the integrity of the British establishment in the eyes of the local population, especially the Greek Cypriots, giving London the opportunity and the time to search for an acceptable and reliable final solution according to its geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new Governor was extremely optimistic about the outcome of his proposals. He considered that both Greece and Turkey would accept them, and as a consequence those two countries would put pressure upon their compatriots in Cyprus to accept his suggestions. As he argues in his memoirs, Foot believed that Ankara would have disagreed with some aspects of his proposals but he sustained the speculation that giving them the absolute veto on long term policy would have outweighed their objections.³⁷ Foot thought that it would have been a more difficult task to persuade Athens to accept his proposals, but again he was convinced that the immediate advantages that he was prepared to offer the Greek officials, such as permission for the Archbishop's return to Cyprus, would have satisfied them.³⁸ However, Foot's calculations were wrong and, as future diplomatic developments showed, his optimism proved to be totally unfounded. London decided to approach Ankara first, in order to inform the Turkish side about Foot's proposals, but when the British ambassador in the Turkish capital visited Menderes he received a sharp and arrogant "No" as an answer. As Foot writes in his memoirs concerning the Turkish response to his plans:

*"On that day of the first Turkish reply everything, all our hopes and all our plans, collapsed."*³⁹

Nevertheless, Foot together with S. Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, decided to visit Ankara in a desperate attempt to persuade the Turkish side to re-consider its position.

³⁵ H. Foot, op. cit., p. 159.

³⁶ C.Foley, op. cit., p. 111.

³⁷ H. Foot, op. cit., p. 163.

³⁸ *ibid.*

However, as soon as the talks began, it became obvious that a common agreement was unattainable. The Turkish side was not prepared to discuss any change concerning the Cypriot status quo, and in addition they asked the British side to work towards the preparation of a plan about the partition of the island. In an attempt to fortify this demand, the Turkish side spoke about the hostile relations between the two communities, and it also spoke about the possibility of the creation of a Turkish equivalent of EOKA.⁴⁰ In order to persuade the British side of the validity of their arguments, the Turkish side decided to re-activate an unmistakable method that had proven extremely useful in the past. Therefore, during the British stay in the Turkish capital (24-30 January 1958), violent disturbances were caused by the Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia. The intensity of these disturbances was such that the British army had to intervene, and as a result five Turks were killed. The disturbances alarmed the British side, and the deputy Governor of Cyprus, Sinclair, expressed in a broadcast his:

*"intense grief that the security forces, in the discharge of their duty, should have caused the deaths of members of the Turkish community."*⁴¹

Due to the violent incidents in the Cypriot capital, a well-organized operation by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu⁴², the British side decided to withdraw its plan and leave Ankara. The same result had been achieved in 1955, during the Tripartite Conference in London, when the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul, well-organized by Ankara, had forced London to abandon its diplomatic initiative due to the importance of Turkey as an ally for British geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. From Ankara, the British delegation arrived in Athens. However, the talks there had a completely different nature. The British side had already decided not to proceed with Foot's plan, however it tried to negotiate with the Greek side by another diplomatic route. Foot and Lloyd expressed their concerns to Karamanlis that Turkey was ready to invade Cyprus, in the event of an alteration to the Cypriot status quo. The British officials told Karamanlis that such a development would be catastrophic for the survival of the North Atlantic Treaty in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore the finding of a settlement between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus was more necessary than ever. The British officials proposed to Karamanlis to accept a Turkish military base in Cyprus, and

³⁹ H. Foot: op. cit., p. 164.

⁴⁰ C. Foley, op. cit., p. 111.

⁴¹ C. Foley, op. cit., p. 112. For more concerning the disturbances in Nicosia see: H. Foot, op. cit., p. 166. Keesing's: June 7-14 1958, p. 16220.

⁴² For more concerning Zorlu's involvement in Nicosia's disturbances see: E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 21.

in return London was ready to offer, after a short period of self-government, the right of self-determination to the people of Cyprus. The response of the Greek side was immediate. As Averof said to Foot, the Greek government was unable to accept a Turkish military base in Cyprus for obvious reasons.⁴³ Once again the Cypriot question reached a stalemate and the British officials left the Greek capital greatly frustrated, realizing for the first time that the situation concerning the Cypriot question was not controlled by them any more.

The main questions that should be answered at this point are: How can the researcher evaluate Foot's plan? What are the main conclusions that derive from the British diplomatic initiative? Was there any deeper reason that forced the Greek government to immediately reject the British proposals? First of all, Foot's plan established a new approach of British diplomacy towards the Cypriot question. During Eden's era, the main approach of the Foreign Office was that Cyprus should remain, at any cost, under British control. During Macmillan's era Cyprus was an undesirable asset that had to be liquidated as soon as possible. As already mentioned, Macmillan's view of Britain's position in the global political arena was different to Eden's. Macmillan wanted to give to his country a new start, placing Britain in the middle of current developments, lifting the country up from the dusty colonial mentality of the 19th century. In order to achieve such a difficult task, he had to erase Britain's attachment to its colonial past and adopt a new political and geostrategic role for the ex-ruler of the waves. Therefore, the Cypriot question had to be solved. Cyprus was one of the main reasons that Britain was accused by the international community of inflexibility, violation of human rights⁴⁴ and maintenance of an archaic colonial image that did not promote the liberal values of the Western World. However, even if the Cypriot case had to be resolved, Macmillan was committed to safeguarding British geostrategic rights, by firstly re-establishing peace and order on the island and maintaining the unity of the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty. On the one hand, the Cypriot case had to be resolved in a way that would safeguard British geo-strategic interests in the wide area of the Eastern Mediterranean, through the establishment of British military bases in the island. Macmillan did not want to share the same political fate as his predecessor, therefore he knew that he had to satisfy the hard-liners inside the party by proving to the Tory back-benchers that he was able to safeguard British interests and end a crisis at the same time.

⁴³ E. Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁴ The hanging of young EOKA fighters and Harding's draconian laws of public order attracted attacks not only from Western nations, but from the USSR as well. In many sessions of the United Nations the

On the other hand, before the final settlement of the Cypriot question, the British side had the ethical and political obligation to work towards the disarmament of the Greek and the Turkish guerilla organizations (EOKA and VOLCAN), in an attempt to prevent the outbreak of a civil war on the island. Civil bloodshed in Cyprus would have counted as a political and diplomatic defeat for the Conservative government, jeopardizing the leading role that Britain wanted to play in international relations. Last but not least, Britain had a responsibility towards NATO and the United States to resolve the Cypriot question in such a way that the unity of the Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean would not have been under threat. Both Greece and Turkey were placing Cyprus in the front line of their national policies. Therefore, a vague and unreliable solution would have created such an explosive situation between the two nations that a war would have been unavoidable. Even if Foot's plan, as already mentioned, was not a final proposal for the solution of the Cypriot case, it was still a brilliant beginning towards finding a final settlement. From the first moment Foot, unlike Harding, realized the complexity of the Cypriot issue and had concluded that it would be impossible for the Cypriot question to be resolved within a short period of time. The experienced diplomat knew that only through small but secure steps would the Cypriot wound be healed, and his proposals were definitely a small but decisive step in that direction. However, Foot's initiative was jeopardized by the country that, until the early days of 1958, was the closest ally of Britain in the Cypriot question: Turkey. For many years and on various occasions Turkey had been used by the Foreign Office officials as an effective shield against Greek and Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis and self-determination in Cyprus. Turkey played its role with great success and zeal, seizing the golden opportunity to be involved once again in Cyprus, even if this involvement contradicted treaties of the past. Without any doubt, in many cases Turkey's assistance and support to the British establishment in Cyprus proved to be valuable for London, but this development had a negative aspect as well. Since 1955, Britain had to carry out its policies concerning the Cypriot question in such a way that would not have left Turkey feeling threatened or left out of future developments. Until Macmillan's arrival in Downing St. the British and Turkish interests in Cyprus were parallel. The British establishment in Cyprus enjoyed high popularity among the Turkish Cypriot community on the island, while Turkey felt absolute security from London's commitment to preserve Cyprus under its control, at any cost concerning Anglo-Greek relations at international level. Nevertheless, this

USSR cited British methods in Cyprus in order to face Western criticism concerning its own violations of human rights, in the Soviet Union or the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

unofficial diplomatic pact ended with Eden's resignation and the modification of the British approach concerning the Cypriot question. Turkey was not willing to follow the new British foreign line, even if this new approach was still structured in such a way that it would not have threatened Turkish geostrategic interests, and demanded the partition of the island as a reward for its services during the past. Eden's pro-Turkish feelings, and Lennox-Boyd's irresponsible statements inside the House of Commons about the possibility of partition in Cyprus, had had such an impact in Turkey that Foot's proposals sounded empty in Menderes' ears. The past plays great importance in politics, and because of previous miscalculations Britain found herself trapped in a labyrinth in which the Minotaur was Cyprus and Ariadne (i.e. Turkey, in this case) was unwilling to help. Last but not least, at this point it is essential to assess the Greek response towards Foot's and Lloyd's proposition. According to some specialists, Greece had lost a golden opportunity to come closer to Macmillan's government and manipulate future developments on Aphrodite's island.⁴⁵ At first sight the above argument sounds logical and well founded. However, if this argument is linked with the developments of this particular period on the Greek domestic agenda, which have until now been ignored by the previous specialists that have dealt analytically with the Cypriot question, then a final conclusion can be drawn concerning the Greek response to the British proposal.

Despite Karamanlis' careful and responsible approach to the Cypriot question, an attitude that had been characterized by realism and moderation, the extreme nationalist circles, even inside his government, were most displeased with his role. The fact that Makarios had been released from Seychelles, a great success of Karamanlis' cabinet, was of no importance to the extreme nationalists, since only Enosis would have been sufficient for them, but it had not been achieved yet. Therefore, according to the extreme nationalists, the only solution for the absolute success of the Cypriot question was to overthrow Karamanlis and welcome the arrival of a new figure in the post, who would be dynamic and popular among the Greek people. And there was no other suitable person for this post than the Cypriot Archbishop, Makarios. Makarios was the leader of the Enosis movement in Cyprus, an excellent orator and extremely popular among the Greek people, mainly due to his exile in Seychelles that gave him the title of "the national martyr", even if the conditions of his stay in the tropical island of the Indian Ocean had resembled a luxury holiday more than a miserable incarceration. The popularity issue was of great importance to the nationalist circles because it was literally

⁴⁵ For more concerning this view see: F. Papagathagelos, A Study of Karamanlis' Foreign Policy: The Early Years, ("K" Journal of Political and Social Intervention of the Left, Athens 1983), vol. X, pp. 89-

impossible to overthrow Karamanlis violently. Greece was an American protectorate and Karamanlis was extremely popular with the State Department and the CIA, therefore the Americans would never have agreed to such a solution. Therefore, the only possible option was to overthrow Karamanlis politically and replace him legitimately with Makarios. The first approach between the conspirators and the Cypriot Archbishop was effected through Makarios' close associate, N. Kranidiotis. As he writes in his memoirs concerning this meeting:

"As I recall, it was a warm July afternoon [1957] when A. Bodosakis⁴⁶ called me and invited me to his office. I went to his luxury office in K. Palamas St. and I saw Bodosakis and S. Venizelos waiting anxiously for me. We invited you, Bodosakis said almost immediately, because we are aware of how much you love your country and of your desire to see it unified with Greece. But there is only one way to realise that possibility... Makarios to be the Greek Premier and unify Cyprus with Greece as E. Venizelos did with Crete.

-Cranidiotis: I did not understand you

-Venizelos: Yes. The existing government had lost its support inside the Parliament. Two hundred fifty members of the Parliament from all the parties and especially the governing party are ready to support Makarios, in the event that he wants to be the next Prime Minister.

-Cranidiotis (with great astonishment): Makarios is not a politician. Makarios is a national fighter. After all he is a clergyman and a British citizen.

-Venizelos (with great annoyance): All these are minor details. We can easily offer Makarios Greek citizenship. On the other hand, regarding the fact that Makarios is a clergyman, we had a similar case during the recent past when Damaskinos became the Vicegerent of the Greek throne.⁴⁷ Your duty is to inform

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⁴⁶ A. Bodosakis was a well known businessman with close links with EOKA as one of the main economic contributors to Grivas' organization.

⁴⁷ Damaskinos was the Archbishop of Greece who after the liberation of the country from the Axis powers, became the Vicegerent of the Greek throne, Churchill's invention, until the fate of the monarchy was decided by a plebiscite on September 1946.

Makarios of our conversation and give us his answer as soon as possible"

And he continues:

*"I left from Bodosakis' office with mixed feelings. I went back to Makarios' hotel, where I found the Archbishop waiting. As soon as I informed him of Venizelos' offer, he, with a sarcastic smile and a look full of confidence, turned down the offer."*⁴⁸

Nevertheless, despite the secretive ways of the plotters, Karamanlis was aware of Venizelos' offer to Makarios. According to a classified letter sent to Averof on the eve of Kranidiotis' meeting with Bodosakis and Venizelos, Karamanlis informed his Minister of Foreign Affairs about what would happen and also predicted that Makarios

*"will turn down the offer, mainly because he will consider it as a well organized set-up designed to lower his popularity and credibility in the eyes of Greek public opinion"*⁴⁹

As a matter of fact Karamanlis predicted Makarios' response correctly but it did not make him forget about the incident. The Greek Premier knew that his enemies were waiting for his first wrong move, in order to overthrow him from his post, and he also knew that even if Makarios were to deny the offer, his greed for power was so strong that at the first opportunity he would have changed his mind and turned against the existing political establishment. A possible acceptance of the British proposals would have given to his opponents the opportunity to turn the people against him and eliminate his political future, a catastrophic development for the fragile political equilibrium of the state since the Civil War ended just eight years ago, and for the Cypriot question as well. As the aforementioned issues illustrate, Karamanlis rejected the British offer, increasing Foot's despair, but he was left with no other choice than to react in such a way that would give him the opportunity to win valuable time in order to rally his forces and eliminate his political opponents once and for all. Nevertheless, once again external factors played their influential role in the continuation of an explosive situation in Cyprus, leaving no space for a proposal that had all the potential to alter the political scenery on the island.

Despite Karamanlis' careful moves in order not to provoke his political enemies, the latter decided to question his authority openly inside Parliament. According to Karamanlis' opponents the time for such a move was right, because the Greek electorate

⁴⁸ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 278-280.

⁴⁹ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 28.

was most displeased with Karamanlis' economic reforms and the inability of the Greek government to modernize the nation's industry according to Western standards.⁵⁰ Therefore, on 1 March 1958, two of Karamanlis' closest associates in the cabinet, P. Papaligouras and G. Ralis, resigned from their posts, while 15 M.Ps from Karamanlis' party, with an official statement in the Greek Press, declared their lack of trust concerning the existing government and the Prime Minister as well. Karamanlis' opponents believed that the Greek Premier would be unable to survive such a well-organized attack. It is true that Karamanlis was surprised by the events, mainly because the two Ministers were personal friends of his, but after the first shock he rallied his powers in order to commence his counter-attack. On 3 March, Karamanlis visited the Palace and informed King Pavlos that it was his intention to resign as Prime Minister. Karamanlis' resignation was a highly political decision intended to answer his political opponents and to prove, that he was still in control of the developments in the political background of the country and on the other hand, to prove to the Greek electorate that he respected the procedures of parliamentary democracy.⁵¹ The King had no choice but to dissolve the Parliament and lead the country towards new elections. At this point, it is essential to refer to an extremely delicate point that Greek historiography fails to deal with or still does not dare to deal with, successfully. According to all the key actors of that period, Karamanlis, Averof, Iliou⁵², as well as great Greek historians such as Psiroukis and Tsoukalas, the political crisis had been caused mainly by American and British involvement. The Foreign Office and the State Department wanted to isolate Karamanlis because he was the main obstacle to the final settlement of the Cypriot question. However, this view is totally wrong and it reveals the weakest point of the Greek mentality, which had developed after the defeat of the Greek army in the Ionian coast in 1922, that external forces had to be blamed for every negative development in the Greek political spectrum. Characteristically, Karamanlis wrote in his memoirs:

"The crisis in 1958 was a result of a plot, organized by the Palace, the British, the Americans and some of my closest associates. Each of the above factors aimed to the fall of my

⁵⁰ For more concerning the socio-economic situation in Greece during this particular era see: A. Dimitriadis, The Incurable Trauma: Greece after the end of the Civil War, (Thessaloniki, 1978), pp. 120-29.

⁵¹ Karamanlis' political opponents accused him of governing the nation as an Asian dictator. Statements like this had a big impact on the nation's public opinion, therefore Karamanlis had to prove his attachment to democracy by following the correct procedure, even if he had the choice of continuing to govern the nation by forming a wide coalition with the other parties of the Right and Centre-Right spectrum.

⁵² The leader of the Unified Democratic Left.

*Cabinet for different reasons. Foreign elements wanted to force me to co-operate with other parties [it is obvious that Karamanlis is speaking about G. Papandreou's party, the Liberal Party] in order to close the Cypriot question. The other factors, wanted to decrease my strength in order to put me under their control."*⁵³

Averof, on the other hand, gives a similar explanation for the crisis of 1958 in his own memoirs:

*"The British side wanted to get rid of Karamanlis. A weak government would have been easier for London to manipulate... The American embassy in Athens also played a great role in the crisis, as well."*⁵⁴

However, the above approach is inaccurate and can easily lead to wrong conclusions. On the one hand, London did not welcome Karamanlis' resignation and the announcement of new elections. The British officials knew that Karamanlis was a responsible and moderate politician with modern and accurate views concerning the Cypriot question. London had nothing to gain from Karamanlis' fall, particularly while it was trying to modify its policies and adopt a more moderate approach concerning the Cypriot question, and was extremely concerned that a possible defeat of Karamanlis would lead to great political instability in Greece with grave consequences for the Cypriot question as well. London was aware of the fact that Karamanlis' dominance inside the Parliament was the only secure factor that was able to keep the extreme nationalists and the hard-liners away from the highest posts of the national administration. In order to fortify the above argument it is necessary to present some articles from the British pro-Conservative press, that defended Karamanlis passionately during the political crisis in Athens. "The Times" in an thorough article praised Karamanlis' government ⁵⁵, while the Observer wrote:

*"During the 2.5 years of Karamanlis government Greece enjoyed the unusual luxury of political stability to such a great extent that even the Greeks forgot that they are living in a country famous for its political earthquakes."*⁵⁶

⁵³ K. Karamanlis, *Archive: Facts and Papers*, (Athens, 1994), vol. III, p. 86.

⁵⁴ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 28.

⁵⁵ The Times, 3 March 1958, p. 10.

⁵⁶ The Observer, 3 March 1958, p. 7.

On the other hand, neither did Washington welcome the possibility for political instability in Greece. As seen in previous chapters, Washington had supported Karamanlis from his first steps as the Greek Premier. For the American side Karamanlis was the only figure in the Greek political arena who was able to limit the Communist influence and at the same time control the extreme right in such a way that, on the one hand, Greece would have continued to be the only bastion of free economy in the Balkans, and on the other hand, would have maintained a tolerable level of Greco-Turkish relations in order to preserve the unity of NATO's south eastern flank. As a matter of fact the CIA and its director A. Dulles decided to influence the electoral result in favour of Karamanlis by buying off some of Karamanlis' opponents.⁵⁷ From all the above facts, the only conclusion that follows, is that the political crisis of 1958 was an internal Greek issue and that the role of the external factors, especially the United States, was anything but hostile to Karamanlis. However, how and to what extent had the course of the Cypriot question been influenced by the result of the general elections of 1958?

The day of the national elections was set for 11 May, and the electoral result was a great surprise for the international community. Karamanlis won an impressive majority inside the Parliament, showing his opponents and his supporters that he was still in charge of political developments in the country. However, the great winner of the national elections was EDA, which managed to increase its electoral power to such a great extent that it became the second party in the national political arena. The result of the national elections was:⁵⁸

ERE	1,583,85 (41.16 %)	171 seats
EDA	939,902 (24.42 %)	79 seats
KF	795,445 (20.67 %)	36 seats
PADE	408,787 (10.62 %)	10 seats

The above result was a great shock for every political analyst with even relatively little knowledge of the political situation in Greece. EDA, as has already been mentioned, was the only legal party of the Left that had not been obliged to disband by the

⁵⁷ There is a document proving that the CIA managed to bribe some Greek politicians, however the names and the amounts are still classified. See: A. Dulles Papers, 26 February 1953-29 November 1961, (Princeton University), Vol. III, pp. 97-98. See also A. Papahelas, The rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor 1947-1967, (Athens, 1997), p. 60.

⁵⁸ For full data of the national elections of 11 May 1958 see: K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 125.

draconian anti-communist laws of that time. Despite its relatively moderate manifesto⁵⁹, it was a common secret that EDA was the fifth column of the International Communist movement inside Greece. The party's policies had been decided by the exiled leadership of the Greek Communist Party from Moscow, while the absolute majority of its electoral support had participated in the Civil War fighting against the restoration of the monarchy and the old bourgeois Greek class. Nevertheless, it cannot be suggested that 939,902 Greeks were fervent supporters of Marxism Leninism and Moscow. The real power of Greek Marxists never exceeded 300,000, even during the Second World War and the Axis occupation in the country, when KKE was the dominant in the political arena. Therefore, the reasons for this impressive electoral increase should be sought elsewhere. One of the main reasons was the economic repression of the lower classes during Karamanlis' first two and a half years in power. American financial aid, the so-called Truman Doctrine, was not enough by itself to heal the destroyed national economy, therefore heavy taxation was placed upon the lower classes creating an explosive social situation in the country. In order to illustrate the deep social problems that Greece was facing during this particular era, it is useful to refer to a characteristic passage of a Canadian Travel Guide of 1957 about Athens. According to the author of the guide:

*"Athens is the most surprising European capital I have ever visited. Within a short drive from Kolonaki [the area behind the old palace] to Kokinia [a traditional Communist stronghold and the old industrialized area of Athens] the visitor can experience the luxury of a wealthy modern Western capital and the misery and abandonment of a forgotten African town."*⁶⁰

However, another major reason for the impressive electoral result of EDA was the Cypriot question. As already mentioned, EDA was one of the most fervent supporters of the Enosis movement concerning the struggle of the Greek Cypriots and their national dream. On many occasions the party's youth had organized violent rallies outside the British and American embassies, while quite frequently, during the pre-election period, EDA raised the political thermometer by accusing Karamanlis of collaboration with the Western powers concerning the Cypriot question. In an interview, Mr. G. Farakos, ex secretary-general of the Communist Party, confessed:

⁵⁹ EDA's manifesto was characterized by its careful terminology in order not to provoke the establishment. It was a combination of political ideas coming from the theoretical field of Social Democracy and of the Italian Euro-Communism, avoiding any reference to the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

⁶⁰ R. Worthing, A Long Travel to the Cradle of Civilization, (Toronto, 1957), p. 39.

“-Farakos: EDA's leadership followed, almost blindly, our instructions from exile concerning the party's approach towards the Cypriot question. We were against Grivas and his so-called liberation struggle, but we were supporting the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis.

-Author: However, Mr. Farakos, I have to notice that your approach concerning the Cypriot question was coming into conflict with the Marxist preaching of Internationalism and was approaching the political manifestos of the nationalist parties of that time.

-Farakos: Mr. Litsas you have to understand that the Cypriot question was our golden opportunity to increase our political influence. I am not suggesting that the Communist leadership acted in an opportunistic way. After all, the Greek Communist Party was always in the front line of the national aspirations of our race, however we knew that the people were disappointed with Karamanlis and his efforts to negotiate rather than to impose a satisfactory solution for the Cypriot question. After all, as history is showing, a Greek can stand a lot of things but you can not ignore his deep patriotic feelings.

-Author: Can we justify your policy towards the Cypriot question by Moscow's intention to cause constant problems for NATO's unity in the Eastern Mediterranean?

-Farakos: Mr. Litsas it is time, once and for all, to clarify this issue. For sure Moscow wanted to create problems for NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, however it will be a methodological mistake to support the erroneous view that the Soviet Union wanted to expand its presence in Cyprus, Greece or Turkey. The above areas belonged to the West according to the secret agreement of Yalta, and during this particular time the Soviet leadership had great problems to face in Central and Eastern Europe and in the frontiers with the other great Communist power, China. The Soviet Union had neither the intention nor the power to open another front in the Eastern Mediterranean. After all, it is common knowledge that the

Soviet interest in Cyprus had been established in the mid-60's until the Turkish invasion in 1974."⁶¹

Judging from the result, EDA's approach towards the Cypriot question was extremely beneficial for the party's electoral appeal. However, this success annoyed certain reactionary circles in the internal political spectrum of Greece. Those circles on the extreme right received the news of EDA's impressive electoral strengthening as the final proof of a supposed Red plot aiming to overthrow the establishment through parliamentary procedures. Therefore, they began to speak about the overthrow of Karamanlis from power and the endowment of a coup with the support of the Palace.⁶² As Mr. I. Tsiligrakis, an ex-service Brigadier in the 4th Armored Kilikis Brigade, admits in a private interview:

*"We had no other choice than to overthrow Karamanlis. His policies, and especially his attitude towards the Cypriot question, gave EDA the opportunity to become the second party in the Greek political scale. We wanted to impose a military regime with the King's approval in order to finish once and for all with the Red threat."*⁶³

However, the CIA in Athens, as expected, had been informed of the plot and did not agree with Karamanlis' overthrow. Mr. Tsiligrakis explains the reasons for the American attitude:

"-Tsiligrakis:...However, the main reason for the postponement of our plans was the American factor.

-Author: Why do you believe such an intervention occurred?

*-Tsiligrakis: Because Karamanlis was the figure that the CIA wanted at this particular period of time. The Americans were afraid to allow the real patriots to seize power because they knew that we would have achieved the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece. Karamanlis was not willing to allow something like that, therefore he was the right person for the Americans... We did not have any other choice than to obey the American orders, however we demanded that they react against EDA's electoral strengthening."*⁶³

⁶¹ Personal interview with Mr. G. Farakos., Athens, June 1999.

⁶² K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 139.

⁶³ Personal interview with Mr. I. Tsiligrakis, Athens, June 1999.

⁶³ *ibid.*

From Tsiligrakis' words it follows that the Americans did not want to allow the extreme nationalists to seize power, mainly because they were afraid of the latter's aggressive policies concerning the Cypriot question and the Turkish response towards them. The Americans realized that it was time for another diplomatic initiative about Cyprus, in order to satisfy Greek public opinion and at the same time to jeopardize EDA's political thesis about the diplomatic stagnation of the Cypriot question.

Therefore, the United States began a new series of negotiations with London, urging the finding of a final solution concerning the Cypriot dispute.⁶⁴ London was convinced that a new plan was more than necessary. On the one hand the American involvement, and on the other hand the escalation of violent events between the two communities, influenced 10 Downing St. and the officials in Foreign Office to act with no more delay. A characteristic event occurred in Nicosia during the late hours of 7th June, when a bomb exploded outside the Press Office of the Turkish Consulate. Almost immediately, large groups of young Turks entered Nicosia's Greek sector looting and burning houses and shops. During the disturbances two Greek Cypriots were killed.⁶⁵ The tension in the island was increasing and the British authorities were forced, in order to prevent a Greek Cypriot retaliation, to re-introduce the state of emergency on the island. It was clear that Cyprus was in danger of turning back to the dark years of Harding's administration, unless something drastic happened. However, as in every Greek tragedy a God was appearing from above in order to offer the final solution. Macmillan decided to play the role of the deus ex machina, in order to assist the plot of the Cypriot tragedy.

On 19 June, the British Premier announced inside the House of Commons his plan for Cyprus, euphemistically known as "the Partnership Plan". The main points of this plan were as follows:

"a) There will be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities, and these Houses will have final legislative authority in communal affairs.

b) Authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security, will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and six

⁶⁴ For more concerning the American pressure upon Macmillan's government see: Foreign Relations of the United States: 1958-1960, Eastern Europe Region: Soviet Union: Cyprus, (Washington, 1993), part 1, vol. X, p.p. 605-24.

⁶⁵ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

elected Ministers drawn from the House of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.

c)The Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, will have reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both communities are protected.

d)External affairs, defense and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.

e)The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments will have the right to require any legislation which they consider to be discriminatory to be reserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal. ”⁶⁶

As far as the future status of Cyprus was concerned, Macmillan stated that it would not be altered for seven years. However, Macmillan avoided any reference to the Cypriot status quo after the end of the seven years. As he stated:

“Her Majesty's Government trust that this imaginative plan will be welcomed by all concerned in the spirit in which it is put forward, and for their part they will bend all efforts to ensuring its success. Indeed, if the Greek and Turkish Governments were willing to extend their experiment in partnership and co-operation, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, at the appropriate time, to go further and, subject to the reservation to the United Kingdom of such bases and facilities as might be necessary for the discharge of her international obligations, to share the sovereignty of the Island with their Greek and Turkish Allies as their contribution to a lasting settlement. ”⁶⁷

An overall evaluation of Macmillan's plan is that it was more complicated and radically different to any of the previous ones. Macmillan by itself described it as *“an adventure in partnership between the two communities in the island and also between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey.”* The idea of partnership

⁶⁶ Macmillan: House of Commons, June 19, 1958, vol. 589, col. 1317.

⁶⁷ Macmillan, op. cit., col. 1318.

was the main characteristic of the new plan, allowing Turkey and Greece the right to be formally and actively involved in the Cypriot problem. However, despite the fact that at a theoretical level the above plan had many positive aspects, in reality it was doomed to failure. First of all, the idea of partnership included the idea of partition, that both Athens and the Greek Cypriot leadership were strongly against. On the one hand, Macmillan's plan tried to bring together the two communities and the three governments in the Administrative Council. On the other hand, however, it contributed to the separation of the two communities with the two Houses of Representatives and with the provision for dual citizenship. As a matter of fact the Labour Party leader, Callaghan, spoke about the emphasis of Macmillan's plan upon the nationality of the two communities, while he criticized the fact that the new plan did nothing to emphasize the common identity of the Cypriot population. As he stated:

*"All this is an emphasis on division, and not of unity. It is an emphasis on the Greek nature of the people and the Turkish nature of the people. Where is there, in this plan, any emphasis on the fact that these people are Cypriots?"*⁶⁸

In addition, Macmillan's plan offered Ankara the opportunity to establish herself, officially, in the island's political future. With the introduction of the Administrative Council, even if the Greek Cypriots were to hold the majority, Ankara would have had the opportunity to interfere in the island's administration, jeopardizing the Greek argument that Turkey, according to international law and treaties, had no administrative right upon Cyprus.⁶⁹ Furthermore, with the provision for the creation of the two separate Houses, Turkey would have had the opportunity to achieve her main goal, the theoretical and practical political separation of the two communities, a development that would have led with mathematical certainty to the definite partition of the island. As a matter of fact, The Times said about the creation of two separate Houses that *"it involves what is virtually a system of non-territorial partition."*⁷⁰

Macmillan sent his proposals to Ankara and Athens, suggesting a Tripartite meeting as well, for further discussions and negotiations. As it was expected, Karamanlis and his cabinet rejected Macmillan's plan and clearly stated that he did not intend to attend a Tripartite meeting but he was willing to meet the British Premier alone. As the Greek Premier continued:

⁶⁸ Callaghan: House of Commons, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col. 623.

⁶⁹ As mentioned in a previous chapter the official line of Athens was that Turkey had every right to demand satisfactory guarantees for the Turkish community in Cyprus, but it rejected the idea of recognizing any right of Ankara to demand an administrative role on the island.

*“Examining the outline of your plan from a practical point of view, it is apparent that the whole system is based on an entirely ephemeral situation, i.e. on the tension in the relations between the Greeks and the Turkish Cypriots, who have lived for centuries in peace on a united and indivisible territory. I sincerely believe that this tension has been artificially created during the last months, and therefore, can be brought to an end. Consequently, the administrative machinery which the plan is setting up is unjustified, and, owing to its intricate nature and to the friction which it is bound to cause, will prove inoperative.”*⁷¹

Makarios rejected Macmillan's plan as well. In a letter to the Cypriot governor the Cypriot Archbishop criticised:

*“the idea of partnership which forms the basis of the plan, and which in substance imposes a triple condominium on Cyprus unavoidably leading to antagonism and strife and creating a focus of permanent unrest and a threat to peace in the whole area.”*⁷²

On the other side of the Aegean Sea, Macmillan's plan received the same reception. Menderes' government rejected the British proposal on the basis that the partition of Cyprus was the only acceptable solution for Ankara.⁷³

Despite the rejection of Macmillan's plan, the British side did not follow her traditional policy of abandoning the initiative. After all, this time London was seriously committed, to her allies (NATO and the US) and to the British people, who were getting tired of the long-established dispute in a distant island on the far side of the map, to resolving the Cypriot question. Macmillan's plan was the final recognition of the British side that its presence on the island had to be terminated. This decision had been influenced by a combination of events and facts that affected the British foreign line. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Suez crisis turned out to be an economic Waterloo for Britain. Financial collapse had been avoided, however, immediate economic measures had to be taken in order to regularize the situation. In January 1957, the new

⁷⁰ Quoted by Mr. Callaghan's statement in the House of Commons, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col. 623.

⁷¹ Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Cyprus Question: Correspondence exchanged between Karamanlis and Macmillan, June 10 to August 19, 1958, (Karamanlis' letter to Macmillan of June 21, 1958).

⁷² Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, p. 16451.

⁷³ *ibid.*

Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, began concocting plans for a far-reaching overhaul of strategy and expenditure. This resulted in the production of a White Paper, on 5 May 1957, which promised to end conscription by 1960 and to reduce the army to 165,000 professionals by 1962, while defence expenditure would be held at 7% of the GNP.⁷⁴ The alteration to British defence plans simply meant that Britain was no longer in a position to continue her costly presence in Cyprus, while the end of conscription persuaded the British officials that they could not continue to risk the lives of British soldiers at any cost. Another fact that impelled the British decision to resolve the Cypriot question through the application of Macmillan's plan was the manufacture of the first British thermo-nuclear bomb. In May 1957, the first British thermo-nuclear bomb explosion occurred on Christmas Island in the Western Pacific.⁷⁵ The manufacture of a nuclear arsenal was, in a sense, the expression of British bitterness towards the American role during the Suez War. The diplomatic events during the Suez episode and the American refusal to stand by the British side, urged London to limit the American influence over the country's defence. Nevertheless, the manufacture of the thermo-nuclear bomb meant that Britain could now control Soviet expansionism in the Middle East from military bases in Cyprus. Control over the whole Cypriot territory was no longer necessary. In the whole of the British empire a new wind of change was blowing. In 1957, Malaysia and the Gold Coast (Ghana) gained independence, Nigeria and Sierra Leone were to be next. In 1956, a new liberal constitution was introduced in Kenya in order to pacify the Mau-Mau, and serious procedures for the independence of West Indies had begun. Cyprus could not be excluded from the process of de-colonization. Therefore in August the British Premier visited Athens and Ankara in order to persuade the two governments to reconcile their views. Macmillan arrived in Athens on 7 August and the next morning he met with Karamanlis and Averof in the political office of the Greek Premier. During the talks Macmillan attempted to reassure the Greek side that his plan was not an Anglo-Turkish plot against the Greek Cypriots and Greece but a serious diplomatic effort that aimed to offer an acceptable solution to two sides with completely different approaches to the same issue. However, Karamanlis and Averof supported the Greek refusal by claiming that Athens was opposed to the existence of two different Houses, and they suggested the establishment of a common Legislative Assembly with authority extending to all matters, except those remaining in the Governor's power, and that the composition of the Administrative Council should be modified in order to

⁷⁴ A. Sked & C. Cook, *Post War Britain: A Political History*, (London, 1993), fourth edition, pp. 141-42.

⁷⁵ J. Lawrence, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, (London, 1998), p. 593.

correspond to the proportions of Greeks and Turks.⁷⁶ The talks ended the next day and Macmillan flew to Ankara, where he met with Menderes and Zorlu. There are no official records of this meeting except a brief statement that was published after the end of the discussions which said that there had been "*a frank and friendly exchange of views*", that the British Prime Minister had "*explained the nature and purposes of the partnership plan*" and that Menderes had "*set out the point of view of his Government*"⁷⁷. Despite the vagueness of the statement, it was obvious that the Turkish government was more positive than the Greek concerning Macmillan's plan. After the end of his tour, Macmillan returned to London where he declared that the decision of his government was to proceed with his plan and also suggested some changes to his proposals, in order to please Athens. According to those changes, the representatives of Greece and Turkey would not sit as members of the Governor's [administrative] Council, but, while they were to be granted direct access to the Governor, they would maintain their functions. In addition, the provision for dual nationality was dropped because of legal complications, and a new provision provided for the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot municipal councils. This time, the Turkish side accepted the plan. The Turkish Foreign Minister stated that his government decided to support it "*so as to prove Turkey's goodwill in the face of the positive efforts made by Britain*"⁷⁸. Athens, on the other hand, maintained its previous stance, following the political developments concerning the Cypriot question with a critical eye.

It has to be said that Macmillan's plan, even if it tried hard not to show it, displayed a clear pro-Turkish view concerning the Cypriot question. It was the final recognition that the two communities could not live together and it was the first step towards the partition of the island. Furthermore, it gave de jure recognition to Turkey's involvement in Cyprus, a development that conflicted with international legality. Therefore, the attitude of the Greek government was fully expected and justified. On the one hand, Karamanlis was not in the position to permit the Turkish diplomatic triumph over the Cypriot dispute by accepting Macmillan's proposals, since the principle of partition was one of the main Turkish arguments and it was convenient for the Turkish plans for full dominance in the wide area of the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, Karamanlis could not have allowed Turkey to gain a de jure stance in Cyprus, because such a development would give the legitimate right to Turkey to move towards the re-negotiations of the frontiers concerning the Dodecanese and the Western Thrace.

⁷⁶ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p.p. 187-202.

⁷⁷ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., p. 203.

Nevertheless, it would be a methodological mistake if Macmillan's plan were to be judged by history as an exclusively negative proposal. First of all, after a long period of time, it was the first sincere British plan towards the final resolution of the Cypriot question. As has been shown, in many previous cases the British side proposed a plan simply in order to lift the diplomatic pressure from its shoulders. However, that was not the case with Macmillan's proposals. As for the pro-Turkish nature of the plan, it should be kept in mind that Turkey was for Britain the most valuable ally in a region, the Middle East, which London regarded as its traditional sphere of influence. While Greece, after the end of the Civil War, had developed closer relations with the United States, Turkey remained the closest ally of Britain, either within NATO or within the Baghdad Pact. Therefore, it would have been extremely harmful to the British interests to neglect the Turkish factor and displease it in the Cypriot case. After all, it was extremely difficult for Macmillan to reverse, within the short period that he was in power, the well established policy of his predecessor concerning Turkey and Cyprus. Macmillan's plan was a sincere effort to resolve the Cypriot question, an attempt that can be compared to the desperate efforts of an acrobat to balance on a thin rope without a safety net under his feet. After so many years of diplomatic stagnation, it was the first attempt to resolve a dispute that had been transformed into a thorn in the side of the imperial lion, the first firm step, no matter what its result, towards the re-establishment of peace on the deeply-traumatized Aphrodite's island.

⁷⁸ Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, p. 16453.

CHAPTER X
CYPRUS AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY: THE END OF BRITISH
DOMINANCE ON APHRODITE'S ISLAND.

The Politics of Aristotle

"Generally, we may add, a constitution will tend to be preserved by the observance of all the legal rules already suggested, in the course of our argument, as making for constitutional stability. Here we may note, as of paramount importance, the elementary principle which has been again and again suggested: the principle of ensuring that the number of those who wish a constitution to continue shall be greater than the number of those who do not."
 Aristotle, VI.5.

This chapter will examine the period from the announcement of Makarios' plan concerning the independence of Cyprus until the final agreement of all the sides involved, as embodied in the Zurich-London agreement. It will examine the diplomatic background of the complicated negotiations concerning the future of Cyprus, and will assess the context of the Zurich-London agreement. The main questions that this chapter will seek to answer are: What was the diplomatic importance of Makarios' proposal concerning an independent Cyprus? What were the reasons that persuaded both Athens and Ankara to negotiate concerning the Cypriot question? Which were the reasons that made Makarios hesitate to recognize the Zurich-London agreement and how were those hesitations bypassed? What was the Zurich-London agreement?

Despite the fact Greece had rejected Macmillan's plan, the British side still showed no sign of accepting this. As mentioned in a previous chapter, London had already decided to close the Cypriot case at any cost, therefore the Greek objection was not enough by itself to stop the British initiative. In reality, the officials in the Foreign Office knew that, this time, Athens had neither the power nor the means to interrupt the realization of Macmillan's plan for Cyprus. As a matter of fact, Athens found herself isolated from the rest of the Western world that, after a long and disruptive period of turmoil in the fragile area of the Eastern Mediterranean, and an endless series of fruitless diplomatic negotiations concerning the Cypriot question, considered Macmillan's plan as the only reliable solution that could stabilize the severely shaken internal balance of the island. All NATO countries, except Greece, accepted the validity of the British plan¹, while even the political opposition inside the House of Commons maintained a positive approach to Macmillan's plan.² As seen in previous chapters, since 1955, the Labour party had adopted a clear and, on many occasions, passionate pro-Greek and Greek Cypriot position inside the House of Commons, concerning the Cypriot question.³ However, this time the climate in the Labour party was different. Labour leaders acknowledged Macmillan's efforts to find a way out of the political deadlock, therefore, to nobody's surprise, Callaghan's speech inside the House of Commons stated that:

*"I want to make this clear: the situation in the island is of such a character, and in the Middle East generally it is of such a nature, that we would welcome any agreement that the parties to this dispute can come to. We should want to see it run its course. We would not seek to overturn it. We say to all the parties to this dispute: "It is your duty at the present time to go into negotiations and discussion." We beg of you to do so wherever you may be and whoever you are, to see whether this situation can be brought to an end!"*⁴

In this turning point for the fate of Cyprus, Athens lost its most valuable ally within the British political scene and every day that passed brought Turkey closer to Cyprus. The Greek side was faced with a great dilemma. Either, she had to agree with Macmillan's

¹ Lennox-Boyd: House of Commons, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col.618.

² For more concerning the attitude of the Labour party see: House of Commons Debates, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col.618-731

³ Traditionally since the Greek War of Independence and Lord Byron's contribution and support to the Greek struggle, the Liberal and Labour parties supported the Greek side while the Conservatives supported the Turkish.

plan and allow Turkey to gain the same political rights as her in Cyprus, a possibility that would have created an explosive situation in Greece, or to maintain her negative attitude towards the British proposal, isolating herself from the political developments in Cyprus, at the same time offering Turkey the opportunity to strengthen her profile and position in the Western camp.

However, Makarios' political instinct was to try to modify the negative political scene in favour of the Greek side. On 22 September, during an interview with B. Castle, then Vice Chairman of the Labour Party, he introduced the idea of an independent Cyprus. According to Makarios' proposal, after a period of self-government Cyprus would become an independent state "*linked neither to Greece nor to Turkey*". The status of Cyprus would be guaranteed by the United Nations and would not be changed "*either by union with Greece, by partition, or by any other way*", unless such a change were approved by the United Nations. The status of independence "*would not be incompatible*" with Cyprus' membership of the British Commonwealth. Makarios also re-assured Mrs Castle that the Turkish community would enjoy full safeguards under his plan. In addition, the Archbishop stated that the British government, together with the Cypriot peoples' representatives, would frame a constitution for internal self-government. This would operate for a fixed period, after which Cyprus would become independent.⁵ The idea of an independent Cyprus was not new. Athens, during the summer of 1957, attempted to persuade the Greek Cypriot Archbishop to approve the realization of such a plan. However, this plan was soon abandoned, mainly because of the severe reactions among the officials in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the major parties of the opposition and the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy, who regarded such a development as the defeat of the Enosis movement.⁶ Nevertheless, this time Makarios surprised all sides, by officially stating that he was ready to abandon every demand concerning the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, in order to achieve the end of the British presence in the island and avoid the involvement of Turkey in the internal politics of Cyprus. Makarios knew that he was playing with fire, since it would have been impossible for the Archbishop to silence the critical voices of the hard-liners inside the Ethnarchic Council, whose main slogan was Enosis and nothing but Enosis, but, on the other hand, he knew that he could have easily sidestepped this obstacle, since his political influence, after his exile in Seychelles, was so high that he had an advantage.

⁴ Callaghan: House of Commons, June 26, 1958, vol. 590, col.626.

⁵ Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, 16454.

⁶ For more concerning this see: E. Averof-Tositsas, *A Story of Missed Opportunities*, (Athens, 1982), vol. I, p. 192.

As a matter of fact, Grivas, as soon as he was informed of Makarios' statement, expressed his deep distress concerning the Archbishop's plan. As he says in his memoirs:

*"It was a complete surprise to me, and I confess to being upset and shocked. The Archbishop had no mandate to depart from our basic claim for self-determination – the right to choose our own future and join our Greek motherland."*⁷

Despite Grivas' reaction, both the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side agreed with Makarios' plan about independence. On 29 September, the Greek Premier announced that his government was ready to accept Makarios' proposals, while the next day the mayors of Paphos, Limassol, Larnaca, Famagusta, Kyrenia and Nicosia, in a common statement, expressed their full support for Makarios' plan.⁸ Nevertheless, London's reaction was not in the same spirit. In a letter to Karamanlis, Macmillan described Makarios' position as:

*"falling outside the scope of the immediate problem of setting up interim arrangements for restoring order and developing representative institutions"*⁹

London's refusal to accept Makarios' proposal was expected. Despite the fact that it was the first time that the Greek Cypriot side had abandoned her demands concerning Enosis of the island with Greece, still the possibility of an eventual Enosis remained. If Makarios' plan had been accepted, Cyprus would have gained its independence after a fixed period of self-government. The Cypriot status of independence was not to be modified, unless the United Nations agreed to such an alteration. However, no one could guarantee to the British and Turkish side that Nicosia or even Athens would have not commenced a new diplomatic struggle, after a sufficient period of an independent Cyprus, inside the United Nations, in order to achieve the long-desired Enosis. London and Ankara also had other reasons that justified their negative reaction towards Makarios' plan. Under the Archbishop's proposals, the Greek Cypriot side would have kept political power under its control, since Athens and Ankara would have had no political authority over the Cypriot administration. In addition, Makarios' proposal did not mention anything about the establishment of British military bases on Cypriot territory, which alarmed London. Nevertheless, it must be said that despite all the

⁷ *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, ed. by C. Foley, (London, 1964), p. 162.

⁸ On Karamanlis' statement, see: Keesing's: October 18-25, 1958, p. 16454. On the statement of the Cypriot mayors, see: N. Kranidiotis, *Difficult Years*, (Athens, 1981), p. 344.

⁹ Keesing's: *ibid.*

disadvantages of Makarios' plan, it still offered the Greek Cypriots the chance to abandon the inflexible policy of Enosis and approach Macmillan's plan from a different position. As soon as the leaders of the Labour Party were informed about Makarios' interview their response was immediate. On 26 September, only four days after Makarios' interview, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party issued a statement calling upon the Government to suspend the implementation of Macmillan's plan by postponing the arrival in Cyprus of Turkey's representative. No lasting settlement, the statement said, was possible without the consent of the people, and the plan was rejected by an overwhelming majority of the island's population. The attempt to put it into operation was therefore unwise and dangerous. The statement suggested that recent declarations by the Archbishop and other Greek Cypriot leaders held out new hopes of settlement by agreement. Finally, it urged that negotiations should be re-opened with Cypriot representatives.¹⁰ Without any doubt, Makarios' proposal gave increased vitality to the Greek diplomatic efforts to suspend the implementation of the British plan in Cyprus. It was the first time that London could not claim that the inflexible policy of Enosis was the main obstacle to the establishment of peace and order in the island, and Karamanlis and his associates were determined not to throw away such a brilliant opportunity.

However, at this particular time the US decided, once again, to intervene in order to regularize the situation in the southeastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance. The Americans recognized the sentimental value that Cyprus held for Greece and they were anxious about the Greek response had Macmillan's plan been implemented in the island. Characteristically, the estimate of the American National Intelligence, on 23 September 1958, stated that:

"If the UK goes ahead with the plan-as now appears likely-Greece's reaction might include at least a partial disengagement from its NATO obligations. There would almost certainly be critical strains in Greek-Turkish relations if not a complete disruption, and the danger of wide-spread violence on Cyprus itself would be great. If the US publicly supported the British plan, American influence in Greece would be seriously affected...The growth of neutralist sentiment, however, and particularly Greece's sense of disenchantment with its Western allies over the Cyprus issue will probably impel Greece to take

¹⁰ The Times, June 27, 1958, p.4.

a more independent line in NATO and the UN affairs affecting Greek interests. This tendency would be modified though not entirely offset by increased US economic aid or markedly greater US sympathy and support for Greece on the Cyprus question.”¹¹

From this time onwards, the US began a great diplomatic effort in order to prevent the implementation of Macmillan's plan in Cyprus. The first step was to send Paul-Henri Spaak, newly appointed NATO Secretary-General and former Prime Minister of Belgium, to Athens for talks with Karamanlis. Spaak arrived in the Greek capital on 23 September and met Karamanlis, on the same day, in the latter's office in Parliament. Karamanlis expressed his dissatisfaction to Spaak concerning the British attitude, while the latter reassured the Greek Premier that he was ready to commit himself to find a satisfactory settlement for the three countries concerned with the Cypriot question.¹² The next day the Secretary-General, immediately after his return to Paris, submitted to the NATO Council a plan that became known as the Spaak plan. In submitting his plan, the Secretary General also suggested that a conference should take place as soon as possible between the Governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey and representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Spaak plan, which would serve as a basis for discussions at the proposed conference, suggested a provisional solution based on the following principles:

- “a) Creation of a House of Representatives for each of the two communities having competence in all communal affairs.*
- b) Creation of a representative institution having competence over questions of joint interest.*
- c) A governmental council presided over by the Governor with a Greek Cypriot majority.*
- d) Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security will remain within the competence of the Governor.”¹³*

The Spaak plan tried to transform some of the main points of Macmillan plan, in order to make it more attractive to the Greek side, according to the American wishes. The new plan did not mention anything about the involvement of either Turkey or Greece concerning the administration of the island. Another point that was closer to the Greek

¹¹ Foreign Relations of the United States: 1958-1960, Eastern Europe: Finland: Greece: Turkey, (Washington, 1993), part 2, vol. X, p. 635.

¹² For more concerning Spaak's visit see: K. Karamanlis, Archive: Facts and Papers, (Athens, 1994), vol. III, pp. 236-243.

stance was that, instead of the creation of two separate communal Houses, another common House was to be created for all the people of Cyprus, a clear attempt to strengthen the political unity of the island. As expected, the Turkish officials were so outraged with the proposals of the Secretary-General that M. Sarper, the Turkish representative at the NATO Council, personally attacked Spaak by stating that his plan was a knife in the back of Turkey.¹⁴ The British reaction, on the other hand, was more moderate, however it was clear that London was not prepared to abandon its plan and adopt Spaak's proposals. As a matter of fact, while the NATO Council was trying to find an acceptable settlement for the three concerned sides, the British administration in Cyprus continued its efforts to implement Macmillan's plan on the island. Therefore, on 1 October 1958, the Turkish representative in Cyprus officially resumed his duties, while Foot personally supervised the preparation of separate electoral rolls, and a three-man commission arrived on the island to examine the question of establishing separate Turkish municipalities.¹⁵ The British attitude outraged Grivas and gave the hard-liners inside the Ethnarchic Council the opportunity to demand more violent actions, as a sign of protest of the Greek Cypriot people against the British policy. As a result, October was one of the most violent months for the island since 1955. EOKA began a new series of sabotage actions against British targets; even attacking unarmed British civilians, while the British establishment reacted to the provocation with the same zeal and efficiency.¹⁶

In this negative climate for the final resolution of the Cypriot question, Athens decided, once again, to appeal to the United Nation in New York. At this particular time the United Nations was the only reliable hope for the Greek side, since no other method that Karamanlis and his associates had employed in order to jeopardize the realization of Macmillan's plan, had addressed the British determination to close the Cypriot question once and for all. The Commission dealt with the Greek appeal from 25 November until 4 December. Unlike every previous Greek appeal, when Athens had asked for the implementation of the principle of self determination in the island, this appeal was based upon the principle of independence. Therefore, a Greek resolution submitted at the 996th meeting of the First Committee invited the General Assembly to consider that "the

¹³ Discussion of Cyprus in N.A.T.O, Sept-Oct. 1958, Cmd.566, London, 1958, pp. 4-5.

¹⁴ K. Karamanlis, op. cit., vol. III, p. 244.

¹⁵ Keesing's, *ibid*.

¹⁶ For more concerning E.O.K.A's actions and the attitude of the British establishment during this particular period see: C. Foley, *Legacy and Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War*, (London, 1964), pp. 141-46. H. Foot, *A Start in Freedom*, (London, 1964), pp. 174-5.

political status and the future of Cyprus should mainly depend on the Cypriots" and invited:

*"the Government of the United Kingdom to assist the Cypriots towards instituting the status of independence, following a period of genuine and democratic self-government."*¹⁷

The resolution of the British side, on the other hand, called on the General Assembly to consider the Cypriot question, to invite the British government *"to continue its efforts to arrive"* at a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned, and to *"invite the other parties to co-operate to this end."*¹⁸ Last but not least, the Turkish resolution called on the General Assembly to recommend:

*"that the three Governments directly concerned resume and continue efforts in a spirit of co-operation with a view to reaching a friendly solution in the application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination according to the particular circumstances of Cyprus and its people, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter."*¹⁹

The main points of the discussions in the First Committee were, on the British side, that its government was prepared to commence negotiations with Greece and Turkey and the two communities in Cyprus for a provisional solution, which would not prejudice the final solution. The Greek delegation insisted on the independence of the island, and was ready to give all the necessary guarantees for the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot minority in the island. The Turkish side, on the other hand, tried to establish its proposals for the partition of the island by arguing that Cyprus was not a political entity but was divided into two distinct ethnic groups with different national loyalties. The Turkish delegation argued that the Turkish Cypriot community should not be treated as a minority but as a national entity, sharing equal political rights with the Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, Britain, Greece and Turkey were not the only countries that submitted resolutions to the first committee concerning the Cypriot question. Colombia, Belgium and Iran also submitted resolutions, which was not surprising, since the Cypriot question was an international issue of great interest and at the forefront of public concern. At the end, after many changes and modifications, the Iranian resolution was adopted by the

¹⁷ Gen. Ass, 13th Session, Agenda item 68, Annexes, Document A/4029, Resolution A/C. I/L. 222.

¹⁸ Gen. Ass, op. cit., 221.

¹⁹ Gen. Ass, op. cit., 223.

First Committee by 31 votes to 22, with 28 abstentions. The Iranian resolution, as adopted, reads as follows:

*"The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Cyprus,
Recalling its resolution 1013 (XI) of 26 February 1957,
Believing that a conference between the three Governments
directly concerned and representatives of the Cypriots at which
there would be discussion not only of the interim arrangements
for the administration of Cyprus but also of a final solution ,
with assistance if desired of Governments and personalities
acceptable to the interested parties, offers the best hope of
peaceful progress towards an agreed solution of the Cyprus
problem,
Considering that self-government and free institutions should
be developed in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots,
Urges that such a conference should be convened and that all
concerned should cooperate to ensure a successful outcome in
accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations."*²⁰

The Iranian resolution came closer to the British and Turkish views, therefore the two sides voted in favour of it while the Greek side voted against. However, it was clear that it would have been impossible for the Iranian resolution to attract the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, in order to be officially adopted by the United Nations. Once again the Cypriot question was faced with a diplomatic deadlock; however, this time secret diplomacy was destined to play a catalytic role in the final solution.

When the voting ended late at night, all the delegations gathered in a specially designed lounge outside the conference room. There, the Greek and Turkish sides had the opportunity to speak away from the microphones and isolated from the other delegations. Averof and Zorlu had an interesting dialogue that set the bases for the future developments of the Cypriot question. Zorlu approached Averof and congratulated him over his diplomatic struggle during the meeting. The rest of the dialogue went as follows:

²⁰ Gen. Ass., 13th Session, Agenda item 68, Annexes, Document A/4029.

-Averof: *"You won, therefore you can easily treat yourself to the luxury of congratulating me."*

-Zorlu: *"I came with a positive feeling to congratulate you because your speech was wonderful and your arguments exceptional. I did not come here to be insulted."*

-Averof: *"I apologize. I did not want to offend you. After all you were a difficult opponent and you gave an excellent battle. However, we both gave a battle by using dishonorable methods."*

-Zorlu: *"What do you mean?"*

-Averof: *"That our countries were enemies for important reasons and two great politicians succeeded in re-establishing friendly relations. [It is obvious that Averof refers to Venizelos and Attaturk and the dispute over Asia Minor]. That our nations are underdeveloped, they are both at the same dangerous crossroads, and we are cultivating the hate between our people because we do not want to co-operate over an issue that is simple and minor compared with other issues of the near or far past."*

-Zorlu: *"I agree with you. I am alarmed by the common threats to which we are exposed. [It is clear that the Turkish Foreign Minister refers to the Soviet threat] However, your failure to understand that Cyprus is a vital factor for Turkish security is the main obstacle to the beginning of negotiations."*

-Averof: *"We are aware of that, therefore we are ready to propose a de-militarized Cyprus."*

-Zorlu: *A de-militarized Cyprus means that when the British leave the island, it would be an easy prey for our enemies. In addition, you insist on the fact that in Cyprus there is a majority that surrounds a small minority. You refuse to accept the existence of two different communities."*

-Averof: *I can accept that, but you have to accept the fact that 80 is four times more than 20. [Averof speaks about the percentage of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot community.]"*

-Zorlu: *"I can accept that, therefore I propose tomorrow, after the end of the meeting to meet again alone in order to see if we can reach a common agreement."*²¹

As follows from the above dialogue, the two sides had a common understanding concerning the Cypriot question and were ready to co-operate regarding its final solution. However, what was the main reason that forced the two countries to put aside their deep historic differences and come closer concerning the Cypriot question?

On the one hand, the Greek side was ready to negotiate with the Turkish side for only one reason. Since 1955, Athens had avoided any direct negotiations with Ankara concerning the Cypriot question because this would mean accepting the Turkish right to be involved. However, after three years of fruitless negotiations with the British side, Athens found itself isolated before a unified Anglo-Turkish front. Therefore, the commencement of direct negotiations with Ankara was the last opportunity for Athens to infiltrate the unofficial Anglo-Turkish pact and prevent the catastrophic break up of the unity of the island. Turkey, on the other hand, was alarmed by the American speculations that Greece was ready to distance itself from NATO. However contradictory to the Turkish geostrategic interests in Cyprus, it was still not in Ankara's interest to see Greece keep its distance from NATO, even if this would have meant that Turkey's policy over Cyprus would have turned out to be a triumph. Turkey's interest in preserving the unity of the southeastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance was based on recent events in the Middle East, in particular Iraq. From the end of Second World War, Iraq remained firmly under the control of the Hashimite monarchy with clear pro-Western and pro-British orientations in the exercising of nation's foreign policy. However, the Iraqi governments of the post-war era had a limited base of support, mainly due to the failure of the establishment to introduce any social reforms. As a result of this, in July 1958, Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the regime in a bloody military coup, in which King Faysal II and Prince Abd al-Ilah were killed. As soon as the new dictator was established in power, he withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and established close ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern block states, reaching an agreement with the USSR for military and economic assistance.²² According to the new developments in the Middle East, Turkey was surrounded by hostile nations such as the Soviet Union, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt that were influencing the

²¹ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., pp. 135-36.

²² For more concerning the dramatic developments in Iraq during July 1958 and about Qasim's regime see: M. Farouk-Sluglett & P. Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, (London, 1990).

rest of the Arab world against Kemal's nation, due to the latter's close links with the West.²³ If Greece's relations with NATO were about to change, then Turkey was in danger of being totally surrounded by hostile nations, with no geographical links to its lifeline, the West. Additionally, once again, American involvement was crucial to the Greek-Turkish negotiations. During that time, the Turkish economy was at its lowest point since the end of the Second World War. In the first months of 1958 the black market of the Turkish lira had fallen by one third, while during the first months of the same year the credit of the Turkish Central Bank had expanded 4.2%.²⁴ Turkey asked the US for financial aid, and the latter had promised \$234 million. The only American term was that Turkey should show more flexibility concerning the Cypriot question.²⁵ On the other hand, the US promised Karamanlis greater assistance in military equipment in the event that Greece was ready to co-operate with Turkey and Britain over the Cypriot question. As a matter of fact, after the signature of the Zurich treaty Greece signed a deal in which the U.S would supply Greece with nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and training: the warheads, however,²⁶ would remain under American control. Macmillan's plan was not on the cards any more and the US had succeeded in preserving the unity of the southeastern flank of NATO at a reasonable price.

On the morning of 6 December, Averof and Zorlu met in the building of the United Nations. From the first moment, it appeared that Turkish side was prepared to abandon Macmillan's plan, and negotiate the plan for an independent Cyprus. However, Zorlu explained the Turkish position to his interlocutor. First of all, in order to achieve Cypriot independence the Greek and the Greek Cypriot leadership had to accept the establishment of one or two British military bases on the island. Such a development would be beneficial for both communities.²⁷ Another point that the Turkish Foreign Minister discussed was the nature of independence. Due to the existence of two communities in the island, issues such as education, religion, and legal disputes between members of the same community, should all be controlled separately by each

²³ Since the formation of modern Turkey and Kemal's endeavor to limit Islam within the Turkish framework, the Arab world accused Ankara of a high act of treason towards the sacred principles of the Koran. However, the close links that Ankara developed with the modern state of Israel after 1949 played a significant role in shaping the Arab mentality, as well. For more see: M.C, Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven, 1977).

²⁴ Department of State, Operations Coordinating Board Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey, (Washington, 1990).

²⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States: 1958-1960, Eastern Europe: Finland: Greece: Turkey, part 2, vol. X, pp. 747, 753. See also: B. O' Malley & I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion, (London, 1999), p. 70.

²⁶ B. O'Malley & I. Craig, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

²⁷ According to Zorlu, the British presence in the island would have guaranteed the peaceful co-existence of the two communities. On a theoretical level that was right, however future events, especially during

community. In addition, Zorlu proposed that in the main Cypriot cities the Greek and the Turkish communities should have the right to elect their own mayors. Zorlu also spoke about the establishment of one or two Turkish military bases in the island, however Averof opposed that. As the Greek Minister said, such a development would not have been accepted either by Athens or by the Ethnarchic Council, and he continued by saying that Greece could not be a threat to Turkey due to its small population, however he was ready to propose a de jure neutralization of Cyprus, following the Austrian model, under the supervision of NATO or even the United Nations. Averof continued by saying that he was ready to support his proposals concerning separate education and religion, but he had no choice than to oppose the administrative division inside the Cypriot cities, mainly due to the fact that such a scheme would set the foundations for the de facto and de jure partition of Cyprus after some years.²⁸ It was obvious that it would have been impossible for the two men to agree at such an early stage, therefore they ended the meeting by setting a new date, after a week, for the meeting of NATO Council in Paris. Despite the fact that the two men did not agree about almost anything, it was still a progressive step towards the final resolution of the Cypriot question. After all, one week was not such a long period compared with 80 years of fruitless negotiations, inflexible ideas, and opportunistic and irresponsible proposals.

As soon as Averof returned to Athens, he informed both Karamanlis and Makarios of his meeting with his Turkish counterpart. Both men were satisfied with the context of the meeting and Karamanlis instructed Averof to continue the discussions in Paris. The Greek and Turkish delegations met again in Paris on 16 December, where Averof and Zorlu began a new series of discussions. In Paris the Greek and Turkish Ministers found the opportunity to inform S. Lloyd, their British counterpart, about their discussions. The British side was satisfied by the approach of the two Ministers, and as Macmillan stated later on, London was prepared to accept any agreement reached by the Greeks and the Turks, even if it implied the transfer of sovereignty, provided that such an agreement satisfied and safeguarded the British military requirements.²⁹ With British approval, the two sides continued the discussions during 18-20 January 1959, again in Paris, in the course of a meeting connected with the European Common Market. These talks were described by the Hellenic News Agency as *"unusually long and cordial"* and with

the Turkish invasion in July 1974, showed that the British army had no the desire to be involved in a Greco-Turkish dispute as long as its presence on the island was to continue.

²⁸ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p.p. 139-145.

²⁹ Macmillan: House of Commons, February 19, 1959, vol. 600.

*"indications that some progress has been made during these meetings."*³⁰ After further diplomatic negotiations and endless diplomatic tricks from both sides, it was announced, on 5 February, that the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers had started negotiations in Zurich, with a view to finding a bilateral solution to the island's problems. The discussions were held in Dodler Hotel, a few kilometres outside the Swiss capital, and lasted for 6 days. Despite the great obstacles that appeared during the talks, from both sides, finally the two delegations reached a common agreement and issued a common statement that said:

*"the question of Cyprus was discussed at length in a spirit of mutual understanding. A compromise agreement was finally reached, in spite of considerable difficulties which this problems presents. The cause of the unity and welfare of Cyprus emerges victorious."*³¹

After the discussions, Averof and Zorlu flew to London in order to inform the British side about the precise terms of the agreement. However, the problems for the Greek side were not over yet. The Turkish government had the luxury of total control of the Cypriot question, however Athens had to persuade the Greek Cypriot leadership and in particular Makarios. As soon as Karamanlis returned back to Athens, on the night of 11 February, he invited Makarios to a meeting in order to inform him personally about what had been agreed in Zurich. Makarios was satisfied with the final agreement, and asked Karamanlis only to negotiate about the territory to be given to Britain for military bases.³² After Makarios' agreement the path was wide open for the final signature of the Zurich agreement, an historic event that was to take place in London. On 17 February, the negotiations in London began with the arrival of Makarios and Kutluk, the Turkish Cypriot leader. However, the same night a new problem appeared backstage. Inside the Greek embassy building in Park Lane, the Greek and Greek Cypriot delegations met in order to co-ordinate their actions and adopt a common line. However, as is apparent from the conversation between Karamanlis and Makarios, the latter hesitated to give his final approval to the Zurich agreement. The following dialogue followed between an outraged Greek Premier and a puzzled Archbishop.

-Karamanlis: *"How it is possible, at this point to have objections, since in Greece you agreed to accept the British*

³⁰ Keesing's: February 14-21 1959, p. 16644.

³¹ *ibid.*

³² E. Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

proposal and come in London in order to speak about the Zurich agreement?

-Makarios: "You are right. But my conscience is not allowing me to accept further responsibilities.

-Karamanlis [addressed to the rest of the people that were witnessing the scene]: "In order not to embarrass Greece I will participate in the meeting, whatever Makarios will decide. But from this point I terminate the Cypriot policy of the Greek government. If Makarios wants to continue the struggle, then he has to find another supporter."'³³

Once again the Cypriot question was at a turning point, however the crisis this time was deeper, because all the conflicting sides had exposed themselves at international level by admitting the fact that a solution was closer than ever. Therefore, why had Makarios changed his mind? The answer comes from two directions, the Archbishop's psychological profile and the role of MI6. Without any doubt, Makarios was a gifted political leader with great abilities and enormous popularity among his compatriots. At this particular moment, no one inside the Ethnarchic Council could question his authority, therefore the view that Makarios refused to recognise the Zurich agreement under the pressure of the hard-liners inside the Ethnarchic Council is simply not valid.³⁴ Makarios' first preoccupation was his position in history after his death. His education, concerning the greatness of the Byzantine Empire and the heroic figures of the War of Independence of 1821, his nationalist political ideas and his belief that the Great Idea, the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire, was not a distant dream, and his determination to preserve his popularity in Cyprus, all made Makarios hesitate at the final moment to put his signature to a paper that would literally have recognized the end of the Enosis movement. However, Makarios' reaction outraged not only the Greek delegation but also the Greek Cypriots. They were aware that London was the last chance Cyprus had, in order to remain unified, and on the other hand they were alarmed by Karamanlis' threat to stop any activity concerning the Cypriot question. So, the other members of the Greek Cypriot delegation applied considerable pressure on Makarios, and even suggested that he should resign rather than renounce the Zurich agreement.³⁵ However, an ambitious person such as Makarios was not able to withdraw from the front

³³ N. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 370. See also Keesing's: ibid.

³⁴ For more concerning this view see: N. Fotopoulos, The Great Defeat in Zurich and London, (Monthly Review of Political History, Athens, November 1984).

³⁵ E. Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 208.

line of public life, therefore on 19 February, he informed the other delegations that he was prepared to recognize the Zurich agreement after "*a night's prayer and reflection on the agonizing dilemma*" which faced him.³⁶ Another explanation concerning Makarios' change of mind comes from the Intelligence writer Nigel West (the pen-name of the former MP Rupert Allason). According to West the Cypriot Archbishop was blackmailed by British security services. Makarios was threatened by MI6 with disclosure of his alleged homosexuality unless he recognised the validity of the agreements.³⁷ Sir Dick White, head of MI6 at that time, claimed in his biography that this particular blackmail was used to secure Makarios' agreement to Britain retaining two sovereign bases.³⁸ No matter which of the above theories approach the truth, Makarios changed his attitude. On the same day, the agreements were signed by all the delegations. One and a half year later, on 16 August 1960, British control over Cyprus ended and the island was declared an independent nation.

Nevertheless, what was the Zurich-London agreement? The first part of the agreement reached by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in the Swiss capital set down the basic structure of the state of Cyprus. According to this part, Cyprus was to be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish, elected by the island's Greek and Turkish communities respectively. The President and the Vice-President were to be invested by the House of Representatives, in which they were to take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. Executive authority was to be exercised by the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they were to have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers.³⁹ This Council would adopt decisions by absolute majority. Legislative powers would be vested in the House of Representatives and in the two Communal Chambers, one for each community. The House of Representatives would be elected every five years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community. This House would have authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. The House of Representatives would decide by a simple majority of the members present, but any law modifying the electoral law or

³⁶ Keesing's: *ibid.*

³⁷ At this point it is essential to point out that West's theory cannot be supported by primary sources, therefore in a sense it is problematic. However, I consider that is the duty of the researcher to provide all existing evidence in order to support the academic objectivity of the thesis. N. West, *The Friends*, (London, 1988), p. 75.

³⁸ T. Bower, *The Perfect English Spy*, (London, 1995), p. 231.

³⁹ It was stated that one of the main ministries foreign affairs, defence or finance should be entrusted to a Turk.

relating to the municipalities or imposing duties and taxes, would require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House. Two separate chambers would exist, one for each community. These Communal Chambers would have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision. In addition they would exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status. Their authority would also be extended to interests and institutions of a purely communal nature. Finally, the Communal Chambers would have authority in matters indicated by municipalities which were composed of one community only. There would be a Supreme Constitutional Court with competence over conflicts of authority [between the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers] and on questions of discrimination. This Court would be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral president appointed jointly by the President and the Vice President. There would also be a High Court of Justice, composed of two Greeks, one Turk and a neutral president (appointed jointly by the President and Vice President), who would have two votes. This Court would be the highest organ of the judicature, dealing with appointments, promotions of judges, etc. Civil disputes in which both the plaintiff and the defendant were from the same community, or disputes relating to questions of personal status and to religious matters, would be tried by tribunals composed of judges belonging to the same community. If the plaintiff and defendant were from different communities, the composition of the tribunal would be mixed and would be determined by the High Court of Justice.

A very interesting feature concerned the checks and balances provided for in the Agreement between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary, and also between the President and the Vice President. Firstly, the President and the Vice-President separately and conjointly would have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs. An exception to this rule would be the participation of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which both Greece and Turkey were participants. Also subject to veto would be all important questions relating to defence and security, expressly defined. According to the agreement such questions were:

“a) the composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.

b) appointments and promotion.

c) imports of warlike stores and all kinds of explosives.

d)the granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries."

Security questions were:

"a)appointments and promotions.

b)the allocation and stationing of forces.

c)emergency measures and martial law.

d)Police laws."

Secondly, it was previously pointed out that the House of Representatives would adopt decisions by a simple majority of the members present. However, the President and the Vice-President separately and conjointly would have the right to return (within 15 days) all laws and decisions to the House for reconsideration. If the House maintained its decision, then the President and the Vice President would promulgate the law or decision in question. In addition, if the President or the Vice President considered a law or decision of the House to be discriminatory against either of the two communities, they could appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which could annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The rights of the President and the Vice President to return a law to the House for reconsideration or appeal to the Constitutional Court, would also be valid in the case of the budget. Thirdly, as shown above, the Council of Ministers (with seven Greek and three Turkish members) would adopt decisions by absolute majority. But the President and the Vice-President would have the right of final veto over all main decisions, concerning foreign affairs, defence, and security. In addition, they would have the right to return the decisions of the Council for reconsideration under the same conditions as those mentioned above for decisions of the House of Representatives. In addition, the Civil Service would employ the ratio of 70 per cent Greeks to 30 per cent Turks. Attempts would be made to apply this ratio to all grades of the Civil Service. One of the heads of the armed forces, the police and the gendarmerie would be Turkish, and the head and the deputy head would belong to different communities. The state of Cyprus would have an army of 2,000 men, 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish. There would also be a security force of 2,000, of which 70 per cent would be Greek and 30 per cent Turkish. Separate municipalities would be established in the five main towns of the island, but in each of these towns a co-ordinating body would be created for matters requiring joint action. The Constitution could only be revised by a majority, comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives. However, the basic articles could not be modified.

The second part of the agreement set down the international status of Cyprus. A treaty between the Republic of Cyprus and Britain, Greece and Turkey was included in the Zurich-London Agreement: it was called the Treaty of Guarantee. According to article 1 of this treaty, the state of Cyprus undertook to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It also set out that the new-born Republic would not participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever. This was intended to prohibit any attempt at Enosis or Taxim (partition, in Turkish). Article 2 laid down that, Britain, Greece and Turkey would recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution. They also undertook to prohibit any activity promoting Enosis or Taxim. Article 3 of the Treaty declared that in the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey could undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. If common action proved to be impossible, each of three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty. Besides the Treaty of Guarantee, a Treaty of Alliance was concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Under this Treaty, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were to co-operate for their common defence, and the High Contracting Powers undertook to resist any attack or aggression against Cyprus. In order to fulfill these undertakings, a Tripartite Headquarters was to be established on the island's territory Greece having 950 officers and Turkey 650 officers. The President and the Vice-President of Cyprus, acting in agreement, could ask for the increase or reduction of these contingents. Last but not least, under the Zurich-London agreement the British government undertook to transfer sovereignty over the island to the Republic of Cyprus, with the exception of two areas, namely, a) Akrotiri-Episkopi-Paramali, and b) Dhokelia-Pergamos-Agios Nikolaos-Xylophagou, which were to be used by Britain as military bases. The State of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertook to respect and guarantee the integrity of these areas retained under British sovereignty.⁴⁰

The finalization of the Zurich-London agreement and its recognition by all the involved sides marked the end of the Cypriot question. In a paradoxical way, the Zurich-London agreement ended the British colonial era, however the British side

⁴⁰ For a full text of the Zurich-London Agreement see: Zurich-London Agreement, Final Documents, Cmd. 679, (London, 1959).

retained two military bases on the island. In that way, the British presence on the island was continued and legitimized. On the other hand, it ended the Enosis movement and the Turkish Cypriot demands for partition, nevertheless nationalism and ethnic divisions within the Cypriot framework were not eradicated. On the contrary, they were enlarged by the agreement itself. In the next and final chapter of this thesis I will give a full account of the Zurich-London agreement. However, at this point I would like to point out that it was an agreement that had been imposed on the Cypriots by external actors (USA, Britain, Greece, Turkey) in the Cypriot question, whose main preoccupation was to stabilize the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, this did not necessarily mean the stabilization of the situation on Cyprus itself.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION: THE END OF THE CYPRIOT QUESTION THROUGH THE ZURICH-LONDON AGREEMENT

"Such were the events connected with the plague and the times were hard indeed, with men dying inside the city and the land outside being laid waste."

Thucydides, II: 53, 54.

The historic narrative appears to show that the Cypriot question, as it developed from 1878 until 1959, was the product of fervent nationalism, colonial inflexibility, secret diplomacy, and political immaturity. This conclusion will seek to assess the Enosis movement in Cyprus, the British, Greek and Turkish methods of dealing with the Cypriot question, as well as the American intervention and its role as an external factor of influence in the emergence of Cyprus as an independent entity. In other words, this conclusion will seek to assess the contribution of internal and external factors which influenced the course of the Cypriot question, in order to answer the basic question of this thesis: What were the factors that brought about the Zurich-London agreement and signalled the end of the Enosis movement in Cyprus? In addition, this chapter will assess the importance of the Zurich-London agreement and will answer the following questions: Which side benefited the most from the Zurich-London agreement and did the Zurich-London agreement have the capacity to last permanently?

At midnight on 15 August 1960, the Union Jack was lowered for the last time in the Government House of Nicosia. Colonialism was terminated and the Cypriot state

emerged from the ashes of the old regime like Phoenix, the mythological bird. However, despite the fact that British era was concluded on the island, the Enosis movement had nevertheless been defeated. In order to understand this fact it is essential to answer the following questions. What was the Enosis movement, and what was its main aim?

As mentioned in chapter II, the first signs of the Enosis movement in Cyprus appeared immediately after the commencement of the War of Independence (1821) in continental Greece. The emergence of Greek nationalism within the Cypriot framework was a combination of the Ottoman administration and the social and economic prosperity of the Christian population on the island, compared to the deeply conservative and backward Muslim community. The combination of the above factors set the basis for the spread of the Enosis movement on the island. The main aim of the Greek Cypriot nationalists was to liberate the island from the Ottoman yoke and then unify it with the metropolitan center of Hellenism, Athens. However, Cyprus failed to follow the course of the revolution in continental Greece, mainly because of the immediate Ottoman response, which resulted in the brutalities of 9/21 July 1821. By this, the Ottomans succeeded in keeping the outbreak of the revolution away from Cyprus, but at the same time traumatized the Greek Cypriot mentality and created a deep gap between the Christian and the Muslim communities, a psychological barrier that had not previously existed. The arrival of Britain in Cyprus during 1878 was welcomed by the Greek Cypriots as the final step towards the Enosis of the island with Greece. The end of the Ottoman era and the pro-Greek role that Britain played during the War of Independence and during the first period of the emergence of the Modern Greek state, convinced the Greek Cypriots that soon enough they would follow the fate of their compatriots in the Ionian islands, which were unified with Greece under the Treaty of London (March 1864). During the early period of the British administration in Cyprus, the Enosis movement gained considerable strength and became the main political demand of the Greek Cypriots. The British administration did nothing to regularize the situation. On the contrary, it encouraged and welcomed the ethnical division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in an attempt to establish itself in the island through the well-known policy of "divide and rule". Nevertheless, the British establishment failed to comprehend that the concept of Enosis was not a trend of the time but the main national aim of the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, London and the British governor of the island were alarmed when in 1931 the Greek Cypriots, for the first time since 1878, decided to adopt a violent approach in order to protest for the

cause of Enosis. It was the first sign that the Enosis movement was not only a theoretical club of prominent Greek Cypriot figures but an established reality in the hearts of the majority of the Cypriot population. The Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus became, during that period, the leading figure of the Enosis movement. Its economic prosperity, its double role as a religious as well as political body, and the British hesitation to limit its role in the social and political spectrum of the island, enabled the Church to stand in the front line of the Enosis movement and propagandize the cause to the Greek Cypriot masses. The upper Greek Cypriot class, soon enough, united its forces with the Church, therefore in 1899 the first Ethnarchic Council was established, adopting as its slogan "Enosis and nothing but Enosis". The pure nationalist character of the Ethnarchy as well as its social composition transformed the anti-colonial movement in Cyprus into a reactionary group with inflexible ideas concerning the Cypriot question. It is important to note here that the pure nationalist nature of the Ethnarchy, at the end of the 19th century and during the first decades of the 20th century, was in complete harmonization with the rise of nationalism in Greece. In 1841, 1858, 1866 and 1867, the Christian population in Crete revolted against the Ottomans, demanding Enosis with Greece, in 1878 the Greeks of Macedonia revolted against the Ottomans demanding Enosis with Greece, the flame of revolution soon enough spread in Thrace and in Epirus, while from 1912 until 1922, the Balkan peninsula and the Ionian coast of Asia Minor witnessed two Balkan wars and the arrival of the Greek army in Smyrna. Nevertheless, while after 1922 the situation was regularized in all the above regions, Cyprus still remained under British control and the Ethnarchic Council remained loyal to its nationalist nature and slogans for "*Enosis and nothing but Enosis*".

Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to show the catalytic role of the Enosis movement in the course of the Cypriot question. Without any doubt, the Enosis movement, as developed by the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy, was the major internal factor which influenced the Cypriot question and led it towards the Zurich-London agreement. However, in order to establish this verdict it is important to examine the policies of the Enosis movement throughout the Cypriot question.

From the end of the Second World War until the signature of the London-Zurich agreement, the Enosis movement maintained an inflexible stance that was characterized by political immaturity and fruitless nationalist romanticism, and resulted in the defeat of the Enosis cause and the establishment of the Zurich-London agreement in the island. The first signs of its negative role and influence can be seen in 1948. As mentioned in Chapter III, in 1948 the British side formed a Consultative Assembly for the

introduction of a constitution in Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriot Ethnarchy refused to participate and forced AKEL to withdraw from the negotiations, as well. By the inflexible position of the Ethnarchy, which demanded "*Enosis and nothing but Enosis*" and refused any negotiations with the British side, a golden opportunity was lost for the formation of a Greek-Cypriot administration that would have been able to manipulate the situation and apply pressure to London from within the Cypriot establishment. No one can deny that AKEL must also be blamed for lacking courage to withstand the pressure coming from the reactionary Ethnarchic circles. However it was the Ethnarchy, under the Enosis banner, that pulled the strings for the failure of the Consultative Assembly. Another great opportunity for the settlement of the Cypriot question, with advantageous terms for the Greek Cypriot side, was wasted during the talks between Harding and Makarios (1955-1956). Again, the British establishment seemed ready to propose a constitution with favourable terms for the Greek Cypriot side. Even if Harding's proposals were not as pro-Greek as the proposals of 1948, Makarios' refusal to accept them was a great mistake. However, as seen in chapter VII, Makarios' refusal had been imposed by the extreme Nationalists inside the Ethnarchic Council (Kyrenia clique and Grivas), a fact that was catalytic for the final outcome of the discussions and the arrest and exile of the Archbishop to the tropical island of Seychelles. Another negative contribution of the Ethnarchic Council to the Cypriot question was the considerable pressure applied to Papagos' government in order to persuade Athens to refer to the United Nations concerning the Cypriot question. As seen in chapter V, Papagos' decision to appeal to the United Nations gave Turkey the opportunity, for the first time at an international level, to express her views and plans concerning the Cypriot question and legitimize its claims and views for the fate of the island. Despite the fact that the Greek-Cypriot Ethnarchy was not the only actor responsible for the Greek appeal to the United Nations, she yet again managed to play a negative role in the course of the Cypriot question. Another negative contribution of the Ethnarchy was the formation of EOKA. As seen in chapter VI, EOKA became the military part of the Ethnarchy which aimed to organize a military resistance movement against the British establishment in Cyprus. Nevertheless, that was a unfortunate decision for the course of the Cypriot question. The Greek state declared, from the first moment, that she was not willing to support the Greek Cypriot endeavour either morally or economically. The Greek official line towards the Cypriot question was that a diplomatic solution should be reached through bipartite negotiations with London. In other words, Athens recognized only political pressure as an effective method of

resolving the Cypriot question and objected to a military confrontation with Britain. However, the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy ignored the suggestions of the Athenian government and persisted in her decision to form a guerilla group to challenge the British presence in the island. However, at this particular period the British military presence in Cyprus was strengthened due to the evacuation of the military base in Suez and the transfer of the Middle East Land Forces and Middle East Air Forces to Cyprus. Therefore, EOKA due to its small number and limited military capacity, was not able to threaten the British presence in the island in an effective way. The majority of Greek analysts suggest¹ that one of the main successes of EOKA was that it forced London to spend a vast amount of money in order to face its guerilla resistance. As a matter of fact, from 1955 until 1959, London's expenditure for military purposes in Cyprus touched \$60 million yearly.² Nevertheless, those who suggest that this was a great success for EOKA simply fail to comprehend the whole picture of the Cypriot question. As mentioned in chapter VI, the British Intelligence managed to manipulate the appearance of EOKA for its own interests in Cyprus. Until 1955, London had to face a unified anti-colonial front in Cyprus, composed of the Church, right-wingers and the Communist Greek Cypriots. As was analytically presented in this thesis, until 1955 AKEL was in the front line of the Enosis movement, and due to its great influence over the Greek Cypriot masses its anti-colonial dynamism and action was catalytic for the Cypriot question. However, immediately after the appearance of EOKA, AKEL, voluntarily, assumed a negative stance towards the Enosis movement and EOKA in particular.³ By allowing EOKA's formation and establishment in Cyprus, the British Intelligence finally succeeded in jeopardizing the Enosis unified front and limiting the anti-colonial action of AKEL. At the same time, EOKA gave the British establishment a brilliant excuse to intensify and legitimize its policy of divide and rule in Cyprus. The appearance of EOKA alarmed the Turkish Cypriot community which responded with the formation of VOLCAN, a secret guerilla organization that sought to protect the Turkish community from EOKA's attackss, while the British establishment took the opportunity, using EOKA as an excuse, to transform the Cypriot police into an almost exclusively Turkish Cypriot group.⁴ The social unrest created in Cyprus after the

¹ For more concerning the above view see, M. Moutsaras, The Legacy of EOKA in Cyprus, (Monthly Review of Political History, Athens, January 1987), pp. 92-99.

² A.J. Meyer, The Economy of Cyprus, (Harvard, 1962), p. 16.

³ General Grivas, EOKA's leader, was a fervent anti-Communist and a figure of hatred for AKEL mainly because of its leading role with the Royal Forces during the Greek Civil War.

⁴ According to a survey held by the Government of Cyprus (July 1958) the racial composition of the Police Force was:

appearance of EOKA, was another positive fact for London. As was analytically explained throughout this thesis, London, in order to justify its Cypriot policy to the international community, argued that the British presence in Cyprus was the only factor of security that could prevent the outbreak of a civil war. EOKA succeeded in giving credence to the British argument and gave London the moral and practical opportunity to present itself as the guardian of stability on the island. All the above suggest that the contribution of EOKA to the Cypriot question was only negative. It managed to jeopardize the unified Enosis front, greatly polarized the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island, and greatly assisted the British side in manipulating developments concerning the Cypriot question for its own geostrategic benefits. Unfortunately, EOKA's main contribution to the Cypriot question can be found in the following table of the casualties caused by Grivas' fighters from 1 April until December 1958⁵, of which surprisingly enough the Greek Cypriots, most of them left-wingers, are the majority:

1955	British (12)	Greek-Cypriots (12)	Turkish-Cypriots (0)
1956	British (81)	Greek-Cypriots (115)	Turkish-Cypriots (12)
1957	British (10)	Greek-Cypriots (21)	Turkish-Cypriots (3)
1958	British (40)	Greek-Cypriots (74)	Turkish-Cypriots (15)

The final judgment of Enosis' contribution to the Cypriot question follows the conclusive outcome of the Zurich-London agreement, which signalled the end of the British dominance in Cyprus. On 1 March 1959, Makarios, from the Archbishopric Palace of Nicosia told thousands of Greek Cypriots who came to welcome him back to the island after 3 years of exile: "*People of Cyprus, we won*" ⁶ However, how can anybody claim that the Zurich-London agreement was a victory of the Enosis movement, since its established aim was "Enosis and nothing but Enosis"? The Zurich-London agreement was the gravestone upon the Enosis idea, a clear and sound proof that the actions and policies of the Enosis movement were based upon unrealistic ideas and unfortunate methods. The Enosis movement was established upon policies that failed to comprehend political developments in the rest of the world and to associate

Auxiliary Police and Special Constables	Greeks	Turks
	70	1,700
The Mobile Reserve	-	542

⁵ The Official Archives of the Republic of Cyprus, Casualty list 1955-1958, box 3, ser. II, col. 47-51.

⁶ N. Kranidiotis, Difficult Years, (Athens, 1981), p. 386.

them with the Cypriot question; remained stubbornly attached to ideas and doctrines that belonged to another era; and was represented by figures, such as Makarios and Grivas, who, instead of working patiently towards the accomplishment of Enosis by analyzing the facts and adopting feasible policies, behaved with great irresponsibility and opportunistic romanticism, refusing to see reality, and living inside an imaginary world of nationalist bravado and so-called historic duty towards the principles of Hellenism. What would have been the fate of Cyprus if the Enosis movement had adopted realistic policies according to the spirit of the era? What would have been the fate of Cyprus if the Enosis movement had not decided to make use of Grivas' military calibre? What would have been the fate of Cyprus if the Enosis movement had applied political pressure to the British side and waited passionately for the moment that Cyprus was no longer useful to London? It would be a great methodological mistake to make any attempt to answer the above hypothetical questions, nevertheless the overall conclusion of this thesis is that the Enosis movement in Cyprus failed to represent successfully the demand of the Greek Cypriot people for Enosis with Greece, and its dynamism proved to be self-destructive for the objective of Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, since its attitude led the Cypriot question to the Zurich-London agreement.

In addition, the Zurich-London agreement was not merely a product of the Enosis movement in Cyprus. On the contrary, the Cypriot fate had been influenced by the role of external factors as well. In order to support this, it is important to review the policies of Britain, Greece, Turkey and the USA towards the Cypriot question. The British policy towards that question can be divided into two periods. During the first period (1878-1939), British policy was influenced by London's commitment to establish itself on the island by effecting its administrative and economic transformation, but at the same time London used Cyprus as a post in order to safeguard its naval superiority in the Mediterranean, as a power base in order to protect the trade routes of her Asian colonies, and as a diplomatic card in order to safeguard her alliance with either Greece or Turkey.⁷ However, after the end of the Second World War, London began to approach Cyprus with another point of view. After the end of the Second World War the demise of the British Empire began, and Britain had to accept a secondary role in the global confrontation of the two superpowers, the USA. and the USSR. The Jewel of the Empire, India, gained its independence, the British forces withdrew from Suez, and British influence in the Middle East was threatened by the emergence of Arab

nationalism and Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Cyprus, after the Second World War and until 1957, held a special place in the British "super-ego". A Freudian analysis would have showed that during that time Britain was in the stage of recovering from the "post-Imperial trauma". The demise of the British empire; the social and economic wounds from the Second World War; and the secondary role that the nation had to play in the Cold War era, compared to the USA and USSR, after centuries of political and military superiority in the global spectrum: all those factors deeply scarred the British mentality and lacerated the pride of its citizens. Despite the fact that the demise of the Empire did not have the same traumatic effect on the British public as for example in France⁸, Cyprus was still the last British holding in the Eastern Mediterranean, the remnant of an era that had lapsed, the last emblem of the Imperial past destined to remind the British people of their glorious history. Therefore, because Cyprus held such great psychological importance, quite often, as was presented in this thesis, London's attitude towards the Cypriot question derived from the heart and not from the head. Hopkinson's "never" concerning the independence of Cyprus, and Makarios' arrest and exile were cases that can justify the above argument. However, Cyprus did not only have sentimental value for London. It was also used quite successfully by the Foreign Office in order to strengthen the political bonds between London and Ankara. On 21 February 1947, the British ambassador to the United States informed the State Department that London would no longer provide economic aid to Greece, and that the British army, which was assisting the Royal side against the Communist guerillas, would pull out by the end of March.⁹ This decision of the Labour government was the turning point for Anglo-Greek relations. Since the formation of the modern Greek state, the diplomatic relations between London and Greece had been extremely close. However, after 1947 and the introduction of the Truman doctrine in

⁷ Characteristically, Britain used Cyprus in order to prevent Turkey from entering the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, while it was promised to Greece as a "gift" in the event that the latter were to abandon her neutral policy during the First World War and join the Entente.

⁸ The violent de-colonization of the French colonies deeply polarised the French society and was one of the main reasons for the student and labour uprising during May 1968. According to J. Lawrence, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, (London, 1998), pp. 588-89: "...the Algerian war brought about the downfall of the Fourth Republic in 1958, a large-scale mutiny by the French army in 1961, tumults in Paris, and a spate of terrorist outrages undertaken by the Algerian settlers movement, the OAS (Organisation Armee Secrete) during 1961-62. Portugal's farewell to empire was equally turbulent and bloody: between 1960 and 1976 135,000 Portuguese troops were deployed against nationalist partisans in Mozambique and Angola. There were also repercussions at home with a revolution which over-threw the right-wing regime of President Caetano in April 1974. Within a month of Belgium granting independence to the Congo (Zaire) in June 1960, the new state had disintegrated into anarchy and civil war with massacres of white settlers." For more concerning this issue see: S. Litsas, *The End of the Colonial Era: A comparative analysis of Britain and France*, (Hellenic Institute of Politics, Athens 2000), vol. XXV, pp. 14-19.

⁹ Foreign Office Papers, F.O to Washington, 21-2-1947, 371/67032 R:1900

Greece, Anglo-Greek relations loosened and Greece, from a British "protectorate", became an American power-base in the Balkans. However, the same thing did not happen with Ankara. After the end of the First World War Anglo-Turkish relations passed a crisis. However, after 1945 the two sides forgot the past and strengthened their diplomatic relations. Turkey was for Britain the most valuable ally in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turkish geostrategic place in the Middle East, close to the oil-producing Arab states, and its prestigious place in the Baghdad Pact, where Britain held the leading role, made London consider Ankara a valuable asset for the protection of her economic and military interests in the Middle East. Therefore, Britain used Cyprus, an island of great geostrategic interest to the Turkish defence structure, in a way that strengthened the diplomatic bonds between the two nations by opposing the Enosis demands of the Greek Cypriots and preserving the island's neutrality towards the Greco-Turkish antagonism in the Eastern Mediterranean. As was presented throughout this thesis, Britain placed Turkey in the centre of the Cypriot issue, even if according to the Lausanne Treaty the latter had no right of claim upon the island. No matter what moral accusations Britain faces concerning this decision, it was a brilliant diplomatic move that aimed to reinforce her relations with Ankara, and on the other hand to discourage the appeals of Athens for bipartite talks concerning the finding of a common settlement for Cyprus. However, Britain has a great moral and political responsibility for introducing the idea of partition. This idea, as introduced by Lennox-Boyd and legitimized by Macmillan's plan, was a British attempt to find a permanent solution for the Cypriot question that could please Ankara, at a time when London wanted to spare herself from the perplexities of the Cypriot question. After 1957, the British attitude towards Cyprus changed and the British desire was to get out of the Cypriot labyrinth. It is important to remember here that the end of National Service, the substantial cuts in defence spending, and the manufacture of the H-bomb, made Britain re-consider her position towards her colonies and their geostrategic importance and hasten the process of de-colonizing Cyprus. However, the idea of partition was irresponsible, since Greeks and Turks were living together all over the island in mixed villages, and the development of such a scheme would have led to a long and destructive civil war that could also have affected military relations between Athens and Ankara. In general, I strongly disagree with the view of many Greek and Greek Cypriot analysts, who accuse Britain over her attitude towards the Cypriot question. I firmly accept the view that every country has to pull every available string in order to promote and protect her interests. Nonetheless, I oppose the introduction of the idea of partition, which became established in the

Turkish-Cypriot mentality, was perilous for the fragile unity of the island, and was fully realized by the Turkish army during July-August 1974. I will not attempt to answer the hypothetical question of whether Ankara would still have aimed to partition the island with or without the introduction of the aforementioned idea by the British side. However, I do believe that Lennox-Boyd was the spiritual godfather of the present partitioned Cyprus. Nevertheless, as contradictory as it sounds, the idea of partition assisted the arrival of the Zurich-London agreement, which signalled the final resolution of the Cypriot question. Greece and the Greek Cypriots, alarmed at the possibility of a partitioned Cyprus, were forced to re-consider their stance, while the American side intervened in a catalytic way in order to block the implementation of the idea of partition in the island.

The Cypriot question is still taboo in Greece. Only popular singers and left-wing intellectuals tend to speak about it in great detail, attacking the previous Greek governments concerned because of their attitude towards the Greek-Cypriot demands for Enosis, and for signing the Zurich-London agreement. However, their philosophical approaches fail to comprehend the perplexities of the subject. All Greek governments from 1878 until 1959 tried to maintain a moderate attitude towards the Cypriot question, mainly because of the fact that Cyprus was a secondary issue compared to others, such as the Macedonian issue, the unification of Crete, the Dodecanese question, the Ionian question, the Greek minority in Constantinople, the defeat of Greek Communism, the social and economic problems that the country faced after the end of the Greek Civil War, the admission of the country to the North Atlantic Treaty organization and the new responsibilities that followed for Greece in the Cold War era. It is a fact that since the formation of the modern Greek state, Cyprus has held a moral value for Greece, but its geostrategic importance for Athens was small in comparison to other territories containing a large Greek population which were still outside the Greek framework (Macedonia, Crete). The reason for this attitude can be justified by the geographical position of Cyprus. The island is very close to the Turkish coast but at the same time far from continental Greece, therefore it was not included in the immediate political and military plans of the Greek officials for the enlargement of the nation. Another reason for the lack of interest of Athens towards Cyprus was the fact that the island was under British control. Due to the close links of Athens with London, at least until 1947, the former did not want to upset her closest ally and champion and hoped that one day Cyprus would be granted to Greece as had happened with the Ionian islands and the Dodecanese. The only grave mistake that a Greek government committed during the

early period of the Cypriot question was in 1915, when London offered Cyprus to Greece on condition that the latter joined the Entente. Zaimis' government refused the offer and a golden opportunity was lost for the Greek side to gain Cyprus, an historic irony, since two years later Greece finally joined the Entente but the British offer had lapsed. The post-Second World War Greek governments remained loyal to the moderate policy of Athens towards the Cypriot question, but they were often embarrassed by the reactions of their Cypriot compatriots and by the attitude of the opposition parties. During the final and most important stage of the Cypriot question (1950-1959), Papagos' and Karamanlis' governments tried to negotiate with London for the final resolution of the Cypriot question, but they had to face the irresponsibility of the Greek-Cypriot leadership and the political opportunism of the opposition parties. The Liberals and EDA sabotaged any attempt of Athens to work towards the finding of a satisfactory settlement with London for the Cypriot question, by creating a deep social and political instability in the country and by antagonizing the Greek Cypriot Ethnarchy with unrealistic nationalist slogans. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties it has to be said that both Papagos' and Karamanlis' governments, especially the latter, moved quite successfully through the perplexities of the issue and the final outcome of the Cypriot question was the best result that could feasibly have been achieved, both for Cyprus and for Greece. A large number of Greek scholars¹⁰ accuse Athens of causing the demise of the Greek minority in Constantinople, and for the defeat of the Enosis movement in Cyprus by signing the Zurich-London agreement. However, as is argued in this thesis, in both cases Athens had no responsibility whatsoever. The Greek minority in Constantinople was attacked during the Tripartite Conference in London and it was a Turkish official plot to put a violent end to the negotiations. If some argue that a refusal of Athens to attend the Conference would have protected the Greeks in Constantinople, then they simply fail to understand the puzzle of the Cypriot question. Athens could not have refused to attend the Conference, since in that period EOKA made its appearance in Cyprus and Athens, by its presence in the Conference, wished to disprove British accusations that it was assisting Grivas' guerillas. Additionally, even if I accept the view that the Greeks in Constantinople would not have been harmed by the Turkish mob had Greece not participated in the Conference, I cannot accept the fact that Ankara would not have reacted in the same way towards a similar situation in the future. The Zurich-London agreement, on the other hand, was not the best settlement either for

¹⁰ For more concerning the above views see: T. Tsekouras, The Death of Hellenism in the City, (Larissa, 1988), pp. 245-59. See also: E. Annaniadis, Turkey and Minority Issues: The Armenians, Greeks and

Cyprus or Greece. The aim of Enosis had to be forgotten forever, while the Turks gained considerable political rights relative to their numerical composition inside the Cypriot framework. However, the question that must be answered is, what would have happened had Athens not worked towards the realization of the Zurich-London agreement? The immediate response to this question is that Macmillan's plan would have been introduced in the island and would have authorized the *de facto* and *de jure* partition of Cyprus, a development that would have resulted in the out-break of a Civil War between the two communities and a possible Greco-Turkish war, as well. I entirely accept the fact that the Zurich-London agreement was a negative development for the Cypriot question, from the Greek perspective, but I also support the view that it was the only possible solution offering the least harm, compared to Macmillan's plan, to both Athens and Nicosia. In many cases in diplomacy, the "least harm" is much better than the theoretical and vague "best". Karamanlis had the political maturity to accept the above rule and deny the calls of the nationalist Sirens, who were thirsty for more blood and destruction.

The Turkish attitude towards the Cypriot question can also be divided into two parts. In the first part (1878-1955), Turkey seemed completely disinterested in Cyprus and the Muslim population there. From 1878 until 1920 the declining Ottoman Empire had neither the power nor the will to deal with Cyprus. According to the Sultan, Cyprus belonged to Britain, while the Ottoman defeat in the First World War and the occupation of the country by the forces of the Entente (Britain-France-Italy-Greece) posed more important issues for the officials in Constantinople than dealing with the island. The Turkish apathy towards Cyprus continued with the rise of Kemal to power and the emergence of the modern state of Turkey. Catalytic factors for this attitude were the Treaty of Lausanne, and the foreign policy of the Kemalist movement. According to the Lausanne Treaty Turkey abandoned every right upon the ex-Ottoman dominions that remained outside the new Turkish borders, as set by the Treaty. On the other hand, Kemal's policies set a new framework for the new state. The Ottoman expansionism in the Balkans and the Middle East was abandoned and great concentration was given to the internal affairs of the state, such as the strengthening of the new regime, the creation of a racially pure Turkey by the extirpation of the ethnic minorities [Armenians, Greeks, Kurdish], and the limitation of Islam's influence by the

secularization of the state.¹¹ The same attitude towards Cyprus continued after the end of the Second World War, however, this state of apathy came to an end after 1955, for various reasons. The most important was the new geostrategic plans adopted by Ankara because of the new global political reality, the Cold War. Traditionally, the Ottoman and Turkish foreign line was influenced by the fear of Russian expansionism and by the lack of trust towards Greece. After the granting of the Dodecanese to Greece (1946) and the Soviet penetration in Middle Eastern affairs, Turkey felt she was surrounded by nations traditionally hostile to her existence. The Aegean Sea became a Greek lake, the Black Sea was under the Soviet shadow, while the Middle East began to turn her back to Ankara establishing close links with Moscow and the rest of the European communist states. Therefore, Ankara began to review her policies towards Cyprus, realizing that the island could have been used as a power-base in the Eastern Mediterranean, safeguarding an exit to the sea except the Straits. However, it must be noted here that Turkey never tried to question the British presence on the island. On the contrary, she seemed to be satisfied by the prospect of Cyprus remaining under British control, because London was Ankara's closest ally in the region and at the same time it meant that the Enosis question with Greece would have remained an unfulfilled dream. The main preoccupation for Ankara was not to regain Cyprus but to safeguard the island from Greece. Even though both Greece and Turkey belonged to NATO, the antagonism between the two states was still great and a short-or long-scale war could not have been ignored as an standing possibility. For that reason, Turkey strongly opposed the possibility of Cypriot unification with Greece, because in the case of war Cyprus would have been used by Greece as the first and main line of attack against Turkish targets, together with the Dodecanese. A characteristic account of the Turkish policy concerning the Cypriot question comes from the American side. On 12 July 1956, Nixon briefed the National Security Council on his trip to the Far East. During the discussion he referred to his visit to Turkey:

"Apropos of his visit to Turkey, the vice-president said that he was amazed to find that the Turks had a positively pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister had even gone so far as to suggest that if Cyprus was joined to Greece, the Turks would go to war to prevent it... The reason for Turkish alarm over Cyprus, said the Vice President, was rather

¹¹ Kemal's policies can be compared to Stalin's policies concerning the strengthening of Bolshevism in the USSR, abandoning Lenin's and Trotsky's revolutionary expansionist ideals.

*the closeness of the island to the Turkish mainland than concern for the Turkish minority living on Cyprus."*¹²

With British encouragement and protection Ankara entered with great dynamism into the Cypriot question and played a catalytic role in the final outcome of it. As a researcher I have to declare my deepest admiration for the Turkish side, that managed to play her diplomatic cards in an excellent way and, finally, to sign the Zurich-London agreement, which gave her more rights upon Cyprus than even the most optimistic Turkish diplomat would have expected a few years earlier.

Last but not least, the Cypriot question was a source of great embarrassment for the American side. The three countries involved in the Cypriot question were closely linked with the United States, however they were crossing their swords at an international level, questioning the unity of the Atlantic Treaty. It is a common idea in Greece that the American side played an anti-Greek role. However, I object to that view. This thesis clearly shows that the American side maintained an extremely cautious attitude towards all the countries involved. The greatest concern of the State Department was to preserve the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty and avoid a possible Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus. Therefore, the American attitude varied according to the circumstances. While it clearly supported Britain and Turkey during the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, when Athens applied to the United Nations on Cyprus behalf, it also applied considerable pressure upon London to modify its inflexible position towards the Cypriot question when Karamanlis threatened that he was ready to withdraw Greece from NATO, and also pulled the strings for the liberation of Makarios from Seychelles. It has to be understood that Washington was anxious for the final resolution of the Cypriot question, no matter what this would have been, wishing the return of peace and tranquility in the southeastern flank of NATO. In general, the US was the *deus-ex-machina* of the Cypriot question. It watched the political and diplomatic developments of the issue with great attention but from a distance, ready to intervene and give solutions every time the plot of the Cypriot drama reached a deadlock.

As follows, the Zurich-London agreement resulted from a combination of internal and external factors influencing the Cypriot question. It was an attempt to resolve a situation that threatened both to de-stabilize peace and order in the Eastern Mediterranean and to discredit the unity of the southeastern flank of the Atlantic

¹² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957: Soviet Union: Eastern Mediterranean*, ed. by J.P. Glennon, (Washington, 1989), vol. XXIV, pp. 378-79.

Alliance in an international level. It signalled the end of colonialism as well as the termination of the Enosis movement in Cyprus. Both internal and external factors played their historic part in the course of the Cypriot question and influenced the final outcome of it, as expressed by the Zurich-London agreement. This thesis was based upon the research of primary sources, both Greek, British and American, while I also interviewed important personalities from Greece and Cyprus in an attempt to give a complete picture of the Cypriot question. It is important to note here, that I faced great difficulties in persuading people to talk about their experiences and conclusions concerning the Cypriot question. In many cases they seemed unsure whether they had to be absolutely honest, and in others they simply tried to enlarge their role and their position. For example, after a series of failed attempts I managed to persuade the ex-Greek Premier, Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis, to give me an interview. The interview was booked for late August 1999 and I arrived in his country villa in Akrotiri expecting an hour, the time that I had been given, of interesting discussion and important revelations. However, soon enough I discovered that the ex-Premier was more interested in his public image than serving historiography. During that period I was extremely concerned about EOKA's financial links with Greece, therefore one of my first questions was whether he knew of any important evident concerning this issue. His answer irritated and displeased me. *"Mr. Mitsotakis, I am glad that you ask me this question, because I have never revealed that I financed EOKA's struggle".*¹³ For obvious reasons I regarded this statement as preposterous, therefore I did not use it in my thesis. On this point it is essential to clarify that I did not have a set questionnaire for all the people that I interviewed. My questions varied according to the personality of my interlocutor, his position, and his role in the Cypriot question. Therefore, while my interview with the former secretary-general of KKE, Mr. Grigoris Farakos, was focused upon the Soviet factor and EDA, my interview with the ex-service brigadier of the 4th Armored Kilkis Brigade, Ioannis Tsiligrakis, was focused upon the sentiments and the role of the Greek army in the Cypriot question. For reasons that I mention in the Introduction, I did not make use of Turkish primary or secondary sources, however, whenever necessary I was assisted by the British and American archives. On occasions, I faced some problems due to the fact that the majority of the Greek archives concerning Cyprus are still closed, however I overcame this by using memoirs and diaries, as well as, interviews. I strongly believe that the writing of an historical thesis, whenever possible, should be based upon archives, memoirs, diaries, and interviews. It is

¹³ Personal interview with Mr. Mitsotakis, August 1999.

essential for the researcher to combine the information that derives from the primary sources with the evidence of key actors during interviews, in an attempt to link facts with empirical knowledge and observation. Only then can historic evidences be cross-examined and epistemological truth be approached, as much as possible. Only then can an historic thesis "*bring order out of chronological chaos, truth out of human accounts, and knowledge out of oblivious unawareness*", as the Ancient Greek historian Kalikratis the Corinthian urged his students in "Parabolas" [x, 67].

In the last part of the conclusion I will make a general evaluation of the Zurich-London agreement and I will answer the following questions: Which side benefited the most from the Zurich-London agreement? Did the Zurich-London agreement have the capacity to last permanently? First of all, as mentioned in chapter X, the Zurich-London agreement was the last opportunity for the Greek side to keep Cyprus unified. The agreement was the official recognition of the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side that the Enosis struggle had to come to an end, without achieving its goal. Without any doubt, the final agreement was a defeat for Greek diplomacy, but at the same time, according to the political climate surrounding the Cypriot question, it was the only available solution for Athens, in order to prevent the implementation of Macmillan's plan and the de facto partition of the island. Britain, on the other hand, accepted the transfer of sovereignty over Cyprus, however, it also preserved the continuation of its presence in Cyprus through the establishment of two military bases on the island. In addition, London managed not to be deeply involved with the Zurich-London agreement, leaving the stage to Turkey and Greece, a development that would have protected her international image in the event of failure of the agreement. With little effort, London managed to safeguard its geostrategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and at the same time end its costly engagement in Cyprus. Nevertheless, Turkey appeared to be the true winner. She succeeded in not allowing Cyprus to be unified with Greece, she improved her national image at an international level by playing a major role in the finding of the final solution about Cyprus; and at the same time she managed to improve her diplomatic relations with Greece, a vital nation for her political and military survival at this particular point.

Continuing with the second question, the main disadvantage of the agreement was that it was set up by the Greek and the Turkish governments in Zurich. Immediately afterwards, Britain agreed to it. It is important to note that the agreement had been reached between these three Governments in the total absence of the Cypriots. When the Greek and Turkish Cypriot delegations came to London, they were faced with the complete text of the Agreement and they had either to accept or reject it. They were not

given the opportunity to negotiate the text point by point. It may be assumed that Greece and Turkey represented the standpoints of the two communities at the Conference, but this was not the case. While it is a fact that the people of Cyprus are Greeks and Turks, it is also a fact that the governments in Athens and Ankara are not Cypriots. Therefore, the Zurich-London Agreement was formed by two nations outside the daily Cypriot reality, which could not understand, in spite of their national links with the inhabitants of the island, the political and sociological mentality of the two Cypriot communities as shaped by centuries of antagonistic co-existence. Greece, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Britain, behaved like 19th century colonial powers, shaping the future of the people of Cyprus without even asking them first. However, it can be claimed that there was not sufficient time for such a development and that Athens and Ankara had to move fast in order to close the Cypriot question. Nevertheless, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that both Greece and Turkey agreed in Zurich, taking into account their national interests and not the complexities of the Cypriot question, behaving like an immature child, who "tidies" his room by placing all his toys and clothes under his bed, instead of making a real effort to place them into the closet. The Zurich-London agreement was a solution that had been imposed upon the Cypriot people and, as was proven during the 60's, neither the Greek nor the Turkish communities felt the need to respect it, since for them it was something artificial and involved no contribution from them. It was a diplomatic effort that was less concentrated upon the re-establishment of peace and order on the island and more focused upon the disengagement of Athens, Ankara and London from the labyrinth of the Cypriot question. However, on the other hand, the Cypriot leadership is not without its responsibilities, as well. With its attitude during the past, both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leaderships proved to the international community, including Greece and Turkey, that they had neither the courage nor the patience to overcome their traditional differences and reach a common settlement. Both sides behaved as if the Cypriot question was the only diplomatic issue that Athens and Ankara had to deal with, and this attitude persuaded their metropolitan centres that they had neither the political maturity nor the desire to play a leading role towards the final solution of the Cypriot question.

In addition, the Zurich-London agreement did not succeed in distributing the powers in Cyprus fairly, according to the composition of the population. It was the first time in history, that 18% of the population had the same political powers and authority as the other 80%. The Turkish side succeeded in securing the representation of the Turkish Cypriots at the extraordinary levels of 30% in the island's public sector and 40% in the

army, while Turkish forces were to be stationed on the island. As N. Erim, the well-known Turkish academic, told the Turkish Press at the end of the London conference:

*"Cyprus did not return to Turkey. However, it is almost impossible to find another country in the world where such a small proportion of the population seized so many rights, as the Turkish Cypriots seized with the Zurich-London agreement."*¹⁴

It will not be an exaggeration to claim that the Zurich-London agreement was a Frankenstein of international diplomacy, an agreement that violated one of the basic principles of liberal international morality: the legitimate right of the majority to hold more power than the minority. If the verification of this argument is linked with the Greek and Greek Cypriot mentality, then future generations will realize why the Zurich-London Agreement was doomed to failure. Following the disaster of the Greek army in the Asia Minor campaign in 1922, and the violent eviction of the Greek population from the Ionian coasts by Kemal's army, the Greek people lost their trust in the Western Powers. With great simplicity and lack of true knowledge concerning the actual facts of the Asia Minor campaign, the Greek people held the powers of Entente exclusively responsible for the sound defeat of the Greek army in the Ionian coasts and the bankruptcy of the Great Idea. The years that followed did nothing to improve the situation. Despite the fact that Greece, from the early days of the Second World War, united its forces with Britain against the Axis power, London seemed to regard the Greek territory as its protectorate. Britain, together with the Ottoman Empire back in the War of Independence (1821-1830), was the only nation that bombarded Athens during the battle of December 1944 against the Greek Communist forces; while despite its promises during the Second World War it did not allow Cyprus to be unified with Greece, adopting a clear pro-Turkish position, especially after the appearance of EOKA in the Cypriot spectrum. The combination of all these factors gave the extreme nationalist circles inside the Greek establishment the opportunity to speak about another plot of the West against Greece, with the signature of the Zurich-London agreement. It is characteristic that as soon as the Zurich-London agreement became known to the Greek public, the secret organization inside the army, IDEA*, famous for its nationalist ideas, issued the following statement:

¹⁴ M. Drousiotis, *E.O.K.A: The Dark Side*, (Athens, 1998), p. 238.

* IDEA was a secret organization formed by young nationalist officers immediately after the end of the Second World War. Its members fought during the Civil War against the Communists and were loyal to the King but hostile towards the Greek political establishment, and their main aspiration was the abolition of democracy in Greece and the establishment of military rule, headed by the King, as in Metaxas' regime back in 1936.

"We, the protectors of the national frontiers and the defenders of the Hellenic values would like to re-assure all the true patriots that the Cypriot question cannot be closed with the signature of the treacherous Zurich-London agreement. Hellenes, Cyprus will be a part of our beloved country. Have faith in the bravery of the Greek Royal Army"¹⁵

Those prophetic words were intended to be realized with the establishment of the military junta in Greece of Papadopoulos, Patakos, and Ioannides, the spiritual leaders of IDEA, and the attempt to overthrow Makarios in 14 July 1974, a development that gave Turkey the right to invade Cyprus in order to protect the Zurich-London Agreement and led to the final partition of the island and the creation of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, unrecognized by the international community (except Turkey). As this thesis has demonstrated, the Cypriot question was an apotheosis of colonialism and nationalism, a problem that involved the Cypriot population, Britain, Greece, Turkey and the USA. It was a complicated issue that divided the Cypriots, worsened Anglo-Greek relations, brought Greece and Turkey close to a military confrontation and obliged the US to commit its forces in order to regularize the situation and pacify the island. The Zurich-London agreement officially closed the Cypriot question, a diplomatic thorn in the British side since 1878, allowing the Cypriot people to enjoy the right to independence. However, due to its context, the signature of the agreement was not the end of the Cypriot adventures but the opening of a new dramatic chapter for the history of the stormed-tossed island, the commencement of the Cypriot Odyssey destined to end in the port of oblivion, instead of Ithaca.

¹⁵ I.D.E.A statement to the Greek Press, Eleftheria, 22 February 1959.

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
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MAP I



Source Department of Land and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus

MAP III






Fig. 1: Distribution of Population according to the 1960 Census. Urban settlements (circles) and villages (squares) according to population. The communities: Turks in black, Greeks in white, others in grey. The majority of the Turkish population is scattered in mixed urban settlements and in villages situated on coastal and lowland regions.


MAP IV



Source: Department of Land and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus.



MAP V



Source: Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus

